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Abstract
This thesis investigates the sources, structure, and exercise of authority and 
influence in international policy-formation. It does this by examining two 
contemporaneous negotiations to harmonise securities firm capital adequacy standards, 
the European Union’s successful adoption of regional standards and the International 
Organization of Securities Commission’s failed effort to adopt international standards.
The thesis examines the accuracy of state and non-state centric hypotheses in 
explaining the outcomes of the negotiations. It also proposes a synthetic analysis of 
empirical findings, which identifies and assesses interactions between observations 
drawn from state and non-state centric approaches, to develop new perspectives on 
authority and influence in policy formation.
The thesis argues that international policy-making authority ultimately resided 
with state actors and institutions. Policy-making was informed by the interaction of state 
and non-state preferences. Rarely, however, were non-state preferences translated, 
unaltered, into policy. The case studies demonstrated that international policy-making 
authority and influence extended beyond state actors, but that states retained their 
autonomy and sovereignty in policy formation.1
This thesis finds that non-state-centric approaches are analytically superior to 
state-centric perspectives. But synthetic analysis of state and non-state centric empirical 
observations goes even further, to develop distinctive conclusions that cannot be derived 
by relying solely on discrete analytical perspectives. This is because it examines the 
process of policy-formation and the dynamic interaction of state and non-state 
observations. These conclusions encourage multi-variable, process-focused analysis.
The empirical analysis also qualifies the arguments of certain non-state centric 
perspectives. First, theorists’ conflation of authority and influence detracts from a 
nuanced assessment of influences on policy formation. Second, the analytical complexity 
of multiple-variable perspectives is justified by their superior analytical insights. Third,
1 This argument applies only to the US and EU member-states.
theorists’ argument that globalisation has transformed state authority is shown to be 
overdrawn. Fourth, predictions of international regulatory convergence also appear 
strained. Finally, the utility of EU integration perspectives in non-EU analyses is 
demonstrated.
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Glossary of Terms
“1992” and “1992 Initiative” 
AFBD
AIBD
AICPA
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Deutschen 
Wertpapierbdrsen
BAFT
The “Bank”
Basle Capital Accord 
(also “Capital Accord”)
Basle Committee
Bearer security
BIS
See: “Single Market”
Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers 
(UK). See SRO.
Association of International Bond Dealers. Renamed 
International Securities Market Association. The 
only international self-regulatory organisation in the 
UK. Recognised under the FSA as an SRO with 
responsibility for regulation and supervision o f the 
international and Euro bond markets.
American Institute o f Certified Public 
Accountants
The Federation o f German Stock Exchanges
Bankers Association for Foreign Trade (US 
banking trade organisation)
The Bank o f England, England’s central bank.
The Basle Capital Accord o f July 1988, sets 
down the agreement among the G-10 central 
banks to apply common minimum capital 
standards to their commercial banking industries, 
to be achieved by end-year 1992.
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, a 
committee o f banking supervisory authorities, 
established by the central bank Governors o f the G- 
10 countries.
A “bearer” security is not specifically registered as 
to ownership to an individual or institution. Rather, it 
is registered to the holder or bearer o f the security. 
The owner o f the security is literally the entity 
bearing the security. As a consequence, the security 
can be held confidentially and traded without 
disclosure o f the seller or purchaser. This practice 
was prohibited in the US as bearer ownership makes 
it very difficult to track ownership for tax purposes.
Bank for International Settlements (BIS - Basel, 
Switzerland). The principal international 
organisation for central bank cooperation and 
consultation. The BIS was established in 1930 to 
deal with reparation payments imposed on Germany 
by the Treaty o f Versailles. The bank acted 
principally as a trustee for Dawes and Young Plan 
Loans. As reparations declined, BIS activities 
focused entirely on cooperation among central banks 
and, increasingly, other agencies in pursuit o f  
international monetary and financial stability.
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Glossary of Terms (continued)
“Bunds”
CAD
CBOE
CBOT
CBV
CEA 
CFTC 
‘The City’
COB
Commercial paper (CP) 
Euro-commercial paper (ECP)
German government bonds
Capital Adequacy Directive
Chicago Board Options Exchange
Chicago Board o f Trade
Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs. The French 
Stock Exchange Council. Primarily a private sector 
legislative and judicial stock exchange authority.
Commodities Exchange Act, the legislation 
governing the CFTC.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(US)
The “City” refers to the financial district in 
London where the majority o f financial services 
firms and regulators are traditionally housed.
Commission des Operations de Bourse,
French domestic securities regulator.
Short-term, unsecured promissory notes issued in 
domestic and international markets including 
Euromarkets. Maturities typically range from 1 day 
to nine months.
COREPER Committee o f Permanent Representatives, a 
Committee o f senior EC member-state official 
representatives based in Brussels. COREPER is the 
forum where the majority o f drafting and negotiating 
over directives took place prior to ministerial 
meetings. Its presence ensures member-states 
maintain control over Council working processes.
Credit risk The likelihood that an institution will default on a 
credit (borrowed money) obligation. See market risk.
Derivatives The term encompasses a wide variety of, frequently 
complex, financial instruments developed with the 
use o f futures, options, indices and conventional 
securities, often designed to hedge related asset or 
liability positions or to take advantage o f arbitrage 
opportunities between or within discrete markets.
Derivatives Policy Group (“DPG”) Forum comprised o f representatives from six 
largest US derivatives dealers. Activities are 
coordinated, not supervised, by SEC and CFTC.
DG XV The EC’s Directorate General for Financial 
Services and Company Law. The EC 
administrative agency responsible for, inter alia, 
developing financial services regulation.
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Glossary of Terms (continued)
Disintermediation
DJIA
D M
DTB
DTI
EBRD
EC
ECB
ECOFIN
ECSC
ECU
EMI
EMS
EMU
ERM
Euromarket
European Commission 
Exchange rate swap
FASB
The “Fed”
The replacement o f bank borrowing by securities 
issuance in capital raising
Dow Jones Industrial Average. A widely 
followed index for US equities
Deutsche Mark
Deutsche Termin Borse
Department o f State for Trade and Industry,
(UK Government)
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development
European Community, the predecessor to the 
European Union (“EU”).
European Central Bank
European Council o f Economic and Finance 
Ministers
European Coal and Steel Community
European Currency Unit
European Monetary Institute, predecessor 
organisation to the ECB
European Monetary System
European Monetary Union
Exchange Rate Mechanism
The largely unregulated, off-shore debt and 
equity primary and secondary markets, 
centred in London and, in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s denominated principally in 
US dollars. Also, Eurobond, EuroYen, etc.
Administrative arm o f  EC/EU bureaucracy.
An agreement between borrowers to exchange 
(or “swap”) the currency o f their repayment 
obligations. Also “currency swap.
Financial Accounting Standards Board, the US 
SRO responsible for setting US domestic 
accounting rules and regulations. See IASC.
The US central bank, the Federal Reserve.
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Glossary of Terms (continued)
FIMBRO
Foreign exchange risk
FRJBNY
FRCD
FRN
FSA 1986
FSVC
GAAP
GAO
“Germany”
“Gilts” or “Gilt-edged market” 
GNMA
“Grandfathering”
IASC 
I AT A
Financial Intermediaries, Managers and 
Brokers Regulatory Organisation, responsible for 
retail investment management (UK). See SRO.
The risk to which an institution is exposed 
by virtue o f carrying obligations in multiple 
currencies whose value, relative to other currencies, 
is subject to fluctuation. See market risk.
The Federal Reserve Bank o f  New York. See 
“Fed.”
Floating rate certificate o f deposit.
Floating rate note.
Financial Services Act o f 1986 (UK)
Financial Services Volunteer Corps (US)
GAAP is an acronym for Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles, the standard for 
financial accounting practice in the United States. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(“FASB”), the industry standard-setting body, 
determines GAAP.
General Accounting Office (US). The official US 
federal research and auditing body.
After WW II, Germany was divided into western 
(Bundesrepublik Deutschland - BRD) and eastern 
(Deutsche Democratische Republik - DDR) states. 
After reunification in 1989, the successor state was 
called the BRD. For simplicity, I have referred 
throughout to “Germany.” Where the context applies 
to pre-unification Germany, the reference is to West 
Germany.
UK domestic government bond market
Government National Mortgage Association
The practice o f excluding institutions from certain, 
typically new, regulations, if  those institutions meet 
certain criteria, usually that they began operations in 
the affected jurisdiction before the regulations were 
adopted.
The International Accounting Standards Committee 
is the international accounting industry body 
responsible for establishing internationally 
recognised and accepted accounting and auditing 
standards. See FASB.
International Air Transport Association
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IIF
IMRO
Interest rate swap 
IPMA
IOSCO
IPE
IR
ISD
ISMA
ISRO
ISRR
Junk Bonds
LAUTRO
Leverage
Glossary of Terms (continued)
Institute o f International Finance. A private, 
regulatory research and lobbying organisation 
comprised o f international financial institutions.
Investment Management Regulatory 
Organisation, responsible for institutional fund 
management. (UK) See SRO.
An agreement between obligors to exchange (or 
“swap”) interest rate payment obligations.
International Primary Markets Association, founded 
in 1984, as a trade association comprised o f senior 
members o f the international financial community 
involved in the underwriting and distribution o f both 
debt and equity issues in the Euromarkets. Its limited 
membership was comprised o f the leading 
international banks and securities firms located in 
London.
International Organization o f Securities 
Commissions
International Political Economy. Generally 
considered a sub-discipline o f IR although this is 
contested.
International Relations.
Investment Services Directive
International Securities Markets Association. Global 
SRO. Has the status o f a Designated Investment 
Exchange in the UK. See AIBD.
International Securities Regulatory 
Organisation (UK)
International Securities Regulation Report
Junk bonds technically referred to as “high-yield” 
bonds, carry ratings (issued by independent rating 
agencies such as Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s) that 
are below investment grade, that is, below BBB- and 
Baa3. By virtue o f  their lower ratings and higher 
implied repayment and default risks, these securities 
carry higher, compensatory, rates o f interest.
Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory 
Organisation, responsible for retail life assurance and 
regulated investment schemes. (UK) See SRO.
The ratio o f capital (shareholder’s funds 
and additional paid in capital) to liabilities, a 
common measure o f risk for financial institutions.
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Glossary of Terms (continued)
Liffe
Liquidity risk 
LSE
Market risk
MAT1F
Medium-Term Notes 
MJDS
Moral hazard
MOF
MOU
NASD
NASDAQ 
Program trading
London International Financial Futures and Options 
Exchange
The risk that a firm will not be able to unwind or 
hedge a position.
London Stock Exchange
The variability o f portfolio values due to changes 
in market prices o f portfolio components. May 
include changes in interest rates, credit values, 
economic conditions, political concerns, foreign 
exchange or related market factors. See liquidity 
risk, credit risk, foreign exchange risk, settlement 
risk.
Marche a Terme Internationale de France
“MTNs”) Unsecured debt obligations with maturities ranging
from 9 months to 30 years. Typically issued in small, 
discrete tranches in US and international markets.
Multijurisidctional disclosure system. Agreement 
between the US and Canada to recognise each 
other’s domestic securities registration requirements.
The risk that government insurance o f  bank deposits 
or other activity will provoke risky lending or similar 
behaviours.
Ministry o f  Finance (Japan).
Memorandum o f Understanding
National Association o f Securities Dealers (US). A  
U.S. SRO dedicated to trading and broking issues.
National Association o f Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation system. The main domestic 
OTC market.
Generally describes debt or equity trading initiated 
by a computer program, as opposed to the judgment 
o f an individual. Program trading is typically 
predicated on certain trading actions, the purchase or 
sale o f securities, being triggered by a market 
achieving pre-defined thresholds. Once a threshold 
was achieved -  for example, once a market index or 
security price had declined sufficiently -  the 
program would trigger the sale o f designated 
securities. The action was automatic. Because many 
firms employed program trading strategies (which 
themselves were relatively well known) as a hedging 
mechanism they were frequently blamed for creating 
a “herd mentality” among traders, stimulating large 
sell-offs in securities
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Glossary of Terms (continued)
OECD
OTC
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development
Over-the-counter. Typically refers to an unregulated 
market.
PSA
Qualified Institutional Investor (“QIB”)
‘Quote-driven” markets
(SEC) “Registration’
Public Securities Association. US SRO 
concerned exclusively with bond trading.
The definition o f a “qualified institutional 
investor”(or buyer) is complex but, in essence, it 
represented an institutional investor managing in 
excess o f $100 million. Estimates o f the size this 
universe o f investors represented varied from 800 
to over 3,000 investors.
Quote-driven markets are characterised by 
trade pricing being determined without 
reference to the magnitude o f a trade. (See “trade- 
driven” markets.)
Registration o f securities with the SEC refers to a 
procedure whereby an entity wanting to issue 
securities in the US “public” or registered market, 
completes the preparation o f a Registration 
Statement and Prospectus containing information 
regarding the issuer as well as the securities being 
issued. The documents are submitted to the SEC, 
which reviews them for completeness and 
conformity with disclosure requirements stipulated 
by SEC regulations. If the material meets the 
appropriate SEC standard, the documents are 
accepted and the issuer may proceed with the 
issuance o f  securities. Meeting the SEC mandated 
disclosure standard has been an insurmountable 
obstacle for many non-US based issuers o f  
securities.
“Repo” Repurchase (or “repo”) agreements are agreements
entered into by financial institutions to repurchase 
securities that have been sold, typically to other 
financial institutions. Repo agreements are widely 
used for balance sheet management and borrowing.
If a firm wishes to decrease the percentage o f  
securities on its balance sheet it can enter into repo 
agreements and “sell” its securities (with a parallel 
agreement to buy them back) and invest the proceeds 
in low risk investments, such as government 
securities. If a firm wishes to raise money, it can 
lend (sell) securities and take cash in return, in effect 
borrowing as it intends to purchase the securities 
back. The risk associated with this practice is that the 
value o f  securities sold changes before the agreement 
is completed, requiring the lending firm locate 
additional funds to buy back its securities.
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Glossary of Terms (continued)
Rights Offering
‘S&L’
SBD
An offering o f securities (“rights”), typically made to 
existing securities holders, granting the ability to 
purchase additional securities (occasionally the right 
may itself be a share in the company) issued by the 
company. Rights are generally priced preferentially 
to existing market share prices, but may incorporate 
limits on the ability o f an investor to exercise their 
purchase right
Savings and Loan. Also called a “thrift” 
institution (US). Devoted primarily to mortgage 
lending.
Second Banking Coordination Directive 
(EC)
SBF La Societe des Bourses Francoises. The 
French Stock Brokers Association. An SRO 
whose membership includes all securities brokers in 
France.
SEA
SEAQ and SEAQ-I
Single European Act (see Appendix A.)
Stock Exchange Automated Quotations 
system. SEAQ-Intemational (“SEAQ-I”) is the 
London Stock Exchange’s electronic price quotation 
system for non-UK equities and forms the basis for 
the London market in international securities. It is 
based on the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automatic Quotation system (“NASDAQ”) 
used in US OTC markets.
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission (US) 
Established in 1933.
Securities firm Financial institutions whose principal activities 
Are underwriting and trading of securities. 
Typical securities firm activities also include 
corporate finance (advice on balance sheet 
management and corporate strategy) as well as 
investment advice.
Settlement risk The risk o f settlement default due to operational 
causes.
SFA Securities and Futures Authority (UK). 
Established in 1991 by the merger of the AFBD 
and TSA (see “SRO”)
SIA Securities Industry Association. The senior US 
lobbyist/SRO for investment banking and brokerage 
issues.
13
SIM
“Single Market” 
SRO
SWIFT
Thrift
“Trade-driven” markets 
TSA
UNCTAD
Glossary of Terms (continued)
Securities and Investments Board (UK).
Established in 1988 with the implementation of  
the FSA 1986. Responsible for the regulation and 
supervision o f UK securities markets. Not a 
government bureaucracy, but a private limited 
company. However, reports to Treasury 
Secretary.
Societa de Intermediazione Mobiliare Specialised 
entities eligible to underwrite and trade securities 
domestically in Italy.
The goal established through the SEA and the 
Cockfield Report to harmonise regulatory 
standards in the EU in selected areas by the end 
o f 1992. Also “1992 initiative.”
Self Regulatory Organisation. UK SROs included a) 
the Association o f Futures Brokers and Dealers 
(“AFBD”) responsible for futures and options 
contracts, b) The Securities Association (‘T SA ”) 
responsible for securities dealing and corporate 
finance, c) the Investment Management Regulatory 
Organisation (“IMRO”) responsible for institutional 
fund management, d) the Financial Intermediaries, 
Managers and Brokers Regulatory Organisation 
(“FIMBRO”) responsible for retail investment 
management, and e) the Life Assurance and Unit 
Trust Regulatory Organisation (“LAUTRO”) 
responsible for retail life assurance and regulated 
investment schemes. Other countries have SROs as 
well
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications. A commercial organisation set 
up to facilitate interbank funds transfers and related 
communication.
A savings & loan institution. (US) See S&L.
US SROs included the NASD, the PSA and the SIA.
Trade-driven markets are characterised by 
trade pricing being determined with prior 
knowledge o f the magnitude o f a trade. (See “quote- 
driven” markets.)
The Securities Association, UK SRO responsible 
For securities dealing and corporate finance.
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development
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Universal banking
US
UK
Glossary of Terms (continued)
Refers generally to a financial institution’s 
authorisation to participate in both traditional bank 
“credit” or lending activity as well as in securities 
“underwriting” and trading.
United States of America
United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland
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Chapter 1
Introduction
International finance operates at the intersection of politics and economics, which 
makes it a particularly rich subject for scholarly inquiry. Governments depend on 
financial markets to raise capital and to exercise monetary and fiscal policy. Individuals 
and corporations also rely on financial markets for investment and capital raising. Capital 
markets, and the financial organisations that operate in them, are highly differentiated; 
they can be public or private and can function domestically and globally. Financial 
markets and institutions work under diverse economic and political structures and are 
subject to distinct national and supranational regulatory regimes. These characteristics 
make international finance both important and arcane -  a potentially volatile and 
stimulating regulatory combination.
Two features of financial markets and institutions make their operations 
particularly significant. First, the majority of markets and institutions are private, yet 
they often provide public goods. Second, private financial institutions typically mediate 
capital access, yet many of the most important users of capital markets are sovereign or 
supranational entities.1 As a consequence, the efficient, fair and prudent operation of 
financial services institutions and markets is important to supranational actors, to states, 
to regulators, and to private actors. These characteristics make the regulation of financial 
institutions an issue of critical concern.
Two aspects of recent capital market evolution have complicated the 
development of harmonised international regulatory standards. First, capital markets 
have developed from national into regional and even global institutions. Financial firms, 
following market evolution, have also become global actors, often with attenuated 
national affiliations. Second, product and technological innovation in financial services
1 There are, o f course, exceptions. Some governments and large multinational corporations access capital 
markets directly, rather than through intermediaries.
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has accelerated. This has made market institutions and actors constantly changing 
regulatory targets, able to rapidly adjust their organisational structure and product 
offerings to accommodate market opportunities or regulatory constraints. Finally, 
despite the prediction by state/market theorists3 that globalisation would encourage 
market and regulatory convergence, distinct national markets and regulatory regimes 
persist.4 Technical and operational developments have increased the ability of private 
firms to arbitrage their operations and capital-raising activities between markets and 
regulatory regimes. But, at the same time, market growth has increased the demand from 
private and, particularly, from public sector actors for harmonised rules to manage and 
monitor multinational markets and institutions. These developments describe a dynamic 
market environment that operates across borders and that is highly differentiated. It also 
describes an environment with many conflicting sources of regulatory authority and 
influence.
Empirical Focus
The primary research objective of this study is to determine how authority was 
structured and how it was exercised in two case studies of contemporaneous international 
capital adequacy harmonisation efforts in the securities industry. The case studies are 
used to assess the structure and avenues for expression of authority and influence in 
international policy formation.5
In the early and mid-1980s, inconclusive discussions between national regulators 
over bank capitalisation were formalised in talks between representatives of the Bank of 
England and the US Federal Reserve. These discussions ultimately led to the 
development of the Basle Capital Accord (“Basle Accord” or “Capital Accord”)6 under 
the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”)7 and its affiliated
2 See Chapter 2 for an extended discussion.
3 See description o f state/market theoretical approaches in Chapter 3.
4 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the 
Possibilities o f  Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
5 “Securities firm,” “investment firm,” and “investment bank” are used interchangeably in this study. All 
refer to the same type o f commercial entity -  one whose principal business is underwriting, distributing 
and trading securities. See Chapter 2 for a discussion o f the operational and regulatory implications of the 
differences between commercial banks and securities firms. See Glossary for additional definitions.
6 Addressing capital adequacy for “credit institutions.”
7 See Glossary.
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institution, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (“Basle Committee”).8 The 
success of these discussions, combined with the increasing prominence of securities 
issuance in financing and investment,9 stimulated wider discussions among national and 
supranational regulators aimed at creating analogous harmonised capital standards for 
securities firms. These later discussions took place in two forums: in the European 
Economic Community (“EU”),10 as part of its 1992 Single Market program,11 and in the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”). Shadowing both the 
EU and IOSCO discussions were the Basle Committee’s deliberations on the appropriate 
capital treatment of bank equity portfolios. These latter discussions influenced both the 
substance and the outcome of the EU and IOSCO negotiations.
The EU negotiations resulted in the adoption of the Capital Adequacy Directive 
(“CAD”) and the Investment Services Directive (“ISD”) in early 1993. These directives 
were intended to harmonise, inter alia, capital adequacy standards for investment firms 
operating in the EU. Concurrently, IOSCO’s members laboured to develop an 
international capital adequacy standard for investment firms. However, IOSCO’s 
negotiations failed to produce an internationally acceptable standard, and they collapsed 
in 1993. Consequently, this analysis also addresses the question of why the EU 
negotiations succeeded and the IOSCO negotiations failed.
Theoretical Objectives
The theoretical objective of this study is to assess empirical observations against 
hypotheses that define state and non-state centric arguments on the location of authority 
in international decision-making.12 The thesis examines a central argument of non-state
13centric theories, that policy-making authority has migrated away from the state, and it
8 Bank for International Settlements. See Glossary.
9 Referred to generally as disintermediation. See Glossary.
10 Throughout this thesis, for convenience, reference is made to the European Union (“EU”). The EU was, 
of course, preceded by the European Economic Community (“EEC” or “EC”). The EU came into existence 
in 1993.
11 Discussed in chapter 4. '
12 Theoretical perspectives range from state-centred to non-state centred. This same range also describes a 
progression from analyses focused on a limited number o f variables to analyses considering multiple 
variables and levels o f analysis.
13 This refers to state/market and EU integration theories. See chapter 3 and, inter alia, Susan Strange, 
States and Markets, second edition. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988)., Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and 
Kermit Blank, "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance," Journal 
o f  Common Market Studies 34, no. 3 (1996).
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asks what is the best way to understand the exercise of authority and the resulting 
patterns of securities market governance across levels of analysis and a range of actors.14 
This study also develops a “synthetic” analysis of empirical data that combines 
observations derived from state and non-state centric perspectives in order to develop 
new insights into international policy formation. This analysis reveals where individual 
theoretical perspectives succeed or fail in explaining international policy-making. 
Finally, the thesis examines such issues as the complexity of non-state centric analytical 
perspectives, whether EU integration perspectives are sui generis, whether globalisation 
has encouraged regulatory convergence, and the state/market argument that globalisation 
has “transformed” the state.
There is an important qualification to these objectives. This thesis examines 
specific negotiations that were conducted over a short time period, which limits 
assessment of the migration of authority over time. As a consequence, this thesis 
considers whether, within the examined environment and timeframe, states or other 
actors and institutions had influence over international regulatory policy development. 
Additionally, by limiting the definition of authority to formal state authority, the thesis 
clarifies the multiple sources of influence in international policy formation.
Arguments
This thesis argues that international policy is formed by the interaction of state 
and non-state preferences. It concludes that, for the case studies, state preferences 
predominated in policy formation, but that non-state preferences influenced the 
formation of state preferences. These arguments are based on three observations. First, 
state economic and political structures were central to negotiations over the structure of 
international policy. In particular, fundamental state preferences acted as thresholds for 
determining the acceptability of international policy harmonisation alternatives. These 
preferences were influenced by non-state preferences, but they were dominated by 
powerful state concerns associated with the preservation of public goods and historic 
state policies. Second, state actors and institutions were responsible for assessing policy 
preferences and for acting on their assessment. They preserved state autonomy. Third, 
few instances are observed of non-state preferences being translated into policy, either
14 “Governance,” “authority,” and “influence” are examined in chapter 3.
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unaltered or in contravention of state preferences. As a consequence, it is inaccurate to 
say that authority has migrated away from states. Rather, policy in the case studies was 
formed by states, influenced by both state and non-state preferences.
The argument that authority has migrated away from the state is overdrawn. 
However, if we only look at the state and do not examine closely the sources and patterns 
of non-state influence, we will be equally inaccurate, because these sources of influence 
helped determine state preferences. Each analytical perspective provides useful 
diagnostic insights. But these insights are limited; each perspective privileges certain 
explanatory variables and makes distinctive predictions regarding the outcome of 
negotiations. Consequently, this thesis argues that only a comprehensive, synthetic 
analysis will capture the interrelationships of state and non-state preferences in policy 
formation.
In order to assess sources of authority and influence, this thesis first examines 
how these terms are defined. The conventional definition of authority is the right to 
perform some action, including the right to make laws and other rulings.15 However, 
authority also implies that actors’ actions and preferences carry legitimacy and utility. As 
a consequence, authority may be formal or informal, public or private; it may appear as 
the ability to set agendas and fix rules, or the ability to shape actions other than by brute 
force. This description of authority, similar to that utilised by Weber, Susan Strange and 
Gramscian scholars,16 conflates authority with influence and power.17 This thesis 
considers whether this conflation clouds our understanding of how authority and 
influence operate.
Can authority and influence be constructively distinguished? States develop and 
enforce rules and regulations, exercising their formal authority. States may also “rubber- 
stamp” the regulatory preferences of influential non-state actors or institutions whose
15 See generally: David Miller, "Authority,” in The Blackwell Encyclopaedia o f  Political Thought, ed.
David Miller, et. al., (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) and Chapter 3.
16 Dr. A.R. Walter suggested this point. On Gramsci see: Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, 
"Engaging Gramsci: International Theory and the New Gramscians," Review o f  International Studies 24, 
no. 1 (1998). and Craig N. Murphy, "Understanding IR: Understanding Gramsci," Review o f  International 
Studies 24, no. 3 (1998).
17 Strange’s definition o f structural power (defined as the power to decide how things are done -  to shape 
frameworks) is, o f course, broader, encompassing brute force or forced compliance. This is contrasted with 
her definition o f relational power (defined as the power o f A to get B to do something it would not 
otherwise do). Both definitions focus on power rather than authority or influence.
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recommendations carry utility and legitimacy.18 Identifying and assessing sources of 
authority and influence is important in clarifying the location(s) and character of policy­
making authority.19 It is ironic that non-state centric analytical perspectives should 
conflate authority and influence, since they encourage examination of a wider range of 
variables than do state-centric approaches. This thesis argues that analysis could be 
improved by disaggregating authority and influence in policy formation.
The thesis also argues that formal authority is one form of influence among many 
in policy formation. The conflation of authority with influence obscures other forms of 
influence, including other forms of authority. Private actors demonstrated influence in 
the EU case study and helped shape state policy decisions, even though they did not have 
formal authority and could not unilaterally “adopt” capital adequacy rules. Their 
influence stemmed principally from their context-based expertise and access to formal 
authority. Conversely, IOSCO, which represented putative formal authority by virtue of 
its designated international role, demonstrated very little authority (or influence) because
it lacked credibility. These examples indicate that conflating authority with influence
0 0raises the risk of misinterpreting the precise “contours of authority.”
This study takes the view that non-state centric perspectives develop a more 
accurate and realistic understanding of policy-making than do narrower state-centric 
perspectives. Because non-state centric perspectives assess the interaction of a range of 
variables, they encourage a wider conversation between observations from a range of 
analytic perspectives, which this thesis considers to be the foundation of synthetic 
analysis. Synthetic analysis compares and contrasts the observations of non-state centric 
and state-centric perspectives. This is designed to reveal dynamic relationships between 
observations. It seeks to identify limitations in theoretical approaches and to develop 
observations not revealed by individual perspectives alone. Even broad non-state centric 
perspectives have their limitations. State/market perspectives are limited by their focus 
on power and the relations of states and markets. EU integration approaches are limited 
by their even tighter focus on specific variables: policy networks, institutional structures, 
and MLG. Synthetic analysis studies ways in which the observations derived from
18 Such as private commercial actors or institutions not formally recognised by the state.
19 See Chapter 3 for an extended discussion.
20 This term is used by A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, eds., Private Authority and 
International Affairs, SUNY Series in Global Politics (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1999).
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analytically different perspectives interact with and modify each other and, in doing so, 
affect our interpretation of individual perspectives and of how authority is exercised in 
policy formation.
Synthetic analysis can reveal the relative significance of analytical variables in 
identifying how and why policy-making succeeded or failed. A synthetic analysis neither
presupposes that one approach is superior, nor assumes that levels of analysis are
1 \ ' exclusive. Rather, it identifies more precisely principal and secondary causative factors
in analysis across theoretical perspectives. This constitutes an argument against
parsimonious analyses that attempt to demonstrate precise connections within an
artificially constrained variable universe.22
This thesis argues that the complexity of non-state centric and synthetic analyses 
is justified because they identify the limitations of narrower analyses and the 
interconnections between levels of analysis, and because they develop new insights into 
international authority and policy formation.
A synthetic analytical approach builds on theoretical paradigms developed by 
John Odell,23 Susan Strange and EU integration scholars,24 addressing the interaction of 
domestic and international variables.25 The hypotheses are derived from research by 
Marks, Hooge and Blank that examines state and non-state centric analyses.26 This thesis 
joins scholarly efforts to identify linkages between analytical perspectives and thereby to 
expand the universe of authoritative actors assessed. This approach seeks to understand
how actors and institutions, public and private, operating domestically and
01internationally, interact, change and influence international policy-formation. Synthetic
21 Simon Hix, "The Study o f the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics," West 
European Politics 17, no. 1 (1994).
22 A. Hurrell and A. Menon, "Politics Like Any Other? Comparative Politics, International Relations and 
the Study o f the EU," West European Politics 19, no. 2 (1996).
23 See: John S. Odell, Negotiating the World Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).
24 Both neo-functionalist and intergovemmentalist scholars.
25 See Chapter 3 for a detailed exploration.
26 Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level 
Governance,”
27 Peter B. Evans, "Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics," in Double- 
Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold K. 
Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). H. Kassim and A. 
Menon, eds., The European Community and National Industrial Policy (London: Routledge, 1996).
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analysis also seeks to generate conclusions that are greater than the sum of observations 
generated by narrower analyses. This objective is assessed in the final chapter.
The Case Studies
The EU case study negotiations began in 1988 with the circulation of the first 
draft of an Investment Services Directive,28 establishing a “single passport” for 
investment firms to operate anywhere in the EU. Discussions quickly expanded to 
encompass a proposed Capital Adequacy Directive,29 which addressed securities firms’ 
capitalisation. The scope and language of the directives were finally agreed upon late in 
1992 and ratified by the European Parliament in 1993. The negotiations took place 
against a complex backdrop of extensive regulatory and institutional change in domestic 
markets and financial services institutions, assertiveness of expert private actors and 
institutions, and a well-defined, time-specific regional Single Market objective. These 
factors were intensified by market and institutional competition and by the resilience of 
deeply embedded national economic institutions and regulatory practices. An empirical 
objective of this thesis is to determine the influence of each factor in the final form of the 
CAD and ISD.
Based on observations developed from different theoretical perspectives, this 
study concludes that the CAD and ISD were shaped by several factors. Major influences 
included the resilience of national political, economic and social structures, the 
preferences of private and supranational actors, and the commitment of the EU member- 
states to 1992 Single Market objectives. The assessment of observations from different 
perspectives reveals a complex picture of policy-formation and influence. Member-states 
rejected policies requiring substantial alteration of national institutions. Private actors 
worked directly with the EU Commission and the member-states to encourage the 
development of policy proposals encompassing member-states’ structural preferences 
and private actors’ “Euromarket” regulatory preferences. As a consequence, EU policy­
making reflected a combination of distinctive inputs. Each was legitimate and credible 
by virtue of its basis in market knowledge, its institutional source, or its structural
28 Investment Services Directive, 93/22/EEU, “Council Directive o f 10 May 1993 on investment services 
in the securities field”. O.J. N*. L141, 11.06.93, pp. 27-46.
29 Capital Adequacy Directive, 93/6/EEU, “Council Directive o f 15 March 1993, “on the capital adequacy 
o f investment firms and credit institutions”, O.J.N*. L141, 11.06.93, pp. 1-26.
23
context. As a result, each had influence and shaped the directives. However, state 
preferences were predominant in EU policy-formation.
IOSCO’s negotiations also began in 1988 with the creation of an internal working 
party to investigate the harmonisation of national capital standards for securities firms. 
Discussions took place concurrently with those of the EU. As a result, the state 
preferences expressed in EU regional debates were reflected in IOSCO. However, 
IOSCO’s discussions also incorporated the preferences of the world’s oldest and largest 
national securities regulator, the United State’s Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“US’s SEC”). After five years of debate, IOSCO’s membership failed to agree on a 
capital standard and abandoned harmonisation discussions in 1993.
This study finds that IOSCO’s discussions failed for three reasons. First, for 
domestic political and institutional reasons, the SEC would not accommodate changes to 
its domestic capital adequacy standards. IOSCO’s weak governance combined with the 
attractiveness of US markets and the SEC’s intransigence enabled the SEC to impede 
progress in IOSCO. The SEC’s stance was reinforced by an aggressive program of 
exporting US regulatory norms and by an unusually passive domestic private sector. 
Second, IOSCO was institutionally incapable of orchestrating a compromise that would 
accommodate SEC and EU member-states’ regulatory preferences. Third, recognising 
the SEC’s inflexibility, the Basle Committee’s support for their regulatory preferences, 
and IOSCO’s lack of authority, IOSCO’s EU members effectively withdrew from 
IOSCO’s discussions. Their decision was bolstered by their commitment to establish a 
regional capital standard. This thesis argues that non-state actors and institutions were 
only indirectly influential in IOSCO’s deliberation and that state authority predominated.
Analytical Approach
This analysis returns us to the core question of the thesis. Why were the EU 
negotiations successful while IOSCO’s were not? And if multiple factors were prominent 
in the outcome of negotiations, what is an appropriate way to examine and characterise 
international policy-making?
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The more state-centric approaches suggest distinct investigative avenues focusing 
on state, institutional, and/or domestic variables. Non-state centric perspectives 
emphasise the balancing of state/market authority and multi-level variable analysis. This 
study argues instead that state and non-state centric observations examined through 
synthetic analysis yield not simply more complete empirical evidence but more accurate 
and realistic assessments of policy-formation. This is not merely a matter of achieving 
greater empirical inclusiveness. Altering analytical focus from a “level of analysis” or a 
constrained variable perspective to an interactive, topical and process-oriented focus 
reveals international policy-making and authority as dynamic and multi-level. Policy 
formation involves public and private actors and institutions, each with influence, 
interacting across levels of governance. A synthetic analysis combines observations 
derived from individual perspectives to generate new insights and more accurate 
understandings of policy formation processes.
Theoretical Perspectives
■) A
This study utilises traditional, positivist theoretical approaches, together with 
perspectives developed by EU integration and state/market scholars, to build contrasting 
hypotheses. Non-state centric perspectives assume that international policy-making and 
authority are complex and influenced by multiple variables. They examine a range of 
domestic and international variables to develop a comprehensive understanding of policy 
formation and authority. One conclusion of this study is that this approach is analytically 
superior to state-centric approaches.
Traditional international political economy (“IPE”) and international relations
T1(“IR”) perspectives utilised predominantly state-centric analytical paradigms, originally 
designed as stand-alone diagnostic templates.32 State-centric perspectives vary
30 “Positivist” refers to analytical or theoretical perspectives that adopt a limited or constrained variable 
analytical approach, typically state-centred, often based in micro-economics (also “rational choice”), for 
the examination o f international phenomena. These perspectives include structural (realist and 
institutionalist), domestic and bargaining approaches. Variables include power, institutions, domestic 
preferences, institutions and ideas, and “statesmen.”
1 Some scholars consider IPE to be a subset o f IR, while other scholars consider it to be distinct from IR. 
This is, o f course, a heavily contested topic.
32 Research frequently adopted structural/international (“outside-in”), domestic (“inside-out”), or 
bargaining (“statesman”) analytical perspectives. “Outside-in” and “Inside-out” are descriptive terms 
developed by B.J. Cohen. See: Benjamin J. Cohen, "Phoenix Risen; the Resurrection o f Global Finance,"
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significantly, ranging from unitary state approaches to intergovemmentalist explorations 
of domestic variables and their influence on interstate negotiations. Scholars “competed” 
to refine these perspectives, demonstrating the unique advantages of each in explaining 
international policy formation. This competition defines an intellectual journey, which, 
more recently, has encouraged re-examination of the benefits of synthesising 
observations from multiple analytical perspectives.
The state-centred analytical perspectives that dominated research in the 1980s 
and 1990s34 have expanded further to incorporate new perspectives, many of them based 
in sociology and psychology. Scholars have developed analytical perspectives focusing 
on process analysis and multi-level actor and institutional interaction to explain
or
transnational policy-formation. Theoretical perspectives developed by Putnam,
o o  o o
Moravcsik, Milner, and Odell, together with closely related state/market and EU 
integration perspectives,39 are examples of efforts to expand on narrower analytical 
approaches.40
World Politics 48, January (1996). Each perspective, many o f which have been extensively sub-divided, is 
briefly described in Chapter 3.
33 Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the 
Study o f  World Politics," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998).
34 Particularly in the US.
35 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic o f Two-Level Games," International 
Organization 42, no. Summer (1988). See also: Peter B Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D.
Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1993).
36 Andrew Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories o f International 
Bargaining," in Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, ed. Peter B. 
Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam (Berkeley, Ca.: University o f California Press, 1993).
37 Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
38 Odell, Negotiating the World Economy.
39 Moravcsik is often considered an EU intergovemmentalist scholar -  see Chapter 3 and Appendix A.
40 These approaches enlarge the universe o f actors and institutions by adopting non-state centric 
perspectives, by assessing policy development processes and by examining the roles o f economic 
structures and institutional histories. In 1992, Helen Milner alluded to gaps in the research literature when 
she noted two weaknesses o f structural perspectives. She argued that systemic assumptions o f anarchy 
were ambiguous and relativistic. Anarchy was being used to “explain” empirical inconsistencies that could 
only be clarified by examining domestic politics. By 1998, combinations o f theoretical concepts taken 
from comparative politics, domestic regulation, and systemic analysis had advanced considerably. “Being 
able to systematically explore domestic politics and its effects on international relations holds out the 
promise o f  more cumulative research. Understanding how preferences are aggregated to arrive at ‘national 
interest’ and how different political and economic institutions yield different outcomes are important 
steps.” (See: Helen Milner, "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis o f  International, American, 
and Comparative Politics," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998)). Odell and Kapstein advanced this 
observation by linking domestic and international evidence in empirical analyses and building an 
understanding o f international policy-formation by utilising bounded rationality with inductive and 
deductive examination See generally: John S. Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, 
and Ideas as Sources o f  Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982)., Odell, Negotiating the 
World Economy., Ethan B. Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the State
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State/market and EU integration perspectives explore specific variables, potential 
linkages between analytical variables, and levels of analysis in policy development. 
State/market literatures assume that policy-making authority lies along a continuum 
between states and markets and is the product of the interaction of those variables. EU 
integration builds on domestic perspectives, combining multi-level analysis with inquiry 
into the sources of domestic preferences in policy-formation. These perspectives 
acknowledge that the location of authority varies, that it is influenced by economic and 
political institutions and by the influence and authority of actors involved in policy 
formation. These perspectives generally assume the interpenetration of the domestic and 
international and the potential authority and intersubjectivity of actors and institutions, 
private and public, in policy formation.
Synthetic Analysis
Determinative variables examined by state-centric perspectives are frequently 
monocausal, and empirical observations derived from these approaches are typically 
assessed without reference to observations generated from different perspectives. 
However, this latter observation is also true of non-state centric approaches, which, 
despite their multi-variable focus, still emphasise certain variables over others. As a 
result, these approaches often afford a weak approximation of reality. This encourages 
the comparison of observations from different perspectives and their combined 
evaluation. A synthetic analysis captures this logic by facilitating a conversation between 
the observations of non-state centric and state centric analyses. A synthetic approach 
potentially modifies conclusions by highlighting contrasts between analytical 
observations and suggesting alternative interpretations of phenomena.
For example, from a (narrow) state-centric perspective, the successful 
development of the CAD and ISD was a function of EU member-states’ commitment to 
achieving Single Market objectives (and establishing an international regulatory 
precedent) during a period of declining US and Japanese influence. Conversely, 
IOSCO’s failure was a function of members’ inability to resolve conflicting regulatory
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994)., and, generally, Helen Milner, "International Theories of  
Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (1992).
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objectives. This was exacerbated by IOSCO’s institutional weakness and the SEC’s 
efforts to impose its regulatory preferences internationally.
These observations are accurate but incomplete. They do not provide an 
assessment of the relative significance of a range of empirical observations developed 
using other analytical perspectives. In the EU case, a focus on state power ignores the 
role of the EU’s (particularly the Commission’s) objectives, of influential private actors, 
of political elites, and of national regulatory histories and economic structures, each of 
which made important contributions to the shape of the directives. Authority resided 
predominantly with states, but influence was exercised by a range of actors and 
institutions. Similarly in the IOSCO case, a focus on state power ignores the significant 
role of IOSCO’s governance structure, the domestic roots of member-state 
disagreements, the minor contribution of private actors, and the complex pressures 
shaping the SEC’s preferences and international authority. Through a synthetic 
assessment of both state and non-state centric observations, conclusions regarding the 
structure and exercise of authority and influence can be made.
Contribution
Empirically, the case studies identify important influences on international 
policy-making not developed in earlier studies.41 For the EU CAD/ISD case these 
include the role of the Basle Accord and of IOSCO in stimulating the EU’s regulatory 
precedential ambitions and the proactive involvement of private actors, principally US 
and UK investment banks and industry SROs, in influencing the EU Commission and 
member-states’ policy decisions. The influential roles of specific French and British 
private actors and institutions are also identified. The critical relevance of member-state
41 For the IOSCO case see: Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, "Keeping Governments out o f Politics: Transnational 
Securities Markets, Regulatory Cooperation, and Political Legitimacy," Review o f  International Studies 21 
(1995)., for EU see: Philip Brown, "The Politics o f the EU Single Market for Investment Services: 
Negotiating the Investment Services and Capital Adequacy Directives," in The New World Order in 
International Finance, ed. Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (London: Macmillan Press, 1997)., Benn Steil, 
Competition, Integration and Regulation in EC Capital Markets (London: Royal Institute o f International 
Affairs, 1993)., William D. Coleman and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, "Globalization, Regionalism and the 
Regulation o f Securities Markets," in Regionalism & Global Economic Integration: Europe, Asia and the 
Americas, ed. William D. Coleman and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (London: Routledge, 1998). See generally 
Jonathan Story and Ingo Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the 
Systems (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997).
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domestic structural variables, which is developed in the “new institutionalist” literature,42 
has not been examined previously in the specific context of the CAD/ISD discussions.
The IOSCO case has been less thoroughly researched than the CAD/ISD, and this 
thesis develops a deeper empirical perspective. This perspective includes the role of US 
regulatory, economic and market histories in shaping the SEC’s and Richard Breeden’s 
regulatory preferences and Breeden’s definition of IOSCO’s appropriate international 
regulatory role. These factors also influenced the development of the SEC’s international 
regulatory harmonisation objectives, which evolved from multilateral harmonisation to 
the bilateral promotion of US regulatory norms. The interaction of the EU and Basle 
Committee deliberations with IOSCO’s is also developed. These examinations and these 
findings have not been extensively developed elsewhere. They add to recent research on 
the role of individuals and bounded rationality in decision-making, a relatively 
undeveloped area in international negotiations 43 Additionally, the confusingly small role 
of US private actors in the IOSCO negotiations -  particularly in comparison with private 
actors’ role in the EU deliberations -  is identified and explained.
Theoretically and methodologically this study joins research that assesses 
international policy-formation through examination of relationships between private and 
public actors and institutions, across sub-national, national and supranational levels of 
authority. EU integration and state/market approaches have promoted the value of 
multiple variable analyses of international policy-making.44 The empirical findings of 
this thesis add to the theoretical arguments and conclusions of these scholars in three 
important respects. First, they confirm the value of process-focused, multi-variable, 
analyses to an accurate understanding of how policy-formation develops from the 
interaction of preferences. Second, however, this thesis observes that policy-making 
authority, while influenced by private and public institutions, was still predominantly 
shaped by state preferences. Finally, the value of a synthetic analysis is confirmed by its 
identification of the interactions and limitations of narrower approaches.
42 See Chapter 3 and, inter alia, J.R. Hollingsworth and R. Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The 
Embeddedness o f  Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). And, Story and Walter, 
Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems.
43 See: Odell, Negotiating the World Economy, and John S. Odell, "Bounded Rationality and the World 
Political Economy: The Nature of Decision Making,” in Governing the World's Money, ed. David M. 
Andrews, C. Randall Henning, and Louis W. Pauly (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
44 See, in particular, literature cited in Chapter 3.
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There are four reasons why these cases, and the theoretical questions examined, 
are important in IPE. First, understanding international policy-formation is central to 
both IR and IPE and forms the focus for much of the academic literature. Second, this 
study assesses the utility of core analytical perspectives by synthetically examining 
events in international financial services regulation and international finance.45 Third, as 
noted, international finance operates at the intersection of politics and economics. The 
effective operation of domestic monetary and fiscal policy, and of domestic and 
international regulatory regimes, is increasingly subject to the concurrence of private 
actors and markets. Consequently, the interaction of markets and states is a critical 
concern to IR scholars. Finally, the internationalisation of financial markets has brought 
together previously isolated national policies, institutions and regulations, giving rise to 
the negotiations and analysis that are the focal point of this research. The interaction of 
national policies, shaped by domestic and international institutions, interests and ideas, 
has been a core concern of IPE for many years.46
This study addresses four gaps in the IPE literature addressing financial services 
and analytical perspectives. First, the scholarly literature frequently addresses issues 
related to commercial banking, but it rarely addresses topics that arise in securities or 
investment banking. This is a glaring omission, considering the prominent role of 
securities in capital raising and the internationalisation of capital markets.47 Exceptions
45These areas have recently received considerable analytic scrutiny. See, for example: Cemy, 
"Globalization and the Changing Logic o f Collective Action,” Eric Helleiner, States and the Re-emergence 
o f  Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994)., 
Michael Moran, The Politics o f  the Financial Services Revolution: The USA, UK and Japan (1990)., Louis 
W. Pauly, Who Elected the Bankers?, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997)., and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, "Private Markets and Public Responsibility in a Global 
System: Conflict and Cooperation in Transnational Banking and Securities Regulation," in The New World 
Order in International Finance, ed. G.R.D. Underhill (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1997).
For an overview o f recent IR/IPE related analytical work in international financial services see: Peter 
Dombrowski, "Haute Finance and High Theory: Recent Scholarship on Global Financial Relations," 
Mershon International Studies Review 42, May (1998)..
46 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
47 This omission is being redressed. See: Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: International Finance 
and the State, Tony Porter, States, Markets and Regimes in Global Finance (London: The Macmillan 
Press, 1993), Andrew C. Sobel, Domestic Choices, International Markets: Dismantling National Barriers 
and Liberalizing Securities Markets (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1994), Glenn Tobin, 
"Global Money Rules: The Political Economy o f International Regulatory Cooperation" (Harvard 
University, 1991), G.R.D. Underhill, "States, Markets and Governance. Private Interests, the Public Good, 
and the Democratic Process,” (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2001)., Miroslava 
Filipovic, Governments, Banks and Global Capital: Securities Markets in Global Politics (Aldershot:
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exist, but few studies focus exclusively on securities regulatory development. Second, 
the preponderance of financial services and regulatory research addresses state or 
domestic variables. With notable exceptions (Filipovic,48 Haufler,49 Porter, Sinclair50 and 
Underhill), supranational and private actors are rarely included in analysis. Additionally, 
these scholars infrequently assess private or supranational actors in conjunction with 
hypotheses drawn from EU integration or state/market theories -  or synthetically.51 
Third, research into international regulatory organisations, particularly the Basle 
Committee and IOSCO, has been limited. Basle Committee research focuses primarily
c*y
on the creation of the Basle Accord. Combined Basle Committee and IOSCO research 
has focused on regime formation53 and the difficulty of democratically developing 
international rules with insulated policy communities.54 Few studies assess EU, IOSCO 
and Basle interaction.55 Finally, this study provides new empirical detail concerning the 
specific roles of private actors, domestic economic and political structure and 
multilateral governance mechanisms, facilitating a synthetic assessment of policy­
making authority.
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1997)., and Underhill, "Keeping Governments out o f Politics: Transnational 
Securities Markets, Regulatory Cooperation, and Political Legitimacy".
48 Filipovic, Governments, Banks and Global Capital: Securities Markets in Global Politics.
49 Virginia Haufler, "Crossing the Boundary between Public and Private: International Regimes and Non- 
State Actors," in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995).
50 Timothy J. Sinclair, "Between State and Market: Hegemony and Institutions o f Collective Action under 
Conditions o f International Capital Mobility," Policy Sciences 27, no. 4 (1994).
51 Notable exceptions are Porter, Coleman and Underhill, cited previously.
52 Predominantly attributing the Accord’s development to domestic variables. Kapstein, Governing the 
Global Economy: International Finance and the State and Thomas Oatley and Robert Nabors, 
"Redistributive Co-Operation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle Accord," International 
Organization 52, no. 1 (1998).
53 Porter, States, Markets and Regimes in Global Finance., Filipovic, Governments, Banks and Global 
Capital: Securities Markets in Global Politics, and Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The 
Twilight Existence o f  International Financial Regulatory Organizations.
54 Underhill, "Keeping Governments out o f  Politics: Transnational Securities Markets, Regulatory 
Cooperation, and Political Legitimacy,”
Nancy Worth, "Harmonizing Capital Adequacy Rules for International Banks and Securities Firms," North 
Carolina Journal o f  International Law and Commercial Regulation 18, no. 1 (Fall 1992).
55 See studies by Brown, "The Politics o f the EU Single Market for Investment Services: Negotiating the 
Investment Services and Capital Adequacy Directives,”, Richard Dale and Simon Wolfe, "Capital 
Standards," in The European Equity Markets: The State o f  the Union and an Agenda fo r  the Millennium, 
ed. Benn Steil (London: Royal Institute o f International Affairs, 1996)., and Steil, International Securities 
Market Regulation, in Benn Steil, ed., International Financial Market Regulation (Chichester: John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd., 1994).
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Implications
This study has several research implications. First, analyses based on restrictive 
assumptions or narrow analytical perspectives may be incomplete or may encourage 
misleading conclusions. When observations from narrow and broad perspectives are 
synthesised, factors affecting policy-formation are more accurately revealed and 
evaluated. Additionally, empirical findings from and across different levels of analysis 
should be examined interactively rather than hierarchically and as a process executed 
over time. These conclusions do not invalidate observations of individual perspectives, 
whether narrow or broad. They suggest that, in the case studies, individual observations, 
when analysed synthetically, produce more revealing explanations of authority in policy- 
formation.
Second, the cases indicate that international policy-formation is a function of 
multiple variables. It is, therefore, a complex process. Policy-making does not succeed or 
fail absolutely. It is more likely to reflect a negotiation with gains, losses, and 
compromises. Similarly, the location and composition of authority is the function of a 
range of variables.56 To ensure accurate research, consideration of multiple variables and 
actors is appropriate. Research should also assume that the location and composition of 
authority will vary from case to case.
Third, narrowly focused research may under-appreciate this complexity, a 
complaint of state/market and EU integration scholars. However, non-state centric 
approaches may overstress the role of non-state or market factors in policy-formation, 
undervaluing the persistent and predominant role of state-centred preferences. This 
observation encourages synthetic analysis to identify and overcome the limitations of 
individual perspectives.
Fourth, the cases indicate that EU integration perspectives can be utilised in non- 
EU contexts. The EU is, of course, sui generis. However, the analytical approaches
56 Assuming IOSCO’s negotiations failed and the EU’s succeeded is incomplete. The absence o f shared 
understandings on IOSCO’s objectives doomed its discussions to failure. In contrast, EU negotiators 
agreed on objectives and through difficult negotiations established a capital regime. However, the price of  
cooperation was ineffectual harmonisation.
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spawned by the EU can be usefully exploited to identify the roots of international policy 
formation outside an EU context.
Fifth, state/market analysts’ conflation of authority and influence benefits from 
disaggregation. A broad definition of authority inhibits the identification of specific state 
and non-state sources of influence, of which formal authority is one. In order to 
encourage a deeper examination of influences over policy formation, authority is defined 
more narrowly as formal state authority and as one source of influence among many.
Sixth, the cases indicate that the transformation of state authority and the 
convergence of regulatory norms, both projected consequences of globalisation, were 
limited. International policy-making authority has broadened but is dominated by states 
and state preferences. International regulatory convergence is limited.
Finally, international policy-formation is a dynamic process, involving public and 
private actors who operate across levels of authority. It is not a static or singular event. 
Negotiators change, national and international preferences evolve, markets adjust, and as 
a result, available information, national and international commitments, preferences, and 
institutions all change. This means that authority can be exercised at any stage in a 
negotiation. In the case studies, multivariable, multilevel analyses, focused around broad
cn
questions, produced more accurate and defendable policy-formation research.
Caveats
Complex explanations are not a priori superior to monocausal ones. This is an 
empirical claim that must be proven. Analytical complexity raises concerns about 
pinpointing causation. Non-state centric research addresses these concerns through a 
focus on policy-formation processes and specific topics. These simple observations
57 For example, the combination o f IOSCO’s policy formation failure and the EU’s ineffectual directives 
encouraged closer cooperation between the Basle Committee, IOSCO, EU and private sector agents in 
forming regulation after 1993. This observation encourages research recognition o f the value o f assessing 
the interaction o f observations from different perspectives, across levels o f authority. The creation o f the 
“private” Derivatives Policy Group (“DPG”) by the FRBNY is a specific example. See Chapter 12, 
Appendices and Glossary for definitions and further explication.
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encourage more extensive dynamic comparative research in policy-making -  over time -  
than is typical in US IR/IPE literature.58
Analytical complexity is justified if research subsequently indicates the 
limitations of narrow perspectives or if it produces new interpretations not available 
without a complex analysis. This thesis joins recent studies utilising process 
perspectives59 and EU integration/state/market studies.
Research design
This thesis uses case studies for analysis and employs systematic, focused 
comparison to develop clear causal pathways.60 The thesis examines two cases 
addressing related topics with different outcomes. Case selection was based on several 
criteria: both cases focus on financial services and on securities and capital adequacy.61 
The Basle Accord negotiations (which addressed commercial bank capitalisation) and a 
range of analogous regulatory harmonisation negotiations were excluded because their
58 Excepting, o f course, research conducted by US EU integration scholars. State/market literature is 
associated predominantly with Canadian and British scholars.
59 Christer Jonsson, Superpower: Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Frances 
Pinter, 1984)., Jeffrey W. Knopf, Domestic Society and International Co-Operation: The Impact o f  Protest 
on US Arms Control Policy, ed. Smith. Steve, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998)., and Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic 
Theories o f International Bargaining.”
60 Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method o f Structured, Focused 
Comparison," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren 
(New York: The Free Press, 1979).
61 The EU case highlights the influence o f  state economic structures and o f multilateral and private 
interests. Private actors and associations consistently lobbied and educated the EU and its member-states. 
However, the CAD and ISD were predominantly negotiated by states and by EU representatives. 
Negotiations were characterised by compromise and by the preservation o f  state autonomy. State and 
multilateral actors made independent decisions, sometimes different from the advice o f private actors. In 
the IOSCO case, private authority was rarely present for two reasons: the SEC used its authority (domestic 
and international) to impede alteration o f capitalisation rules and IOSCO was an unattractive lobbying 
target, especially in comparison with the EU and its member-states. But SEC preferences, although 
powerful influences, did not sway other international regulators, and the negotiations collapsed.
Both cases addressed the same objective in the same time frame, and with substantially the same actors. 
Similarities: 1) Same states with the exception of US, 2) general regulatory harmonisation objectives and 
time frame, 3) economic and market sources o f harmonisation objectives, 4) similar market dimensions 
between US and EU, 5) same private actors involved, particularly the most active, US and UK investment 
banks, 6) state and private actor preferences did not vary significantly -  except for the US and, somewhat, 
France, and 7) Basle Committee deliberations impacted both sets o f negotiations.
Differences: 1) Multilateral actors involved (EU and IOSCO), 2) institutional structure and decision­
making capacities o f EU and IOSCO (EU -  supranational, IOSCO -  intergovernmental), 3) state actors 
involved -  IOSCO included the US/SEC, 4) state institutional structure, 5) character o f state 
motivation/commitment to harmonisation, and 6) ability o f private actors to lobby state and multilateral 
actors involved in policy formation.
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focus did not correlate with the EU and IOSCO discussions.62 The cases selected differ 
in the specific explanatory variables identified.63 However, variation in the dependent 
variable (authority) was not artificially correlated with explanatory variable values. The 
theories used to examine the cases are both falsifiable and capable of generating multiple 
observable implications. The approach is not parsimonious. This thesis assumes that the 
world is complex.64
Organisation of study
To provide context, Chapter 2 briefly examines capital market and institutional 
globalisation as well as regulatory harmonisation. Chapter 3 reviews theoretical 
perspectives on international policy-formation and develops hypotheses for the case 
studies. It also discusses synthetic analysis and criticisms of complex, multivariable 
analytical approaches. Chapters 4 through 11 present empirical research findings. The 
final chapter summarises and compares the empirical findings and the accuracy of the 
hypotheses. It then considers the implications of the study’s findings for theory and 
research.
62 Including I AT A discussions on airlines, UNCTAD negotiations on ocean shipping and GATT and WTO 
discussions on financial services.
63 For the EU: the roles o f national institutions, negotiations embedded in wider regional processes, and 
private actors. For IOSCO: dominant domestic preferences.
64 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
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Chapter 2
Securities Firms, Banks, Market Globalisation and 
Regulation
Introduction
This chapter positions the case studies in the evolution of international securities 
markets, firms and regulation. It has several objectives: first, to establish the context for 
the questions addressed by this study; second, to examine securities market globalisation 
and factors affecting regulatory harmonisation; and, finally to consider why regulatory 
harmonisation became an objective for IOSCO, the EU and the Basle Committee.
The chapter highlights rationales and incentives for international regulatory 
harmonisation and variables that define differences between national regulatory systems. 
These variables include the history, structure, and commercial objectives of the financial 
services industry and its relationship with domestic supervisors and regulation. These 
variables are focal points for the EU integration and state/market theoretical literatures 
described in Chapter 3 and shape empirical research for the case studies.
Securities market globalisation
During the 1970s and 1980s, economic and technical advancements spurred the 
globalisation of securities markets1 and the growth and increased interdependence of 
capital markets. These trends were stimulated by market deregulation, the oil crisis of 
the early 1970’s and the elimination of exchange controls in many industrialised
1 “Globalisation” is a highly contested term and topic, referring generally to the international dispersion of 
economic, political, social and technological developments and norms -  and their effect on state 
sovereignty and authority. See, inter alia, Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: 
The International Economy and the Possibilities o f  Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
2 Franklin R. Edwards and Frederic S. Mishkin, "The Decline o f Traditional Banking: Implications for 
Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy,” Economic Policy Review, (July 1995).
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countries. These developments encouraged growth in international trade and in cross- 
border capital flows and spurred the growth of securities markets. Also encouraging 
these phenomena were the increasing size and influence of institutional investors and 
concomitant growth in competition and product innovation among financial services 
providers. These changes enabled investors and borrowers to access capital more 
cheaply through a broader array of products offered through national and international 
markets.
Deregulation and market expansion
Growth in international securities transactions can be traced to specific national 
deregulatory decisions that commenced in the mid-1970s.4
In the US, disintermediation of bank lending was initially encouraged by the 
deregulation of brokerage commission rates in 1975.5 In 1982, the SEC adopted Rule 
415, which simplified public registration requirements for securities and streamlined 
foreign disclosure and reporting requirements. These steps encouraged foreign borrowers 
to enter US securities markets. The SEC’s initiatives were designed to enhance the 
competitiveness of domestic markets and discourage the migration of capital markets 
activity to the growing Euromarkets.
In Europe and Japan domestic market deregulation started in the early 1980s 
coincident with a dramatic increase in Euromarket securities underwriting. Differences in 
the timing of national deregulation were indicative of variations between countries in 
political, economic and commercial factors affecting market operations. They were 
largely a function of the extensiveness of public share ownership (broad in the US, 
limited in Europe and Japan), the ratio of equity and debt in corporate capitalisation 
(balanced in the US, higher debt usage in Europe and Japan) and the nature of 
relationships between financial services institutions and other corporate and state 
interests (arms-length in the US, much closer in Europe and Japan). These factors
3 Terry M. Chuppe, Hugh R. Haworth, and Marvin G Watkins, 'The Securities Markets in the 1980s: A 
Global Perspective,” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1989), from which 
this historical description is adapted.
4 For a detailed discussion see: Steven K. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in 
Advanced Industrial Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
5 SEC, "Fifth Report to Congress on the Effect o f the Absence o f Fixed Rates o f Commissions,” 
(Washington, D.C.: US Securities and Exchange Commission, 1977).
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encouraged the greater use and the faster growth of securities markets in the US than in 
Europe or Japan.
Exchange controls in France, the UK and, partially, in Italy were removed during 
the 1980s. The Japanese MoF permitted the issuance of Yen-denominated Eurobonds. 
Deutschemark, Sterling and other currencies were used for the first time to denominate 
bonds issued in Swiss capital markets. Following the 1986 deregulation of British 
securities markets, France, Canada and Spain opened their domestic markets to greater 
competition.
Increased growth of cross-border securities markets was also encouraged by 
economic and commercial developments that restricted the ability of bank credit markets 
to meet investor demands for flexible and liquid investment vehicles.
International securities markets expansion was preceded by increases in 
Euromarket bank lending in the 1970s. Primarily petrodollar recycling stimulated this 
expansion. The economic recovery of the mid-1980s increased corporate and 
government capital demands. However, persistent government budget deficits limited 
bank credit and encouraged borrowers to access international securities markets, which 
represented a relatively under-exploited supply of capital.6
Also during the 1980s, investors also began to acknowledge that internationally 
diversified portfolios were less risky than portfolios concentrated in domestic assets. The 
development of new financial techniques, including interest rate and currency swaps and, 
later, derivatives, further encouraged the growth of international markets.7 Moreover, the 
characteristics of securities made them increasingly attractive to borrowers and 
underwriters.8
6 Toyoo Gyohten, "Global Financial Markets: The Past, the Future, and Public Policy Questions," in 
Regulating International Financial Markets: Issues and Policies, ed. Franklin R. Edwards and Hugh T. 
Patrick (Boston: Wolters Kluwer, 1992).
7 Joseph A Grundfest, "Internationalization o f  the World's Securities Markets: Economic Causes and 
Regulatory Consequences," Journal o f  Financial Services Research 4 (1990). and David E. Van Zandt, 
"The Regulatory and Institutional Conditions for an International Securities Market," Virginia Journal o f  
International Law  32 (1991).
8 Securities are typically freely marketable and have market-determined prices.
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These factors prompted dramatic growth in cross-border transactions and 
portfolio investment, in the percentage of foreign assets held by financial institutions, 
and in foreign equity listings. Foreign offices of major securities firms also expanded. 
The internationalisation and growing interdependence of capital markets were further 
demonstrated by narrowing interest and exchange rate differentials between national 
markets. As securities issuance increased, commercial bank lending decreased.
Financial institutions* response
International banks’ responses to market globalisation varied significantly. Large 
British clearing banks9 reacted by rapidly expanding into investment and asset 
management. This dramatically increased sectoral competition, particularly for US 
investment and commercial banks that had already established pre-eminent international 
positions in securities underwriting, syndicated lending and mergers and acquisitions 
advisory work. UK and US institutions also aggressively exploited advances in 
technology; increasing their capital investments in trading, settlement, and information 
assessment in order to reduce their personnel and retail expenses.
Large German banks10 expanded very cautiously into international investment 
banking. Deutsche Bank moved its small investment banking operation from Frankfurt to 
London in 1984 but only solidified its commitment to securities-related businesses with 
the 1989 acquisition of Kleinwort Benson, a UK accepting-house.11 Six years later, 
Dresdner Bank acquired another old-line London securities firm, Morgan Grenfell. But 
neither Commerzbank nor WestDeutsche Landesbank made a UK bank acquisition. As a 
result, German banks have consistently lagged behind their US and UK counterparts in 
securities underwriting and investment banking services. German banks also failed to 
rationalise their vast domestic retail operations or adopt information technology 
improvements.
9 The major British “clearing banks” were Barclays, National Westminster, Midland and Lloyds. ‘Clearing 
bank’ refers generally to a financial institution that directly clears cheques or other payment instruments 
with other institutions. Some direct clearers, for a fee, also clear payments on behalf o f other banks and 
non-bank financial institutions.
10 Deutsche, Dresdner, Commerz and WestDeutsche Landesbank were the largest German banks at the 
time.
11 “Accepting house” is an archaic term for a British investment (or “merchant”) bank. Traditionally they 
represented a select group o f UK banks whose main function was ‘accepting’ bills o f exchange, thereby 
facilitating the lending o f money.
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During the 1980s, French banks expanded rapidly into neighbouring retail 
markets and grew their London-based syndicated lending operations. However, their 
expansion into securities businesses was, as with German banks, slow. This was, in part 
because the French Tresor decided French banks should become more like German 
universal banks. But, more generally, French banks’ sluggish entry into securities-related 
businesses was caused by the Tresor’s frequent “interference” with French banks’
1 7business plans and by the nationalisation of the banking sector in 1982. Credit 
Lyonnais, the most aggressive French bank, did acquire a small London merchant bank 
in 1986,13 but generally, the big French banks moved cautiously into international 
securities activities in the 1980s and early 1990s, encouraged by their government to 
focus on developing domestic capital markets in tandem with government-initiated 
domestic regulatory reforms.
The aggressive penetration of US and UK banks into higher margin investment 
and securities businesses was reflected in their higher returns on equity, particularly in 
comparison with German and French financial institutions. Story and Walter attribute 
these disparities in large part to different corporate governance systems.14 US and UK 
institutions are predominantly shareholder-managed. Conceptually, this means that 
institutional and managerial viability is closely tied to market-determined share price 
performance.15 French and German banks are stakeholder-driven institutions. This means 
they are subject to the persistent influence of corporate or state owners and influential 
employee board representatives. It also means that they traditionally focused strategically 
on commercial lending. As a result, both the US and UK have long-standing, powerful 
and influential securities markets, firms, and related infrastructures, which do not exist in 
Germany or France.
12 Referred to generically as dirigisme. See: Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration 
in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems.
13 Alexander Laing & Cruickshank. Societe Generate acquired Hambros Bank in the 1990s. Credit 
Lyonnais, o f course, had to be rescued by the French government in the mid-1990s after a series of 
disastrous international lending initiatives.
14 Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems, p. 
354ff.
15 The equity performance o f technology companies in the 1990s brings this hypothesis into question. 
More specifically, governance systems are only one o f several significant influences on business strategy 
and commercial performance. Other important factors include government regulation, competition, 
economic structure and management skill.
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Regulatory harmonisation
Securities market globalisation was uneven. Deregulation in one market could 
encourage the migration of new issue activity or trading in order to take advantage of 
lower borrowing costs or more favourable regulatory standards. The potential for 
regulatory arbitrage and market contagion acted as incentives for international regulatory 
harmonisation. In addition, deregulatory trends were accompanied by an upsurge in 
scandals associated with financial institutions.16 Globalisation meant that national 
regulatory regimes could be compromised by activities in other jurisdictions.
The principal economic justification for regulatory harmonisation was the 
avoidance of market failure, which could arise from the activities of firms, markets or 
powerful individuals.17 The political rationale was that it would create a “level playing 
field” and discourage a regulatory “race to the bottom” as jurisdictions were deterred 
from regulatory competition or “competition in laxity.”18 These analyses encouraged 
national regulators to develop cooperative regulatory strategies.
As domestic regulators became more aware of international market 
developments, their institutional focus expanded to encompass the potential problems 
caused by differing national regulatory standards. These and other factors stimulated 
discussions between national regulators, which encouraged the development of the Basle 
Capital Accord (“Basle Accord”) in 1988.19 These concerns also encouraged regulators
16 Charles Goodhart et al., Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now? (London: Routledge, 1998).
17 Principally contagion. See: Lawrence J. White, "International Regulation of Securities Markets: 
Competition or Harmonization," in The Industrial Organization and Regulation o f  the Securities Industry, 
ed. Andrew W. Lo (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1996). See also: Uri Geiger, "The Case for 
the Harmonization o f Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market," Columbia Business Law Review 
1997, no. 2&3 (1997).
18 See: Joseph A. Grundfest, "Internationalization o f the World's Securities Markets: Economic Causes and 
Regulatory Consequences," Journal o f  Financial Services Research December, no. 4 (1990).
Paul Guy, "Regulatory Harmonisation to Achieve Effective International Competition," in Regulating 
International Financial Markets: Issues and Policies, ed. Franklin R. Edwards and Hugh T. Patrick 
(Norwell, Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), Roberta S. Karmel, "National Treatment, 
Harmonization, and Mutual Recognition: The Search for Principles for the Regulation o f Global Equity 
Markets" (paper presented at the Capital Market Forum, London, 1993), Steil, Competition, Integration 
and Regulation in EC Capital Markets.
19 Sources o f the Accord included, particularly American, concerns over IMF quota increases and low 
international bank capital levels. These concerns were reflected in the U S’ International Lending 
Supervision Act o f 1983. The Basle Committee’s initially tepid response to US calls for more congruent 
international capital standards; coupled with the collapse/rescue o f US bank Continental Illinois prompted 
the US Federal Reserve to release supplementary capital guidelines in 1986. Fed Chairman Volker 
suggested a joint capital agreement with the Bank o f England, which was announced in 1987. The Accord
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to focus more generally on the control and supervision of global markets and financial 
institutions. If, as regulators suspected, financial institutions were able to avoid 
regulatory oversight and thereby spark negative systemic “events,” then new, 
internationally coordinated, regulatory responses were needed to address these “market 
inefficiencies.”20
However, in the mid-1980s, regulatory harmonisation prospects were 
complicated by the wide diversity of national securities regulatory regimes, supervisory 
entities, and financial services institutional configurations. The US regime dated from the 
1930s, the UK and France had only formalised their regimes in the mid-1980s, and 
Germany had no securities regulatory regime. Differences in regulation and capital 
treatment arose from different market histories, financial services institutional structures 
and regulatory objectives. As bank and securities firm activities expanded internationally 
and pressures to harmonise national regulatory regimes increased, differences between 
banking and securities businesses, as well as differing domestic market and institutional 
structures, were highlighted.
The Relationship of Risk and Regulation
Traditional banking involves taking deposits and extending credit with the 
expectation of repayment. This relationship places a high value on evaluating a 
borrower’s ability to repay. In contrast, securities firms act as financial intermediaries; 
they underwrite and trade securities, but rarely hold them to maturity like loans. For this 
reason, secondary market pricing and liquidity are more important than ability to repay. 
As a result, from a risk management perspective, securities firms typically focus on
followed in 1988. See: Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the State, and 
Tobin, "Global Money Rules: The Political Economy o f International Regulatory Cooperation".
20 Worth, "Harmonizing Capital Adequacy Rules for International Banks and Securities Firms,” A counter 
argument notes that domestic regulation may create market failure by inhibiting the efficient allocation o f  
financial resources by capital markets. As a consequence, regulatory harmonisation may perpetuate 
inefficiencies. This perspective argues that a superior harmonisation approach encourages regulatory 
regimes to compete, which will enhance the overall efficiency o f international capital markets See: George 
J. Benston, "Competition Versus Competitive Equality in International Financial Markets," in Regulating 
International Financial Markets: Issues and Policies, ed. Franklin R. Edwards and Hugh T. Patrick 
(Boston: Kluwer, 1992).
Edward J. Kane, "Tension between Competition and Coordination in International Financial Regulation," 
in Governing Banking's Future: Markets vs. Regulation, ed. Catherine England (Boston: Kluwer, 1991). 
Benn Steil, "Regulatory Foundations for Global Capital Markets," in Finance and the International 
Economy, ed. Robert O'Brien (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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9 1liquidity and market risk while banks focus on credit and repayment risk. This 
distinction has powerful implications for the structure of capital regulations designed to 
mitigate institutional risk.
An additional risk for banks is that a mismatch between funding and lending will 
prevent them from repaying depositors, provoking a funding or cash crisis and a 
potential “run” on the bank.22 Because the provision of bank services, principally 
deposit-taking, is considered a public good, regulators have determined that the 
prevention of catastrophic deposit loss, through regulation and government insurance, is 
appropriate. However, to avoid “moral hazard” regulators (particularly in the US) 
have historically constrained the scope of banks’ business activities to enhance 
institutional safety and soundness.
The relationship of regulation and risk is less clear with securities firms. Their 
principal risks are portfolio liquidity and counterparty default. These risks arise from 
core securities businesses: underwriting, brokerage, and trading. Because a regulator has 
several securities “businesses” on which to base regulation, national regulators’ business 
orientations differ and affect the type of regulation it develops.
This distinction is evident when the securities regulations of the UK, US, France 
and Germany are compared. In the UK, where individual share ownership was 
historically limited, securities regulation was traditionally designed to encourage
9 f \competitive underwriting and trading institutions, not the protection of investors. In the 
US, share ownership has historically been broader, and securities regulation, developed 
following the 1929 market crash, has focused on investor protection rather than 
institutional competitiveness. In Germany and France, limited securities market 
development meant that regulation emphasised different principles, principally support 
for government mandated economic policies. Because securities firms typically do not
21 See Glossary.
22 Securities firms do not accept deposits.
23 Deposit-taking is a public good because banks provide a “safe haven” for depositors’ funds.
24 See Glossary.
25 “Counterparty default” is the failure or inability o f  a party with whom an institution or financial actor 
has entered into a financial transaction, to settle or complete that transaction.
26 The UK’s regulatory orientation shifted to a greater emphasis on investor protection in the late 1990s.
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have access to public safety nets,27 regulators, particularly in the US, have also 
emphasised the promotion of fair and transparent markets. These distinctions were 
critical in the negotiations studied in this thesis.
Institutional Structure and Regulation
Organisational distinctions between banks and securities firms may also differ 
between countries. In Germany, Austria and Switzerland, financial institutions perform 
banking and securities functions through universal banks. In other European countries, 
the historic distinction between banking and securities businesses has evolved toward 
universal banking as well, but sectoral distinctions remain. In some countries, financial 
conglomerates control both types of firms.28 Until 1998, the US kept banking and 
securities activities institutionally separate under the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act 
of 1933. However, over the preceding decade the Act had been weakened through the 
decisions of courts and by commercial banks’ offshore investment banking activities 
conducted under Federal Reserve Regulation K.
Four approaches to securities supervision, based on the institutional structure of 
domestic financial services, are developed by Worth.30 First, central banks or finance 
ministries generally regulate universal banks. This is the case in Germany and 
Switzerland. Second, mixed financial services systems may have bank supervisors 
regulate bank credit and securities activities while separate securities regulators monitor 
brokers and conventional securities firms. France follows this model. Third, as in the 
UK, several national regulators might work together to supervise the same institution. A 
final approach, exemplified by the US, institutionally segregates regulatory oversight,
27 In the US, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) provides limited investor insurance 
against broker bankruptcies. However, SIPC is not a government agency or regulatory authority. It is a 
non-profit, membership corporation, funded by its member securities broker-dealers. It was created by an 
Act o f the US Congress in 1970. See: http://216.181.142.217/sipc/.
28 These countries include: Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. See: Worth, "Harmonizing Capital 
Adequacy Rules for International Banks and Securities Firms.”
29 In 1988, commercial banks were permitted to operate “Section 20” subsidiaries with limited 
underwriting powers.
30 Worth, "Harmonizing Capital Adequacy Rules for International Banks and Securities Firms.”
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assigning securities regulation exclusively to the SEC, and bank supervision to the
'X 1Federal Reserve and other government agencies.
Differing national structures for the provision of financial services are reflective 
of differing perspectives on business and the role of regulation. In universal banking 
countries, financial services regulation traditionally concentrated on credit services, high 
capital levels and overall institutional security. Securities markets were often 
underdeveloped and securities regulation and regulatory institutions rudimentary. In 
mixed countries, securities regulation ranged from the sophisticated, competitive regime 
established by the UK32 to less sophisticated systems focusing primarily on equity 
market management and modest investor protection, as in France. At an extreme, the US 
regulatory model encompassed an independent regulator, a conservative approach to 
capitalisation, and a large, sophisticated securities market.
The extensiveness and location of securities regulatory authority also helps 
distinguish regulatory systems. France, Japan, the UK and the US, countries with 
powerful securities regulators, located authority primarily at the national level. Canada, 
Australia and Germany, countries with less powerful regulators, until recently located
' X ' Xauthority at a provincial or state level.
These historic structural arrangements are deeply embedded in individual 
countries’ economic, political and commercial histories. As a result they have a profound 
impact on national regulatory norms. It should not be surprising, therefore, that 
regulatory harmonisation debates frequently revolved around possible amendments to 
these norms.
The Scope for Harmonisation
In 1990, IOSCO released a report on the scope for international harmonisation of 
domestic capital adequacy standards for securities firms that confirmed the diversity of
31 This model is not completely accurate as the Fed, through its supervision o f commercial banks’ 
securities activities, does impinge on the SEC’s functional regulatory responsibilities. As a result, the US is 
probably closer to Worth’s “mixed” model than it is a distinct model.
2 Under the Financial Services Act o f 1986.
33 Germany now has a national securities regulator, the Bundesaufsichtsamt fur Wertpapier. Australia and 
Canada operate hybrid systems.
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national approaches to securities regulation.34 The US had developed a conservative, 
comparatively inflexible, approach to capitalisation. Securities firms could choose 
between a basic capital adequacy model (aggregate indebtedness could not exceed 15 
times capital) and a model requiring a minimum capital cushion representing at least 2 
percent of customer and customer-related receivables. Japan and the UK permitted 
greater flexibility. The UK allowed firms to minimise capital requirements by employing 
hedging and portfolio diversification.
British and Japanese capitalisation provisions both incorporated graduated 
securities classifications based on the liquidity of securities held in investment firms’ 
portfolios. In contrast, the US simply defined securities as either “readily marketable” or 
“not readily marketable” and imposed a unilateral 15 percent charge against all equity 
securities. US regulation did not include portfolio diversification in determining required 
capital.
Another factor differentiating national regulatory regimes was portfolio valuation 
methodology. In the US and UK, securities firms were required to value asset portfolios 
at current, rather than historic, market prices.35 Other countries (e.g., Germany and 
Japan) valued assets at original, historic cost. This latter practice camouflaged the current 
value of a firm’s securities inventory. US securities laws were promulgated in 1933, and 
significantly updated in 1975 and 1991; British rules were promulgated in 1986, French 
and Japanese in 1989.36
Early Harmonisation Efforts
In addressing the consequences of globalisation, regulators’ principal objectives 
were the maintenance of regulatory authority over multinational institutions and the 
prevention of systemic problems. When the EU and IOSCO began their regulatory
34 Technical Committee IOSCO, "Capital Requirements for Multinational Securities Firms,” (Montreal: 
International Organization o f Securities Commissions, 1990).
35 This is referred to as “marking to market.”
36 In general, irrespective o f national rules, large international securities firms maintained capital levels in 
excess o f minimum requirements. This accommodated unexpected capital demands and acted as a 
marketing tool.
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harmonisation discussions in 1987/88, regulators had limited experience in crafting 
multilateral responses to globalisation.37
Euromarket growth spurred the G-10 central bank governors to create the Euro­
currency Standing Committee38 in 1962. The 1974 Herstatt bank crisis led the G-10 
governors and the BIS to form the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision in order to 
ensure adequate supervisory oversight of banks’ domestic and international activities. 
These committees were established to ensure that regulatory responsibilities were clear 
in a financial crisis. In 1975, the Basle Committee released the Basle Concordat, 
establishing the principle that home country regulators were responsible for supervision 
of their domestic banks’ international activities.40
Financial crises have often prompted the development of international regulatory 
standards and supervisory forums. Harmonised capital adequacy standards are an 
example. In 1982, the Mexican debt crisis and the collapse of Banco Ambrosiano 
encouraged the examination of bank capital adequacy. This exercise culminated in the 
adoption of the Basle Capital Accord in 1988 and the subsequent international 
discussions on capital adequacy for securities firms.
Four roughly contemporaneous developments encouraged securities regulators to 
initiate discussions on the harmonisation of capital adequacy regulation. These included: 
market globalisation and securitisation; the October 1987 stock market crash, which 
graphically demonstrated the interconnectedness of domestic capital markets; the 
successful conclusion of Basle Capital Accord in 1988, which established a precedent for 
international capital harmonisation; and finally, the 1985 development of the EU’s 1992 
Single Market program, which established specific regional regulatory harmonisation 
objectives.41
37 For a detailed discussion see William R. White, "International Agreements in the Area o f Banking and 
Finance: Accomplishments and Outstanding Issues,” (Basle: Bank for International Settlements, 1996).
38 To monitor Euromarket developments. It was created under the auspices o f the BIS.
39 See: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm.
40 This understanding was modified in 1981; home country supervision would be managed on a 
consolidated basis. See: Andrew Walter, World Power and World Money, Revised ed. (Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). p. 227.
41 The 1987 stock market crash and the EU’s 1992 Single Market objectives are described in the case 
studies. The Basle Capital Accord is examined in Appendices B and C.
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Following promulgation of the Basle Capital Accord, the Basle Committee and 
EU both considered expanding it to accommodate additional risks, including market 
risks associated with equity positions held by commercial banks. Separately, as part of 
the EU’s Single Market program, the EU Financial Services Commission drafted the ISD 
in 1988, providing a “single passport” for securities firms and mirroring provisions 
available to banks in the SBD.42 The CAD was drafted shortly afterward to address 
harmonisation of securities firms’ capital, also mirroring SBD provisions. Multilateral 
consultation was expanded to incorporate IOSCO because bank and securities firm 
market risks overlapped. Separately, IOSCO released its 1989 study on the 
harmonisation capital adequacy standards, which identified a “need for a common 
conceptual framework.”43 IOSCO’s report actually highlighted two needs: addressing 
gaps in the Capital Accord and developing a common international understanding of 
capital for securities firms. A 1990 IOSCO report outlined the scope for international 
regulatory harmonisation.44 As a consequence of these efforts, three multilateral 
institutions, the EU, IOSCO, and the Basle Committee, each addressed itself to the 
development of harmonised capital adequacy standards for securities firms and securities 
portfolios. But by 1993, only the EU had ratified a capitalisation standard. IOSCO 
abandoned its efforts in that year. Also in 1993, the Basle Committee, focused more on 
developing regulatory standards for banks than securities firms, released a limited bank 
equity capitalisation proposal. The Committee’s standards immediately superseded the 
standards just adopted by the EU a few months earlier.
Market globalisation, financial crises, and conflicting regulatory precedents 
created incentives for international harmonisation of securities capitalisation standards. 
However, distinctions in the structure and historic role of national securities markets, and 
in approaches to securities regulation, ensured that international harmonisation would 
generate conflicts.
The next chapter examines theoretical bases and develops hypotheses for 
analysing the EU and IOSCO negotiations.
42 See Glossary.
43 Technical Committee, IOSCO, "Capital Adequacy Standards for Securities Firms,” (Montreal: 
International Organization o f Securities Commissions, 1989).
44 IOSCO, "Capital Requirements for Multinational Securities Firms".
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Chapter 3
Perspectives on Authority and Influence
Introduction
This study seeks to assess authority and influence in international policy-making 
by examining the development of international regulations that address the capital 
adequacy of securities firms. The central question is whether policy-making authority 
has migrated away from the state. The thesis investigates this question by assessing 
arguments addressing the best way to understand both the exercise of authority and the 
resulting patterns of securities market governance across levels of analysis and a range of 
actors. If regulatory authority has migrated away from the state, why, how, and to
whom? State-centric theoretical approaches emphasise the role of unitary states or state
1 *) institutions on policy-formation. Non-state centric theoretical perspectives argue that
globalisation and related factors have caused authority to migrate away from states to
private and supranational actors and institutions and that they have encouraged policy-
formation processes to spill across borders. Non-state centric theorists argue further that
migration has also contributed to the “transformation” of international authority by
diluting state power and by empowering private and supranational actors and institutions.
These perspectives also argue that these forces encourage regulatory norms to converge
onto a single set of standards. This thesis evaluates these arguments by examining
empirical findings from the case studies of EU and IOSCO negotiations.
Empirical evidence is assessed against hypotheses that describe contrasting 
analytical perspectives. These perspectives range along a continuum defined, inter alia, 
by the degree to which supranational, state and private actors or institutions predominate
1 These include realist and institutionalist perspectives, as well as perspectives based on analysis o f the 
impact o f domestic structures and bargaining on state policy-formation.
2 “Non-state centric theoretical perspectives” refers primarily to state/market, and EU integration 
perspectives. The continuum o f theoretical perspectives is described in this Chapter 3.
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in international policy-making. The extreme limits of this continuum reflect state and 
non-state authority in policy-formation.3 Other variables potentially affecting authority 
include economic, political and regulatory structures and the relationship and 
participation of policy-communities in policy-making. A secondary objective of this 
study is to assess the efficacy of state centric and non-state centric analytical perspectives 
in defining the character of authority in international policy-formation.
The continuum describes intellectual and research progression in IPE from 
narrow, idealised analyses focused on specific variables (state centric perspectives) to 
broader, more realistic analyses of a spectrum of potentially interrelated variables (non­
state centric perspectives).4 However, the analytical objective is more than the binary 
determination of whether state or non-state actors are authoritative or influential in 
international policy-making. Non-state centric theorists argue that policy-making 
encompasses state, private and transnational actors and institutions. This implies a 
diminution in state authority. Their objective is to assess empirical findings derived from 
multiple levels of analysis in order to understand the developmental process of 
international policy-making. This thesis’ study of this process seeks to identify the 
relative accuracy of hypotheses highlighting contrasting theoretical perspectives, in order 
to locate and assess the sources and structure of authority in international policy­
making.5 However, since analytical perspectives are limited by the variables they 
evaluate, further objectives of this thesis are to expand the range of variables assessed 
and to compare and contrast observations from differing theoretical perspectives in order 
to develop new insights.
This thesis examines a spectrum of perspectives on policy formation and 
develops hypothesised predictions for the case studies. The current chapter explores the
3 Jayasuriya defines these limits as “corporatist state” (positive coordination) and “competition state” 
(negative coordination) based on the degree o f state control (positive coordination) over policy-formation. 
See: K. Jayasuriya, "Globalization and the Changing Architecture o f the State: The Regulatory State and 
the Politics o f Negative Coordination," Journal o f  European Public Policy 8, no. 1 (2001). Cited in: Daniel 
Muegge, "The Governance o f the European Securities Industry: From the Investment Services Directive to 
Lamfalussy" (University o f Amsterdam, 2002).
4 As noted earlier in Chapter 1, proponents o f non-state centric perspectives argue that this continuum also 
describes the evolution o f international policy-making. They have observed the “transformation” o f the 
state’s role in international policy-formation, referring to the evolution o f international policy formation 
into a multi-level process involving supranational, state, domestic and private variables, all with potential 
influence. It also implies a diminution in state authority.
5 A “by-product” o f dynamic comparative analysis, encompassing distinctive perspectives, is the 
identification o f perspectives that are more accurate than others in explaining policy-formation.
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strengths and weaknesses of a range of perspectives, extending from state-centric 
structural, domestic and bargaining approaches to non-state centric EU integration and 
state/market approaches. Each is assessed by examining its main arguments.6 It is, of 
course, difficult to assign analytical perspectives precisely to state or non-state centric 
“camps.” Few perspectives are exclusively state or non-state centric; virtually all 
acknowledge, in varying degrees, the influence of non-state actors. State and non-state 
centric expressions of these perspectives are used to generate contrasting hypotheses. 
Finally, this chapter examines research methodology and criticisms of complex 
approaches to analysis.
This thesis also considers whether it is possible to examine observations 
generated by different theoretical perspectives and to develop new or unique conclusions 
regarding the sources of regulatory authority. This examination does not simply assess a 
wider field of observations.7 Instead, it facilitates a “conversation” between analytical 
observations developed from different perspectives, state and non-state centric, to 
determine whether new conclusions can be developed about the policy-formation 
process. This examination is referred to as a “synthetic” analysis.
IR/IPE studies, especially in the US, have been dominated by state-centric, 
“rational choice”8 analytical approaches. These argue that states, whether unitary or 
disaggregated, represent dominant international decision-making authority. Since the late 
1970s,9 these arguments have been challenged by analytical perspectives that stress the 
influence of non-state, private, sub-national and supranational actors and institutions. 
They explicitly acknowledge that authority lies on a continuum. They were particularly 
encouraged by changes in the legal structure of the EU in the mid-1980s and by earlier 
research initiated by Susan Strange, Ernst Haas, Robert Keohane and others.10 These
6 The theoretical perspectives described do not attempt to encompass the universe o f IPE perspectives.
7 This is, in essence, what a non-state centric analytical approach does.
8 Also referred to as “positivist.”
9 As discussed in this chapter, “functionalist” research by Ernst Haas, David Mitrany, Karl Polanyi and 
others predates the late 1970s resurgence in neo-functionalist and state/market research.
10 These research programs did not insist on the decision-making authority o f the state, but observed 
instead that governance norms could also be shaped and enforced by non-state actors and institutions.
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studies brought EU integration research, and IR/IPE with it, through the “dark ages”11 of 
state-centred analysis, enhancing analytical substance significantly.
The Contours of Authority
The specific roles of agents and institutions are significant in understanding the
formation of governance norms and the structure of authority. Policy-making establishes
governance, defined as “the intentional regulation of social relationships
and...underlying conflicts by reliable and durable means and institutions, instead of the
1
direct use of power and violence.”
Governance in the international sphere operates as a set of rules for the 
interaction of actors and institutions. But this does not describe how authority and 
influence operate in forming international rules. Governance is defined by a (typically) 
non-coercive process of setting up regulatory boundaries within which actors and
1Tinstitutions interact. But governance depends on recognition and enforcement, which in 
turn depend on legitimate authority and influence. These variables define how policy­
making determines governance norms and how governance operates.
This thesis contrasts two definitions of authority. The first defines authority 
narrowly14 as the right to perform certain actions, including the right to make laws. This 
definition links authority with legitimacy and with explicit power.15
11 R.O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s," in The New European 
Community. Decision-making and Institutional Change, eds. R.O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann (Boulder: 
Westview, 1991).
12 M. Jachtenfuchs, "The Governance Approach to European Integration," Journal o f  Common Market 
Studies 39, no. 2 (2001). quoting M. Ziim, Regieren Jenseits des Nationalstaates. Globalisierung und 
Denationalisierung als Chance (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998). Young concurs with Ziim that 
“...governance involves the establishment and operation o f social institutions capable o f resolving 
conflicts, facilitating cooperation, or, more generally, alleviating collective-action problems in a world of 
independent actors.” Young defines ‘social institutions’ as: “rules o f the game that serve to define social 
practices, assign roles, and guide interactions among the occupants o f these roles.” (See: Oran Young, 
International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1994)., p. 15). Keohane and Nye define governance as “the processes and institutions, both formal 
and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities o f a group.” (See: Robert O. Keohane and 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Introduction," in Governance in a Globalizing World, ed. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and John 
D. Donahue (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000)).
13 Governance can operate formally and informally.
14 Two variants o f this definition o f authority exist: the first derives from legitimacy and utility and the 
second, from the unconditional relationship between ruler and ruled. These conceptions hinge on a 
construction o f governance that rests on authority, defined as a social relationship, where “decisions issued 
by one actor are expected to be obeyed by a second.” See: Kim Scheppele and Karol Soltan, "The
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A second definition, developed by Susan Strange and preferred by state/market 
theorists, defines authority broadly, as “structural power.” This definition conflates 
authority with power and influence.16
Both conceptions of authority rest on compliance based on legitimacy and utility. 
More specifically, they depend on “recognition,” which derives from context-based 
expertise and/or power.17 However, a general definition of authority does not help to 
differentiate the roles of state and non-state actors in policy-formation. Both state and 
non-state actors may express legitimacy or utility -  and authority. A more precise 
definition of authority, based on its source, helps differentiate types of authority from 
other potential sources of influence.18 Policy is formed by the interaction of formal 
authority and other sources of influence. Rather than combine variables as Strange does, 
each variable may be separately identified and examined: formal authority implies the
Authority o f Alternatives," in Authority Revisited: Nomos XXIX, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. 
Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1987). The second concept hinges on the recognition 
that, for example, words uttered by a ruler (or other authoritative entity) must be accepted, unconditionally, 
as authoritative. This description implies that authority lies at the centre o f a relationship between ruler, 
rules, ruled and response. The first definition is defined above. Under this definition authority is elastic, 
referring to any system o f  social or political guidance considered legitimate and demonstrating utility by 
those to whom it applies. This Weberian conception does not focus on specific rules or methodologies, but 
argues that authority rests on “a particular type o f attitude among a people regarding the mode of  
subordination to which they are subject.” (Weber famously defined three types o f  authority systems: 
charismatic, traditional, and legal-rational. This study focuses on the last system. See: Miller, "Authority.”)
15 Ibid., and from which this section is adapted.
16 See also earlier discussion on page 21. Structural power “confers the power to decide how things shall 
be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate 
to corporate enterprises. The relative power o f each party in the relationship is more, or less, if  one party is 
also determining the surrounding structure o f the relationship.” Strange, o f course, includes brute force in 
her definition o f structural power, which authority excludes. Strange also posited “Relational Power,” a 
simpler, realist notion o f power. See. Strange, States and Markets.
17 This assertion is, however, contested, as it goes to the ability o f authority and autonomy to co-exist. This 
has led to the development o f a taxonomy o f the constituent parts o f authority: first, there must be means to 
recognise those entitled to positions o f authority (who may be formal or informal), and second, 
authoritative rulings must be grounded in legitimacy, based on expertise or superior knowledge for which 
intellectual (or experiential) authority is the archetype. This characterisation stresses the importance o f  
recognising that context defines the balance between these concepts and the ability or need to balance 
authority with independent judgement. Finally, authority is a “human artifice” depending on human 
recognition.
18 Weber defined power as “the probability that one actor in a social relationship w ill.. ..carry out his own 
will’ against the resistance o f others.” (See: Weber, M, Economy and Society, vol. I., ed., G. Roth and C. 
Wittich, New York, Bedminster, 1968, quoted in Miller, Political Thought, p. 400.) This definition implies 
that one actor compels another’s compliance. Influence is defined as the ability “to affect or alter by 
indirect or intangible means.” (See: Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA:
G.&C. Merriam Co., 1963). This implies an indirect avenue to policy-formation based on persuasion or 
other means. These definitions associate formal or explicit authority with power, distinguishing it from 
influence. Power, authority and influence are, o f course, closely related. They describe the ability o f one 
actor to get another actor to do something -  directly or indirectly -  that it might otherwise not do.
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right to make rules; influence and power both define additional potential “inputs” into 
policy-formation, one of which may be informal authority based on utility or 
legitimacy.19 This defines authority as one, differentiated, form of influence. Each 
variable may express inputs with legitimacy and utility and each may operate discretely 
in policy-formation.20 Acknowledging this possibility focuses analytical attention on the
91multiple sources of influence and the process of international policy-making.
An Analytical Taxonomy
Benjamin Cohen distinguishes two broad theoretical perspectives on international 
policy-making, “outside-in” and “inside-out,”22 and he uses “level of analysis” to 
differentiate influences on policy-formation. An outside-in explanation, typically 
presented as either institutionalist or realist/neo-realist, is based on structural or systemic 
variables. An inside-out explanation is based on analysis of domestic or societal 
considerations, particularly how competition between domestic interests and institutions 
influences interstate cooperation.23 Each perspective privileges analytical variables and 
causative agents. However, despite their different analytical focuses, these perspectives 
have a common view on the primary location of international rule-making authority;
19 “Informal authority” may include contextual or moral components.
20 This observation is refined in a distinction made by Ziim about state and non-state analytic biases. 
Traditional state-focused analyses revolve around the power or authority o f states or institutions in conflict 
resolution. Non-state oriented analyses emphasise a greater variety o f paths to successful governance, 
which do not necessarily operate through or incorporate the state or state institutions for validation, 
credibility or authority. Authority may rest with states or it may rest with non-state actors and institutions. 
See: M. Ziim, Regieren Jenseits des Nationalstaates. Globalisierung und Denationalisierung als Chance 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1998). Quoted in Jachtenfuchs, "The Governance Approach to European 
Integration".
21 Contemporary theories o f legitimacy come in three basic forms: those that derive legitimacy from 
“immanent” or “divine” traditions, those that limit legitimacy to rationally accepted conventions governing 
citizen/state relations, and, finally, theories insisting that norms and standards are pervasive and 
conventionalised, implying “discursive consent” to patterns o f living or acting. The second option implies 
explicit consent. The third option, reflected in the work of Habermas, broadens the definition o f legitimacy 
to encompass practices, standards and norms previously considered private or market-derived as 
increasingly shaped by power and politics. See: J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. T. McCarthy 
(Boston: Beacon, 1973). and W.E. Connolly, "Legitimacy," in Political Thought, ed. D.W Miller, et al. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
22 Cohen, "Phoenix Risen; the Resurrection o f Global Finance.” See also: Sobel, Domestic Choices, 
International Markets: Dismantling National Barriers and Liberalizing Securities Markets, and Kenneth 
N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
23 Cohen actually prefers a tripartite analytical typology, which he defines by reference to “systemic (or 
structural)”, “domestic (or unit)”, and “cognitive” levels o f  analysis. This approach expands on state- 
centric perspectives.
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states24 are principal policy-makers and allocate only limited authority to either 
supranational or sub-national institutions or actors.
Cohen’s two-level model serves as a theoretical starting point for describing a 
taxonomy of analytical perspectives based on their state/non-state causative emphases.
of\ 01Analytical concepts developed by Putnam, Moravcsik, and Milner build a third, 
“bargaining” analytical perspective, which links structural and domestic perspectives and 
introduces non-state actors and institutions into analysis. Odell29 expands this linkage by 
introducing the variable of time by examining the “process” of policy formation
EU integration and state/market perspectives expand on bargaining 
perspectives.30 EU integration encompasses “middle-level” theories emphasising the 
ability of domestic and supranational actors and institutions to influence policy-
*3 i
formation, independently and across levels of authority. State/market perspectives 
identify state and market authority components in policy-formation. Both perspectives 
explore the relocation and re-balancing of authority in reaction to intensifying 
regionalisation or globalisation. Both research programs continue to expand empirical 
focus beyond state actors and institutions, identifying additional sources of authority and 
governance.32
24 That is, state actors and institutions.
25 Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level 
Governance.”
26 Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.”
27 Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories o f International Bargaining,".
28 Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations.
29 Odell, Negotiating the World Economy.
30 Non-state perspectives grew, in part, out o f David Mitrany’s research, which encouraged Ernst Haas to 
explore non-state oriented approaches to the development o f international governance norms. Haas’s 
empirical research focused on multilateral institutions and other supranational actors, especially those that 
proved difficult to assess adequately using prevailing state-centric paradigms. In particular, the 
development o f powerful EU regional institutions confounded analyses premised on the decision-making 
authority o f  states. The mid-1980s enhancement of EU institutional authority through the adoption o f the 
SEA and TPU further encouraged this research program. EU integration research was complemented by 
research programs o f Keohane/Nye and Strange, both prompted by the early consequences o f  
globalisation. Each emphasised the role o f non-state institutions and actors. Keohane worked within a 
substantially positivist framework while Strange, though often referred to as a realist, promoted an 
analytical platform stressing economic and political structures and processes rather than states or 
parsimonious research equations.
31 Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level 
Governance.”
32 The definition o f “state” can be confusing. States are not defined as unitary. They are comprised o f  
public actors and institutions, which represent or act through national governmental organs, as well as non­
governmental actors and institutions. Where state is used in the text it refers to the first component o f a 
“state.”
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The juxtaposition of these perspectives along an intellectual continuum prompts 
the central empirical and theoretical questions of this research; where is policy-making 
authority located and which perspective best explains international policy formation 
influence?
Theoretical Perspectives
This section assesses five theoretical perspectives ranging from state-centric to 
non-state centric. This discussion is divided into sections corresponding to the analytical 
perspectives assessed: 1) structural (neo-realism and institutionalism), 2) domestic 
(preference, institutional and ideational), 3) bargaining, 4) EU integration, and 5) 
state/market perspectives on policy-formation. The degree to which authority and 
influence in policy-formation rests predominantly with the state distinguishes the three 
initial approaches from EU integration and state/market theoretical perspectives. The 
latter two perspectives more explicitly acknowledge the potential for linkage between 
and across levels of analysis. The movement from state to non-state centric represents a 
broadening of conceptual and empirical focus, a move from an idealised analytical view 
to a more complex and realistic one. These five perspectives do not represent “bright- 
line” theoretical distinctions nor do they represent a smooth, two-dimensional 
continuum.33
State/non-state theoretical distinctions raise an additional question: “Can the roles 
of supranational or intergovernmental actors, such as IOSCO, the EU or the Basle 
Committee, be assessed using state-centric perspectives?”34 This question is relevant 
because the perspectives do not explicitly assume that intergovernmental actors should 
be analysed in the same manner as states. Additionally, EU integration perspectives, 
particularly MLG,35 treat EU analysis as sui generis. This question is answered 
affirmatively in this thesis. Intergovernmental actors share many characteristics with 
states, which argues for substantially similar analytical treatment. Supranational actors,
33 As mentioned, with the exception o f neo-realism, these perspectives all, to varying degrees, 
acknowledge the potential influence o f non-state actors and institutions as variables.
34 See discussion o f  Hix/Hurrell/Menon debate in footnote 109 on page 72. This question is related to the 
contention that EU integration perspectives are sui generis to the EU, which is addressed separately.
35 “MLG” or multi-level governance is defined below.
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as well as state and private actors, can be understood both as unitary and differentiated. 
Internal differentiation arises from the contrasting preferences of members and 
institutions, their review and ratification procedures, their governance mechanisms, their 
underlying principles and objectives, their distinctive, independent bureaucracies, and 
their memberships. Like states, intergovernmental actors are influenced by their 
members, by other supranational actors, and by public and private interest groups. 
Supranational actors have a “domestic” polity similar to states, comprised of their 
members.
A significant distinction between states and intergovernmental actors is that 
intergovernmental actors are typically not subject to election pressures. However, their 
members generally are and, as a consequence, the pressures and motivations attendant on 
politicians domestically are reflected in the actions of intergovernmental assemblies. A 
further significant distinction is that intergovernmental actors make collective decisions 
and recommendations regarding states. This differentiates state and intergovernmental 
actor roles but does not necessitate different analytical treatment.
Structural Perspectives
Neo-realism
Neo-realism lies at the extreme state-centric end of the policy-formation 
spectrum. It argues that unitary states survive in a competitive, anarchic world by 
amassing power. Power, not legitimacy, gives states the ability to determine 
international governance standards, should any be established.37 Order and stability are 
achieved by balancing the objectives of competitive states. A more refined view argues 
that states are pre-eminent, unitary, decision-making actors in the international system.39 
Institutions are insignificant. Governance norms can be established hegemonically or
36 “Ability” does not equate to authority, as legitimacy is not necessarily included.
37 See, e.g., E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919 - 1939, an Introduction to the Study o f  International 
Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1946)., Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense o f  the National 
Interest (1951)., Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace, 5 th 
Edition (1978)., and Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony o f  American History (1952).
38 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.
39 Neo-realism has also been called “structural realism” See Charles Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Co­
operation as Self Help," International Security 19 (1994/1995). Other neo-realists include Robert Gilpin, 
The Political Economy o f  International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
K. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (Addison-Wesley, 1979). and Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and 
the Limits o f  Co-operation: A Realist Critique o f the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International 
Organization 42 (1988).
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where agreement is prompted by one state respecting another’s right to protect its 
autonomy.40 But major obstacles exist: interstate relationships are antagonistic, 
cooperation is temporary, and states increase their security by maximising their power. 
Moreover, governance arrangements can limit independence, produce uneven relative 
gains, or encourage defections and cheating 41
The analytical shortcomings of neo-realism stem from its narrow focus on power 
and its unitary conceptualisation of states. By defining state preferences as the interests 
of the most powerful actor, this perspective ignores potentially significant distinctions 
between competing supra and sub-national interests.42 The significance of non-state 
actors does not arise solely from their association with states or through power but could 
arise, for example, through context-based expertise. In developing international 
standards, non-state actors may even make policies that are not in states’ interest43 An 
example is found in bond-rating agencies.44
Neo-realism fails to answer obvious questions raised by the different outcomes of 
the cases. For example, neo-realism explains EU and member-states’ support for the 
CAD and ISD as a function of efforts to improve their international regulatory stature. 
But it fails to explain how agreement among EU member-states was achieved. This is 
particularly critical in understanding the structure of authority and influence, because 
empirical examination reveals that starkly differing regulatory preferences within core 
EU member-states -  Germany, France and Britain -  were reconciled. In the other case 
study, realism explains IOSCO’s failure as a consequence of a stalemate between
40 See, for example: Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure o f International Trade," World 
Politics 28, April (1976), David Lake, Power, Protection and Free Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1988)., and Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression: 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University o f  
California Press, 1973).
41 John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise o f International Institutions," International Security Winter, no. 
19(1994).
42 See: John E. Richards, "Toward a Positive Theory o f International Institutions: Regulating International 
Aviation Markets," International Organization 53, no. 1 (1999). who cites Baldev Raj Nayar, "Regimes, 
Power, and International Aviation," International Organization 49, no. 1 (1995). Realism also risks 
misinterpreting circumstances where powerful actors defer to weaker actors or make decisions that are not 
in their self-interest. Ibid. See also: Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life 
on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics 43, no. 3 (1991). for a further example o f this approach.
43 A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, eds., Private Authority and International Affairs, 
(Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1999).
44 Sinclair, "Between State and Market: Hegemony and Institutions o f Collective Action under Conditions 
o f International Capital Mobility.”
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balanced, but opposed states, the UK and the US. However, it fails to explain why the 
UK and the US adopted different regulatory preferences in the first place.45
Institutionalism46
Institutionalism assumes a larger role for mutual interests and international 
institutions in mediating interstate relations, but it adopts neo-realist assumptions47 
Guided by microeconomic theory, institutionalists argue that international actors try to 
maximise mutual interests through the promotion of international, cooperative 
institutions and mutually acceptable regime norms.
This optimistic perspective views international society as dynamic rather than 
static; states trade autonomy and power to approach Pareto optimality.49 Power and 
autonomy remain prominent influences, and unitary states remain primary decision­
makers. Keohane and other institutionalists expand concepts of authority and actors by 
placing greater emphasis on legitimate authority, expressed through regimes, rather than 
brute power.50 Authority may be concentrated or dispersed but is not based on hegemony 
or power. Instead, it is represented by institutions and regimes created by states to 
organise and manage international society. Institutions and regimes promote shared
45 For a less pessimistic view o f realism’s analytical utility see: Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg, 
"Interview with Ken Waltz," Review o f  International Studies 24, no. 3 (1998)., Jack Donnelly, "Realism: 
Roots and Renewal," Review o f  International Studies 24, no. 3 (1998)., and Barry Buzan, David Held, and 
Anthony McGrew, "Realism Vs. Cosmopolitanism: A Debate," Review o f  International Studies 24, no. 3 
(1998).
46 Scholars have used various names to describe this perspective including “liberal institutionalism”, 
“rationalist institutionalism”, “neo-liberal institutionalism”, and “neo-liberalism”. Although some scholars 
accord unique significance to each characterisation, I have used the term “institutionalism” to describe this 
approach, which challenges neo-realism from similar premises. See: Robert J. Beck, "Institutionalist 
Approaches," International Rules 3 (1996).
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). and Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State 
Power: Essays in International Relations Theory 3 (1989).
47 Institutionalism adopted neo-realist assumptions, in part, to emphasise that cooperation can emerge 
despite neo-realist cynicism.
48 Institutionalists argue that rational states seek utility maximisation and that power asymmetries do not 
necessarily discourage cooperation.. Robert Keohane argues that an emphasis on asymmetries is “illogical” 
when cooperation develops significant mutual gains and states are not threatened by force. See: Keohane, 
After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.
4 Governance norms, even restrictive norms, may be acceptable if  they lead to other gains.
50 States develop regimes or institutions to resolve market failure and promote mutual interests. State or 
non-state actors may in turn, influence market failure and mutual interests. Institutions enforce regime or 
governance norms by encouraging reciprocal relationships. See: Robert O. Keohane, "International 
Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988).
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benefits that move states closer to Pareto frontiers.51 This is accomplished by 
encouraging mutually beneficial agreements, transparency and regime compliance.52
The decision of states to establish regulatory regimes vests these institutions with 
authority. Non-compliance attracts penalties and/or market censure. This distinguishes 
institutionalism from realism, but still locates authority principally with states. 
However, institutionalism introduces non-state-centric analysis and has encouraged non­
state centric enquiry.54 Keohane/Nye’s theory of complex interdependence rejects a 
restrictive focus on state sovereignty. Their definition of regimes as “sets of governing 
arrangements... networks of rules, norms and procedures that regularize behaviour and 
control its effects,” implicitly assumes that regimes may be created in response to non­
state centric concerns.55
Institutionalism’s main contributions come from its acknowledgment of 
influential non-state actors, its non-static perspective and its argument that regimes and 
institutions help organise international society and promote regulatory convergence.
Research programs led by Strange, Puchala, Hopkins, Young and Keohane/Nye56
C7
examined regime concepts. Their observations encouraged the development of cross- 
border and multi-level neo-functionalist organising concepts.
51 Keohane defines regimes as “persistent and connected set(s) o f rules (formal and informal) that prescribe 
behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectation.” Keohane, International Institutions and State 
Power: Essays in International Relations Theory 3. Krasner’s well-known definition described regimes as 
“sets o f implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes 
and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," International Organization 36, no. 2 
(1982).
52 Compliance may be realised through institutional enforcement o f regime guidelines or rules or through 
self-enforcement or self-compliance. See Lisa Martin, "Theories and Empirical Studies o f International 
Institutions," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998).
53 States remain the major analytical focus; they create regimes, may act contrary to regime rules, and can 
enter or leave regimes. This focus is consistent despite institutionalism’s emphasis on lowering transaction 
costs and increasing predictability, accomplished through the “conditioning effect” o f existing 
relationships (the “shadow o f the future”) and the fear o f reciprocal regime enforcement. Robert Axelrod 
and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (1993).
54 See generally: Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995).
55 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). p. 19.
56 See page 59.
57Strange, presaging her state/market perspective, argued that regimes were epiphenomena. She identified 
underlying economic and political variables, influenced by public and private actors, as changing 
behaviour and outcomes. (See: Susan Strange, "Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique o f  Regime Analysis,"
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But institutionalism is limited by its adoption of neo-realist assumptions. 
Exploration of the potential authority of domestic or supranational variables is ignored or 
assumed, defined as a source of “residual variance.”58 Like neo-realists, institutionalists 
assume state preferences are “exogenously given”59 and do not evolve.60 By assuming 
that states create regimes to address market failure, institutionalism ignores potentially 
significant investigative avenues: “Do regimes address issues other than market failure?” 
or “Can non-state actors create regimes?” This limits examination of potential 
relationships between regime development, structure, and distributional consequences 
and discourages locating authority outside states.61
Institutionalism suggests that the EU succeeded in creating the CAD and the ISD 
because the directives promoted collective benefits. This fails to explain why states 
confronting similar market failure developed differing policy preferences. Conversely, 
IOSCO’s failure is explained by its inability to create a regime. But the same question 
raised about the EU’s policy formation process applies to IOSCO; why did states facing 
the same market failure and sharing membership, mutual interests and objectives, fail to 
agree?
International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982).) Krasner observed that Hopkins, Puchala and Young’s regime 
analyses drew on Grotian traditions o f finite state power, stressing interconnected supranational and 
national “elites,” where sovereignty was a “variable” rather than an “assumption.” (See: D. Puchala and 
R.F. Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis," in International Regimes, ed. 
Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). and Oran Young, "Regime Dynamics: The 
Rise and Fall o f International Regimes," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1983). See generally: Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1983).)
58 Knopf, Domestic Society and International Co-Operation: The Impact o f  Protest on US Arms Control 
Policy.
Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories o f International Bargaining.”
59 Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches,” Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity 
Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review 88, June (1994).
60 That is, they do not evolve in response to international relationships or to domestic variables. “[Few 
institutionalists] treat state interests as endogenous to interaction...interests are formed outside the 
interaction context. ..systemic interaction does not transform state interests.” Ibid.. Game theoretic 
analyses confirm this problematic conclusion by identifying domestic constraints encountered by states 
pursuing utility maximising objectives. Duncan Snidal, "The Game Theory o f International Politics," in 
Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
61 See: Oatley and Nabors, "Redistributive Co-Operation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle 
Accord,", and Richards, "Toward a Positive Theory o f International Institutions: Regulating International 
Aviation Markets,".
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Neo-realist and institutionalist analytical weaknesses do not invalidate their use 
as “first cuts” in assessing authority.62 However, limiting analysis to structural variables 
consigns domestic policy development to a “black-box,” where it enters analysis only 
when systemic assumptions generate empirical results incongruent with initial 
hypotheses.
Domestic Perspectives
To address structural shortcomings and clarify state decision-making, scholars 
integrated domestic preference formation with structural perspectives, building on 
theories of comparative politics63 and regulation.64 Unitary state assumptions and 
structural motivations were abandoned. Milner argued that states were “polyarchic.”65 
Moravcsik commented that structural theorists’ domestic assumptions were 
“indeterminate” and incapable of defining fundamental state motivations. He concluded 
that these could only be understood by examining domestic factors.66
Where these scholars disagreed was not over the potential influence of domestic 
variables but over their ability to influence decision-making without the support of state 
actors or institutions. Consequently, domestic analytical perspectives adopt both state- 
centric and non-state centric formulations, although, in empirical research, this 
distinction is frequently difficult to isolate. States may be the predominant authority in 
policy formation -  or their role may be empty, a formalistic acknowledgement of non­
state actor preferences. Because definitive distinctions may be elusive, analytical 
objectives are more refined; determining degrees and areas of authority, often across 
levels of analysis. Nevertheless, these perspectives encouraged analytical attention to
62 Robert O. Keohane, "The World Political Economy and the Crisis o f Embedded Liberalism," in Order 
and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. John Goldthorpe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
63 For an overview see: Peter A. Hall, "The Role o f Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative 
Political Economy o f the Industrialized Nations," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and 
Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997).
64 For overviews see: Christopher Hood, Explaining Economic Policy Reversals (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1994). and Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal, "Modem Political Economy and the 
Study o f  Regulation," in Public Regulation: New Perspectives on Institutions and Policies, ed. Elizabeth E. 
Bailey, MIT Press on the Regulation o f  Economic Activity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).
65 Neither anarchic nor hierarchic, but comprised o f actors sharing decision-making power and varied 
interests. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations.
66 Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories o f International Bargaining,".
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non-state actor and institutional preferences in policy-making and foreshadowed the 
development of both EU integration and state/market perspectives.
Relaxing structural assumptions facilitated the development of three domestic 
analytical perspectives. These assumptions are first, that state preferences are constant 
over time; second, that states have an unlimited ability to mobilise domestic resources; 
and third, that states are rational. Relaxing these assumptions generated analytical 
perspectives on the potential impact of three domestic variables on international policy- 
formation: domestic actor preferences, domestic institutions for resource mobilisation, 
and the distribution of information among domestic actors.
Preferences
Preference perspectives argue that states’ international policy preferences are
if o
linked to variations in domestic interest group pressure. Analysis of the interests of 
domestic regulators, politicians or business groups affected by international policy 
development provides insight into factors motivating states and the success or failure of 
international cooperation. However, while domestic actors may be influential, 
international policy authority under this perspective remains with states.69
Analytical focus is critical in identifying connections between preferences and 
international negotiating positions. Key analytical steps include the identification of a 
catalogue of domestic interests, assessing their relationship with potential outcomes, and 
determining comparative advantage. Preferences are typically deemed to influence 
upwards, from domestic to state to international levels. However, they can also operate 
in the opposite direction. This opens two potential analytical pathways: the impact of 
international developments on domestic preferences and its reverse, the effect of
67 Adapted from Hall, "The Role o f Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative Political Economy 
o f the Industrialized Nations. ” See also: Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics 
and International Relations, and Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic 
Theories o f International Bargaining.".
68The theorised relationship between state policies, the development o f international governance norms and 
the domestic preferences o f individuals or groups can be traced to research in international and 
comparative politics. See: Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988). and Peter Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies o f  Advanced 
Industrial States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).
69 See description o f Moravcsik’s “nested” intergovemmentalist perspective under EU integration section.
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70domestic preferences on international policy-formation. This observation encourages 
an assessment of the interaction of variables identified at different levels of analysis.
A central concern is to determine whose preferences to analyse. Scholars have 
focused principally on domestic producer groups. In the context of securities capital 
adequacy negotiations, producer groups include the firms involved in securities
71 77businesses, as well as state producers of regulation.
This perspective’s tight focus may over simplify policy formation. The potential
77influence of other domestic or supranational groups is excluded. The possibility that 
motivations other than economic gain, re-election or job retention might lie behind 
policy decisions is not taken into account.74 This perspective may be powerful because of 
its clarity and falsifiability, but it sacrifices empirical accuracy in order to preserve 
consistency. Private and public sector preferences may be multi-faceted rather than 
unitary. In addition, private sector preferences may relate not to individual states, but to 
policies or proposals with multilateral or industry emphases.
Institutions
Institutionally oriented domestic research was encouraged by studies authored by 
Katzenstein75 and earlier by Keohane/Nye.76 They argued that domestic institutions 
operate prominently in shaping state politics and policy-making, although
70 See: Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources o f Domestic Politics," 
International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978).
71 Including securities firms as well as firms with securities-related business, including, for example, rating 
agencies and stock exchanges.
72 A variation focuses on politicians and politically sensitive bureaucrats, including regulators, but may 
exclude significant social and economic actors. A basic assumption is that politicians’ desire to be re­
elected influences the structure o f domestic preferences and policy objectives. This focuses examination on 
voting patterns, electoral politics and campaign contributions. Extending this hypothesis to international 
policy-formation, international cooperation and institution building are encouraged if  they enhance 
politicians’ or bureaucrats’ domestic political support and re-election prospects. Alternatively, 
international cooperation may benefit domestic political constituencies through transfers o f  property rights 
or wealth. An important difference between this perspective and comparative politics lays in the 
observation that wealth, property rights or other benefits can be transferred between countries, not just 
within domestic economies. See: Oatley and Nabors, "Redistributive Co-Operation: Market Failure, 
Wealth Transfers, and the Basle Accord,", and Richards, "Toward a Positive Theory o f International 
Institutions: Regulating International Aviation Markets".
73 Distribution o f costs and benefits and the problems aissociated with collective action and disbursed 
groups “theoretically” preclude wider analysis. See: Ibid.
74 Hood, Explaining Economic Policy Reversals.
75 Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies o f  Advanced Industrial States.
76 Keohane and Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics.
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internationally, states remain predominant policy decision-makers.77 Domestic 
institutional research and preference research are tightly linked;78 institutions shape the
70processes and biases through which preferences are translated into policy. For this 
thesis, institutions are comprised principally of national structures, which may be 
normative, economic, political, market, sociological/cultural or historic. Domestic 
preferences are influenced by these structures, among other factors. The linkage between 
preferences and institutions encourages analysis of domestic structures with potential to
on
influence policy formation. Relaxing fixed resource mobilisation assumptions 
encourages analysis of the allocation and contours of policy-making influence and 
authority among domestic policy-making institutions. This isolates nationally distinctive 
responses to common exogenous stimuli by identifying connections between institutional 
structures, economic organisation, and domestic incentives and constraints on policy-
O 1
formation. A close relationship exists between “new institutionalism,” a variant of EU 
integration theory discussed in the next section, and institutionalism.
The utility of this theory hinges on the identification and examination of the most 
influential institution(s). In multi-country analyses, risk lies in selecting too many or too 
few institutions or selecting only those that fit predicted patterns. Also, assuming that 
domestic resources are fixed ignores the observation that resources and institutions 
change. Dynamism is lacking in a fixed institutional model. Assessing change in 
institutional variables reveals that they influence the development of national regulatory 
regimes. In turn, national regulatory regimes influence international negotiations.
For this study, domestic regulatory regime selection was based on the 
prominence of national securities markets. This judgement was based on market size and
77 As discussed in a structural context, institutions represent groups o f socially accepted rules or constraints 
defining and structuring preferences. Institutions are distinct from organisations; institutions are structures 
and organisations agents.
78 The association o f domestic preferences and institutions in broader analysis o f domestic politics and 
international policy-formation is frequently found, reflecting the difficulty o f isolating distinctive causal 
pathways. See, in particular, recent studies in international finance by Sobel, Domestic Choices, 
International Markets: Dismantling National Barriers and Liberalizing Securities Markets, Vogel, Freer 
Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries, and Reinicke, Banking, 
Politics and Global Finance: American Commercial Banks and Regulatory Change, 1980 - 1990.
79 Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations.
80 See “new institutionalism” below.
81 Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries.
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institutional stature/influence. By these standards, the US and British/Euro markets and 
regulatory institutions were the most influential in the world. Japan, despite the relative 
magnitude of its domestic markets, lacked the stature to meaningfully influence 
regulatory development internationally. However, this thesis expands selection criteria 
to incorporate additional factors that affect market prominence -  size of domestic
Of
economy and international standing o f national currency -  leading to the inclusion of 
French and German regulatory regimes.
Informational/Ideational perspectives
Domestic perspectives that address the influence of ideas and information 
resources on policy-formation and the potential for linkage between ideas, preferences 
and institutions are associated with Peter Haas. Haas’s research focuses on the role of 
epistemic or knowledge communities. This research is closely allied with EU “policy 
networks” research.
Haas’s communities share “causal understandings” and policy recommendations
Of
and often assume policy leadership roles. Epistemic communities are broadly 
envisaged, commensurate with the gregariousness of ideas.87 Haas identifies three ways 
that epistemic communities affect policy formation. First, they serve as “focal points” for 
policy leaders and discussion. Second, they represent context-based knowledge; in policy
oo
debates they define and “expertise” constraints and incentives on policy-formation.
82 The domestic British and supranational Euromarket regulatory regimes are closely linked for several 
reasons. First, financial institutions operating in the largest sector o f the Euromarket, the US dollar sector, 
operated overwhelmingly from a London base. This meant their institutions were subject to British 
domestic regulatory standards. Second, standard Euromarket practice has been for contracts to be executed 
under English law. Third, British regulators, cognisant o f the Euromarket’s prominence and London 
operating base, developed the English regulatory regime with a view not solely to domestic Sterling 
markets, but also to the vastly larger, multi-currency, Euromarket.
83 Market size is typically measured in US dollar terms. As a result, it is often distorted by exchange rate 
fluctuations reflecting wider macro and microeconomic variations that have little bearing on the 
comparative stature, authority or influence o f domestic markets.
84 Additionally, the Japanese securities regulatory regime was based on a US model.
85 Either as a reserve or borrowing currency.
86 Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International 
Organization 46, no. 1 (1992).
87 They may be domestic or international, public or private, and appear in various forms: industry 
associations, advocacy groups, and similar organisations with interests in policy-formation.
88 The conclusions drawn by Dimson and Marsh in reviewing the relative efficacy o f competing capital 
adequacy formulations represented a belated coda to international debates over capital adequacy 
harmonisation. Their article highlighted gaps in arguments made in the IOSCO negotiations and suggested 
other rationales may have encouraged negotiators’ opinions. See: E. Dimson and P. Marsh, "City 
Research Project: The Debate on International Capital Requirements - Evidence on Equity Position Risk 
for UK Securities Firms, Subject Report VIII," (London: London Business School, 1994).
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Finally, ideas may act as causal factors when they tap into underlying “meaning
QQ
systems.” Informational perspectives might suggest that the evolution of domestic 
securities regulation reflects a coherent national view, which influences national 
preferences in international policy debates.90 Consequently, as with domestic 
institutional arguments, domestic regulatory histories are important in understanding 
national participation in policy debates.
Idea-based analyses generally assume that epistemic communities influence 
states. But this assumption is not rigidly held. Epistemic communities may be based in 
the public or the private sector. This ambivalence acknowledges the mobility and breadth 
of ideas and their ability to exert influence independent of the state. These communities 
often serve as conduits for integrating private sector preferences into policy-making 
processes.
The difficulty with employing idea-based analytical perspectives lies in 
distinguishing the impact of ideas from the impact of other variables. “Meaning systems” 
analysis does not provide guidance in understanding how ideas or epistemic communities 
independently influence policy-formation.91
Bargaining Perspectives
The weaknesses ascribed to domestic perspectives do not disqualify them as tools 
for analysing authority and policy-making. Structural and domestic perspectives restrict 
research to accommodate underlying assumptions. Structural approaches discount the 
significance of domestic variables. Domestic perspectives may exhibit selection bias or 
narrowly define preferences. Nonetheless, particularistic approaches continue to thrive, a 
testimony to the embeddedness of rational, parsimonious research design.92
89 “Meaning systems” are the ideological, psychological or cultural orientations o f  states and other actors 
that are often based in economic and historic structures.
90 Three examples are Germany’s preoccupation with risk avoidance and conservative capitalisation based 
on its 1930s experience with hyperinflation and the importance o f banks in economic recovery post-WWII. 
In France, the belief that the state should lead and control economic development policy -  rather than the 
private sector -  motivated the Mitterrand government’s approach to international policy-formation. In the 
US, the traumatic experience o f the 1929 crash stimulated the creation of the SEC and the adoption o f its 
central regulatory focus -  investor protection.
91 However, see “new institutionalism” below.
92 See, in particular, Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic 
Politics, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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In response to the weaknesses of these approaches, more comprehensive 
methodologies for analysing authority and cooperation have been developed. These 
are: 1) perspectives that build comprehensive analyses by sequentially examining the 
impact of domestic variables on state policy preferences and international policy- 
formation (a “ground-up” perspective); 2) a cumulative approach that layers domestic 
and systemic perspectives (an “integrated” perspective); and 3) a “process” perspective 
that examines negotiation processes, bypassing level-of-analysis distinctions. EU 
integration and state/market perspectives further expand the conceptual compass of 
bargaining perspectives.
A “Ground-up”perspective
Helen Milner builds an analytical perspective that combines the three domestic 
perspectives previously discussed.94 Her premise is that international decision-making is 
influenced by the domestic, particularly distributional, consequences of cooperation.95 
Breaking with parsimonious research design, she acknowledges political complexity and 
makes the case that a range of factors, beyond survival and market failure, determine 
state decisions. In acknowledging the myriad interrelationships that influence state policy 
formation, she significantly departs from narrowly focused perspectives.
Milner claims that domestic preference structures, the distribution of information 
among domestic actors, and the allocation of decision-making authority among domestic 
institutions, taken together, are critical in forming states’ policy positions in international 
negotiations.96 Increasing the complexity of domestic decision-making decreases the 
potential for international cooperation.97 She acknowledges the potential significance of 
formal authority and influence, of policy complexity, and the relationship of domestic 
preferences to state policy formation. However, Milner’s approach still discounts the
93 Referred to herein as “bargaining” perspectives.
94 Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations.
95 Her work has influenced arguments proposed by Richards (See: Richards, "Toward a Positive Theory o f  
International Institutions: Regulating International Aviation Markets.”) and Oatley and Nabors. (See:
Oatley and Nabors, "Redistributive Co-Operation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle 
Accord.”) and others.
96 Complexity is equated with the “distinctiveness” of policy preferences, the distribution o f actor veto 
power, and the allocation o f institutional information and power. These variables are interconnected. As 
distinctiveness increases, the distribution o f information and institutional power becomes more balanced, 
more actors hold veto power and policy-formation becomes increasingly anarchic, decreasing the potential 
for agreement. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International 
Relations.
97 See: Ibid.
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potential for domestic variables to influence international policy formation other than 
through states.98 Her perspective adds complexity but privileges domestic variables and 
fails to synthesise domestic and structural theories. Her analysis does not provide 
guidance as to which domestic or structural factors may be analytically significant, nor 
as to their potentially independent or joint influence on international outcomes.99
An “Integrated”perspective
Robert Putnam’s “two-level” games perspective recognises the role of domestic 
variation in forming state interests and international outcomes.100 He examines a 
mediating “statesman” role -  between domestic and international incentives and 
constraints -  and identifies policy-making as a two-stage, two-way process involving 
international bargaining and domestic ratification. The international bargaining options 
of states are constrained by what can be ratified domestically. Variables defining 
domestic policy options also define win-set boundaries. In Putnam’s model, the link 
between levels of analysis is the chief negotiator or statesman, who represents the state. 
He is an honest broker who wields decision-making authority and is influenced by 
personal as well as domestic political and societal considerations.
Andrew Moravcsik expands Putnam’s metaphor into formal hypotheses that 
integrate domestic and structural perspectives. His core assumption is that a policy 
vacuum is created when international and domestic objectives differ. The statesman’s 
role is to resolve these differences and to assist policy development. The statesman is 
“Janus-faced,” in that he considers both domestic and international constraints and 
preferences in policy-making.101 The statesman’s personal views enter the policy-making 
equation through his “acceptability-set,” defined as the range of policy outcomes 
acceptable to him.
98 All decisions may go through the state but this may be true only in a formal sense. If non-state actor 
preferences are met, we might conclude they influenced or even dominated policy-making. Comment 
made by Dr. A.R. Walter.
99 Oatley and Nabors, "Redistributive Co-Operation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle 
Accord,", and Richards, "Toward a Positive Theory of International Institutions: Regulating International 
Aviation Markets,".
100 Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.”
101 He refers to his approach as “intergovemmentalist” or “liberal intergovemmentalist.” Moravcsik does 
not necessarily limit the application o f his theoretical arguments to the EU but acknowledges the EU’s 
special characteristics more clearly support his perspective. See: Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating 
International and Domestic Theories o f International Bargaining.”
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Moravcsik argues that juxtaposing domestic win-sets and statesman 
acceptability-sets illuminates negotiating options and constraints, the statesman’s 
potential role and influence, and the vigour with which he will pursue negotiations. 
International policy-making analysis is based on Putnam’s contention that the degree of 
win-set overlap, coordinated by statesmen, determines the outcome of international 
negotiations. But, like Milner and Putnam, Moravcsik assumes that policy-making is 
largely based on the interaction of states. The potential for non-state actor or institutional 
preferences to influence international outcomes is included indirectly; they are viewed as 
potential influences on state domestic policy formation and statesman preferences.
The integrated perspective’s strengths are its design of a simple analytical tool 
and its acknowledgement of a range of potential public and private causal variables. This 
approach also introduces the idea that understanding policy-making means examining 
negotiation processes and sources of authority and influence, rather than focusing 
exclusively on domestic or structural variables. Nevertheless, this approach privileges 
state decision-making authority and avoids synthesising levels of analysis. Little 
direction is given to analytically significant variables and, because domestic win-sets 
define the range of international outcomes, the potential for novel, non-state governance 
arrangements is minimised.
A “Process” Perspective
John Odell102 dispenses with level-of-analysis distinctions and encourages 
examination of the process of negotiation. He argues that negotiating strategies evolve 
over the course of policy formation, stimulated by state and non-state influences.
Odell contends that policy-making should be considered part of a larger 
interactive process, in which a range of influences affects the development of negotiated 
agreements. This approach dispenses with a limited-variable universe and replaces 
precise variable analysis with process analysis and actor strategy assessment. Negotiating 
strategies are formed and interact in a context comprised of stimuli, defined as “aspects
i mof the situation that are normally beyond the influence of the...negotiator.” Odell is
102 Odell, Negotiating the World Economy.
103 Ibid.
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explicit that authority may arise from non-state sources, including markets, beliefs, 
domestic politics, cultures, power relationships, and international and domestic 
institutions. This approach does not assume that actor preferences are fixed or that they 
are based on utility maximisation. It departs from state-centric structural and domestic 
assumptions and examines a broad range of explicit, implicit and anecdotal factors in 
ascertaining outcomes.104 Odell’s approach is closely related to the EU integration and 
state/market literatures discussed below.
The strength and the weakness of this approach stem from its complexity. A 
process perspective is neither parsimonious nor idealised -  it reflects a messy, shifting 
reality. Analytically, it assesses a broad range of potential causal variables, providing a 
superior approximation of reality. However, it may fail to trace outcomes to specific 
variables, relying instead on a surfeit of empirical evidence to bolster observations and 
conclusions. It relies on inductive reasoning and multiple case studies to develop 
hypotheses and inferences. The methodology is justified if the observations it develops 
are not available from narrower analyses or if they modify the conclusions of narrower 
analyses.105 Odell’s theoretical work serves as a bridge to EU integration and 
state/market literatures, as well as to synthetic analysis.
EU Integration and State/Market Perspectives106
Scholars’ efforts to assess authority and policy-making in the EU stimulated the 
development of distinctive EU analytical models. The development of these models was 
prompted by the EU’s unique structure and the inability of conventional analytical 
models to encompass the interaction of the EU’s multi-layered political, economic and
104 Similarly to Milner and Moravcsik, Odell concentrates primarily on domestic factors influencing 
negotiator preferences. But he does this, not by dismissing structural factors, but by highlighting the weak 
correlation between security/structural conditions and negotiated outcomes and the difficulty negotiators 
encounter trying to influence structural variables.
105 Inductive arguments are “ampliative” (that is, arguments where something beyond initial premises is 
inferred), however, induction is differentiated from theoretical arguments, which share an ampliative 
character, “by being confined to inference in which the conclusion involves the same properties or 
relations as the premises.” David Hume challenged this conclusion, arguing that nature is not uniform and 
that induction therefore was flawed. See: David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
(1748). John Stuart Mill proposed five inductive principles to regulate scientific inquiry arguing, inter alia, 
that multiple case studies, linking observed outcomes, helped resolve Hume’s concerns. See: John Stuart 
Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy (1848). See: Simon Blackburn, Dictionary o f  Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996).
106 For a longer discussion o f  the origins o f EU integration perspectives see Appendix A.
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governance processes. While rooted in domestic and bargaining perspectives, this 
development expanded the variables and the actor and institutional relationships under 
consideration. State/market analytical perspectives were stimulated largely by 
globalisation analyses, but concluded similarly that analytical premises had to be 
expanded.
Early EU research developed in the 1960s and 1970s and conceptualised regional 
integration processes as either evolutionary, “self-reinforcing processes,” called “neo­
functionalist,” or as state-centric decision-making procedures, termed 
“intergovemmentalist.”107 In the early 1980s,108 debates between these approaches were 
invigorated by accelerated EU integration. State-centric approaches abandoned unitary 
state assumptions, opened the “black-box” of domestic variables, and adopted 
Moravcsik’s two-stage decision-making process. Neo-functionalist approaches embraced 
the influence of supra and sub-national actors and institutions, both private and public, 
interacting directly, rather than through state governments.109
EU integration perspectives on policy formation derive, in part, from Majone’s 
arguments describing the EU as a “regulatory state.”110 Majone helped bridge 
intergovemmentalist and neo-functionalist approaches by focusing on the
107 See generally: M.A. Pollack, "International Relations Theory and European Integration," Journal o f  
Common Market Studies 39, no. 2 (2001). and P. Taylor, "Intergovemmentalism in the EC in the 70s: 
Patterns and Perspectives," International Organization 36, no. 4 (1982).
P. Taylor, The Limits o f  European Integration (London: Croom Helms, 1983).
108 Following a fallow period in the late 1970’s associated with stagnation in EU governance development 
and regional integration.
109 Hix, Hurrell and Menon assessed this analytical evolution in a well-known debate. Hix argued EU 
politics was not inherently different from politics between states. Consequently, analysis o f the EU as an 
“international organisation,” using neo-functionalist and intergovemmentalist perspectives, was 
appropriate. However, “internal EU politics” was more accurately assessed using conventional 
comparative (domestic) politics models. Hix, "The Study o f the European Community: The Challenge to 
Comparative Politics.” Hix also assumed bright-line distinctions between international and internal EU 
politics, and, despite shared ontological and methodological assumptions, between international and 
comparative (domestic) theoretical perspectives. Hurrell/Menon disagreed, arguing EU international and 
internal politics were essentially indivisible, resting on the centrality o f states, the EU’s complex nature 
and power: “Although not easy to operationalise, there is no fundamental contradiction between accepting 
the centrality o f the state in EU policy-making and the need to open up the state and enquire into the 
domestic processes though which interests and identities are shaped and determined.” Hurrell and Menon, 
"Politics Like Any Other? Comparative Politics, International Relations and the Study o f the EU.” 
Hurrell/Menon’s argument synthesised international and domestic, state and non-state centric perspectives 
-  and marked a departure from earlier IR perspectives.
110 Jachtenfuchs, "The Governance Approach to European Integration.” It is useful to compare Majone’s 
“regulatory state” with Cemy’s “competition state,” with which it shares many characteristics. See: Cemy, 
"Globalization and the Changing Logic o f Collective Action.”
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regulatory/policy consequences of integration and by comparing regulatory systems.111 
He suggested analysing EU regulatory development through time series examination of 
institutional and economic structures and processes.112 This perspective transcends 
nation-state/supranational distinctions by focusing on the development of a new “Euro- 
polity,” distinct from nation-states and international organisations. Majone’s analysis 
encouraged research leading to the network, new institutionalist and multi-level 
governance perspectives described below. His research also supported state/market 
arguments that globalisation had transformed the structure of authority, particularly 
international policy-making authority.
The reinvigoration of EU research in the 1980s was accompanied by 
simultaneous investigation into the impact of globalisation on the relationship of states 
and markets, particularly in the context of regulation and international financial 
services.113 This prompted the development of state/market analytical perspectives that 
generally focus on the causes and consequences of variations in the balance of public and 
private authority. These two literatures, EU integration and state/market research, 
advanced concepts regarding the influence of non-state actors in the development of 
international governance norms and proposed alternative analytical constructs for 
understanding the interaction of actors and institutions.
EU integration perspectives
In the large and diverse literature on EU integration, debate between neo- 
functionalism and intergovemmentalism has dominated and been well documented.114 
Neo-functionalists describe political and policy change as incremental processes that are
111 He considered the EU ideally suited for the development o f Pareto efficient regulation - defined as 
regulations that require a “high degree o f specialized technical knowledge .. .and (are) independent o f  
political pressure but not for politically volatile redistributive policies” For discussion see: Jachtenfuchs, 
"The Governance Approach to European Integration,” and G. Majone, "Cross-National Sources of 
Regulatory Policymaking in Europe and the United States," Journal o f  Public Policy 11, no. 1 (1991). See 
also: G. Majone, "The European Community between Social Policy and Social Regulation," Journal o f  
Common Market Studies 32, no. 2 (1993).
112 Majone defines institutional (or regulatory) structures in terms o f their responsiveness to the operational 
demands o f  global markets, and as solutions to problems o f  credible commitments and democratic 
legitimacy. Jachtenfuchs, "The Governance Approach to European Integration.”
113 See, particularly, Strange, States and Markets.
114 For intellectual histories and reviews see: J. Caporaso and J. Keeler, "The European Community and 
Regional Integration Theory" (paper presented at the Third Biennial Conference o f the European 
Community Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 27-29 May 1993), Robert O. Keohane and S. 
Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s," in The New European Community, ed. Robert O. 
Keohane and S. Hoffmann (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
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responsive to external and internal events. Intergovemmentalists, arguing from a 
modified rational-choice perspective, explain EU integration as a consequence of 
agreements negotiated between states.115
These approaches privilege different actors and describe the processes of 
decision-making differently. Variations in approach and emphasis complicate clear 
distinctions. However, to assess the CAD/ISD and IOSCO negotiations and to facilitate 
focused analysis, these approaches are refined to core questions and concepts.
The central intergovemmentalist argument116 is that European integration does 
not challenge the autonomy or authority of member-states.117 This argument develops 
from the observation that member-state agreements typically rest on a “lowest common 
denominator” calculus.118 Supranational actors support member-states by facilitating 
agreements and providing information that would not otherwise be readily available. But 
regional decision-making is driven by member-state preferences and power rather than 
by supranational actors, whose impact on decision-making is modest.119
Intergovemmentalism departs from unitary state assumptions. However, domestic 
preferences are “nested” within each state and do not interact with corresponding
115 On rational choice, see: Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy, p. 13, 70.
116 Moravcsik re-labelled “intergovemmentalism” as “liberal intergovemmentalism” to distinguish his 
approach from neo-realist intergovemmentalist analyses with which it is often confused. Liberal 
intergovemmentalism includes both domestic and state level empirical analyses and departs from the 
unitary state assumptions o f neo-realism. See: A. Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European 
Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach," Journal o f  Common Market Studies 33, no. 4 
(1993).
117 EU membership reinforces, and can strengthen, state sovereignty; European integration is motivated by 
agreements negotiated between member-state governments who maintain control over their degree o f  
integration with the EU. M. Mann, "Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, 
Developing, Not Dying," Daedalus 13 (1993), Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and 
Domestic Theories o f International Bargaining,” Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European 
Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," International 
Organization 45, no. Winter (1991), W. Streeck and P.C. Schmitter, "Neo-Voluntarism: A New European 
Social Policy Regime?" in Governance in the Emerging Euro-Polity, ed. G. Marks, et al. (London: Sage, 
1996).
118 A “lowest common denominator” calculus contends that most regional decision-making is based on 
preserving unanimity by permitting states to maintain control over the comprehensiveness o f integration 
and collective decisions. This thesis has been contested. See: A. Heritier, "The Accommodation o f  
Diversity in European Policy-Making and Its Outcomes: Regulatory Policy-Making as a Patchwork," 
Journal o f  European Public Policy 3, no. 2 (1996). And A. Heritier, C. Knill, and S. Mingers, Ringing the 
Changes in Europe. Regulatory Competition and the Transformation o f  the State. Britain, France, 
Germany (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1996).
119 Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level 
Governance.”
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interests in other member-states. This assumption preserves the argument that authority 
rests with state executives and that state executive bargaining is primarily responsible for 
policy-making. Moravcsik defines European decision-making as “a process that takes 
place in two successive stages; governments first define a set of interests, then bargain
i ?namong themselves in an effort to realize those interests.” Based on empirical research, 
intergovemmentalism has evolved but retains its central premise that state preferences 
and intergovernmental bargaining determine international policy outcomes.121
Neo-functionalists argue that states remain important actors in regional 
governance and policy-making but that political control has shifted to supranational 
institutions, diluting state sovereignty. Comparative politics and policy analysis 
specialists agree, arguing that the EU’s structure and character breaks down barriers 
between domestic, comparative and IR analyses.122 They cite collaboration between 
domestic and supranational actors and institutions in the development of EU regulation 
and international and domestic policies. States’ control over individual citizens and 
corporate actors has also shrunk.123 Their observations encourage scholars to question 
whether state autonomy is threatened by regional integration.124 These conclusions arise 
from assessments of member-state regional decision-making and from the increasing 
autonomy and influence of EU institutions.
These conclusions are also supported by empirical studies highlighting the 
influence of informal groups and private associations as well as of supranational 
institutions. These analyses encouraged the refinement of both intergovemmentalist and
120 Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental 
Approach.”
121 See footnotes 139 and 140 in this chapter.
122 Hurrell and Menon, "Politics Like Any Other? Comparative Politics, International Relations and the 
Study o f  the EU.”
123 Moravcsik, following Putnam, argues that he addresses this issue by basing EU integration on national 
preference formation and interstate bargaining. “Control” refers generally to authority and specifically to 
the regulation o f (and the development o f regulations for) business enterprises.
124 These questions were raised by earlier analyses of the impact o f  the international system on domestic 
economic decision-making but had, despite the literature on interdependence and transnational relations, 
remained analytically marginal until the early 1990s. See: Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The 
International Sources o f Domestic Politics.”
Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies o f  Advanced Industrial States.
125 The European Commission and Council o f Ministers, the European Court o f Justice and the European 
Parliament, particularly after the 1985 SEA.
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1 Oftneo-functionalist perspectives into more precise analytic “frameworks.” These 
frameworks adapted concepts developed in other disciplines, generally defining “middle- 
level" approaches to integration. They stopped short of developing comprehensive 
theories addressing broader IR/IPE concerns.127
Three interrelated, predominantly neo-functionalist, “focal-points” or frameworks
1emerged from EU empirical research: the “Europeanization” of politics and policies, 
the analytical implications of collective regulatory policy-making, and the development 
o f new forms of governance.129 These literatures address differences in levels of
Europeanization, which are apparent in policy sectors and in the EU’s ability to resolve
110problems.
This research stimulated the development of several neo-functionalist 
approaches, all emphasising the role of non-state actors and institutions: 1) policy 
networks assessment, 2) “new institutionalist” or economic structure analysis, and 3) 
“Euro-polity”/multi-level governance (“MLG”) perspectives.131 Similar themes, albeit 
addressing international relations and globalisation more generally, were echoed in 
state/market literatures.132 Both literatures sought to address related questions; for the 
integration literature: “How have authority, influence, and governance been affected by
126 Writing in 1998, Bulmer defined five separate “frameworks” for analysis o f EU governance These are 
liberal intergovemmentalism, multi-level governance, policy network analysis, the new institutionalism 
and a “fusion thesis” explanation for integration attributed to Wessels. See: S.J. Bulmer, "New 
Institutionalism and the Governance o f the Single European Market," Journal o f  European Public Policy 
5, no. 3 (1998).
127 The development o f EU integration approaches was paralleled by state/market research and by broader 
rationalist and constructivist debates. For an extended discussion see: Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, 
"International Organization and the Study o f World Politics.” This observation also prompts the question 
whether EU integration perspectives are sui generis. See page 81.
128 Europeanization refers to the extensiveness and source of the EU’s influence on member-state policy- 
formation. It asks which entity, the EU or the member-state, determines regional policy, and why? M. 
Green Cowles, J. Caporaso, and T. Risse, Transforming Europe, Europeanization and Domestic Change 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
129 This analysis is based on Jachtenfiichs, "The Governance Approach to European Integration.”
130 S. Scharpf, "Die Problemlosungsfahigkeit der Mehrebenenpolitik in Europa," in Regieren in Entgrenzen 
Raumen, PVS Sonderheft 29/1998, ed. B. Kohler-Koch (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998).
S. Scharpf, "Introduction: The Problem Solving Capacity o f Multi-Level Governance," Journal o f  
European Public Policy 4, no. 4 (1997). In state/market research these questions focused on globalisation 
consequences: “which entity (or what combination), the state or the market, determined policy and why?”
131 This list differs slightly from Bulmer’s cited above.
132 See below under “state/market perspectives.”
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the development of the EU?” and, for state/market literatures: “How has globalisation 
affected authority, influence, and governance?”133
Network perspectives are prominent in EU integration analyses.134 Networks are 
informal, non-hierarchical structures, comprised of actors or institutions, which operate 
across political and economic boundaries and may express authority or influence 
independent of states. Potential roles include bargaining and collaboration between 
interest groups, member-states, and EU institutions. Although criticised for 
“fuzziness,”136 network analysis opens EU integration studies to comparative research 
into the influence on policy formation of institutional structures and the lack of dominant 
central authorities.137
The “new institutionalist” approach138 focuses principally on the power of EU 
institutions to establish agendas for policy-making and policy-makers139 This approach
133 The dependent variables are authority, influence and governance rather than integration or 
globalisation.
134 Network analysis closely parallels Peter Hass’s research. See: Tanja A. Borzel, "What's So Special 
About Policy Networks? An Exploration o f the Concept and Its Usefulness in Studying European 
Governance," European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 1, no. 16 (1997), B. Kohler-Koch, "European 
Networks and Ideas: Changing National Policies?," European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 6, no. 6 
(2002), Volker Schneider, Godefroy Dang-Nguyen, and Raymund Werle, "Corporate Actor Networks in 
European Policy-Making: Harmonising Telecommunications Policy," Journal o f Common Market Studies 
32, no. 4 (December 1994).
135 These characteristics differentiate networks from intergovemmentalist precepts regarding information 
and authority transmission and from epistemic or idea communities, which facilitate governance by 
providing specialised information. See also: Keohane and Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in 
the 1980s,”, p. 13.
136 T. Borzel, "Organizing Babylon. On the Different Conceptions o f Policy Networks," Public 
Administration 76 (1998).
137 A variant o f network analysis conceptualises networks as a distinctive form o f authority lying between 
anarchy (or markets) and hierarchy, a concept particularly suited to the EU. A. Benz, "Politikverflechtung 
ohne Politikverflechtungsfallle. Koordination und Structurdynamik in Europaeischen Mehrebenensystem," 
Politische Viertlejahrschrift 39 (1998). cited in Jachtenfuchs, "The Governance Approach to European 
Integration". It is also useful to note the parallelism between this conception o f networks and Milner’s 
conception o f state institutional structures lying on a continuum between anarchy and hierarchy.
138 “New Institutionalist” scholars accept Moravcsik’s nested intergovemmentalist structure but reject 
parsimonious interstate bargaining, arguing EU institutions are as important as states in shaping policy.
See: Bulmer, "New Institutionalism and the Governance of the Single European Market,” and Colin 
Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Political Economy o f  Modern Capitalism: Mapping Diversity and 
Convergence (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1997).
Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties o f  Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations o f  
Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), and Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., 
Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness o f  Institutions.
139 Especially the Commission, Council, Parliament, and QMV. See: D. Puchala, "Institutionalism, 
Intergovemmentalism and European Integration," Journal o f  Common Market Studies 37, no. 2 (1999). In 
1998, Moravcsik added a third layer o f analysis to his liberal intergovemmentalist framework, bringing his 
approach closer to constructivist perspectives. Within a rationalist structure defined by national preferences 
and intergovernmental bargaining, Moravcsik added a notion o f institutional choice. He acknowledged that
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defines institutions very broadly, encompassing formal and informal institutions, 
associations, values, norms and cultural conventions. The mutability of new 
institutionalism has spawned at least three variants.140 In each variant emphasis is placed 
on assessing the influence of domestic (economic) institutional structures on actors’ 
multilateral institutional preferences. State policy preferences are a function of the effect 
that multilateral decisions have on domestic comparative advantage.141 Comparative 
advantage is also based on a state’s specific form of capitalism. Analysis of policy­
making, therefore, must focus on comparative domestic economic history, structure, 
coordination, and supervisory processes.142
A third perspective adopts Majone’s arguments explicitly, calling regional 
integration a “polity-creating process,” where authority and decision-making power are 
shared and contested across multiple levels of governance.143 The principal model, 
“multi-level governance,” accepts that state executives and institutions remain the most 
important variables in assessing integration.144 However, MLG also examines the larger 
European polity, arguing that states do not dominate collective decision-making or the
institutions might enjoy agenda-setting powers and argued that nation-states might pool their sovereignty -  
through institutions -  in order to increase the “credibility” o f their commitments. See: A. Moravcsik, The 
Choice fo r  Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998).
140 These include rational choice, historical, and sociological institutionalism.
141 Theoretical discussion focuses on economic structures. However, structures may include political, 
commercial or social structures, among others.
142 Orfeo Fioretos, "Sources o f Multilateral Preferences," in Varieties o f  Capitalism, ed. Peter A. Hall and 
David Soskice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). and Hall and Soskice, eds., Varieties o f  
Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations o f  Comparative Advantage.
143 See generally: G. Marks, "Structural Policy after Maastricht," in The State o f  the European Community, 
ed. A.W. Cafruny and G Rosenthal (New York: Lynne Rienner, 1993), G. Marks, "Structural Policy and 
1992," in Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community, ed. A. Sbragia 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992). Also, drawing on the theoretical work o f Wendt. See, in 
particular: A., Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). and Ruggie John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International 
Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998)., scholars (See: T. Risse, "Exploring the Nature o f the 
Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union," 
Journal o f  Common Market Studies 34, no. 1 (1996), Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary 
Politics and Maastricht," International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993), Wayne Sandholtz, "Membership 
Matters: Limits o f the Functional Approach to European Institutions," Journal o f  Common Market Studies 
34, no. 3 (1996).) argue EU membership alters the preferences and characteristics o f (national) decision­
making groups creating a “Euro-polity” with distinctive, non-member-state, biases in governance 
formation. These scholars accuse Moravcsik o f ignoring the endogenous impact o f EU membership, a 
central characteristic o f integration.
144 MLG derives from several sources. See: Marks, "Structural Policy after Maastricht,” Marks, "Structural 
Policy and 1992,".A. Sbragia, "Thinking About the European Future: The Uses o f Comparison," in 
Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community, ed. A. Sbragia 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992)., and P. Schmitter, "The Emerging Europolity and Its 
Impact Upon National Systems o f Production," in Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness o f  
Institutions, ed. J.R. Hollingsworth and R. Boyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
78
ability to promote domestic preferences. These abilities are found in actors and 
institutions at different political levels, most particularly in supranational institutions.145 
Actors at different levels of the European polity may express authority or influence and 
should be evaluated to assess their potential contribution to policy-formation.
These models imply a diminution in states’ authority. This diminution implies 
that lowest common denominator decision-making is likely to be replaced by zero-sum 
policy-formation. This would be most probable in lower-level decision-making, 
including regulatory policy, where regional unanimity is not critical. These perspectives 
further imply that political preferences are not “nested,” but are interconnected. MLG in 
particular does not believe that domestic preferences are only projected up through 
states; it argues instead that actors operate across political levels, creating “transnational 
associations.”146 These approaches eliminate distinctions between domestic and 
international politics by insisting on consideration of potential interactions between 
supranational, state and sub-national actors.147
EU integration approaches -  sui generis?
EU scholars frequently argue that EU integration perspectives are sui generis, 
developed to explain the EU’s ‘Tmique” multi-level structure, and may be difficult to 
relate to other IR/IPE issues. However, as noted earlier, parallels are evident between 
IR/IPE concepts and EU integration. The broader applicability of EU scholars’ 
approaches is examined in Chapter 12.
State/market approaches
"State/market perspectives” refers to analyses, principally of the evolving 
relationship between the state and economic/financial markets. Not surprisingly, this 
literature has focused attention on the consequences of globalisation for financial market 
authority. It also assesses a range of global economic and social activities affecting 
states, markets and related actors and institutions. Because state/market concepts are not
145 MLG considers authority independent, unconnected with supranational institutions’ potential agency 
with states.
146 Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level 
Governance.”
147 This approach makes a clear distinction between actors and institutions and avoids assigning 
characteristics to states that should more appropriately be assigned to specific groups or individuals. This 
permits a more refined focus on the actions, histories and constitutions o f particular actors or institutions 
within states and further distinguishes this approach from unitary state analyses. See: Ibid.
79
limited by rational choice assumptions, they encompass a wide spectrum of concepts and 
actors and maintain flexible boundaries in terms of hypotheses addressed.148 However, 
the balancing of state and market authority is central to this literature.
Early state/market concepts are often associated with Susan Strange’s research149 
although prior roots have been identified.150 What distinguishes this early research from 
contemporaneous “transnational relations” analyses151 is the inclusion of “social
1 S9structures and relationships” in state/market studies. These relationships embrace a
broad spectrum of domestic and international actors. Early research includes private
political and economic actors and structures and closely parallels the developing new
institutionalist and MLG literatures. State/market approaches were sharply distinguished
1 ^from more rigidly structured perspectives operating within rationalist frameworks. 
Robert Cox characterised Strange’s analytical approach by observing that, “...instead of 
defining the world exclusively in terms of states, she sees power as the basic concern of 
realism and asks: Where does power lie? With states certainly... but also with markets. 
With firms, too, and possibly with some other entities.”154 Strange argued: “[SJtate 
authority has leaked away, upwards, sideways, and downwards. In some matters, it even
148 For surveys see: Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, eds., Political Economy and the 
Changing Global Order (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1994) and G.R.D. Underhill, "The State- 
Market Relationship: Prospects for Change in World Order," International Affairs 76, no. 4 (2000).
149 See, inter alia, Thomas C. Lawton, James A. Rosenau, and Amy Verdun, eds., Strange Power: Shaping 
the Parameters o f  International Relations and International Political Economy (Burlington, VT:
Aldershot, 2000), Strange, "Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique o f Regime Analysis," Susan Strange, 
"International Economics and International Politics: A  Case o f Mutual Neglect," International Affairs 46 
(1970), Susan Strange, "Rethinking Structural Change in the International Political Economy: States,
Firms and Diplomacy," in Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, ed. Richard Stubbs and 
G.R.D. Underhill (London: Macmillan, 1994), Susan Strange, "Wake up, Krasner! The World Has 
Changed," Review o f  International Political Economy 1, no. 2 (1994)., and Strange’s several books listed 
in the bibliography.
150 Geoffrey Underhill, "The State-Market Relationship: Prospects for Change in World Order,” identifies 
Richard Cooper’s positivist view o f international economic interdependence. See: Richard Cooper, The 
Economics o f  Interdependence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968). and James Rosenau’s concept o f the 
interrelatedness o f domestic and international politics as state/market precedents. James A. Rosenau, ed., 
Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence o f  National and International Systems (New York: Free 
Press, 1969).
151 See, for example, Keohane and Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics.
152 Cooper cited in Underhill, "The State-Market Relationship: Prospects for Change in World Order,".
153 Robert Gilpin adopted a states vs. markets framework, but was also a realist who emphasised the 
dominance o f states in the international system. See: Gilpin, The Political Economy o f  International 
Relations.
154 See: Robert Cox, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). p. 183. 
In her later work, Strange focused on the evolution o f structural power, arguing analysis began with 
empirical questions regarding the role of political/economic processes and structures in policy outcomes, 
assessed through examination o f who benefited and who was put at risk by agreements. “Structural power” 
is a seminal Strange construct combining politics and economics. See footnote 13 and related text
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seems to have gone nowhere, just evaporated.”155 Strange’s argument that states compete 
over economic and financial market-shares rather than over territory was later echoed in 
Philip Cemy’s “competition state.”156 Strange and Cemy both attributed these changes 
primarily to globalisation, particularly to changes in technology and production 
modalities. These changes affected the international authority and governance capacities 
of states by expanding the influence and capabilities of both state and non-state actors. It 
also changed the character of state/firm bargaining. This was revealed principally in 
market governance, which evidenced a “new medievalism.”157 These arguments further 
combined comparative and international perspectives by attributing shifts in domestic 
and international authority to globalisation.
The principal implication of state/market arguments is that understanding the 
dynamic relationship of authority, influence, and policy-making requires examination of 
the interaction of a broad range of international processes and variables associated with
1 SRstate and non-state actors and institutions. The assertion of influence and authority by 
new actors or institutions implies a dramatic realignment in the policy-making ability 
and power of institutions, actors and states. Underhill argues that market “creation” 
involves the delegation of wealth formation and “distribution” authority to private 
individuals. This leads to the conclusion that “political authority is not just vested in the 
formal institutions of states and... regimes.... It is also present in the agents of the 
market as part of the state-market condominium.”159 Cemy linked the evolution of 
market structure and of private authority to changes in international financial 
governance. He argued that “national varieties of capitalism will be tolerated only so 
long as they do not undermine profits in international financial markets. If genuinely new 
forms of transnational regulation are not forthcoming from states acting in concert, then 
the transnational financial structure is increasingly likely to be run by a de facto private
155 Susan Strange, "The Defective State," Daedalus 24 (1995).
156 Cemy, "Globalization and the Changing Logic o f Collective Action.”
157 A term describing the anarchic character o f a transformed international system no longer dominated by 
states. The term is attributed to both Strange and Cemy.
158 See: Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, eds., Private Authority and International Affairs, and Sinclair, 
"Between State and Market: Hegemony and Institutions o f Collective Action under Conditions o f  
International Capital Mobility".
159 Underhill, "States, Markets and Governance. Private Interests, the Public Good, and the Democratic 
Process.”
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regime centred in the financial markets themselves.”160 Both scholars argue that 
significant sources of policy-making authority include non-state actors and economic 
structures. Cemy maintains that markets and market actors have policy-making 
authority, while for Underhill, market evolution reveals shared governance through the 
continuous re-balancing of market competition and state regulatory processes.
Shared observations
EU integration and state/market literatures make common observations. First, in 
varying degrees and configurations, policy-making authority is migrating away from the 
state -  either upwards to supranational actors or downwards to private actors, or in both 
directions. This development challenges state autonomy. Second, international policy­
making analyses focusing tightly on the interaction of unitary states cannot capture the 
dynamic evolution of regulatory norms. The impact of networks and economic structures 
must be included. Third, both perspectives share the observation that the interaction and 
influence of supra and sub-national actors is significant. Finally, globalisation and 
regional integration are identified as having altered international policy-making, 
governance, and the capabilities and preferences of states. These observations lead these 
theorists to argue that unless these consequences are considered, analyses will be 
incomplete or misleading.
Synthetic Analysis
As described earlier in Chapter 1, a synthetic analysis seeks to develop a 
conversation between observations and conclusions developed by individual analytical 
perspectives, including both state and non-state centric observations, in order to develop 
new insights into international policy formation. This is achieved by juxtaposing 
observations and comparing and contrasting empirical findings from different theoretical 
perspectives. A synthetic analysis is neither a simple accumulation of evidence nor an 
effort to develop a unified theory. It differs from non-state centric approaches by 
including state-centric observations. It differs from cumulative or sequential analyses by 
seeking to understand the process of policy formation, not simply specific actor or 
institutional roles, and by addressing specific questions. Moreover, it views policy
160 P. Cemy, "International Finance and the Erosion of Capitalist Diversity," in Political Economy o f  
Modern Capitalism, ed. C. Crouch and W. Streeck (London: Sage, 1997). attributing Filipovic, 
Governments, Banks and Global Capital: Securities Markets in Global Politics.
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formation as a process that changes over time. As a consequence, it argues for 
examination and assessment of the entirety of a policy formation exercise instead of an 
examination that seeks a binary explanation of success or failure, or that focuses on a 
specific variable or variables.
Synthetic analysis acknowledges that each discrete analytical perspective 
develops its own observations. The impetus behind synthetic analysis is not, however, to 
develop a unified theory. Instead it is to develop new insights into international policy 
formation by combining, comparing and contrasting observations from different 
perspectives.
Debates between theoretical perspectives would seem to encourage the 
development of a unified, theoretical approach. However, this objective may be 
flawed.161 The phenomena examined by competing analytical perspectives are different. 
Empirical observations and conclusions derived from state/market analysis will likely 
differ from observations derived from analyses based on no-functionalist EU integration 
theory. Intergovemmentalist and institutionalist observations will differ yet again. More 
generally, state and non-state centric analytical perspectives explain how different 
phenomena affect policy formation.
Because analytical perspectives examine different policy-influencing phenomena, 
developing a unified or cumulative analytical approach to explain highly differentiated 
events or observations runs the risk of creating confusion. International policy formation 
necessitates resolving the interests of highly differentiated constituencies. Analysing the 
influence of one category of affected constituent risks an incomplete or inaccurate 
analysis. A unified approach, rather than an approach that compares and synthesises 
empirical evidence from different perspectives, runs different risks. The first is that of 
over-simplification and the second is that of over-complication. A theory that unifies 
differentiated perspectives will need to identify unifying analytical principles. This 
simplification process creates its own potential for ignoring important phenomena. At the 
other extreme, a unified theory that encompasses all analytical perspectives would be 
hopelessly complicated. These problems prompted John Odell to focus on the process of
161 This analysis is made by Puchala, "Institutionalism, Intergovemmentalism and European Integration”.
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policy formation. It is also why state/market perspectives are vague in defining which 
specific variables are important in analysing state/market relationships.
The goal of generating analytical conclusions that are greater than the sum of the 
empirical evidence will be more readily achieved by comparing and contrasting the 
observations and conclusions of multiple analytical perspectives rather than by 
attempting to develop a unified theory. As noted earlier, a more modest synthetic effort 
to identify the limits of individual analytical approaches by juxtaposing them will 
facilitate more accurate evaluation of the sources and contours of influence in policy- 
formation.
Hypotheses
The development of comprehensive EU integration and state/market perspectives 
in response to state-centric analyses is part of the larger contemporary debate in IR/IPE 
theory between rationalist and constructivist scholars.162 This debate contrasts the 
conscious role of the state in policy-making with the authority and influence of social, 
political and economic institutions on actors and governance. These perspectives contrast 
opinions on the evolution of market authority and form the basis for building hypotheses 
in order to focus empirical research.163 They also define different views on the use of 
variables in analysis. Narrower approaches focus analytical attention on the role of the 
state and state autonomy; non-state centric approaches focus on a wider array of public 
and private actor and institutional roles. This contrast helps to re-frame the central 
empirical question of this study: “Is authority migrating away from the state?” to, “How 
should we understand changing patterns of (securities) market governance across levels 
of analysis and among a range of actors?”164 Recasting this question expands the focus of 
research from sources of authority to the broader identification of sources of influence as
162 Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics".
163 A major distinction between rational choice and constructivist analyses lies in their treatment o f  
institutions. If we consider intergovemmentalism and neo-functionalism as sub-sets o f rational choice and 
constructivist approaches respectively, this distinction also defines how the rival o f interest in neo­
functionalism opened new research avenues for scholars. While both perspectives agree that institutions 
matter causally, they differ as to how. Rationalists generally define institutions as “rules of the game,” 
shaping actor strategies in pursuit o f exogenously defined preferences. Constructivists define institutions 
more broadly to include formal and informal mles, understandings and norms. Significantly, institutions 
are also defined as discrete actors who shape their own preferences. See Pollack, "International Relations 
Theory and European Integration.”
164 The phrasing o f this question was suggested by Prof. G.R.D. Underhill.
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well. This prevents research from simply noting the obvious, that authority has migrated, 
by extending analysis to the identification and examination of the components and 
contours of international policy-making influence.
This thesis argues that, based on the case studies, state influence and authority 
remain predominant in international policy-making. This argument rests on three 
observations: state economic and political structures primarily determined international 
policy outcomes; lowest common denominator decision-making prevailed; and, finally, 
state autonomy was preserved. In particular, fundamental state preferences acted as 
thresholds for determining the acceptability of international policy harmonisation 
alternatives. These preferences were influenced by non-state preferences, but they were 
dominated by powerful state concerns associated with the preservation of public goods 
and historic state policies. The thesis notes that sources of authority and influence have 
expanded significantly, reflecting increasing market complexity, dispersed context-based 
expertise, and constrained state regulatory capabilities. These developments have 
increased states’ reliance on non-state expertise and authority, expanding the role of 
these sources of influence on state policy-making. However, in the case studies, state 
autonomy was preserved and decision-making was driven primarily by state actors and 
institutions.
Structural, domestic, and bargaining perspectives generally argue that states are 
the final arbiters in policy-making, although they may consider private actor or 
institutional preferences in making decisions. Integration and state/market perspectives 
argue that understanding the composition of policy-making authority and influence is a 
function of identifying how (and why and where) the preferences of state and non-state 
actors and institutions are represented. These latter two perspectives conclude that, at a 
minimum, policy-making is shared between states and non-state actors and institutions.
Each analytical perspective makes distinct predictions regarding the evolution of 
governance norms. This thesis argues that employment of narrow perspectives inhibits 
assessment of the relative importance of individual variables and the identification of 
limitations or inaccuracies in narrower approaches. The evaluation of a spectrum of 
variables is necessary to determine the contours o f influence and the accuracy of 
contrasting hypotheses. Analysis based on one perspective may or may not provide
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insight into larger questions of international authority or influence and may be 
constrained by theoretical limitations. A synthetic approach assesses empirical findings 
comparatively in order to assemble a more accurate understanding of the sources of 
authority in policy-formation. It resembles a non-state centric approach but adds 
consideration of state-centric observations. By juxtaposing theoretically generated 
hypotheses with empirical observations we can assemble a dynamic and robust 
understanding of authority and policy-making, assess the ability of each perspective to 
draw inferences from the evidence, and more accurately track the relationship between 
stages in governance development (agenda-setting, negotiation, ratification) and 
explanatory or influential variables.165
Hypotheses are drawn to reflect state and non-state centric perspectives. They are 
derived from intergovemmentalist and neo-functionalist arguments. States are not 
deemed unitary. Non-state actors are assumed to be potentially authoritative. For clarity, 
states represent national public authority. Non-state actors represent either international 
or domestic private authority (whether national, supranational or sub-national). A critical 
difference between state and non-state centric perspectives lies in a state’s ability to 
manage the mobilisation of non-state preferences, particularly when they differ from its 
own preferences. When state and non-state preferences overlap, it will be important to 
assess whether this represents agreement or capture. Similarly, where multilateral actors 
are influenced by private actors (or vice versa), it is important to identify why. Was it a 
function of the location of authority or traceable to other factors?
State-centric hypotheses'66
The central decision-making role of the state in policy-formation serves as the 
basis for generating testable hypotheses. To demonstrate support for these hypotheses, 
empirical evidence should indicate a pattern of state executive decision-making 
dominance and little or no migration or diminution of state executive authority in favour 
of either sub or supranational actors or institutions.
165 Andrew Walter, "NGOs, Business , and International Investment: The Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, Seattle, and Beyond," Global Governance, (January 2001).
166 State and non-state centric hypotheses are adapted from Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, "European 
Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance.”
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1. National governments will be able to impose their preferences on 
international actors or institutions.
2. National governments will ensure their individual sovereignty vis 
a vis other governments and international institutions.
3. National governments should be able to control the mobilisation of 
sub-national interests.
These hypotheses revolve around the argument that states overwhelmingly 
dominate the development and structure of international governance norms. State-centric 
hypotheses predict that the EU’s regulatory success and IOSCO’s failure were explicitly 
related to the actions of states, which imposed their preferences on other states and on 
non-state actors and institutions.
State actions in international policy-making negotiations produce affirmative 
policy outcomes and are legitimate. Their actions reflect the objective of preserving their 
individual sovereignty and autonomy, which may be demonstrated through ability to 
avoid compromises, perseverance in maintaining national negotiating preferences, or 
through preservation of domestic economic and political institutions or preferences. 
Finally, to support these hypotheses the empirical evidence will demonstrate that states 
will act affirmatively to control the independent opinions or coalition formation efforts 
of sub-national actors and institutions. Authority in the development of international 
regulatory standards will clearly emanate from national executives or institutions.
Non-state centric hypotheses
Non-state centric approaches, while not formal theories, stress the increasingly 
predominant role of non-state actors and institutions in international policy-making. State 
authority is not entirely discounted but is shrinking in favour of the affirmative role of 
non-state actors and institutions. As noted earlier, arguments made by MLG and related 
literatures overlap with arguments made by state/market scholars. However, for non­
state actors to be deemed influential in policy-formation they must evidence legitimacy, 
recognition, and utility. The same is true for states. Moreover, to demonstrate that 
authority is migrating away from states, the cases must indicate not only a clear pattern
167 They combine the roles o f networks, private actors, economic and/or market structures and multi-level 
governance in regulatory development.
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of diminished state autonomy, but also enhanced private or supranational authority and 
regulatory autonomy. These elements are important in understanding the role of non­
state actors and institutions in the development of international governance norms. 
Authority will appear to be vested independently in these agents -  potentially at the 
expense of state autonomy. Non-state centric perspectives should shed light on how and 
when and where state and non-state actors matter. These conceptual overlaps permit the 
development of common testable hypotheses for examining empirical evidence.
1. A pattern of shared decision-making between levels of 
government will be evident.
2. Individual state executives will be unable to deliver desired policy 
outcomes through collective state executive decisions.
3. Sub-national interests will mobilise directly in the supranational 
arena or will use it as a public space to pressure state executives.
Empirical evidence in the case studies should reveal that collective decision­
making evidenced the influence of sub and supranational actors, institutions or markets 
as well as states. Additionally, outcomes will reflect the role of non-state market 
structures, affecting multilateral preferences and, ultimately, policy-making authority. 
More critically, the (national) preferences of state executives will be frustrated through 
collective bargaining processes. This may result either in the acceptance of stalemate or 
compromise regulatory proposals, reflecting a state-centric lowest common denominator 
outcome, or in decisions to sacrifice preferences in favour of more significant objectives 
(a non-state centric zero-sum outcome). Finally, the legitimacy and authority of 
sub/supra-national interests and/or market structures will be manifest in the outcome of 
negotiations. Overall, these hypothesised observations will reflect shared authority in the 
development of governance norms in financial services, between states and non-state 
actors and institutions, diluting state authority and sovereignty.
Distinguishing these hypotheses are the roles o f non-state actors, economic and 
political structures and the interaction of non-state and state actors across political levels 
in rule-making and governance. This leads to an empirical focus on the process of rule- 
making and not simply on ratification.
Objectives
The objective of this thesis is to describe the structure of authority and influence 
in international policy-making. It is not simply to determine whether authority is 
migrating away from the state, but also how public and private actors and institutions 
interact across levels of authority in the policy development process, and to determine 
when and how they are (or are not) influential. A comprehensive analytical perspective is 
achieved by utilising integration and state/market approaches, focusing on sources of 
authority and influence; by focusing empirically on policy-making processes rather than 
individual variables; and by emphasising the critical role of structure (economic, 
political, regulatory and historic) in determining national policy preferences.
This thesis also seeks to determine whether conclusions drawn from different 
analytical perspectives can be juxtaposed to develop new and different observations 
regarding the structure of authority and influence in policy formation. Synthetic analysis 
is designed to develop insights that are greater than the accumulation of empirical 
observations. By comparing and contrasting a broad spectrum of evidence, new 
understandings, relationships and conclusions may be identified. As a result, a goal of 
synthetic analysis is the development of observations that transcend narrower 
perspectives. Such an analysis could be used to assess a wide range of international 
phenomena and its potential conclusions would not be artificially constrained by its 
assumptions.
The Negotiations
As a starting premise, the EU negotiations are deemed to be “successful,” as they 
resulted in the adoption of the CAD and ISD. The IOSCO negotiations are deemed to be 
‘‘unsuccessful,” as they produced no regulatory agreement. However, analytical 
perspectives do not assume success or failure. They predict influences on and location(s) 
of authority in policy-making. For example, the EU’s success may be associated with 
member-states protecting their sovereign authority -  or with state executives being 
unable to collectively deliver preferred policy outcomes. Similarly for IOSCO, failure 
may be related to a state successfully imposing its unpopular preferences -  or to the 
failure of negotiating states to share collective decision-making authority. In other words,
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negotiated outcomes do not bias hypothesised relationships. It may be difficult to 
distinguish distinct hypothesised outcomes from the empirical evidence. These 
difficulties are resolvable by refocusing on identifying contours of authority and 
influence rather than on negotiated outcomes. Conclusions will turn on the balance of 
state and non-state authority and influence, which is, of course, a matter of degree rather 
than an objective calculation.
Criticisms of “Complex” Analytical Approaches
Non-state centric, synthetic and sequential analyses are closely related. Non-state 
centric analyses examine sources of authority and influence across and along levels of 
analysis. Synthetic analyses juxtapose empirical observations from different analytical 
perspectives. Sequential analyses build analytical conclusions from distinct levels of 
analysis. Because the approaches are closely related, criticisms of sequential analyses are 
relevant to the first two approaches. Sequential analyses have been criticised for three 
reasons: arbitrariness, incompleteness, and “ad hoc-ism.”168
These criticisms are based on the observation that sequential analyses are 
imprecise regarding their analytical “starting points,” regarding their definition of causal 
linkages between levels of analysis, and regarding their development of an overarching 
theoretical structure. These criticisms are addressed by noting first, that influence and 
authority can be exercised vertically (in both directions) as well as horizontally. 
Recognising this possibility encourages analysis from multiple perspectives. Second, 
causal linkages between levels of analysis may be tied to multiple actors and institutions, 
both public and private. Positing a statesman linkage between levels of analysis, as 
Moravcsik does, is arbitrary and ignores other possible links. Finally, non-state centric 
and synthetic perspectives address concern with ad hoc-ism by examining policy- 
formation processes and core questions across levels o f analysis and actors.169
168 See Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories o f International 
Bargaining,” p. 14, for a discussion.
169 Moravcsik notes most sequential analyses start with systemic level examinations and subsequently 
incorporate domestic variables. He considers this arbitrary because it prioritises structural theories and 
introduces bias into empirical research. He also notes it is possible to start research from a domestic 
theoretical base and build an understanding o f  international cooperation.
There is no prima facie  reason to assume bias in analysing evidence, whether the starting context is 
systemic, domestic or both. Integration and state/market approaches do not assume an explicit starting 
context. Rather, they examine processes and authority simultaneously with actors and institutions. Non-
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Moravcsik, although emphasising state predominance, specified three levels of 
analysis and sought a cumulative understanding of cooperation.170 His perspective relies 
on empirical research for the generation of inductive hypotheses. This is not significantly 
different from non-state centric perspectives and synthetic analysis, which embrace a 
wider universe of causal variables. But by establishing the priority of state preferences, 
Moravcsik introduced analytical constraints. The other two approaches accept a priori 
that international and domestic environments influence each other. Identification of how 
domestic interests are translated into international policy outcomes -  or vice versa -  is 
joined with identification of why domestic interests are translated into international 
negotiating strategies -  or vice versa.
Finally, the complexity of international policy-formation -  and of both non-state 
centric approaches and synthetic analysis -  confounds parsimonious analysis and 
encourages the inclusion of complex sets of explanatory variables. Complexity, in turn, 
may inhibit the development of tightly defined causal connections. However, if we build 
an understanding of policy-formation starting from narrower perspectives, with fewer
state centric perspectives are precise and well defined, facilitating the development of testable hypotheses. 
There is also no a priori reason why multiple perspectives cannot be utilised simultaneously in analysis, 
nor why one should be identified as a “starting point.”
Moravcsik also criticises domestic theories o f bureaucratic politics and interest group formation as 
incomplete because they rarely address the impact o f domestic politics on international authority. To 
address this gap he introduces a statesman. This has merit because it approximates reality. Two-level 
games perspectives reflect the resonance o f domestic and international variables.
This is an elegant, though narrow, solution to the level o f analysis problem. The utility o f bargaining 
perspectives lies in the “statesman” metaphor. Instead of focusing attention exclusively on structural or 
domestic factors, the bargaining approach seeks expressly to identify the strategies and preferences which 
bridge the domestic -  international analytical divide and affect international policy-formation. However, 
this approach is also incomplete. Focus on the statesman necessarily excludes the potential independent 
authority, influence or interaction o f supranational, other national, or sub-national actors or institutions in 
policy-making (See, for example, Haufler, "Crossing the Boundary between Public and Private: 
International Regimes and Non-State Actors,", and Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, eds., Private Authority and 
International Affairs.)
Moravcsik’s final critique focuses on the failure o f sequential analyses to develop an overarching 
theoretical construct, employing the same assumptions and variables for analysis across perspectives. 
When this concern is extended to bargaining or intergovemmentalist analyses, Moravcsik argues the 
problem evaporates as analysis has narrowed its focus and need not be concerned with differing 
assumptions for different levels o f analysis. Despite this analytical sleight o f hand, potential problems 
remain.
As noted earlier, focus on one analytical perspective or level o f  analysis is restrictive and unrealistic. 
However, to avoid ad hoc-ism analytical attention is paid to the over-arching questions synthetic 
perspectives ask: “Where is policy-making authority and how does it operate?” rather than simply, “How 
has one level o f analysis affected another?” This methodology analyses core questions across analytical 
perspectives and avoids an ad hoc focus on one variable or analytical level.
170 Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories o f International 
Bargaining,” p. 23.
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variables, and advance to more complex explanations, we may be able to better manage 
complexity and more precisely tie specific variables to specific empirical observations. 
In this way, initial parsimonious observations may add analytical rigor to subsequent 
complex observations. The disappearance of analytical connections as explanatory 
complexity increases may signal a loss of analytical rigor. In this sense, parsimonious 
approaches may act as a control for complex analyses.171 More fundamentally, complex 
perspectives and analyses are justified if they clarify policy-formation processes or 
identify the limitations of narrower approaches.
Research Methodology
Research was conducted using primary and secondary source materials. Primary 
resources included confidential interviews and official BIS, EC/EU, IOSCO, EU 
member-state, and US Federal Government testimonies and reports. Secondary sources 
consisted principally of newspaper and magazine reports including, inter alia, The New 
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, The Economist, International 
Securities Regulation Report, and Dow Jones news retrieval services. Additional 
secondary sources included scholarly books and articles from refereed journals. These 
are listed in the bibliography and footnotes.
Twenty confidential research interviews were completed in New York and
1 7 *) 17 1London. The interviews were conducted under “Chatham House” rules. Most of the 
interviewees had been prominently engaged in the EU and IOSCO negotiations; they 
included senior officials from British and American government and securities 
regulatory agencies, the European Commission, Directorate General XV, and the Basle 
Committee. Several senior private sector officials with significant roles in the
171 See also footnote 106 in this chapter and related text discussion o f  “complex analyses.” This analysis 
was suggested by Prof. G.R.D. Underhill.
172 Prior to interviews, each interviewee received a letter explaining the general objective and confidential 
nature o f research and containing an outline o f both the reasons why an interview was sought and topics 
for discussion. Each interview was recorded with the prior approval o f the interviewee. Interviews lasted 
from one to three hours in length, were conducted in English and took place in interviewees’ offices. 
Interviewees agreed to respond to follow-up questions. With one exception, all requests for interviews 
were accepted.
173 The Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, (“Chatham House”) has established research 
interview guidelines that preclude revealing information developed during interviews that might permit 
identification o f  interviewees or their professional affiliations.
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negotiations were interviewed as well. No employees of IOSCO were interviewed, 
although several IOSCO member-state representatives were.
The Case Studies and Conclusions
The case study chapters174 assess specific aspects of the EU and IOSCO 
negotiations, focusing on elements that provide insight into policy-making authority. The 
EU chapters begin with an examination of state regulatory institutional structures; they 
provide a summary of the negotiations; and finally, they assess EU and private sector 
authority specifically. The IOSCO chapters begin with a summary of the negotiations, 
provide an assessment of IOSCO and private sector authority, and conclude with an 
examination of the SEC’s authority and response to globalisation.
The conclusion assesses findings against hypothesised relationships, addresses 
the core questions, and evaluates the relative explanatory value of each perspective. The 
conclusion also addresses contributions that this analysis makes to the international 
political economy literature and to regulatory evolution.
174 Chapters 4 - 1 1 .
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Chapter 4
State Authority in the UK, Germany and France
Introduction
This chapter examines the historical background and structure of regulatory 
authority in three prominent EU member-states.1 It specifically defines the consequences 
for actor regulatory preferences of different national and sectoral histories and structures. 
The chapter’s objective is to identify how and why state actors and institutions were 
influential in the evolution of the CAD and ISD and the character of the authority they 
may have exercised in the negotiations. The chapter focuses on the UK, France and 
Germany, as these were the principal states involved in the negotiations. The specific 
details of the negotiations are provided in Chapter 5.
This chapter provides historical and institutional background information 
necessary to assess the accuracy of the hypotheses and of the theories used to compose 
the hypotheses. The analytical perspectives defined in Chapter 3 consider, in varying 
degrees, the potential significance of state or domestic institutional histories, and 
political and economic structures, in explaining the evolution of public and private actor 
regulatory preferences. This background helps us to understand the structure and 
interaction of actor preferences in the evolution of the CAD and ISD.
EU integration, state/market and domestic perspectives all stress the significance 
of national and institutional histories in locating authority and influence. Structural and 
bargaining approaches do the same, but to a lesser extent. This history, juxtaposed with 
the negotiations, helps clarify the sources of preferences and the location of authority and 
influence. It also reveals the reasons behind significant preference divergence among
1 See Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems., 
for an extended discussion.
94
private sector firms, pointing to the absence of a single, unified private sector voice on 
capital adequacy standards.
United Kingdom
The structure of domestic markets and regulations
The restoration of London as a major international financial centre was a 
principal objective of the British government in the post WWII period. To help achieve 
this policy, the government and central bank had encouraged institutional and market 
self-regulation, leading to the monopoly operative status of domestic financial services 
sectors. But, by the early 1960s, these sectors were under intensifying competitive
•y
pressure from the growth of the Euromarkets, particularly the Eurodollar market. New 
markets encouraged closer economic and, eventually, political ties between currency 
host and home countries such as the UK, US and other countries whose currencies 
facilitated the development of offshore markets. These developments juxtaposed 
national regulatory and financial systems, encouraging arbitrage and regulatory change.4
In British markets corporate lending and deposit-taking were conducted by a 
small group of “clearing banks,”5 named for their role in executing government monetary 
and credit policies. Regional building societies and saving institutions carried out 
mortgage lending, and investment banking services were provided by thinly capitalised, 
predominantly private, discount houses.6 These latter decided not to accept deposits, 
focusing instead on corporate finance and investment advice. As a result, despite the 
relative absence of legal impediments to universal banking, British financial services
2 Eurodollar markets represent capital markets comprised o f US dollar deposits and securities in circulation 
outside the US. Euromarkets measure their significant growth and nascent influence from the early 1960s 
with the development o f the tradable Eurodollar certificate o f deposit. However, “technically” these 
markets existed much earlier. Euromarkets in other currencies also flourished.
3 Widely circulated currencies enabled the development of offshore markets.
4 Adapted from Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the 
Systems. See also, Chapter 2. Note also that the Euromarket, headquartered in London, competed with 
British domestic markets but was also an important component o f the UK domestic economy. 
Consequently, it is incomplete to refer to the Euromarkets simply as competitors to, particularly British, 
domestic markets.
5 Comprised o f Barclays, National Westminster, Lloyds and Midland banks. Scottish banks handled 
Scottish clearing separately.
6 Also referred to as “accepting houses.”
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until the 1990s resembled the US system of separated financial powers rather than 
continental Europe’s universal banking system.7
Two aspects of the structure of the UK financial services industry distinguished it 
from continental Europe; these were the provision of investment advice to individuals 
and the use of equity markets by corporations.
In much of continental Europe large universal banks provided investment advice 
to both institutions and individuals. However, in the UK investment advice was provided 
to individuals by over 8,000 investment advisors, typically small firms. Their role in 
channelling investment funds in the British economy gave them considerable economic
Q
and political clout, which was reinforced by FIMBRA, an SRO created by FSA 1986. 
Advisory firms, despite carrying limited capital, were initially subject to provisions of 
the CAD and ISD.
The UK economy did not have the influential industry and bank ties that 
characterised the French and, particularly, German markets. Post-WWII UK fiscal and 
monetary policies discouraged bank lending, with the consequence that private 
companies used domestic equity and debt capital markets to raise capital. This 
encouraged the growth of the London Stock Exchange as well as domestic and Euro 
capital markets.
Euromarket growth was centred in London. This was a consequence of many 
factors including London’s well-developed market infrastructure,9 a stable, liquid local 
currency, a long tradition of international openness and market activity, and a market- 
oriented regulatory perspective. The rapid development of the Euromarkets in London in 
the 1960s and 1970s had the consequence of increasing their significance to Britain’s 
domestic economy and its international prestige.
7 British laws did not distinguish between commercial and investment banking but the broker/jobber 
distinction prior to the “Big Bang” (see below) inhibited the development o f universal banking.
8 See Glossary and below for definitions of “SROs” and “FSA 1986.”
9 “Infrastructure:” refers to the physical structures, trained, specialised personnel and technical 
requirements necessary to operate large dynamic capital markets.
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As noted, globalisation and Euromarket growth also sensitised UK regulators to 
the importance of their domestic regulatory environment, its institutional infrastructure 
and operating language in defining the attractiveness of London for international capital 
raising.
However, increased capital and market participant mobility also served to 
highlight archaic UK organisational and regulatory structures, most significantly the 
LSE’s. By the mid-1980s, the growing importance of continental capital markets and 
clients prompted international securities firms to consider relocating their EU securities 
headquarters from London to other European financial centres. If migration had occurred 
it would have decentralised European securities trading and would have represented a 
significant blow to City prestige and the UK economy.
The economic importance of international financial services to Britain prompted 
a governmental review of financial services regulation, focusing attention on competition 
between European banking capitals for financial services and raising public and private 
sector concern with the potential risks of changing London’s regulatory regime.
The “Big Bang”
London’s “City” had a long tradition of laissez-faire self-regulation. The Bank of 
England, supported by the Treasury and Department of State for Trade and Industry 
(“DTI”), was London’s senior regulator of financial services. Prior to 1986, regulation 
was based on traditional practices, rules and “consultation” between the Bank and 
practitioners. However, as noted in Chapter 2, changes over the preceding two decades in 
the context and scope of trading executed in London forced a re-examination of its 
regulatory environment.10
The UK’s initial response was to deregulate its fixed-commission, segmented 
stock market on October 27, 1986.11 Simultaneously, the LSE adopted an automated
17equity price quotation system, called “SEAQ,” for domestic equities, and an affiliate,
10 Adapted from: Denise M. Leydon, "International Securities - London's Dominance in the Emerging 
Integrated International Market," Suffolk Transnational Law Journal 11 (1987).
11 Under new rules, brokers and jobbers were allowed to perform each other’s functions and to own each 
other. See: Supplement, "The City Revolution," Financial Times, 27 October 1986.
12 The Stock Exchange Automatic Quotation system (“SEAQ”). See Glossary.
97
“SEAQ-Intemational,” for international equities, and opened its membership to foreign- 
owned companies. The “Big Bang” led to a rapid increase in foreign institutional 
ownership of British brokers13 and permitted banking institutions, both domestic and 
foreign, to operate as universal banks, encouraging institutional evolution toward the 
continental European universal banking model.
Several days later, on November 7, 1986, Britain adopted the Financial Services 
Act 1986 (“FSA 1986”), revolutionising domestic securities regulation.14
The Big Bang and FSA 1986 had important consequences. London became the 
first European market to substantially deregulate financial services, establishing a 
regulatory precedent for other European domestic securities markets and reinforcing 
London’s regional and international market stature.15 The new regulations incorporated 
recent market developments, including new product and hedging technologies. Finally, 
deregulation encouraged the continued expansion of London-based markets, especially 
the lightly regulated Euromarkets.16 The Big Bang also authorised the DTI to establish a 
regulatory board, the Securities and Investments Board (“SIB”),17 to regulate and 
monitor investment businesses in Britain. The SIB, in turn, was authorised to recognise 
Self-Regulatory Organisations (“SROs”)18 responsible for policing members of 
individual market segments.
The regulatory changes dramatically altered existing public/private regulatory 
arrangements, by introducing multi-level regulation predicated on state control over 
regulatory evolution and decision-making. The government’s adoption of the Big Bang,
13 These changes are commonly referred to as the “Big Bang.”
14 The regulatory revolution was based on political compromises engineered between Labour and Tory 
ministers over a six-year period beginning in 1979. FSA 1986 had a difficult legislative gestation and 
confronted deep opposition from affected parties in London’s City. Nevertheless, the powerful Tory 
majority government pushed the legislation through Parliament See: Leydon, "International Securities - 
London's Dominance in the Emerging Integrated International Market.” Also, J. Pimlott, "The Reform o f  
Investor Protection in the UK - an Examination of the Proposals o f the Gower Report and the UK 
Government's White Paper o f January, 1985," Journal o f  Comparative Business and Capital Market Law  7 
(1985).
15 Vogel categorises the Big Bang and adoption of FSA 1986 as “re-regulation” rather than deregulation as 
more rules eventuated from its adoption than were discarded. See: Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: 
Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries.
16 In both market share and product terms. The rapid development o f Euro commercial paper and medium- 
term note markets in the late 1980’s can be traced to FSA 1986. See Glossary.
17 See Glossary.
18 See Glossary.
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over City opposition, effectively asserted the state’s pre-eminent role in the development 
of financial services regulation, in place of the City’s earlier self-regulatory regime, and 
acknowledged the significance of City activities to the state.
The SIB resembled the US Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) -  but 
with significant differences. The SIB reported to a government department (the 
Treasury) rather than to the President and Congress. More significantly, the SIB and FSA 
1986 were intended to preserve the non-legalistic, consultative approach that historically 
characterised British financial services regulation, in sharp contrast with the US 
regulatory regime. However, FSA 1986 established an additional state-mandated layer of 
regulatory authority between banks and state regulators.
SROs represented specific product markets and set capital adequacy requirements 
for members. Nevertheless, regulatory guidelines were expected to be broadly similar 
across market sectors. Importantly, SROs were created to expand communication 
between regulators and market participants and to encourage market participation in 
regulatory evolution.
The new regulatory structure created jurisdictional overlaps. While the Bank 
retained sole responsibility for commercial bank supervision, areas of overlap with the 
SIB were created, including regulation of integrated banking and securities businesses 
and the gilt-edged19 and wholesale markets. The regulatory objective of developing a 
domestic capital standard for financial institutions with both banking and securities 
businesses highlighted these overlaps. In order to address this, a complex formula was 
developed for capital calculation, based on the amount of securities-related business an 
institution transacted. This UK domestic model set a conceptual precedent for the 
“trading book” approach eventually established by the CAD.
A final regulatory change designed to strengthen London-based markets was the 
November 1986 merger of the London Stock Exchange, a self-regulating institution, with 
the International Securities Regulatory Organisation (“ISRO”), which was responsible 
for “governing” the largely unregulated London-based Euromarkets. The merger
19 See Glossary.
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acknowledged the migration of international bond market activity from Switzerland to 
London, where, by 1985, over 80% of new international bond issues were offered.
These rule changes buttressed London’s international market stature, but they 
also created anxiety among City institutions over the potentially negative implications of 
regulatory change. In New York, the 1975 elimination of fixed commissions by the New 
York Stock Exchange reduced brokerage commissions and increased equity trading 
volumes but had lowered revenues. This had forced securities firms to diversify business 
and revenue streams, favouring well-capitalised firms and resulting in a few large firms 
dominating securities underwriting.20 A similar development in London could make less-
well capitalised, private City institutions vulnerable to acquisition; it might also
01encourage business migration or new concentrations of market authority.
London’s regulators were also aware that the complexity and juridification of 
their new regulatory regime might encourage firms to leave. Reflecting this uncertainty, 
Andrew Large, Chairman of The Securities Association (“TSA”), the newly-created 
securities industry SRO, commented “I just don’t know” when asked what additional 
costs new capital adequacy regulations would impose on London securities firms. 
Replying to another question about potential jurisdictional conflicts between the Bank
and SIB, Large noted, “Obviously where you have two securities regulatory
00agencies...there is potential for complication.”
The Big Bang increased private and public sector investment in financial services 
regulation. This was reflected in the political commitment of the Thatcher government to 
regulatory reform and in the economic cost of compliance with new regulations. This 
investment also increased government and private sector resistance to further regulatory 
change, whether arising from domestic or international sources. The Big Bang made 
London markets more competitive for investors but more costly for bankers. The 
potentially negative consequences of higher compliance costs and a more competitive
20 Six firms, First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and 
Salomon Brothers, the so-called “Bulge Bracket,” dominated securities underwriting in the US in the 
1980s.
21 This is, o f course, what happened. By the late 1990s, only one independent discount house, Cazenove, 
remained, and London’s markets were dominated by foreign, mainly US and Swiss, firms.
22 Neil Osborn, "TSA Chief Admits Big Will Benefit," Euromoney, September 1987., p. 462-463
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marketplace were clear; when asked about a potential move to continental Europe, the 
London head of Salomon Brothers23 commented, “we always maintain our flexibility.”24
The Big Bang reflected formal acceptance by UK regulators and legislators of 
universal banking and sophisticated, market-driven regulation. It reflected as well the 
UK’s decision to have specialised securities regulators, rather than bank regulators, 
supervise investment firms, departing from common practice on the Continent. SROs 
also reflected the regulators’ intention to have regulation substantively incorporate 
private market views and developments even while creating a separate layer of state 
bureaucracy between bankers and regulators. Finally, it acknowledged the need to have 
explicit regulation addressing securities market activities.
These dramatic changes decentralised domestic regulatory authority, increased 
state involvement in regulatory development, increased the potential for domestic 
institutional conflicts, and encouraged private sector involvement in regulatory 
evolution. The new SIB shared regulatory responsibilities with the Bank but could not 
match the Bank’s independence or institutional clout. Further, the SIB, DTI and Treasury 
all represented the UK in international regulatory negotiations, eventually complicating 
efforts to develop consistent policy positions.
The City’s importance to the UK economy
The British economy benefited greatly from large invisibles earnings balances 
generated by its financial services sector. Euromarket activity in London represented a 
significant contribution to Britain’s balance of trade, helping to redress trade account 
imbalances and providing concomitant domestic economic benefits. These conditions 
provided London regulators and legislators with major incentives to promote the City’s 
regulatory regime. A 1991 study commissioned by the Corporation of London analysed 
statistics released by British Invisibles, a major UK financial services lobbying group. 
The study confirmed the important contribution made to the UK current account by 
invisibles balances generated by City activities. It re-emphasised the City’s vulnerability 
to EU directives and the domestic economic importance of maintaining London’s market
23 A leading US securities firm.
24 Martin French, "Doing the Continental," Euromoney, July 1987., p. 28
25 Executed by the London Business School.
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9 Aposition. The report’s leader, Professor Richard Brearly, addressed threats to London’s 
status and regulatory authority, “EC directives and intervention give us the most to worry 
about.”27
British invisibles earnings28 had increased consistently since the 1970’s at a rate 
approximately 50 percent faster than visible earnings, largely due to growth in 
investment income. Investment income growth was attributed to financial deregulation 
and liberalisation; in particular, to the removal of exchange controls, increasingly open 
global markets and the Big Bang. Invisible earnings made a significant positive 
contribution to the current account balance. Invisibles balances were in surplus every 
year from 1970 to 1992 except one (1990), whereas visible balances had been in surplus 
in only four years since 1970 (most recently 1982).
A decline in the UK invisibles balance from 1987 to 1989 reflected a fall in City
90earnings. The decline was a sensitive matter for then Tory Chancellor Nigel Lawson as 
the government’s economic policies had come under increasing Labour criticism. The 
Labour Party pointedly noted that the 1989 trade figures indicated Britain was losing 
world market share in services as well as manufacturing.30
UK Current Account (in billions of Pounds Sterling)
Current Visible Trade Invisibles
Period______ Balance_____Balance_____Exports Imports Balance
1987 (FY) +3.7 -10.9 79.4 90.4 +7.7
1988 (FY) -14.6 -20.8 80.6 101.4 +6.2
Qtr. 3 -3.4 -5.7 20.9 26.6 +2.3
Qtr. 4 -5.4 -6.6 20.2 26.7 +1.1
26 1990 net overseas receipts o f UK financial institutions had risen to £14.1 billion, a 10 percent increase 
over 1989. Fully 50 percent came from the banking sector whose individual earnings alone had risen 16 
percent above their 1989 level to reach £7.2 billion See: Peston, "The Challenge to the City from 
Continental Centres Is Intensifying,” for descriptions of the studies cited.
27ISRR, "London School Warns EC Regulation Threatens London Financial Center,” 7 April 1992.
28 Trade in services, transfers and income from overseas assets.
29 Their contribution to the overall invisibles balance of the current account had declined from £9.7 billion 
in 1986 to £7.4 billion in 1988.
30 Simon Holberton, "City's Foreign Earnings Fall Sharply," Financial Times, 2 August 1989.
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UK Current Account (in billions of Pounds Sterling)
(continued)
Current Visible Trade Invisibles
Period______ Balance_____Balance_____Exports Imports Balance
1989
Qtr. 1 -4.8 -5.9 21.6 27.6 +1.1
Qtr. 2 -4.9 -5.9 22.6 28.5 +1.0
Qtr. 3 -5.9 -6.8 23.0 29.8 +0.9
Source: UK Central Statistical Office, quoted in the Financial Times, 27 September 1989, p.8.
The dismal economic statistics highlighted the important role of the City’s 
earnings and regulatory regime in domestic politics. London’s international market 
authority and invisibles earnings success were tied directly to the City’s regulatory 
regime. Challenges to London’s market status, particularly from Frankfurt or Paris, 
carried potentially dire political, economic and precedential consequences. No other EU 
domestic economy mirrored the UK’s dependence on invisibles earnings generated 
through financial services.31 This highlights the political and economic significance of 
City institutions’ policy-making preferences and encouraged protection of City 
institutional regimes, especially regulatory precedents.
UK Authority
Market Stature
Several factors favoured Britain’s potential regulatory authority and leadership. 
London was home to the Euro and domestic Sterling markets. Together, these markets 
exceeded Continental markets in size, depth, liquidity, trading turnover and product 
diversification. The attractiveness of London’s regulatory and operational institutions 
had encouraged the migration of securities trading, both debt and equity, from 
continental bourses to London exchanges. London, as a result, accommodated a greater 
diversity of institutions than other European markets. The City’s success was confirmed
31 Rather than a broader services sector. See generally: UK Government, "Invisible Earnings: The UK's 
Hidden Strength,” (London: HM Treasury, 1996).
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by the release of a 1989 Bank of England study, which indicated London had a 20 
percent market share in international banking and was a global leader in foreign 
exchange, foreign equity,32 derivatives trading, insurance and international bond trading. 
The LSE had a substantial lead over other national bourses in the number of foreign 
companies listed. The City was also a leading international centre for bank lending, 
funds management, futures and options trading, and commodities trading. Not 
surprisingly, the City was responsible for a major portion of the UK’s overseas 
earnings.33
Regulatory Standing
British regulators had more experience developing regulation for dynamic 
international markets and institutions than other Continental regulators. Domestic 
markets that had made regulatory adjustments to accommodate globalisation, market 
growth, new technology and products were more likely to benefit from EU regional 
harmonisation initiatives designed to facilitate increased competition and reduce 
regulatory arbitrage.34 More importantly, these markets had greater experience and 
better-established regulatory and technical infrastructures necessary for the management 
of sophisticated markets. These conditions encouraged the broader use of regulatory 
precedents developed by these markets, giving states, such as the UK, potentially greater 
authority in the creation of regional regulation.
Both EU and UK regulators acknowledged that British experience and market 
standing resulted in British regulatory preferences being given greater weight than those 
of other EU member-states.35 Because of their expertise, British officials held senior 
positions in both EU institutions responsible for developing the CAD and ISD: 
Directorate General XV (“DG XV”)36 and the EU Commission’s financial services 
“cabinet.”37 This was a unique arrangement within the EU that went against the 
established practice of discouraging nationals of a single country from heading related 
EU institutions. A senior member of Leon Brittan’s cabinet, responsible for negotiating
32 SEAQ-I was the largest international centre for trading in foreign equities.
33 Peston, "The Challenge to the City from Continental Centres Is Intensifying,".
34 See Chapter 6 for discussion o f EU financial services principles.
35 Confidential interviews, London, May 2000 and February 2001.
36 Headed by Geoffrey Fitchew.
37 The group headed by Leon Brittan that was responsible for developing and drafting EU financial 
services legislation .
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the CAD and ISD, noted that, irrespective of nationality, EU officials were painstakingly 
independent and non-nationalistic in their work. Their credibility and professionalism
■30
would be compromised if  they were perceived as biased.
Asserting regulatory authority
The Bank of England’s generally successful efforts to maintain market order 
during late 1980s stock market crises, combined with London’s progressive regulatory 
reforms, prompted Sir George Blunden, the Bank’s Deputy Governor, to recommend that
the Bank assume a regional regulatory role in the post-1992 EU similar to the FRBNY’s
<10domestic role. Subsequently, during a June 1989 London fact-finding trip, the EU’s 
Economic and Social Committee was advised that the ISD needed to be harmonised 
more closely with existing UK regulatory legislation.40
In a further effort to promote British institutional precedents, LSE Chairman 
Andrew Hugh-Smith proposed twice, in 1990 and 1991, that his EU counterparts join 
him in developing a pan-European wholesale equity market to supersede national 
markets. His comments were taken seriously because the LSE’s trading volume and 
listings greatly exceeded those of its continental counterparts. But Hugh-Smith’s 
emphasis on the need for regulatory distinctions between wholesale and retail markets 
remained alien to European regulators. And, while his proposal accurately highlighted 
British domestic regulation as the major reason for the growth of institutional trading on 
SEAQ-I, European exchange managers saw his comments as little more than a bald 
attempt to steal further equity trading from continental bourses.41
These exchanges underline an element of Britain’s strategy in negotiating the 
CAD and ISD. They connected the City’s growth and prominence with Britain’s 
experience in developing and enforcing regulation for complex, international markets. 
As noted earlier, DG XV and EU staffing reflected Brussels’s high regard for Britain’s
38 These same officials observed that British preferences were given “greater weight” as a consequence o f  
their deeper and more sophisticated regulatory expertise. Setting aside EU staff attitudes toward British 
preferences, UK preferences were vigorously promoted in directive negotiations, through governmental 
lobbying and by private actors, with both market and experiential grounds highlighted for their 
consideration. There is no evidence o f national bias on the part o f EU officials.
39 See: David Lascelles, "Order in the Marketplace - the Blue Arrow Affair Brought Credit to the Bank o f  
England," Financial Times, 25 September 1989.The FRBNY implements monetary and foreign exchange 
policy decisions taken by the Federal Reserve Board.
40 "City Faces up to Europe," Financial Times, 17 August 1989.
45ISRR, "LSE Chairman Makes New Bid for European Wholesale Market," 19 November 1991.
105
regulatory expertise. In addition, British negotiators argued that deviation from UK 
regulatory precedents would diminish EU markets’ international competitiveness.
London’s negotiators also wanted to avoid changes to the FSA 1986, especially 
in response to EU decisions. The FSA 1986’s development had been domestically 
contentious. As the 1992 general election approached, the domestic UK political climate 
became increasingly tense, with Margaret Thatcher’s government split over the issue of 
EU monetary union. Labour could exploit the situation by parlaying any Tory back- 
peddling on domestic regulatory precedents into political weakness. Conversely, the 
Tories could promote regional adoption of UK regulatory standards as an endorsement of 
Conservative policies.
John Redwood
John Redwood exemplified the close association of domestic political concerns 
and the regional promotion of UK regulatory interests and authority. Redwood, the 
senior UK DTI representative on the EU’s internal market council and ECOFIN, was 
responsible for negotiating the CAD and ISD.42 His single-minded focus on British 
domestic interests in regional harmonisation negotiations underscores his limited 
appreciation of Cockfield’s original vision. Redwood caustically noted that he preferred 
no directive to one with which he disagreed.43
42 Redwood was acknowledged as a brilliant but abrasive politician, firmly committed ideologically to 
Thatcher’s vision o f an entrepreneurial Britain; commercially allied with -  but politically and monetarily 
independent o f -  the EU. This made him a staunch advocate o f British interests, even if  it meant derailing 
EU harmonisation negotiations. In November 1991, the EU Commission proposed language for the CAD 
that would compel non-bank securities firms to increase their capital in line with commercial banks. 
Redwood objected. The language appeared to be influenced by the German universal banks’ level-playing- 
field preferences. Small British securities firms opposed the language, arguing that capital rules should 
only apply to trading positions. The Commission’s proposal would make capital guidelines for banks and 
securities firms the same, applicable to all securities businesses and penalising Britain’s smaller investment 
advisors, many o f  whom did not position securities. It would have applied specific capital guidelines to 
both securities firms and the securities trading operations of commercial banks. A critical compromise, 
meeting broad approval, was proposed in December 1991. Nevertheless, British/French disagreements 
over the ISD slowed progress on both directives. Early in 1992, rumours circulated that the UK was 
prepared to abandon ISD negotiations when Britain assumed the EU Presidency in July. It is not 
implausible Redwood started the rumours to encourage closure on outstanding issues, although this 
remains unconfirmed. Press attention did focus on Redwood, who summed up his negotiating perspective; 
‘T oo many people have seen the Single Market as a legislative programme whereas I see it as about 
getting more cross-border trade.” (See: Ralph Atkins and Andrew Hill, "UK Plans to Put the Brake on the 
Single Market: British Presidency under the Conservatives May Put New Legislation in Jeopardy," 
Financial Times, 10 February 1992.
43 Ibid.
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Redwood’s perspective was also influenced by the Tories 1992’ election 
platform. Conservatives focused on implementing agreed SEM measures. Of Cockfield’s 
original 282 proposals, 232 were approved. Newspaper articles indicated the Tories 
planned to drop up to ten pending measures from the EU’s agenda (during their 
upcoming Presidency) in favour of implementing those already approved. As the dispute 
between France and the UK over trade transparency44 appeared irresolvable, speculation 
centred on the ISD as a prime candidate for elimination.
Redwood’s uncompromising advocacy of UK interests and authority was a 
source of irritation for British negotiators from DG XV, the UK Treasury and SIB, all of 
whom were less politically motivated. Confidential interviews confirm this observation. 
Redwood’s obduracy would be resolved only when British responsibility for EU 
negotiations was moved from the DTI to Treasury 45 Redwood’s departure, according to 
members of the UK negotiating team, helped “move the negotiations along.”46
Factors Undermining Potential UK Regional Regulatory Influence
Domestic politics and the City
Despite clear incentives to understand and promote City institutional interests, the 
Tories failed to demonstrate a meaningful understanding of City preferences or 
institutions. Ironically, the Labour party appeared more willing to promote City interests 
than the Tories.47 This became clear in the run up to the 1992 election.
Late in 1990, Labour’s spokesperson for City and Corporate Affairs, Maijorie 
Mowlam, announced a series of proposals for financial services regulatory reform. City
44 See Chapter 6. Transparency related to the timing o f publication of trade pricing information.
45 In March 1992, the Conservative Party called a general election for April 9th. Part o f the Conservatives’ 
election platform was to streamline the UK’s financial regulatory apparatus by consolidating securities 
regulatory responsibilities at Treasury. This meant removing responsibilities from the DTI, including 
shifting responsibility for negotiating EU directives from John Redwood to the Treasury under Norman 
Lamont and Anthony Nelson. Following their election victory, the Tories fulfilled their manifesto pledge 
and moved investment regulation to Treasury. As the Treasury had little expertise in investment services, 
the majority o f DTI’s 50-person financial services division also moved to the Treasury - without Redwood. 
The CAD and ISD remained on the EU agenda and were agreed over the summer.
46 Confidential interviews, London, April 28, 2000, May 8, 2000 and May 18, 2000.
47 Confidential interviews, London, April 2000 and February 2001
48 She advocated simplifying the domestic regulatory bureaucracy, promised to review FSA 1986 and to 
promote London as a “major European and international financial services centre.” ISRR, "SIB Undergoes 
Major Reshuffle; New Executive Committee Set Up," 28 January 1991.
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executives responded positively, noting that Mowlam’s unambiguous Single Market 
endorsement contrasted sharply with Tory waffling. She also attacked DTI capabilities, 
timing her comments to follow the release of a House of Commons Select Committee 
report highly critical of DTI market oversight.49
Mowlam’s comments encouraged City bankers to believe that a Labour 
government would support their interests in EU negotiations. The same could not be said 
o f the ruling Tories, who had historically maintained a cool relationship with the City.50 
City bankers were concerned about the Thatcher government’s limited appreciation of 
recent market developments and product innovations. They were concerned as well 
about the Tories’ strident opposition to monetary union, which weakened Britain’s (and 
the City’s) ability to promote its regulatory preferences in EU negotiations.
Major City firms sought out political figures who appeared to understand the 
City’s regulatory preferences. Mowlam and other Labour frontbenchers were courted by 
senior bankers, particularly from the US and UK, who felt they would effectively 
represent their interests domestically and in the EU. Interviews with City officials 
confirm their low regard for Tory officials’ understanding of City institutions and 
interests. A Labour victory in the 1992 general election might have increased the vigour 
with which the City’s regulatory authority was promoted. However, while both political 
parties were aware of the importance of the City to Britain’s economic health -  and 
election platforms made recommendations to amend specific City regulations -  neither 
party wanted to become deeply entangled in a complex EU regulatory debate that could 
negatively affect the City. As a result, the City’s domestic and regional institutional 
significance -  and its influence on the structure of the CAD and ISD -  had to be 
promoted by individual firms and bankers, rather than by political actors.
49 Mowlam noted, “after the affairs o f Guinness, Barlow Clowes, Blue Arrow, Ferranti and, more recently, 
Dunsdale, there is plenty o f evidence to support that contention [that fraud was increasing].” Ibid.
50 The Conservative Party was rooted in the countryside and suspicious o f City businesses and support for 
the Single Market. Traditionally, the City was politically independent although it’s most significant growth 
had occurred during Labour, rather than Conservative, governments. The Tories had been suspicious o f the 
City for years. Recent Conservative Prime Ministers, including Edward Heath in 1974 and Margaret 
Thatcher in the late 1980s, were offended by the City’s political independence. Heath felt his government 
had been weakly supported by the City during a crisis o f confidence and Thatcher had been concerned City 
scandals would taint her administration. See: Peter Lee, "Who's Afraid o f a Labour Government?," 
Euromoney, December 1991.
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Discord over monetary union
Domestic political debates over monetary union and commitment to EU 
objectives further undermined British authority in the CAD and ISD discussions.
In February 1988, representatives from the FRBNY, the SEC, the Bank of 
England and the SIB met to examine the capital adequacy of US securities firm branches 
operating in London. Also attending was Sir Nicholas Goodison, LSE chairman, who 
called for central banks to become the principal regulators of the securities industry.51 At 
the same meeting, the Bank Governor, Robin Leigh-Pemberton, called for the formation 
of a new international group to harmonise national approaches to securities regulation. 
Leigh-Pemberton’s recommendation appeared a logical extension of the successful 
Cooke Committee formula used in developing the Basle Accord. While the meeting did 
not develop formal recommendations, further meetings were scheduled and the group 
indicated its intention of examining capital adequacy separately from either ISOCO or 
the EU. Notably absent were continental European representatives.
Goodison and Leigh-Pemberton’s recommendations highlight conflicting UK 
domestic preferences and potential conflicts between UK, US and other EU member- 
states’ preferences. Goodison’s recommendation was at odds with British and French 
domestic practices and was not endorsed by the UK SIB or TSA. Leigh-Pemberton’s 
proposal was puzzling in light of the EU’s (and IOSCO’s) on-going effort to develop 
regulatory standards. His comments reflected his personal scepticism regarding the 
potential success of the EU negotiations and his perception that the UK’s experience 
with the regulation of sophisticated capital markets far exceeded that of other EU 
member-states. These statements underline preference conflicts within the British 
domestic regulatory bureaucracy and arrogance toward EU regional discussions.
Opening a 1990 Commons debate on Financial Services and the Single Market, 
Peter Lilley, the DTI secretary, expressed his government’s concern that EU member- 
states were negotiating to insulate home markets rather than to promote regulatory
51 His comments echoed a controversial conclusion of the US Brady Commission Report on the 1987 stock 
market crash that called for the Federal Reserve to assume responsibility for domestic US regulatory co­
ordination.
52 Andrew McCathie, "US, UK Move on Joint Regulation o f Banks, Securities," Australian Financial 
Review, 2/12/88.
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harmonisation. But Lilley’s remarks glossed over domestic debate concerning Britain’s 
EU role.
Leigh-Pemberton disagreed with Prime Minister Thatcher over the UK’s 
relationship with the EU. In 1990 remarks to French bankers, he echoed Goodison’s 
1988 remarks by noting that the future EU central bank should be responsible for 
monetary policy and bank regulation. Previously, the implementation of bank regulation 
had been the exclusive responsibility of national authorities, with the EU or Basle 
Committee providing regulatory guidance.54
Leigh-Pemberton’s comments were significant for three reasons. First, his 
announcement indicated the readiness of a senior UK government official to discuss 
external regulation of London’s financial markets, a significant alteration of the British 
government’s historic attitude toward regulation of the world’s leading international 
financial centre. The Governor’s comments reflected an apparent willingness to concede 
some degree of British regulatory sovereignty -  the first time this would have happened. 
Second, the Delors Committee of central bank governors examining monetary union had 
created a special sub-committee, chaired by Brian Quinn of the Bank of England, to 
examine supervisory matters. This put the Bank in a position to influence financial 
services regulatory developments in the EU. Finally, the Governor’s remarks further 
underscored disagreement within British domestic institutions responsible for regulatory 
policy. The Governor’s opinion was shared by Whitehall officials, including Geoffrey 
Howe, and by the City, where support for the Single Market had been consistently robust 
-  but not by the Prime Minister.
While the Governor’s logic was criticised,55 his comments raised the temperature 
of British domestic debate over financial supervision and the Single Market and 
underlined Britain’s delicate domestic relationship with Single Market objectives.56
53 On the possibility o f central bank regulation o f securities firms.
54 Leigh-Pemberton noted two reasons for supporting an expanded EU central bank role. First, a Single 
Market logically implied a single regulatory authority. If banks and markets were integrated, then 
regulation should follow. Second, his professional judgement argued that the institution responsible for 
monetary policy should also be responsible for financial services regulation. The two activities were so 
closely connected that distinguishing them by country or institution would impair the application of  
monetary policy and regulatory objectives.
55 Both Germany and the US (partially) segregated monetary and regulatory authority.
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Highlighting the domestic schism over Britain’s role in the Single Market, Mrs. 
Thatcher restated her vision of Britain’s role in Europe in a 1990 speech at the Lord 
Mayor’s Banquet. She claimed that London’s culture of integrity and innovation would 
ensure that it remained the pre-eminent European financial centre, irrespective of 
developments affecting the Single Market or the Pound.57 Her comments were widely 
seen as a rebuke to Leigh-Pemberton and to her Chancellor’s support for monetary 
union. Chancellor Howe’s resignation the next day did not resolve domestic debate.
Mrs. Thatcher’s remarks catalysed her opponents, and she herself was compelled 
to resign shortly afterwards. These developments were significant in the context of the 
CAD and ISD because they reinforce the observation above that British regulatory 
preferences were not uniform and that domestic political disagreements undercut British 
regional authority. Despite Mrs. Thatcher’s inveighing against monetary union on 
political grounds, many British politicians and business people remained committed to 
Single Market objectives for economic and commercial reasons. Leigh-Pemberton’s 
willingness to concede British regulatory sovereignty was conditioned by his assumption 
that EU standards would reflect British (and City) regulatory preferences -  and by the 
hope that Britain would have a senior role in developing and operating any new 
regulatory institutions. In remarks at a 1991 UK conference, Leigh-Pemberton urged EU 
negotiators to adopt “permissive” British regulatory principles. He observed that EU 
drafting often began with British values, following “the grain of the market,” but that it 
“often proves difficult to maintain this ideal as each member-state seeks to make the text 
conform to its way of seeing things. The elaborate versions which finally emerge, instead 
of being open and liberating, often run the risk of being protectionist.”58 His arguments, 
seen as self-serving and insensitive to continental concerns, shed further light on 
domestic UK political division over regulatory direction.
While many Britons remained strongly in favour of Single Market economic 
objectives, domestic political debate over monetary union and external challenges to the
56 David Lascelles, "Flaw in the Argument: The Governor o f the Bank o f England's Views on Banking 
Supervision," Financial Times, 7 November 1990.
57 Philip Stephens, "Parliament and Politics: Thatcher Denies Isolation over Europe - Prime Minister's 
Guildhall Address," Financial Times, 13 November 1990.
58ISRR, "Bank o f England Chief Urges Liberal Regulatory Regime,” 5 November 1991.
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City undermined the ability of British negotiators to effectively promote the superiority 
of British regulatory preferences.59 This series of political events highlighted the 
powerful juxtaposition of conflicting domestic regulatory preferences, powerful market 
positions, domestic political conflicts and domestic regulatory concerns. The 
combination undermined British state authority and ability to influence other EU 
member-states’ regulatory preferences.
FSA 1986
An internal 1991 Bank of England study highlighted domestic developments 
potentially threatening London’s international regulatory pre-eminence.60 The report, 
which examined the legal setting for financial transactions in London, noted the 
importance of London’s regulatory environment and infrastructure. However, it also 
indicated that FSA 1986 appeared to have altered Britain’s historically successful 
regulatory approach and, more damagingly, did not appear to work very well.61 These 
observations increased public and private sector concern with maintaining London’s 
stature and they undercut arguments that the British regulatory system should serve as a 
model for the EU.62
The study noted that FSA 1986, though predominantly domestic in scope, 
represented a comprehensive overhaul of UK financial services regulation and negatively 
affected the wider constituency of international firms operating in London. Bankers 
complained that the complicated legislation was bureaucratic, expensive and legalistic -  
potentially discouraging firms from expanding their London operations. London’s 
regulators were accused of creating a UK regime with uncomfortable similarities to the
59 In a 1991 year-end interview, Howe’s replacement as Chancellor, Norman Lamont, noted conflicting 
perspectives on London’s EU role. Reflecting British ambivalence to closer monetary ties and fears over 
loss o f influence should London’s stature diminish, Lamont highlighted the UK’s retention, together with 
Denmark, o f an opt-out clause on a single EU currency by 1997 or 1999. Lamont, however, quixotically 
reaffirmed his belief London would be an excellent permanent location for the European Monetary 
Institute (the ECB’s predecessor), basing his claim on London’s pre-eminence as a financial centre, 
glossing over Britain’s negative views on monetary union. Norman Lamont, "Interview with the 
Chancellor," Financial Times, 31 December 1991.
60 The Bank’s interest came as a consequence o f a 1990 House of Lords decision invalidating hundreds of  
millions o f pounds o f interest rate and currency swap contracts between London-based banks and local UK 
authorities, mutual insurance companies and building societies. The Lords ruled the transactions illegal, as 
the banks’ counterparties did not have authority under English law to enter into the transactions. The ruling 
threatened millions o f pounds in losses, heightened uncertainty over the validity o f English law contracts, 
the principal legal standard o f the Euromarkets, and discouraged transactions with UK entities.
61 ISRR. "London Attracts Most Foreign Equities Trading BoE Says," 17 June 1991.
62 For studies cited see: Peston, "The Challenge to the City from Continental Centres Is Intensifying.”
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lawyer-dominated US. Additionally, subsequent development of the SBD, ISD and CAD 
encouraged comparisons with FSA 1986. UK regulators were keenly aware of the 
additional costs and complexity imposed by FSA 1986 and of the potential political cost 
of amendment in reaction to EU directives. Also in 1991, the SIB released the “Clucas 
Report,” which further criticised London’s regulatory regime.
FSA 1986 had four significant, though conflicting, consequences: first, City 
regulation was juridified, ending informal regulation based on Bank “guidance.” This 
increased the state’s role in City regulation. Second, and conversely, the creation of 
SROs increased private sector input into discussion of operational and regulatory issues, 
even while potentially diluting private input with the creation of the SIB. Third, the Big 
Bang reconfirmed London’s progressive regulatory and institutional environment, 
particularly in comparison with its continental peers. Fourth however, the Big Bang 
exposed British regulatory and institutional sensitivities and vulnerabilities. These 
consequences highlight an expansion in domestic regulatory authority that did not, 
however, unambiguously enhance Britain’s international regulatory influence.
Scandals
A series of bungled domestic regulatory investigations in London’s markets 
between 1987 and 1989 raised further concerns with the UK regulatory regime, 
damaging UK international influence. The County Nat West/Blue Arrow affair was the 
most notable.64 Delays in investigating the scandal raised questions about FSA 1986’s 
ability to balance statutory enforcement and self-regulation. Additional scandals included 
a 1987 Guinness PLC stock manipulation scandal65 and the 1988 collapse of Barlow
63 This report advocated merging two SROs (LAUTRO and FIMBRA) and consolidating Britain’s retail 
financial services regulatory apparatus. Following consolidation, IMRO and SFA (the SFA was successor 
to the SIB) would look after institutional investors’ interests and a new organisation would supervise retail 
activities. These recommendations came in part in response to the collapse o f the London-headquartered 
bank BCCI, but also in response to the scandal surrounding Robert Maxwell’s misuse o f company pension 
assets. A House o f Commons Social Security Committee report on the Maxwell affair had been heavily 
critical o f IMRO. ISRR, "IMRO Take a 'Thumping' over Maxwell Scandal,” 21 April 1992. See also: Dan 
Granirer, "A Modem Great Power Concert: New York, Tokyo, London and the Political Economy of 
Transnational Regulatory Cooperation" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1994).
64 Competitive pressures had encouraged County Nat West, the securities subsidiary o f National 
Westminster Bank, one o f Britain’s largest banks, to bid aggressively to underwrite Blue Arrow’s rights 
offering (see Glossary) and, subsequently, to fail to disclose their unsuccessful placement with investors. 
Embarrassingly, the affair was brought to light by a non-UK bank.
65 The scandal did not come to trial for over two years.
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Clowes.66 These events occurred at a time when UK regulators were increasingly 
concerned that their opinions be given precedence in the EU’s early regulatory 
negotiations.67
Domestic financial scandals were not unique to the UK. Both France and 
Germany had their share during the same period. However, the scandals weakened the 
position of the UK by raising questions about the precedential value of the UK 
regulatory system and about the UK’s regulatory authority.
The scandals highlighted the diversification of UK banks into securities 
underwriting and the increasing involvement of non-UK banks in critical areas of the 
UK’s financial system. The participation of commercial banks in securities underwriting 
had grown dramatically since 1986, exposing banks to greater, and different, risks from 
those previously regulated. The incidents focused attention on the failure of the new 
regulatory regime to anticipate or prevent financial scandals. Even the Bank had 
misgivings about London’s regulatory environment. Brian Quinn, the Bank’s Executive 
Director for supervision, publicly noted the difficulty of obtaining cooperation between 
various UK regulatory bodies and of establishing a level regulatory playing field 
between the lending and securities activities of financial institutions. He also commented 
that the UK’s specialised regulatory regimes appeared incompatible with regulation
/TO
adopted in continental Europe to fit dominant universal-banking regimes.
Competitive regulatory trends
The Bank’s 1991 study also highlighted worrisome international competitive 
trends. These included contemporaneous market deregulatory actions in the United 
States, Japan, France and Germany, which could potentially dilute London’s
66 Barlow Clowes, an investment management company, continued to operate despite the DTI being aware 
of concerns about the firm beginning in 1985 David Manasian and Craig Forman, "Confusion, Duplication 
Hamper British Market-Regulation Effort," The Wall Street Journal, 5 January 1989. and "County 
Natwest: Anatomy o f Cover-Up," The Economist, 28 January 1989.
67 Confidential interview, London, February 2001
68 Lascelles, "Order in the Marketplace - the Blue Arrow Affair Brought Credit to the Bank o f  England.”
69 In the US, liberalisation o f the Glass-Steagall Act, which mandated the institutional separation o f  
lending and underwriting, was being actively debated.
70 In Japan, reform o f Article 65, Japan’s Glass-Steagall Act, was under review. The reform o f either 
Glass-Steagall or Article 65 could encourage a series o f mergers between powerful commercial and 
investment banking institutions, challenging European financial institutions and, potentially, prompting the 
migration o f European lending and trading businesses to US or Japanese markets.
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presumptive regulatory influence. These trends reflected states’ re-examination of 
uncompetitive domestic practices in light of disintermediation,73 which prompted 
financial institutions across Europe to focus on securities issuance, profitability and 
operational consolidation -  uncharacteristic concerns in “domestic” industries that had, 
until recently, not been subject to external competitive pressures.74 The Bank concluded 
that these structural changes challenged Britain’s financial leadership and authority in 
negotiating the CAD and ISD.
A fall 1991 survey conducted by the London Chamber of Commerce fuelled 
these concerns. A poll of 109 foreign banks with London operations indicated that 
continental European cities were more likely than London to attract new financial 
services businesses -  and possibly exert greater regulatory influence -  as a result of their 
geographic proximity to the newly opened East European markets. Additionally, the 
report noted that EU efforts to harmonise regional financial services regulation might 
neutralise London’s regulatory authority. London’s liberal, market-driven regulatory 
regime had attracted foreign bank operations and encouraged Euromarket growth. 
Removing London’s regulatory “advantage” through harmonisation could weaken 
Britain’s regulatory influence.
Constraints on regulatory authority
In any attempt to assess authority, a critical consideration is determining whether 
member-states successfully asserted regulatory preferences. The course of EU 
negotiations indicates that no state’s preferences dominated even though interviews 
indicate British regulatory “opinions” were given greater weight. British institutional 
structures and market experience contributed to the final form of the directives. 
However, a persuasive case cannot be made that these factors alone -  or even 
predominantly -  determined the directives’ final form or its adoption. London’s 
international authority was challenged by developments in other EU markets as well as
71 In France, the 1989 removal o f fixed commission rates threatened a repatriation o f French equity 
business transacted in London. See below.
72 In Germany, the 1992 process and reunification costs were expected to bring competitive pressure for 
change in German banks’ operations. See below.
73 See Chapter 2.
74 Richard Lambert, "The City Finds Its Head Start under Attack: A  Far-Reaching Study o f London's 
Prospects as a World Centre," Financial Times, 1 June 1989.
75 Peston, "The Challenge to the City from Continental Centres Is Intensifying.”
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by disagreements among domestic UK regulators, domestic market scandals, political 
considerations, and by complications arising from implementation of the FSA 1986.
Summary - UK
London’s regulatory institutions were critical to the growth of the Euromarkets, 
to the UK economy, and to UK international regulatory influence. They also represented 
a potentially successful model for the EU. In 1986, over private sector opposition, the 
British government dramatically amended market regulation, asserting a pre-eminent 
status in domestic regulatory development. The UK’s potential regional regulatory 
hegemony was prompted by several additional factors; London’s consistent international 
market stature and institutional expertise, aggressive state promotion of the UK’s 
potential regional leadership role and its regulatory views, the presence of Britons in 
senior EU decision-making positions, the UK’s relative success in dealing with late 
1980s market crises. Nevertheless, financial scandals, Tory ambivalence over the City, 
increasing international competition, and domestic political disagreements undercut the 
UK’s international regulatory influence. The British government did preserve its 
autonomy and regulatory sovereignty throughout the EU negotiations. Additionally, in 
the early stages of negotiations they managed the mobilisation of sub-national interests.
Germany
During the period in which the CAD and ISD were negotiated, market 
globalisation, reunification pressures, and competition between Federal and Land 
interests influenced German regulatory objectives. In addition, the prospect of increased 
competition for traditional domestic financial services cartels forecast significant change 
in the structure of German banking. These developments reflected predominantly 
external events, not federal or state initiatives. Traditional federal and Land regulatory 
preferences were shaped by Germany’s economic and political history and the critical 
role of banks in financing the government. However, Germany’s reaction to globalisation 
and reunification reflected more recent changes: a abrupt need to attract savings after 
reunification and a desire to shield long-standing bank and corporate relationships from 
rapidly intensified competition brought about by EU regionalisation. Germany’s role in 
the development of EU financial services directives reflected a tension between
76 Land is translated as a federal “state.”
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preserving a distinctive form of “German” capitalism, characterised by concentrated 
corporate ownership and conservative business practices, and, on the other hand, the 
challenges of globalisation, reunification and EU expansion.
77German bank history
Despite poorly developed domestic securities markets, Germany’s financial 
services industry was highly differentiated and competitive. It was comprised of
7ft 70universal banks, regional Land banks, savings and Giro banks, and credit 
cooperatives. This complexity meant that bank market shares were small relative to total 
bank revenues and that domestic competition for deposits and lending opportunities was 
intense. Bank trade associations and individual banks were thus encouraged to develop 
close relationships with state and federal constituencies responsible for allocating bank 
business. Reinforcing this emphasis was the traditionally close relationship between 
German banks, industry and government expressed through cross-share ownership and 
directorships and the exemption of German banks from competition laws. The 
government encouraged close relationships between banks and industry because bank 
capital was critical in underwriting government borrowing. This relationship discouraged 
the development of domestic, particularly retail, securities markets.
The German form of “capitalism” derived from Germany’s experiences with 
hyperinflation and economic depression prior to WWII and with the prominent 
involvement of the “big three” banks in rebuilding the domestic economy and banking
ftnsystem, through lending, after 1945. German domestic banking regulation dated from 
the 1930s and focused on bank safety and soundness, not on riskier securities-related
ft 1businesses or investor protection. With an emphasis on lending, Germany’s regulatory 
focus also emphasised credit, rather than market, related risks. Portfolio credit quality 
and high institutional capitalisation were more important than asset liquidity or hedging 
to regulators conditioned by the experiences of the 1930s and 1940s. These
77 Adapted from Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the 
Systems. See pp. 166ff.
78 The “Big Three” universal banks were (and remain) Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerz 
Bank.
79 Including, inter alia, Bayerische Landesbank and WestDeutsche Landesbank
80 Alfred Steinherr and Christian Huveneers, "Universal Banking in the Integrated European Marketplace" 
in The New European Financial Marketplace, ed. Alfred Steinherr (London: Longman Group, 1992).
81 Michael Moran, "Regulatory Change in German Financial Markets," in The Politics o f  German 
Regulation, ed. Kenneth Dyson (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992).
117
characteristics were accompanied by Germany’s active discouragement of foreign bank 
entry into its domestic markets.82
The German regulatory system set high minimum required capital levels for 
banks involved in securities or lending. This satisfied German regulators’ prudential 
objectives and resulted in a high cost of domestic market entry.83 German banks, which 
would had benefited from lower capital requirements for their international securities 
activities, were more focused on protecting their lucrative domestic market positions 
than with expanding into new businesses - securities trading - with which they were still 
largely unfamiliar and for which there was little domestic demand.84 German regulators 
recognised that their conservative capitalisation policies would not be supported by other 
member-states. They also prioritised the insulation of domestic markets and market 
relationships from a dramatic increase in external competition. Having achieved a 
primary objective through the adoption of the SBD (single passport), German negotiators 
developed a negotiating strategy based on ensuring their institutions would face a level 
regulatory playing field.
This position contrasted with the situation in the UK and France, where domestic 
regulatory precedents reflected functionally distinct market sectors. It also contrasted 
with the international business perspectives of UK and French financial institutions. 
These basic differences also characterised negotiations over the CAD and ISD, 
particularly when initial CAD discussions sought to develop less onerous rules for 
securities firms than existed for banks under the SBD. German arguments reflected their 
conservative regulatory approach and their concern that a single passport and more 
flexible securities regulation might harm their domestic banks. German negotiators 
initially attempted to promote German capital standards regionally in order to insulate 
domestic markets. Facing stiff opposition, competitive pressure, and concern over the 
financing and regional implications of reunification, Germany subsequently backtracked 
and negotiated to ensure that functional regulatory equivalence existed between 
securities firms, banks and universal banks.
82 This was achieved primarily by restricting the scope o f bank activities available to non-German financial 
institutions.
83 Richard Waters, "EC Amends Proposals for Capital Adequacy," Financial Times, 16 November 1989.
84 See related discussion in Chapter 5 addressing EU structural analytical hypotheses.
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Germany’s regulatory structure
Germany’s financial services regulatory regime mirrored the structure of its 
domestic markets. As in other universal banking countries, there was effectively no 
distinction between banks and securities firms and, as noted, German domestic capital 
markets were poorly developed. Corporate capitalisation relied on internally generated 
funds and bank borrowing rather than equity. German corporate entities, unlike their 
British counterparts, were uncomfortable with public ownership and the scrutiny and 
pressure that shareholders imposed on boards and corporate managers. This meant the 
infrastructure associated with a capital markets industry was also poorly developed -  the 
issuers, underwriters, investors, regulations, and related industries. Not surprisingly, 
German financial services, dominated by universal banks and reflecting poorly 
developed capital markets, produced a domestic regulatory environment with a lending 
orientation. Commercially, unlike the UK or US, Germany was a nation of industries and
Of
industrialists rather than shareholders. German stock exchanges were small, equities, 
both retail and institutional, were unpopular investments, and domestic securities 
markets were thin and illiquid.
The German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz) stipulated that securities-related 
activities were considered banking businesses. This meant that securities businesses 
required banking licenses from the Federal Banking Supervisory Authority, which 
further discouraged the development of independent securities firms. Unlike the UK and 
France, Germany had no comprehensive body of national securities law prior to 1993. 
There were no explicit rules for the offering and sale of DM-denominated debt securities.
o/*
Rules protecting investors were limited; rules addressing insider trading did not exist. 
Domestic securities activities were transacted through small regional bourses.
To encourage domestic regulatory preference harmonisation, regional exchanges
07 '
established the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wertpapierbdrsen in 1986. The
85 Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems, p. 
174.
86 Robert J. Dilworth, "Germany," University o f  Pennsylvania Journal o f  International Business Law  13, 
no. 4 (1993).
87 Translated as Federation o f German Stock Exchanges.
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Federation represented bourse interests and was a full IOSCO member. Its initial 
approach to market regulation was to focus on procedural issues and encourage self­
regulation. This was in sharp contrast to the UK’s FSA 1986.89 The Federation’s 
approach also reflected an explicit emphasis on supporting the country’s economic and 
political policy objectives. Generally accommodative rather than confrontational, 
Germany’s regulatory stance prioritised the protection of universal banking and existing 
domestic regulatory interests from external and internal competition.90 This stance was 
challenged by EU financial services directives that increased regional competition for the 
big German banks, which, at the time, had less than 4 percent of the EU’s deposit 
market. This development, coupled with reunification funding pressures, led Germany, 
in 1989, to initiate defensive steps designed to grow its domestic capital markets and its 
regulatory infrastructure in order to compete more effectively with regional financial 
centres.91
Prior to 1990, Germany had no principal securities market regulator or federal 
securities supervisor. Regulatory supervision was the responsibility of either the 
Bundesbank2 or the eight regional stock exchanges, which were supervised by 
individual Lander. The Frankfurt exchange was the largest, representing 50% of 
domestic equity trading turnover. Individual Lander were very protective of their 
exchanges, which led to frequent commercial and political conflicts when proposals for 
centralisation of securities trading in Frankfurt increased in the context of modernising 
German capital markets. These conflicts were exacerbated by regional bourses being 
subject to both local and federal laws.
Reunification encourages regulatory and strategic change
The Bundesbank’s ambivalence toward its domestic securities markets was 
already evident in the mid-1980s. Unlike French regulators and despite Deutsche Bank’s 
relocation of its investment banking headquarters from Frankfurt to London in 1984, the 
Bundesbank ignored the significance of the migration of domestic securities trading to
88 This was an unusual arrangement contrary to IOSCO’s practice o f extending full membership 
exclusively to “national” securities regulators. However, in Germany’s case, no national regulator existed 
until the early 1990s.
89 Filipovic, Governments, Banks and Global Capital: Securities Markets in Global Politics.
90 Ibid.
91 This program was eventually referred to as “Finanzplatz Deutschland, ” see below.
92 The German central bank.
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London. After reunification in 1989, regulators became more sensitive to Germany’s 
international capital markets’ lagging competitiveness. While Germany had the largest 
European government bond market, 60% was traded offshore among London-based 
banks. This anomalous situation arose for two reasons. First, a strong domestic currency, 
the result of domestic trade surpluses throughout the 1980s, made German government 
bonds attractive to international investors. Second, lower London transaction costs made 
“Bunds” cheaper in the UK than in Germany. The Bundesbank was largely indifferent 
to this situation, as it had no mandate to develop domestic securities markets, had not 
encouraged the development of domestic futures or short-term securities (“CP” and 
“repo”)94 markets, and did not have national concerns about losing control over its 
government debt. Germany’s strong currency and economic performance encouraged 
this ambivalence. Because of its huge U.S. Treasuries portfolio, the Bundesbank was de 
facto an influential investor and market maker internationally, irrespective of the status 
of its domestic securities markets. Private and public sector investors and underwriters 
were careful not to trade or legislate overtly against German interests.95
However, in the early 1990s German domestic economic growth slowed, largely 
due to reunification costs and recession. The resulting lower domestic interest rates 
encouraged the relocation of Germany’s huge pool of domestic savings to higher interest 
rate environments outside of Germany.96 This promoted the migration of German banks 
into neighbouring markets and led them into new businesses, including international 
lending and securities underwriting and trading, particularly in London.97 The focus of 
German banking was reoriented from domestic to international, producing dramatic 
increases in both on and off-balance sheet international assets.
The expansion of German banking was accompanied domestically by the 
centralisation of regulatory powers and a greater focus by banks and regulators on the 
consequences of Single Market regulation. Domestic bank operations converged to a
93 German government bonds.
94 Agreements to repurchase securities -  a borrowing/funding technique. See Glossary.
95 A 1985 project to develop a futures contract in German Bunds on London’s Liffe was abandoned after 
the Bundesbank objected that the market belonged in Germany.
96 See discussion below regarding competition between Germany and France for deposits.
97 German banks, particularly the big three universal banks, had, o f  course, been active in syndicated 
lending and securities businesses in London and domestically prior to 1989. However, despite their large 
asset and capital bases, they had been second tier actors in London’s competitive, and lucrative, securities 
underwriting, trading and derivatives businesses.
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universal bank model. However, German “mercantilism” conflicted with EU directives 
affecting competition law. The 1988 adoption of the SBD, which endorsed the universal 
bank model, had simultaneously exposed domestic markets to increased competition, and 
regulatory standards to the vagaries of qualified majority voting. This compelled German 
banks to defend their extensive industrial shareholdings and pressured Bonn to oppose 
EU insider-trading regulatory proposals.98 These factors heightened regulators’ 
awareness of the need for domestic market reforms.
Germany had three primary motivations for reform. First, reunification 
imperatives superseded domestic efforts to oppose EU regulatory harmonisation. The 
German financial system was forced to re-examine its antiquated capital-raising 
infrastructure to meet this new challenge.
Second, German banks’ historic emphasis on long-term lending, close corporate 
relationships and confidential cross-shareholdings had been penalised by the Basle 
Accord.99 High capital ratios characterised Germany’s regulatory approach. However, 
increasing disintermediation had tightened lending margins, directing interest to funding 
through securities underwriting. But underwriting was a weak area of German banking. 
Typically, German companies raised only 20 percent of their capital through equities, as 
compared with 80 percent for British companies.100
Third, the strong DM had become a key European and international currency. 
Over 20 percent of the world’s foreign exchange reserves were held in DM; it was the 
second most important international lending currency (after the US dollar); and it was the 
key currency in the EMS. In addition, Germany contributed 28 percent of the EU budget 
and had the largest EU population and economy. Not surprisingly, Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl considered it appropriate for Germany to exert its authority regionally. To achieve 
his objectives, Kohl needed to enhance German regulatory influence. This meant 
reforming domestic capital markets. His ambitions were most obvious in German
98 See: Story and Walter, Political Economy ofFinancial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems., 
p. 172, fn. 23 and Joseph McCahery, "Market Regulation and Particularistic Interests: The Dynamics o f  
Insider Trading Regulation in the US and Europe," in The New World Order in International Finance, ed. 
Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997).
99 The Accord required the maintenance o f large capital positions against German bank’s enormous and 
(relatively) illiquid equity positions.
100 Ian Johnson, "Frankfurt Fights to Be Europe's Wall St.," The Baltimore Sun, 5/31/92.
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lobbying for the ECB and in pressing for domestic stock market reform to encourage a 
reverse migration in German equity trading from London.101
Reunification and market modernisation
Reunification significantly increased the pool of German savings available for
1 (Y )domestic investment. The increase stimulated a search for domestic and international 
investment options and encouraged the expansion of domestic capital market 
instruments. Germany’s DTB and OTC markets also experienced rapid growth.103 This 
was paralleled by growth in Germany’s longer-term domestic capital markets and by 
expanded international usage of Euro-DM instruments. In the early 1990s, the opening of 
German offices by several prominent international securities firms reinforced the 
importance of German capital markets.104
These factors boosted the attractiveness of DM financing and of German markets 
and institutions, but they were a mixed blessing in promoting German interests in 
negotiations over financial services directives. As happened in the UK, domestic market 
reform had positive and negative consequences. One goal of reform (ultimately 
unsuccessful) was to make German regulatory preferences more influential. However, 
reform did highlight Germany’s market and regulatory shortcomings. Domestic market 
expansion increased international scrutiny of Germany’s regulatory environment. Over 
the summer of 1991, a domestic bond underwriting scandal at Germany’s largest banks, 
the Deutsche and the Dresdner, underscored the rudimentary state of insider trading 
regulations. Further, regulation of Germany’s regional exchanges by their respective 
Lander had complicated the development of uniform securities regulation and 
enforcement. This had already been made difficult by the lack of a central federal 
regulatory authority and by the historic tension between Federal and Land 
governments.105
101 SEAQ-I handled up to 30 percent o f German companies’ equity trades. See: B. von Ribbentrop, 
"Frankfurt Throws Down the Gauntlet," Euromoney, October 1990.
102 An incremental DM 115 billion from the former East Germany.
103 This occurred principally in derivatives and was accompanied by the introduction o f new, innovative 
products. See Glossary.
104 Including Goldman, Sachs, the large US-based securities firm.
105 Katherine Campbell, "Roles Are Reversed for City of Bankers," Financial Times, 28 October 1991.
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The decision to modernise German domestic capital markets actually began in 
1984 with the removal of restrictions on the composition of domestic bond underwriting 
groups.106 The 1986 creation of the Federation of German Stock Exchanges was 
designed to stimulate the use of equities in corporate financing. However, centralisation 
of securities trading, especially trading computerisation, consistently ran into Lander 
objections. This was typified by the contested passage of a 1988 law to create a DM 
futures market (see below) and of a 1989 law to promote financial markets, both of 
which adopted EU financial services directives previously passed by the Council and 
Parliament. Over Lander opposition, the laws rescinded a domestic turnover tax that had 
restricted the development of new capital market instruments. Also in 1989, Germany 
adopted the EU unit trust directive, UCITS, which helped direct funds into the new 
domestic futures market, the DTB.107
In January 1990, Germany opened a new, high-tech, futures and options trading 
system in Frankfurt, the Deutsche Termin Borse (“DTB”), to compete directly with the 
long-established London-headquartered Liffe. The French had also opened a competitor 
to Liffe and the DTB, the Marche a Terme Internationale de France (“MATIF”). The 
new exchanges were designed to help Frankfurt and Paris catch up with London in 
developing innovative financial instruments and in attracting new trading activity. The 
DTB’s development of a contract for German government securities futures was 
designed to challenge Liffe’s dominance in internationally traded futures contracts. The 
DTB was also the first electronic futures market to compete against a traditional open- 
outcry system such as Liffe’s. The DTB and MATIF challenged Liffe’s dominance in 
futures trading in DM and French franc denominated instruments and were seen as
1 HRindicators of Frankfurt and Paris’ increasing market influence.
Reunification made the Bundesbank’s historic distrust of money markets 
obsolete, paving the way for a package of financial services measures presented by 
Finance Minister Theo Waigel in January 1992. These reforms reflected the big banks’ 
support for a central Frankfurt exchange competitive with London and Paris and
106 Non-German banks were permitted to lead domestic DM offerings.
107 See Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems.,
p. 180.
108 Katharine Campbell and Deborah Hargreaves, "Frankfiirt Fights to Regain Bunds: A Liffe Contract 
under Fire," Financial Times, 26 November 1990.
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incorporated further EU directives. They also demonstrated political support for new 
technology, national supervision of securities markets,109 investor protection and insider 
trading laws, as well as money market reform. Chancellor Kohl threw his considerable 
weight behind these proposals and added a promise that Frankfurt would be the location 
of the new EU central bank. Negotiations over the reforms between Federal and Land 
authorities took two years, although the 1992 adoption of the ISD compelled many 
reforms.
Domestic business migration to London and Paris, pressure from the Federation 
of German Stock Exchanges, the adoption of EU directives and anticipated governmental 
capital needs following reunification forced German regulators to take steps to 
incrementally modernise Germany’s domestic market infrastructure. These changes were 
accompanied by reform of insider trading rules following pressure from the US and other 
EU member-states. However, these changes did not represent a German “Big Bang” as 
significant domestic obstacles to regulatory reform persisted, including Lander 
opposition to exchange consolidation and bank interest group opposition to deregulation. 
As a result, reform came about reactively rather than proactively and in response to 
reunification and external competitive pressures.110 In particular, there was little 
domestic support for Anglo-American style financial services deregulation.111
Finanzplatz Deutschland
Helmut Kohl and Theo Waigel’s Finanzplatz Deutschland plan, announced in
I
January 1992, defined German domestic market development preferences. Kohl’s 
objective was the creation of a domestic financing and regulatory environment that 
would effectively compete with London’s. His announcement acknowledged that the 
quality of domestic regulation bore a direct correspondence to the efficacy and 
attractiveness of domestic capital markets and to national standing and authority in 
negotiations over EU regulation and institutions -  a conclusion that London had also 
reached. Prior to Kohl’s announcement, international securities firms assumed that EU
109 The Bundesaufsichtsamtfor Wertpapier, Germany’s first securities regulator, was created.
110 Moran, "Regulatory Change in German Financial Markets.”
111 Stephen Woolcock, Michael Hodges, and Kristin Schreiber, Britain, Germany, and 1992 (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1991).
112 Garry Evans, "Bundesbank Clings to Power," Euromoney, April 1992. Dating the start o f  the 
Finanzplatz Deutschland programme is difficult as it encompassed a series o f regulatory, structural and 
legislative changes commencing in the early 1980s. See: Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial 
Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems, p. 172ff.
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securities regulation would generally follow London precedents. However, German 
reunification encouraged Kohl to expand Germany’s modest program of market 
liberalisation, with more extensive market deregulation and new product introductions,
113all designed to make Frankfurt a more attractive and influential financial capital. 
International bankers were forced to consider the possibility that Frankfurt would replace 
London and come to dominate EU capital market activity.114
In January 1992, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange announced another step to 
enhance Frankfurt’s stature and international authority. The exchange, Germany’s 
largest, declared it was considering a proposal for a fully electronic trading system (as 
opposed to a floor-based, open-outcry system) to be in place by 1995. Such a step would 
transform Germany’s markets by consolidating into one exchange the trading that had 
been transacted through four separate systems.115 This would stimulate the centralisation 
of securities trading in Frankfurt.116
Summary - Germany
Historic ties between Germany’s banking, corporate and government sectors 
shaped German regulatory preferences and its regional authority and influence. The 
preservation of national business practices and control over national industries shaped
117 , ,  ,ithe reform of German capital market practices, institutions and regulations. The 
modernisation of domestic markets and institutions, the facilitation of reunification, the 
assertion of domestic regulatory preferences outside Germany and response to
1 I O
globalisation were all subordinate to the preservation of national business practices.
113 Andrew McCathie, "Germany Moves to Bring Financial Markets into Line," Australian Financial 
Review, 2/19/92.
114 This was, o f course, unlikely as London had well-established regulatory, language, infrastructure, 
technological, market, personnel and institutional advantages over Frankfurt that would take years to 
duplicate or surpass.
115 At the time, Frankfurt carried more than 50 percent of trading executed over Germany’s eight regional 
stock exchanges.
11‘’The move reflected an expansion o f Frankfurt’s IBIS screen-based trading system, which had grown 
significantly following its introduction in April 1990. IBIS’ success contrasted sharply with London’s 
experience with the introduction o f TAURUS, a similar paperless settlement system. TAURUS had been 
plagued with repeated implementation delays, acutely embarrassing the London Stock Exchange. See: 
David Waller, "Frankfurt Considers Electronic Trading," Financial Times, 18 January 1992. and ISRR, 
"Another Delay Hits Taurus; Launch Set for Spring 1993,” 5 November 1991.
117 Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems, p. 
185.
118 The opening o f the DTB in Germany confirms state ambivalence (if not hostility) to efforts to develop 
harmonised regional regulatory regimes and capital markets. Accommodation o f  divergent national 
interests characterised the EU’s approach to resolving regional debates. Nevertheless, as EU negotiators
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Historic German concern with potential market threats to domestic political stability 
limited the extent to which national regulators or legislators were prepared to embrace 
domestic or EU regulatory reforms. However, German regulators recognised that they 
would not be successful in persuading other EU member-states to adopt German 
capitalisation preferences. As a result, they shifted their objective to securing a level 
playing field for German financial institutions, which would require a minimum of 
change to existing domestic regulatory norms and domestic franchises. German 
international influence arose largely indirectly, through QMV and their insistence on 
safeguarding domestic regulatory norms. Their success can also be traced to Germany’s 
institutional emphasis on universal banking and lending, which was reflected in 
consistent state, corporate and bank regulatory preferences, and to European concerns 
with German revanchisme. Public and private preferences are impossible to untangle.
The absence of either a federal securities supervisor or a coherent securities 
regulatory regime placed regulatory evolution predominantly in the hands of like- 
thinking state and bank interests. As CAD and ISD negotiations evolved, competition 
between member-states’ domestic market preferences complicated regulatory 
harmonisation, illuminating the need to balance the authority of member-states. This 
explains the inability of Germany (and other EU member-states) to comprehensively 
assert their domestic preferences on other states. Reacting to these constraints, German 
negotiators pursued a level playing-field policy, insulating German domestic practices 
and institutions, and preserving German mercantilist interests. Consequently, no broad 
shift in German regulatory authority away from the state is evident from these 
developments.
laboured to accommodate disparate national preferences, member-states (including France through the 
MATIF, the UK through the Liffe and Germany through the DTB) pursued strategies designed to frustrate 
EU objectives. Despite agreed harmonisation objectives, the DTB’s creation reflected an effort to redirect 
to German domestic markets business transacted in London and Paris. The aggressive promotion o f  
national markets conflicted with EU harmonisation objectives. Moreover, it reflected the conflicting 
influences o f powerful domestic constituencies, regional ambitions and member-states’ desire to assert 
their interests. Member-states adopted regulatory reforms designed to preserve or enhance national trading 
practices, regulatory regimes and markets while, simultaneously, aggressively negotiating harmonised 
regional regulations.
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France
Regulatory authority in France was centralised in state agencies and institutions 
in Paris. Members of an elite cartel sharing common educational and social backgrounds 
typically headed government agencies and major commercial enterprises. This 
encouraged the government to promote state involvement in domestic economic 
development with the result that dirigisme119 characterised the relationship of the state 
with commerce. However, globalisation and increasing EU regionalisation challenged 
the statist French model, highlighting domestic capital market parochialism and flawed 
state-sponsored corporate and economic strategies. These weaknesses strained 
commercial and political loyalties, encouraging independent private sector initiatives and 
strengthening the influence of the French private sector in certain areas, principally 
through the Patronat and ERT.120
The Structure of Authority
After WW II, the dominant concept guiding the development of French financial 
services regulation, domestic capital market development and EU regulatory 
perspectives was central state authority; state authority alone was deemed capable of 
productively and beneficially transforming “short-term savings into long-term 
investments.”121 This model generated two critical objectives for post-war French 
regulatory development. First, state administrators attempted to position Paris as a 
financial centre capable of competing with London and Frankfurt. Second, the state 
worked to create an optimal development and regulatory model that promoted its control 
over industrial production and growth.
Relationships between state agencies and corporations were very close, due in 
part to 1981 nationalisations of major industries, but also due to the common 
backgrounds of public and private sector executives. This was particularly prevalent in 
financial services where, for many executives, early training in the Tresor preceded
119 Reflected in the frequent intervention of the state in commercial activity.
120 See Glossary. The European Round Table (“ERT”) is described in Chapter 6.
121 See Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems., 
from which this section is adapted, and p. 190.
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senior positions in government and the private sector. These factors further facilitated 
dirigisme.
Economic institutions and government strategy
State involvement in industrial production reached a high point in 1981 with the 
nationalisation of 49 industries by the new, socialist, Mitterrand government. 
Government objectives called for export-led economic growth and the development of 
large, state-owned industrial enterprises. These enterprises, and the government agencies 
providing industrial direction -  principally the French Tresor, were staffed by graduates 
of the Grandes Ecoles, representing an elite policy network that shared common 
economic, social, and educational backgrounds. These individuals moved back and forth 
between government and commercial positions over the course of their careers, and they 
had dominated French industrial management and planning since the 1930s. In France 
after 1981 the public sector so completely controlled industrial organisation that the 
democratising aspects of globalisation, evident in London financial services, did not 
penetrate the elites already dominating French commercial and political activity. 
Dirigisme enhanced the authority of domestic policy networks, including networks such 
as the Patronat, which was populated by corporate leaders, many appointed by the state. 
Dirigisme also facilitated the entry of elite French networks into regional policy 
networks such as the ERT.122
The French “statist” model was disrupted in the late 1980s by EU-led 
regionalisation efforts. Inadequate public-sector strategic planning and weaknesses in 
state-owned enterprises were revealed by regionalisation. Wallace argues that in the 
early 1980s France endeavoured to dominate certain EU sectors politically and 
economically by expanding statist control over domestic economic policy into regional 
authority through EU programs promoted by French state interests. Initially, France 
was successful; several major EU programs, including the SEA and the SEM, were 
inspired by predominantly French initiatives.124 But, despite initial success, many of 
these initiatives faltered in the early 1990s. EU regionalisation revealed poor French 
public-sector planning and structural weaknesses in French state-owned industries. These 
weaknesses were exacerbated by economic recession in the early 1990s. The results were
122 See below and Chapter 6 for discussion o f the ERT and Patronat.
123 William Wallace, ed., The Dynamics o f  European Integration (London: Pinter, 1990).
124 This list also includes commercial initiatives including Esprit, Brite, Euram, Race, Eureka, Jessi, etc.
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seen in the near collapse of the state-owned bank Credit Lyonnais, in France’s 
persistently uncompetitive industrial infrastructure, and in the necessity for massive 
German support of the French franc, all of which came to public attention in 1992. These 
factors highlight France’s inability to assert regional authority consistently.
Story and Walter trace the unimaginative French economic development plans of 
the 1980s and early 1990s to the insularity of French corporate and government interests 
and officials.126 This narrowness of French economic and political thinking delayed 
constructive responses to market developments and encouraged a reactive rather than 
proactive stance toward domestic and regional regulatory evolution. The dirigiste 
business model failed in comparison with market-led regulatory developments in the UK 
and Germany, adversely affecting French regional regulatory authority.
Dirigisme and state influence
Schmidt explains weak French regional influence differently. As noted, the 
involvement of French government officials in the formation of EU policy was initially 
strong, particularly on macro issues. Schmidt argues, however, that changes brought 
about by increased EU integration weakened the traditionally strong ties between the 
French government and business, changing the character of French regional authority, 
particularly after 1985.127 Despite its key role in promoting such EU strategic policies as 
the 1992 and monetary union objectives, France was less effective within the EU 
Commission. French ministers accused Leon Brittan’s DG IV, the Competition 
Directorate, o f an “Anglo-Saxon” bias hostile to large French industrial conglomerates. 
French corporate executives were also concerned with the Commission’s apparent focus
125 Following reunification, German interest rates rose to attract international savings into government debt 
instruments. In the late 1980s, as part o f its “hard franc” policy - structured to discourage French savings 
from leaving the country for higher interest rate, or better exchange rate, environments - France had 
refused to allow Germany to revalue the DM. This resulted in intense competition for savings between 
French and German institutions, spurring an increase in short-term French interest rates. This shrank 
French banks’ lending margins as 70 percent o f bank lending was short-term. This forced several French 
banks, notably state-owned Credit Lyonnais, close to bankruptcy. When President Mitterrand announced a 
June 1992 domestic referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, the Bundesbank (encouraged by Helmut Kohl) 
and the Banque de France massively intervened to support the franc. The Pound, o f course, was not so 
fortunate. Kohl’s support for the franc can be traced to his support for the Maastricht Treaty and his 
interest in French endorsement. Support for the British Pound was absent, owing largely to Thatcher’s 
disparagement o f  closer British ties with the EU. See: Wallace, W., ed., ibid., and Story and Walter, 
Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems.
126 Ibid.
127 Vivien A. Schmidt, "Loosening the Ties That Bind: The Impact o f European Integration on French 
Government and Its Relationship to Business," Journal o f  Common Market Studies 34, no. 2 (1996).
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on competition policy rather than “creating the conditions for [industrial]
1951development.” But Schmidt indicates that French accusations cannot be traced to any 
overt bias by DG IV.129 Instead, the dilution of French authority is traced to the long­
term failure of French government administrators to cultivate their EU counterparts and 
their failure to staff discretionary EU administrative positions with French nationals who 
shared the views of French government administrators.130 The failure of French ministers 
to educate their international civil servants in EU policy and law further diluted French 
influence. Additionally, French government negotiators were unable to exploit either 
their early EU policy successes or their close ties to EU administrators. This hampered 
the promotion of French preferences, frustrating state and non-state actors and straining 
the historically close ties between the French government and business. In turn, this 
encouraged French private sector elites to develop independent relationships with the EU
bureaucracy. Principally through the ERT, these relationships exploited their close
1^1contacts with influential EU ministers such as Davignon and Delors. Eventually, the 
private sector in France carried greater authority in Brussels than did many French 
government officials for two reasons. They recognised the significance of cultivating 
relationships, and they appreciated the differences between the hierarchical French 
government bureaucracy and the consensus-driven Brussels administration.132
Contributing as well to the dilution of French regional authority was the state’s 
refusal to recognise that concentration and transparency were not supported by major 
international trading markets, particularly the pace-setting Euromarkets, nor by the 
Patronat. They were instead contributing to the continuing migration of French equities 
trading to London.
French state cultivation of bureaucrats in Brussels finally increased in the early 
1990s as French ministers and staffers spent more time working in Brussels on EU
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid., p. 230ff.
130 J. De la Gueriviere, Voyage a L'interieure De L'eurocratie (Paris: Le Monde Editions, 1992)., in 
Schmidt
131 C. Lequesne, Paris-Bruxelles: Comment Se Fait La Politique Europeenne De La France (Paris: Presses 
de la Fondation Politique Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1993)., in Schmidt
132 See Schmidt, "Loosening the Ties That Bind: The Impact of European Integration on French 
Government and Its Relationship to Business," Journal o f  Common Market Studies 34, no. 2 (1996).
131
matters and as they joined ministerial policy networks.133 The French government also 
began encouraging French businesses to assert their commercial interests directly in 
Brussels -  as UK firms had been doing for many years. They also began to educate 
domestic businesses, in a limited fashion, on the implications of the Single Market.
France’s difficulty in asserting its authority within the EU derived from cultural 
factors as well. French administrators, raised in the hierarchical, autocratic, and 
argumentative style of French policy-making, were initially uncomfortable with the EU’s 
consensus building approach to policy construction. In France, policy-making authority 
was concentrated at the top of organisations, whereas in the EU the lobbying of lower- 
level bureaucrats, particularly on technical issues, was critical to success. The 
longstanding relationships that facilitated access to high-level officials in France did not 
exist in the EU where technocrats were responsible for up to 80 percent of the final 
content of directives.134
Schmidt cites the EU’s disallowed acquisition of de Haviland by Aerospatiale 
and Alena as an example of the gap between French and EU policy influencing 
practices. French business and government officials perceived the EU’s de Havilland 
decision as largely political, when in fact it was substantially technical. French lobbying 
had ignored critical technical concerns of EU officials. The proposal was the only EU 
merger refused between 1991-1994. This type of miscalculation did not characterise 
British relationships with the Commission.136
133 C. Lequesne, Paris-Bruxelles: Comment Se Fait La Politique Europeenne De La France (Paris: Presses 
de la Fondation Politique Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1993).
134 See: M. Donnelley, "The Structure o f the European Commission and the Policy Formation Process," in 
Lobbying in the European Community, ed. S. Mazey and J. Richardson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993). and C. Grant, Delors: Inside the House That Jacques Built (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1994). cited 
in Schmidt, "Loosening the Ties That Bind: The Impact o f European Integration on French Government 
and Its Relationship to Business".
135 In the early 1990s, EU competition officials denied the acquisition o f French aircraft manufacturer de 
Havilland by Aerospatiale and Alena. The French government complained that the decision was based on 
incomplete analysis. They argued that the EU had examined the consequences o f merger approval, but not 
the equally important consequences o f denial.
136 Schmidt, "Loosening the Ties That Bind: The Impact o f European Integration on French Government 
and Its Relationship to Business".
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Credit Lyonnais
The negative consequences of dirigisme were further demonstrated by the state’s 
use of banks, especially the Credit Lyonnais, as agents of industrial policy.137 During the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, under the leadership of Mitterrand-ally Jacques-Yves 
Haberer, Credit Lyonnais pursued a bold strategy, endorsed by the state, that was based
on four objectives: rapid regional growth; regionalisation;138 the development of so-
110called “comprehensive” corporate relationships; and the maintenance of close ties with 
the French government as provider of capital and lender of last resort.140 Initially, the 
strategy was successful, but weaknesses became evident in the early 1990s when, 
through poor lending decisions, the bank’s capital deteriorated. Additionally, the 
government was accused of interfering with regional competition and the bank failed to 
anticipate the growth of securitisation.141 After years of steady decline, the French 
government was forced to expensively bailout the bank in the late 1990s. The Credit 
Lyonnais story exemplified the risks inherent in state-centred authority and strategy. 
Credit Lyonnais’ commercial strategy proved incapable of responding rapidly or 
effectively to changes in capital markets and bank lending risks.
French regulatory influence
The deleterious effect of dirigisme on French regional regulatory influence is 
evident in the development of French banking regulation and economic policy from the 
1960s through the 1980s. In 1966, the Finance Ministry announced that domestic 
commercial and investment banks could compete on an equal footing. This created de 
facto universal banks, established formal reserve requirements for banks, helped 
diversify bank’ corporate ownership and increased the availability of banking services to 
the general public. Further significant reform did not come, however, until the mid- 
1980s.
137 Dirigisme did have some successes, particularly in the encouragement o f regional commercial 
enterprises.
138 Credit Lyonnais pursued a strategy o f competing directly with entrenched local financial institutions in 
European domestic markets. Its goal was, eventually, to be recognised as a ’’European,” rather than simply 
French, institution.
139 Typically involving commercial and investment banking services plus significant, controlling share 
ownership -  “German-style” universal banking.
140 Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems.
141 There was, o f course, no “bright line” separating government and bank strategies. What is clear, is that 
government objectives “inspired” the bank’s strategy.
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France was adversely affected by the oil crises of 1972/73 and 1979. Balance of 
payments deterioration highlighted the country’s economic reliance on state-subsidised 
exports.142 Higher oil prices weakened the trade account and led to a dramatic decline in 
foreign currency receipts. Policies adopted following the 1981 accession of Mitterrand’s 
Socialist government spurred a decline in national savings.143 These events, together with 
French banks’ reluctance to lend to nationalised industries, encouraged government 
deficit spending. In turn, this increased external debt144 and led to a rapid decline in 
major industries and government funding difficulties.145
In 1983-84, the Tresor and Banque de France embarked on a series of financial 
system reforms designed to enhance regional and national capital markets. French 
securities markets lacked the liquidity and breadth of London’s markets and were 
uncompetitive alternatives to bank funding. The reforms (a series of bank law changes) 
did result in the growth of domestic capital markets. However, initiatives were neither as 
proactive as London’s FSA 1986, nor as defensive as Frankfurt’s later efforts.146 This set 
the stage for a clash over regulatory principles in the ISD and CAD negotiations.
France adopted the Banking Act in 1984. It adopted homogeneous regulations for 
financial institutions and concentrated bank supervision in the Comite de la 
Reglementation Bancaire}41 The new law officially acknowledged universal banking. 
The new law’s objective was also to increase funding resources available to the state and 
to promote Paris as an international financing centre. To do this, a centralised, 
comprehensive capital market was needed.
The new rules set up stringent capitalisation and financing rules for banks, 
increasing domestic competition. This intensified further when quantitative credit 
restrictions were discontinued in 1986. These developments stimulated banks to expand
142 Mainly to Soviet-bloc and developing country markets.
143 See Story and Walter, pp. 194ff. Mitterrand discontinued the Conservatives encouragement o f  savings.
144 External debt rose from US$34 billion in 1979 to US$80 billion by 1984.
145 A 1980s relaxation o f capital controls had encouraged French cross-border corporate investment, 
causing a current account deficit. The government had responded by encouraging inward portfolio 
investment, leading, by the late 1980s, to a significantly higher percentage o f foreign corporate ownership 
of French industrial assets than was the case in either the UK or Germany (as measured by national 
turnover and employment). See Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: 
The Battle o f  the Systems., pp. 194-195.
146 Keith Dill Nunes, et. al., "French & SEC Securities Regulation: The Search for Transparency and 
Openness in Decision-making," Vanderbilt Journal o f  Transnational Law  26, no. 2 (May 1993).
147 Headed by the Director o f the Tresor and the central bank Governor.
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into new and riskier businesses in search of revenues and profits, a move already 
underway in anticipation of 1992. These changes, combined with the 1986 opening of 
the MATIF, the Paris futures market, were designed to encourage the growth of domestic 
capital market instruments and trading. However, growth was constrained by 
government ownership of corporate assets and by a shortage of other investment 
assets.148
In 1991, Mitterrand began re-privatising state-owned enterprises. This further 
highlighted the lack of liquidity in Parisian capital markets.149 This deficit, and the 
government’s abysmal economic planning record, overshadowed domestic regulatory 
reforms and weakened France’s ability to influence the structure of the ISD and CAD.
French securities regulation
France was the first European country to enact a legislative prohibition against 
insider trading and the first to develop a national securities commission. Despite these 
achievements, in the mid-1980s, securities trading in France remained a traditional guild 
monopoly, restricted to a narrow circle of brokers. The development of contemporary 
French securities regulation can be traced to a 1967 government decision to establish a 
domestic securities regulator, the Commission des Operations de Bourse (“COB”), 
responsible for oversight of domestic securities markets.150 The COB stimulated the 
development of securities regulation, but the agency had limited powers and established 
only basic rules.
Between 1987 and 1989, France liberalised domestic securities regulation in 
response to long-term domestic economic decline, to London’s Big Bang, and to its
148 Principally so-called “funded pension assets.” The government addressed this problem by transferring 
state funding powers to provincial authorities to encourage local support o f regional business initiatives. 
This created other problems, however, by increasing credit problems. This compelled the Tresor to re­
establish control over funding in 1988. At the same time, it consolidated regional bourses into the Paris 
bourse. See Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the 
Systems., pp. 197-198. See: "France Presses Ahead with Liberalisation,” Financial Times, September 26, 
1991.
149 The absence of a large pool o f domestic assets, brought about by nationalisation policies, hindered the 
development o f a domestic capital market that was competitive with Frankfurt and London. See: Story and 
Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems.
150 The COB had regulatory authority for specified market functions, including information verification, 
investigations and enforcement. See: Cara Familet, "Improving Securities Regulations in the EC: The 
French Example," North Carolina Journal o f  International Law and Commercial Regulation 17 (1992).
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desire to promote Paris as an international financial centre.151 In 1988, private French 
stock brokerage firms were recast as Societes de Bourse and the Finance Ministry 
liberalised bourse cartel procedures. A 1989 law, “Security and Market Transparency,” 
implemented an EU directive on insider trading. Also in 1989, the French legislature 
reorganised the COB, increasing its powers and independence. Reflecting its increased 
importance, the COB’s budget quadrupled between 1985 and 1992 to US$17 million, 
and its staffing doubled to 210 employees.152
The reforms enabled domestic and foreign banks to purchase stakes in brokerage 
firms and encouraged the growth of the Paris-based French franc debt and equity 
markets.153 France had more individual shareholders than any other European country154 
and, in the early 1990s, had the fastest growing government bond market.155
Securities reforms were based on three state objectives: the replacement of 
brokers by Societes de Bourse, which diversified securities trading; the continuation of 
centralised (“concentrated”) trading, which ensured that trading took place on organised, 
supervised exchanges; and the creation of the transparency rule, which mandated 
immediate disclosure of all trade terms.156 The transparency reforms were designed to 
assure small investors that their trading activities would be treated the same as those of 
larger institutional investors. The reforms may have reassured small investors, but they 
also limited market liquidity and encouraged institutional trading to move to London. 
Concentration and transparency were, of course, major points of contention in the CAD 
and ISD negotiations. The COB enforced these provisions.
151 New laws stipulated that the COB remain responsible for investor protection, but a new governmental 
agency, the Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs (“CBV”), was established to maintain exchange discipline. 
The CBV developed rules regarding exchange functions and supervised compliance. In early 1987, an 
auction system for distributing domestic bonds was instituted, but the government allowed only one 
foreign firm to be admitted to full membership in the auction group, the US commercial bank Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Company o f New York.
152 Familet, "Improving Securities Regulations in the EC: The French Example.” By way of comparison, 
the US SEC had 3,000 staff and a budget o f over $170 million in the early 1990s.
153 Which, based on 1991 market capitalisation, ranked as the fourth largest in the world, trailing only 
Tokyo, London and New York.
154 Nunes, "French & SEC Securities Regulation: The Search for Transparency and Openness in Decision­
making".
155 Gilbert Durieux, Michel Serieyssol, and Patrick Stephan, French Financial Markets (Cambridge: 
Woodhead Publishing, 1995).
156 See Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the 
Systems., pp. 215-216.
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French market reforms reflected government objectives: reversing long-term 
declines in French industry by increasing the availability of capital and boosting French 
influence in international markets. France’s delay in industrial restructuring until the 
mid-1980s had caused French industrial growth to lag seven percentage points behind
1 ^ 7the EU’s 1980’s national average. Industrial employment had decreased, and 
economic reliance on a few large industrial concerns with government ties had increased. 
In 1986, for the first time in France, imports of manufactured goods exceeded exports.
These trends underscored the shrinking international competitiveness and influence of
1 ^ 8the French commercial sector.
The COB’s mandate was to regulate and expand French securities markets and to 
represent France in international regulatory negotiations. Despite different mandates, the 
COB and CBV overlapped functionally. This resulted in a general ambiguity over the 
allocation of domestic regulatory authority. A French newspaper noted, “In France, 
unlike in foreign systems, there exists no hierarchy that defines the powers of the 
agencies responsible for regulating the financial markets.”159 Of course, real authority lay 
with the Tresor and the central bank.
French emphasis on governmental control of market evolution resulted in little 
responsibility being given to SROs or provision being made for market feedback on 
regulatory evolution. The small role of SROs limited market feedback to unofficial 
vehicles such as the Patronat. The French Stockbrokers Association {La Societe des 
Bourses Frangaises or SBF) included all French securities brokers, but their role in 
regulatory evolution was very limited.160 This contrasted with more consistent SRO and 
private actor participation in market and regulatory evolution in the UK and Germany.
In France, as in Germany, capital market growth objectives reflected, in part, a 
desire to hinder the internationalisation of government bond trading. French regulators 
wanted government debt traded domestically. There were two reasons behind this: first, 
to enhance domestic capital market expertise and depth, and second, to keep government
157 The first French bank de-nationalised was Societe Generate in 1986. See Story and Walter, Political 
Economy ofFinancial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems.
158 Richard L. Holman, "The Decline o f French Industry," Wall Street Journal, August 23,1991.
159 Le Monde, February 25, 1992, cited in Nunes, "French & SEC Securities Regulation: The Search for 
Transparency and Openness in Decision-making.”
160 It was confined to examining listing applications.
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debt under domestic control.161 Only 5% of French government debt was held abroad 
(versus over 30% for Germany), but over 30% of French equity turnover was executed 
through SEAQ-I. To stimulate domestic markets, regulators encouraged securities 
underwriting by French banks, the development of French franc financial futures, and the 
standardisation of domestic securities issuance procedures. French regulators even went 
so far as to institute international promotional “road shows” in the early 1990s to 
increase the appeal of French government bond markets to international investors. 
However, the absence of investment assets continued to inhibit the development of a 
domestic capital market. Funded pension plans, a typical investment pool, were 
unavailable in France until 1993, when the Conservative government’s privatisation
I  csy
program facilitated their development.
Summary - France
Concentrated public sector domestic policy-making -  dirigisme -  resulted in a 
series of unsuccessful economic and commercial policies over a 25 year period. 
Mitterrand’s 1991 capitulation on re-privatisation finally acknowledged the failure of 
dirigisme. This history constrained the state’s ability to influence EU policy-making 
processes. The state’s insularity and ineffective relationships with EU bureaucrats, 
encouraged private sector initiatives through institutions such as the Patronat and the 
ERT.163 Also affecting French state negotiating influence was recognition that 
Euromarket, not recently adopted French, market reforms were preferred by market 
participants. Additionally, French capital markets, lacking investment assets, had little 
negotiating leverage against British regulatory preferences. As a result, state efforts to 
preserve domestic market reforms took policy priority over opposition to the CAD and 
ISD. Influence and authority were represented predominantly by state preferences and 
structural concerns. Private sector influence was pervasive but was predominantly 
filtered through the state, whose policy failures undercut its effectiveness.
161 In the late 1980s, Japanese institutional positions in US government securities were enormous and 
speculation was widespread it could result in increased Japanese leverage over US fiscal and monetary (not 
to mention political or commercial) policies.
162 Before that time they were discouraged as a threat to state interests because they introduced 
shareholders into corporate and social governance policy-making. Story and Walter, Political Economy o f  
Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle o f  the Systems.
163 This is discussed in Chapter 7. The private sector’s close ties with French government elites, EU 
administrators and their commercial peers in Europe facilitated their influence over state negotiating 
positions on the CAD and ISD, as well as over broader EU industrial policies. The ERT’s support for the 
SEM encouraged resolution o f directive debates and the opinions o f  the Patronat were influential in 
swaying French positions on transparency. See Chapter 7 for discussion.
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Conclusion
Each national market instituted securities regulatory reform during the 1980’s to 
insulate domestic market franchises from foreign encroachment and to respond to 
international market evolution. Reforms reinforced domestic regulatory regimes and 
market practices. They also increased the political and economic investment by 
governments and in some cases, by private actors, in the preservation of national 
regulatory regimes. This made regional harmonisation more difficult. For the UK and, to 
a lesser extent, for France, these steps increased the potential for domestic conflicts and 
ambiguous bureaucratic authority. In Germany, close ties between banks and the state 
impeded regulatory reforms that were designed, in part, to increase the use of securities 
in capital-raising. More generally, these developments inhibited regional harmonisation 
by entrenching national regulatory regimes and prioritising domestic market protection 
and growth.
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Chapter 5
The CAD and ISD Negotiations
This chapter describes the evolution of the CAD and ISD negotiations. The 
chapter’s objective is the identification of critical steps, issues, and actors involved in the 
development of the directives.
The Genesis of the CAD and ISD
For EU bureaucrats, the evolution of international economic and market 
relationships after WWII created regulatory challenges and opportunities. Three events 
in the 1970s and 1980s encouraged development of the CAD and ISD. First, the 
successful negotiation of the Basle Accord established a precedent for international 
financial services regulatory harmonisation. Second, the 1987 stock market crash 
graphically demonstrated the capacity of securities firms to generate systemic risks. 
Third, the intense international competition between Japanese and US financial 
institutions and markets threatened to relegate EU institutions and markets to “also-ran” 
status. While the Euromarkets were internationally pre-eminent, US and Japanese 
institutions increasingly dominated them. EU officials and member-state regulators 
wanted EU markets and affiliated institutions to be subject to European leadership. The 
decision to develop a harmonised EU regulatory regime was a central element in 
retaining control over domestic and regional markets and in asserting EU regulatory 
perspectives internationally.
EU Financial Services Legislation1
In 1985, the European Commission released a “White Paper,” (also referred to 
as the “Cockfield Report”) detailing the steps necessary for the creation of a European
1 See also Chapter 6.
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common financial market by year-end 1992. The paper proposed the adoption of almost 
300 directives, including the ISD.3 In 1986, to facilitate adoption of directives, member- 
states signed the Single European Act (“SEA”).4 The SEA implemented “qualified 
majority voting” (“QMV”)5 and defined a “cooperation procedure” for review of 
proposed EU legislation.6 The subsequent release of the Cecchini Report in 1988 
reinforced the benefits of regional integration and buttressed support for the EU’s 
harmonisation agenda.7
The ISD Negotiations
The ISD was the third financial services legislative initiative outlined in the 
Cockfield report, following directives for banking and insurance.8 As a result, the ISD, 
initially released in draft form by the EU Commission in 1988, was influenced by 
coincident debates over related directives.9
The release of the initial ISD proposal immediately highlighted potential conflicts 
between member-state regulatory principles. These conflicts were identified by David 
Barnard, a prominent UK securities lawyer, and by a separate legal study.10 Barnard 
noted that the ISD required national implementation, which provided opportunities for 
domestic debate, revision and delay. Second, Barnard observed that using banking 
directives as precedents for investment services was “totally inappropriate.” The 
activities pursued by banks and securities firms were very different. Finally, Barnard 
indicated that Britain’s post-FSA 1986 regulatory regime, emphasising a growing
2 “Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council” (COM 
No. 85) 310 (June 14, 1985), also referred to as the “Cockfield Report.”
3 The CAD was added later.
4 Single European Act o f 17 February 1986, 30 O.J. European Commission (No. L. 169) 1 (1987). The 
Single European Act is not a legislative act but rather an amendment to a treaty, as quoted in Wolff, 1991, 
p.103.
5 In “qualified majority voting” voting weights are assigned to each member-state based generally on its 
population and economic power. However, social and tax matters still required unanimous approval under 
the SEM. See Appendix B.
6 Barbara Campbell Potter, "Implications o f the Single European Act on European Community Law- 
Making: A Modest Step Forward," Vanderbilt Journal o f  Transnational Law 26 (1993).
7 Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, "1992: Recasting the European Bargain," World Politics 42 October 
(1989).
8 See Chapter 5 for discussion o f these directives.
9 The Commission first proposed ISD legislation in December 1986.
10 The study was executed by Norton, Rose, a British law firm. Their report, “Banking in the European 
Community -  1992”, Norton Rose, London, is cited in ISRR, "U.K. Financial Services Legislation May 
Conflict with EC Banking Directive,” 1 March 1989.
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regulatory preference for investor protection, was incompatible with the market-opening 
objectives of early ISD drafts.
There were broader conflicts in the conceptual foundations of EU regulatory 
development.11 The principle of “competition among rules” was intended to promote 
regional regulatory convergence. This was to be achieved in part by promoting 
regulatory arbitrage. However, this objective conflicted with regime characteristics 
intended to promote regional cooperation. These characteristics, “mutual recognition” 
and “minimal harmonisation,” were both intended to minimise changes to national
19regulatory regimes. This conflict was identified by U.S. GAO report. These
inconsistencies compelled EU negotiators to choose between regional cooperation and
regulatory convergence in structuring broadly acceptable directives by the Single Market
deadline. Barnard noted that David Walker, head of the UK’s SIB, had already suggested
amending the FSA 1986 to prevent the UK from being “over-regulated,” a perception
that might encourage firms to move their operations from London to cities with friendlier
1 ^regulatory environments.
Early Differences
From 1989 through the first half of 1991 little progress was made in resolving 
deeply embedded member-state differences over the structure of the ISD. Disagreements 
reflected powerful national preferences and the desire of negotiators to protect domestic 
market practices, franchises and firms. A Dutch Finance Minister termed disagreements 
“cultural differences.”14 At a November meeting of the EU Council, disagreements split 
negotiating countries along well-defined lines. On one side were countries with open 
regulatory traditions, advocating market-oriented, institutionally driven, less formal 
regulatory regimes. This included the UK, the Netherlands and, on certain issues, 
Germany. This group came to be called the “Northern Europe” group. Opposing them 
were France, Belgium and the southern EU states, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece, who 
represented more traditional, smaller, closed markets. This latter group, called the “Club- 
Med” group, argued for explicit rules, determined through negotiation rather than by
11 See Chapter 6 for discussion.
12 GAO, "European Community: U.S. Financial Services' Competitiveness under the Single Market 
Program,” (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 1990).
13ISRR, "Transparency May Not Come with 1992, Attorney Warns,” 10 May 1989.
14 ISRR, "Investment Services Directive Remains Stalled among Ministers,” 15 July 1991.
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market forces. Not surprisingly, each group argued for the creation of a regulatory
regime that required it to change as little as possible.15
Debates contrasted institutional perspectives on three critical issues:
concentration, transparency and exchange admission.16 The lack of progress caused
negotiators to worry that the ISD would not be in place by January 1993 -  or that it 
might be deferred indefinitely. Their concerns were heightened by comments of London- 
based US investment bankers, who expressed their concern that the SBD might be 
adopted before the ISD, placing investment banks at a competitive disadvantage in 
regional expansion.17
Early ISD debates were intensified by the success of London’s SEAQ- 
Intemational (“SEAQ-I”) over-the-counter (“OTC”)18 equity market, founded in 1986. 
SEAQ-I had successfully encouraged the migration of continental European equity 
trading to London. The trading and operational procedures, and liquidity of SEAQ-I’s 
largely unregulated market resulted in securities being traded more cheaply in London 
than on their tightly regulated “home-country” markets. SEAQ-I’s success had prompted 
Frankfurt and Paris to take steps to protect the viability of their domestic capital markets 
by, inter alia, developing their own domestic futures exchanges19 and by advocating ISD 
language restricting how and where equity trading should take place. The ISD also 
proposed unrestricted bourse admission, which threatened to overwhelm smaller 
domestic exchanges by increasing trading volumes (and operational demands). This 
proposal could also put local firms at risk. These concerns caused national positions to 
harden as successive ISD drafts were circulated in 1989 and 1990.
Concentration
Disagreements over “concentration” centred on whether securities trading should 
be restricted to (concentrated in) regulated, as opposed to OTC, exchanges. This issue
15 See Appendix B.
16 See below for definitions o f “Club-Med” and “Northern Europe” groups.
17 The Second Banking Co-ordination Directive (“SBD”). Directive 89/646, “On the Co-ordination o f  
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit o f the Business of 
Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780”, O.J. (No. L 386) 1 (1989). See also: See: Brown,
"The Politics o f the EU Single Market for Investment Services: Negotiating the Investment Services and 
Capital Adequacy Directives.”
18 Over the counter or unregulated exchanges. See Glossary.
19 The DTB and MATIF, respectively, discussed below and in Chapter 6.
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90brought British OTC and French regulated market interests into conflict. Regulated 
continental bourses also, of course, wanted to reverse trade migration to SEAQ-I.. They 
argued that off-market trading was risky, that it afforded little regulatory oversight or 
investor protection, and that it was contrary to the public interest.21
If Club-Med proposals were adopted as then drafted, they would effectively have 
ended OTC markets. French regulators urged that securities trading be permitted only on 
regulated exchanges such as the Paris bourse. British negotiators responded that Club- 
Med arguments were an attempt to insulate French domestic capital markets from 
international competition. At the time, over 30 percent of trading in French equities was 
done on SEAQ-I. British negotiators pointed out that the recent collapse of Polly Peck 
International, which had been listed on the “regulated” London Stock Exchange (“LSE”),
99ironically proved that regulated markets did not provide superior investor protection. 
Attempts to structure compromise language raised complex definitional questions: “How 
should a ‘regulated’ market be defined?” “What types of securities should be covered?” 
One French compromise proposal would have permitted OTC share trading but only 
when an investor agreed in writing before trades were executed. But establishing a 
procedure to substantiate agreement proved difficult to negotiate. British negotiators 
wanted a tacit understanding, in line with traditional Euromarket trading practices; the 
French, with more formal domestic market practices, wanted an explicit contract.
Transparency
A related argument over the “transparency” of trade pricing terms highlighted 
fundamental structural differences in the way securities trades were executed in the EU. 
French negotiators wanted the terms of any securities trade executed over an exchange to 
be published simultaneously with its execution. The French domestic trading system, an 
“order” or “trade” driven system, differed fundamentally from the British “quote” driven
9*1
system. British and Euromarket practice immediately published the pricing terms of 
trades, but not their size. The French system put a premium on the immediate 
“transparency” (or publication) of the full terms for any trade, irrespective of client or 
trade size. This practice arose, in part, because the French did not have a significant
20 Although Club-Med EU member-states broadly supported France.
21 Steil, Competition, Integration and Regulation in EC Capital Markets.
22 William Murray, "Polly Peck's Fall Signals Banking Shift," The Wall Street Journal, 2 November 1990.
23 See Glossary.
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institutional market. British negotiators argued that their disclosure procedures were 
designed to facilitate the execution of large, institutionally generated trades; terms were 
immediately disclosed to market authorities, but not to the public. They maintained that 
large trades were penalised under the French system, where trade size was broadcast to 
potential investors. As evidence they pointed to SEAQ-I, which specialised in large, 
block trades, attracting institutional equities trading from continental bourses.
The debate also highlighted differing domestic regulatory histories. French 
capital market practices, though liberalised in 1988/89, still reflected their history as a 
closed guild where information was narrowly held and market access and institutional 
trading were limited. The absence of a domestic institutional market made it possible for 
the French to be unconcerned about the competitive aspects of transparency. London’s 
larger and more competitive markets followed practices that were designed to 
accommodate the trading preferences of institutional investors and firms.24
Open Bourse Admission
A third ISD disagreement concerned admission of new members to domestic 
exchanges. A basic premise of the ISD and the SBD, was that trading membership on 
one national exchange would act as a “passport,” permitting membership privileges on 
all EU exchanges. This regulatory objective was attacked on several fronts. A number of 
European national bourses had not changed their admission practices significantly since 
their founding. They were physically small, had limited memberships and facilities, and 
followed antiquated procedures. This was particularly the case for Italy, Spain and 
Portugal. It was considered unrealistic to compel them to absorb many new members and 
a rapid increase in trading volume. Additionally, privately owned exchanges, such as 
London’s Liffe, agreed that requirements mandating the admission of new members 
and necessitating increased trading capacity were unrealistic. A proposal to admit new 
members over a designated time period ran into disagreement over who should be 
afforded membership and under what terms. In six of the twelve EU states, banks were 
not permitted to be members of exchanges, despite an SBD provision allowing banks to
24 Durieux, Serieyssol, and Stephan, French Financial Markets.
Nunes, "French & SEC Securities Regulation: The Search for Transparency and Openness in Decision­
making".
Benn Steil, "Equity Trading IV: The ISD and the Regulation o f European Market Structure," in The 
European Equity Markets, ed. Benn Steil, et. al. (London: European Capital Markets Institute, 1996).
25 London’s highly successful futures exchange. See Glossary.
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pursue investment activity. It was subsequently proposed that banks be required to 
establish separately capitalised local trading subsidiaries before being allowed to trade on 
exchanges.26
Progress on open admission, stalemate elsewhere
A late 1990 ISD draft still proposed a narrow definition of regulated markets, 
excluding OTC, derivative and futures markets. The draft also contained a French- 
sponsored provision that gave member-states the right to require that certain securities be 
traded only on regulated exchanges. Market participants, principally London-based US 
and UK investment firms, advised EU negotiators and national regulators that the 
language was unworkable; investors would find it impractical to provide explicit prior 
permission for trades on unregulated markets.
On trade reporting, UK negotiators continued to object to price transparency on 
all trades, irrespective of trade size. Germany and the Netherlands also opposed revised 
language on trade reporting, claiming the structure of their exchanges made compliance 
impossible.
Despite these disagreements, minor progress was made. A compromise on open 
admission of banks to exchanges, which permitted Spain to delay compliance, was 
reached.27 This agreement deferred until after the next Spanish general election any 
decision on the politically sensitive issue of bank admission to exchanges. Revised ISD 
proposals were presented at a December 1990 ECOFIN meeting, which permitted 
negotiators to tell domestic audiences that progress was being made. Although the main 
protagonists on concentration, French Minister Pierre Beregovoy and the UK’s John 
Redwood, were “talking positively,” an observer called the December meeting a 
“shambles.” ISD negotiating blocs remained unchanged and parallel CAD negotiations 
had stalled. The intergovernmental COREPER had discouraged presentation of new 
proposals to ECOFIN, arguing that agreement was premature. The Council President,
26 However this proposal contradicted the SBD provision that home country capital count for capital 
requirements throughout the EU. See: Lucy Kellaway, "International Equity Issues: Many Rows on the 
Way to Market," Financial Times, 21 November 1990. See also discussion o f SIMs in Chapter 7.
27 Lucy Kellaway, "Single Market Deadline Threatened," Financial Times, 19 December 1990.
28 Brown, "The Politics o f the EU Single Market for Investment Services: Negotiating the Investment 
Services and Capital Adequacy Directives.”
29 See Glossary and Appendix for definitions.
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unconvinced and wanting to show progress, forwarded proposals to ECOFIN. The 
resulting discussions were unproductive.30 The exchange illustrated the strong desire of 
EU negotiators to be seen to be making progress despite the persistence of national 
preferences.
In one important respect the CAD and ISD were linked. For the CAD to be 
effective, the ISD had to be simultaneously adopted. Otherwise, the CAD would impose 
new rules on securities firms that would, however, still be excluded from the regional 
operating passport already available to commercial and universal banks. This was a 
particular concern for aggressive, US multinational securities institutions based in 
London, but it was of little concern to universal banks or more provincial Club-Med 
institutions whose securities expertise was limited. Nevertheless, ISD debates continued 
to focus on transparency and concentration.
Germany supports British ISD preferences
Britain, together with Germany, continued to argue that transparency would 
impede market liquidity and inhibit institutional market-making. Germany’s support for 
Britain was attributed, in part, to the fact that British negotiators, urged by London-based
X iprivate-sector bankers, had explained to their German counterparts the trading and 
regulatory implications of differences between securities and lending risks.
This was a novel concept for German regulators, accustomed to narrowly credit- 
related risks.32 These discussions would subsequently operate more broadly once 
“trading book” and “building block” capital calculation methodologies were developed 
in later CAD drafts.
Germany was, in any event, more concerned with the CAD’s potential domestic 
impact than with that of the ISD. German banks’ securities expertise and regional market 
penetration were limited. But German support for UK ISD preferences indicates that UK
30 Brown, "The Politics o f the EU Single Market for Investment Services: Negotiating the Investment 
Services and Capital Adequacy Directives.”
31 Principally US and UK investment banks, as well as UK regulators, Confidential interviews, London.
32 Confidential interviews, London, May 2000 and February 2001.
33 See below for a discussion o f the “trading book” and “building block” proposals.
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negotiators (and the bankers advising them) had been successful in persuading German 
negotiators of the benefits of British/Euromarket securities trading practices.34
Also encouraging German endorsement of UK ISD preferences was a desire to 
make their own domestic capital markets more competitive and attractive to international 
investors and firms. This reaction was similar to that of many Club-Med regulators to
Of
globalisation, although Germany went further in reforming its domestic markets. 
Germany was motivated in making reforms principally by reunification funding 
pressures and the related need to improve domestic capital markets. However, 
Germany’s actions were conditioned by its desire to insulate domestic markets and actors 
from external competitive encroachment. These two incentives would translate into 
German concessions on the ISD (and eventually on the CAD) in exchange for assurances 
that its domestic financial institutions would not be disadvantaged by the directives. This 
became known as Germany’s “level-playing-field objective.”
Germany’s endorsement marked a turning point in ISD negotiations. It also 
marked the initiation (beginning in 1990) of private sector educational initiatives on the 
market implications of the directive’s structure. London-based private sector interests 
focused on “better regulation, not just less...a preference for a single regulator and
34 UK and US bankers’ positions on the CAD and ISD reflected their preference for preserving UK 
domestic and Euromarket practices, which benefited the UK economically and exploited those firms’ 
operating and experiential advantages. This observation is reinforced by the fact that capital calculation 
methodologies permitted in London were already more sophisticated than the proposed CAD and that 
British and US public and private interests were, as a result, more focused on obtaining the ISD’s single 
passport -  and greater access to continental European markets. UK and US securities firms dominated the 
Euromarkets by virtue o f their superior marketing, product, risk diversification and trading expertise. 
These advantages could be exploited with a single EU operating passport.
35 Germany was also compelled to make reforms because o f reunification and because its domestic capital 
markets were less developed than other EU member-states.
36 Club-Med regulators were generally more concerned with insulating domestic markets and actors from 
external competitive encroachment. The success o f Liffe (and the Euromarkets generally) had encouraged 
Deutsche Bank, the largest German universal bank, to move its securities operations to London in 1984. 
This spurred recommendations for a centralised securities exchange in Frankfurt over powerful German 
Land objections. It also encouraged a 1989 amendment to the Stock Exchange Law, which led to the 
creation o f the first German futures exchange, the Deutsche Termin Borse (“DTB”). Additionally, under 
pressure from other countries, these developments were accompanied by the reform o f Germany’s 
rudimentary insider-trading laws. (Pressure came mainly from the US, See: McCahery, "Market 
Regulation and Particularistic Interests: The Dynamics of Insider Trading Regulation in the US and 
Europe").These developments were also a function, as mentioned, o f German reunification, which forced 
Germany to access external funding sources and to develop a domestic capital market that was more 
attractive to foreign investment. These changes raised the visibility o f the German Federation o f Stock 
Exchanges and o f its Director, Rudiger von Rosen o f  the Frankfurt Exchange. See: Moran, "Regulatory 
Change in German Financial Markets". See also Chapter 6.
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transparent, liquid (order-driven) markets.”37 These objectives were not altruistic; they 
would permit UK and US firms to better exploit their market advantages and expertise. 
Private sector initiatives included seminars and one-on-one meetings with EU and 
national representatives, designed to educate officials on market developments and to 
ensure that bankers were “.. .part of the process” of policy-formation. Their efforts also 
included aggressive intervention through lobbying.38
Continued disagreement over concentration
As ISD debates evolved, France continued to seek SEAQ-I’s exclusion from the 
group of permitted “recognised” trading markets. UK and EU financial services officials 
continued to argue for the preservation of existing Euromarket trading practices, 
squaring off against the Club-Med group. Underlying these arguments was the 
continuing migration of domestic continental securities trading to cheaper and more
- IQ
liquid UK OTC markets. The UK Treasury’s position remained inflexible: “We will 
not countenance protectionism from other markets.”40
A further reason for British intractability was the FSA 1986. If French preference 
for immediate trade data publication were adopted it would compel a re-examination of 
recently implemented UK domestic trading rules. London Stock Exchange 
representations to the DTI and UK Treasury, objecting to French preferences, reflected 
this concern. UK regulations permitted a 24-hour delay in publication of terms for large 
trades on the LSE. Revised rules were to take effect in 1991, shrinking the time delay but 
still permitting market makers to reduce inventories without signalling their intentions. 
John Redwood, head of the DTI, had only approved the new rules after a lengthy review 
by the DTI and the UK Office of Fair Trading. Redwood was reluctant to re-open a 
contentious domestic issue. An LSE official warned, “We do not want to get drawn into 
a similar debate in connection with the EU directive.”41 French negotiators argued that 
fairness and investor protection were enhanced by immediate pricing transparency. But
37 Confidential interviews, London, February 2001.
38 As an example o f aggressive lobbying; in 1993/94, the European Parliament developed the concept o f  
taxing all derivative transactions. A private US investment bank got wind o f the idea, produced a seminar 
for 12 critical MEPs and outlined the “perils” (i.e., difficulties) o f taxing derivatives. The idea never got 
off the ground.
39 Steil, Competition, Integration and Regulation in EC Capital Markets.
40 Frank Kane, "Shaky Foundations May Leave the Cad Tottering with a Single European Securities 
Market on the Horizon," The Sunday Telegraph, 14 June 1992.
41ISRR, "Off-Exchange Trade Compromise Unlikely to Succeed Quickly,” 14 January 1991.
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they were also defending nationalised industries and domestic market practices against 
the growth of lightly regulated markets such as the Euro and SEAQ-I markets.
Brittan proposes ISD compromises
To jump-start the ISD discussions, Leon Brittan presented a compromise 
concentration proposal to ECOFIN in early April 1990. His proposal called for mutual 
concessions by member-states and eliminated earlier language that had defined whether 
the EU or member-states had jurisdiction over the determination of appropriate securities 
trading markets. In earlier drafts, investment companies would have determined whether 
shares would be traded on or off regulated exchanges for transactions exceeding low 
thresholds.42 France had argued that this language undermined French bourses.
An accommodation to French preferences on transparency would require 
investment companies to report price and volume of off-market transactions. However, 
in a balancing concession to British interests, Brittan insisted that an investor’s right to 
trade freely would be emphasised. France was also asked to grant investors the right to 
authorise blanket approval for off-exchange trades, rather than make approvals on a 
trade-by-trade basis.
In a further attempt to break the impasse, the Council President recommended 
that terms of all transactions be reported within 24 hours of execution. But the UK 
insisted on a 48-hour delay and the French continued to argue for same-day reporting.43 
While stalemates had been broken in one area, they remained in others.
Pressure to show progress resulted in further resolution of the issue of open 
access to domestic bourses. Language that delayed open access to domestic bourses was 
circulated and adopted.44 The compromise represented the EU’s adoption of an expedient 
solution to harmonisation disagreements. Previously, the EU had vacillated in addressing 
disagreements, switching between different national preferences instead of resolving 
fundamental issues. The new approach reflected the pressures on negotiators: public
42 Either ECU 10,000 or ECU 40,000.
43ISRR, "EC Commissioner Seeks Compromises from UK, France on Investment Services Directive,” 22 
April 1991.
44 Andrew Hill, "Compromise Proposed on EC Investment Services," Financial Times, 25 June 1992.
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commitment to the Single Market deadline, institutionalised compromise enforced 
through voting procedures, and market participant lobbying.
Deadline pressure
In early 1992, EU officials’ concern with meeting the 1992 deadline intensified. 
Hopes that the ISD draft would be placed on the December 1991 agenda of ECOFIN had 
been dashed by continuing failure to make headway on transparency issues. ECOFIN 
had not reviewed the ISD since the previous summer. A task force assembled to resolve 
ISD disagreements met in December 1991, separately from ECOFIN, but made no 
progress. UK and German concerns with proposals for faster publication of trade 
information and unrestricted bank access to bourses were still unresolved, as were 
French concerns over off-market trading.
Britain was scheduled to succeed Portugal as Council President in July 1992. The 
prospect was viewed as a mixed blessing by negotiators. London’s financial stature lent 
greater weight to British views in ministerial debates and, o f course, British negotiators 
considered financial services to be their area of specialised expertise.45 As a result, 
Whitehall viewed optimistically the prospect of ISD debates being resolved during 
Britain’s presidency. Despite the tradition of EU presidents operating as neutral ciphers 
in deliberations during their terms in office, the UK Treasury was looking forward to a 
proactive presidency. A UK Treasury official, referring to the ISD, was quoted as saying, 
“Things tend to progress in Europe through compromise, but it is not safe to assume that 
Britain will compromise on this one.”46 EU negotiators hoped, however, that recent 
progress made on the CAD would have a positive effect on the development of broadly 
acceptable resolutions to remaining ISD issues.47
ISD compromise
In the first half of 1992, the Portuguese Council President engineered a 
compromise on the ISD. Language was drafted on the issue of concentration that
45 Confidential Interview, London, May 8, 2000.
46 Kane, "Shaky Foundations May Leave the CAD Tottering with a Single European Securities Market on 
the Horizon.”
47 International Reports, "United Kingdom Second Thoughts on Maastricht?", (New York: IBC USA  
(Publications) Inc., 1992). Even though progress initially appeared unlikely. The Chairman o f the French 
Societe des Bourses noted that anew SEAQ-I electronic market for institutional investors in non-UK 
shares would be considered an unregulated market and, as a consequence, would, like SEAQ-I, be a target 
o f France's restrictions on off-market, screen-based trading.
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supported French preferences for restricting trading to regulated exchanges. The drafters 
incorporated sufficient ambiguity into the text, however, to ensure that SEAQ-I would be 
able to continue operating as a “regulated” exchange. Club-Med negotiators thought they 
had successfully excluded SEAQ-I from the definition of a regulated market on the 
grounds that it could not comply with stipulated listing and transparency requirements. 
However, the vague language and many permitted exceptions in the final directive made 
it possible for SEAQ-I to continue to operate successfully after the directive was 
adopted, without changing either its OTC status or its trading procedures -  an outcome 
welcomed in London by both domestic and foreign firms. In addition, investors from EU 
member-states that followed concentration rules were offered the opportunity to “opt 
out” of the requirement. This language ensured agreement but weakened consistent 
regional compliance with concentration provisions.
The final ISD text allowed significantly different interpretations. It permitted the 
continuation of current domestic market practices while adding certain reporting 
requirements. Differing interpretations were likely to stand because challenging a 
member-state’s interpretation required engaging the EU’s protracted legal processes, a 
daunting prospect for any member-state contemplating a protest.49
The text split the difference between opposed positions on transparency by 
suggesting that trade information be released over a period of hours after a trade, rather 
than days, but it avoided a definitive statement on trade reporting. Agreed language 
required regulated markets to publish weighted average prices, high and low prices and 
aggregate trading volumes at the commencement of trading and on a rolling basis 
thereafter. However, opt-out clauses allowed “competent” local authorities to suspend 
transparency rules for “very large” or “illiquid” trades or for “exceptional” market 
conditions. Determination of these conditions was left to the competent local authority.
With respect to open access to bourses, as mentioned, final agreement was 
achieved through the delay (“derogation”) of open access to 1996 and 1999. These 
delays gave member-states a grace period within which to prepare domestic markets for 
expanded membership.
48 Steil, Competition, Integration and Regulation in EC Capital Markets.
49 Benn Steil, "Regional Financial Market Integration: Learning from the European Experience,” (London: 
Royal Institute o f  International Affairs, 1998).
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In resolving the debates, EU negotiators proposed compromises that preserved 
deeply embedded national preferences. Compromise on the ISD was achieved without 
overtly favouring any member-state. State preferences, shaped by the advice of private- 
sector actors and institutions, dominated the agreed language of the directive. 
Compromises facilitated the preparation of a final draft that would be presented to the 
European Parliament shortly after the Single Market deadline of January 1993.
The CAD Negotiations
Early EU discussions on capital adequacy harmonisation spotlighted differing 
national regulatory regimes.50
Regional consistency in the application of capital adequacy rules to all types of 
financial services firms was critical for German regulators. They did not want to see one 
set of rules for universal banks and a separate, potentially more lenient, arrangement for 
securities firms. Since the SBD had provided a single regional passport for universal 
banks’ lending and securities trading activities, the ISD, which also contained single 
passport language, was unnecessary for German banks. However, they privately 
expressed concern that the UK’s FSA 1986 might serve as a precedent for the CAD, 
which would negatively affect German banks. German regulators considered the capital 
rules in FSA 1986 to be overly flexible and feared that the CAD would apply similar 
rules selectively to securities firms, potentially advantaging them over universal banks.
For British regulators, both the CAD and ISD were critical because of the UK’s 
more highly differentiated domestic financial services institutional structure. British 
negotiators were sensitive to draft CAD language on capital calculation for three reasons. 
First, British regulators argued that the FSA 1986 reflected state-of-the-art securities firm 
capital management practices and technology. UK regulators’ Euromarket regulatory 
experience provided them with a knowledge advantage over their EU peers. Reflecting 
this, the FSA 1986 permitted the use of sophisticated hedging techniques to manage 
required capital levels. Second, the FSA 1986, though criticised domestically as 
cumbersome and legalistic, still represented current UK regulation. British regulators
50 See Chapter 4 for discussion o f domestic economic and political structures.
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were loath to amend recently adopted domestic legislation. Third, any EU regulatory 
development that could threaten London’s market superiority was of critical concern.
French regulators generally supported British regulatory preferences on the CAD. 
France had a relatively well developed domestic securities market, which created interest 
in minimising capital costs. But French regulators focused their initial attentions on the 
ISD. The French economy had languished over the preceding decade and domestic 
regulators were concerned with the continued migration of French securities trading to 
London’s markets. Rebuilding French domestic markets was a priority. Moreover, 
negotiators were concerned initially with ISD language that permitted foreign 
institutional access to previously insulated French domestic markets.
Domestic approaches to capital
In determining securities capital, the UK pursued a sophisticated formula 
approach, based on calculating specific market and position risks. Hedging was 
permitted to minimise capital requirements. Continental European countries used simpler 
lump-sum approaches based on balance sheet totals. Reflecting different domestic 
financial services structures, member-states also evinced differing attitudes towards the 
role of capital, with Germany and the UK representing the extremes.51 Germany, with a 
poorly developed domestic capital market, viewed capitalisation in traditional credit 
terms - the more capital the better. Britain, with a highly differentiated financial services 
industry and capital market, viewed the risks and capital requirements of banks 
differently from those of securities firms. In particular, securities firms focused on 
portfolio liquidity while banks focused on borrowers’ ability to repay. Reconciling 
differing capital adequacy calculation methodologies with different domestic banking 
and industry structures represented a significant task. And, as mentioned above, EU 
directives affecting commercial banking and investment services needed to be adopted 
simultaneously if the EU was to avoid unfairly advantaging one industry over another.
These distinctions provide an opportunity to assess whether and how member- 
states’ regulatory or industry organisational preferences influenced EU negotiations.
51 See Chapter 2.
52 David Buchan and Tim Dickson, ’’The European Market: EC Gears up for Financial Services Christmas 
Rush,” Financial Times, 28 November 1988.
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Early CAD discussions
Not surprisingly, early comments on CAD drafts focused on the impact of 
evolving regional standards on existing domestic regimes. The White Paper had not 
contemplated a CAD, and early ISD drafts did not address harmonisation of securities 
capital adequacy standards. However, the absence of a CAD created opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage by securities firms enjoying a “single passport.”54 Conversely, an 
EU directive that “re-regulated” domestic capital standards would encourage additional 
arbitrage.55
Creating a regional securities regulatory regime prompted additional concerns. 
Gemot Ernst, chairman of the Berlin Stock Exchange, commented on the EU’s growing 
supranational powers. He announced that Leon Brittan’s Internal Market financial 
services cabinet56 was “going beyond the objective of opening up the markets and that a 
supranational supervisory body is developing in Brussels behind a flood of individual 
regulations.”57 Ernst argued that market internationalisation required greater coordination 
but not necessarily greater harmonisation. He bluntly stated, “The German stock
c o
exchanges reject any form of a national or supranational supervisory authority.”
German universal banks continued to be concerned with the competitiveness of 
their nascent securities operations, particularly if no capitalisation distinction was made 
between securities and lending functions. As a result, German regulators initially resisted 
any proposed dilution of their existing domestic regulatory standards.59
UK securities firms were concerned that stringent German universal bank capital 
standards not be applied to their operations. Such standards would put them at a 
disadvantage relative to non-EU (mainly US) securities firms and would necessitate 
rewriting the FSA 1986.
53 The CAD was added shortly after the introduction o f the ISD when it was recognised that, though they 
were obviously linked, the original directive addressed sufficiently complex issues to justify independent, 
separate directives.
54 "Well-Mannered Watchdogs," Financial Times, 6 March 1989.
55 This was noted by a director o f the International Stock Exchange in London who called capital adequacy 
“one o f  the most important and difficult problems” facing the EU. See: ISRR, "European Exchanges Look 
to 1992, Some Question Commission's Role,” 18 January 1989.
56 The EU Commission group leading the development o f the CAD and ISD.
57 ISRR, "European Exchanges Look to 1992, Some Question Commission's Role.”
58 Ibid.
59 Dale and Wolfe, "Capital Standards.”
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In the spring of 1989, UK domestic debate was focused on the Thatcher 
government’s rejection of the Delors Plan for monetary union. Yet, despite its 
disagreement with EU monetary objectives, Thatcher’s government was committed -  at 
least commercially -  to the Single Market. The UK government also viewed movement 
toward the Single Market as “irreversible.”60 Since the 1985 Single Market decision, 275 
directives had been implemented. The opposition Labour Party also supported the Single 
Market but criticised Tory concern that it threatened British “sovereignty.” Labour 
argued that the Conservatives wanted trading benefits without the necessary regional 
harmonisation concessions.61 The British domestic debate was carried through to the 
CAD and ISD debates where member-states’ disagreements revolved around changes in 
domestic market practices required by regulatory harmonisation.
Permeating the early debate on the CAD was a basic question: “Should banks and 
securities firms be treated alike?” While banks and securities firms were subject to 
different risks and engaged in different activities, the EU had concluded that their 
businesses would increasingly overlap, either through securitisation or the growth of 
universal banking. The SBD, by granting commercial banks a “passport” encompassing 
securities activity, effectively endorsed the development of a universal bank model. 
German regulators saw no regulatory distinctions arising from the fact that universal 
banks engaged in both lending and securities underwriting. UK regulations were, 
however, functionally based. Domestic securities activity was segregated into separately 
incorporated firms or subsidiaries of commercial banks and, as a result, regulation could 
be tailored by institutional function. The CAD regulatory debate placed EU members, 
financial institutions, and national economic structures in competition.
Early discussions of the draft CAD had two additional consequences: they 
publicised the proximity of the 1992 Single Market deadline, and they raised the public 
profile of EU discussions on other directives.
60 Richard Donkin, "Europe Losing Sight o f Single Market Goal, Says Lord Young - Challenge o f 1992," 
Financial Times, 4 May 1989.
61 Ibid.
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EU precedential ambitions
The EU Commission was certain that its regional regulatory precedent would be 
the first international standard to define capital adequacy for investment firms. This 
achievement would advance the Commission’s international authority just as the Basle 
Committee and IOSCO were working on capital adequacy. IOSCO had begun related 
research but had yet to publish findings. Once promulgated, an EU capital standard 
would resist dislodgement, particularly as most member-states were members of IOSCO 
and the Basle Committee, unless newer standards were shown to be superior. A 
contemporaneous study issued by the US GAO acknowledged this observation, noting 
that standards defined by the EU could become de facto international standards.
The establishment of an EU precedent ahead of the Basle Committee or IOSCO 
would help allay EU concern that their regulatory standards not be dictated by either of 
the other two institutions. The release of the Basle Accord had surprised the EU, pre­
empting their regulatory deliberations on bank capital and effectively determining the 
structure of related EU directives.
But the Commission downplayed any precedent-setting ambitions. In October 
1989, Leon Brittan discussed the difficulty of establishing capital standards that covered 
both universal banks and securities firms. He indicated that the Commission’s goal was 
to set a standard that gave neither institution an advantage over the other. Nor did the 
Commission want regulatory compliance to require changes to current operating 
methodologies. While recognising the difficulties inherent in establishing such an even- 
handed system, Sir Leon indicated the Commission’s belief that “broad equivalence” 
could be achieved. Jose Fombellida, of DG XV, indicated that the EU’s approach was 
“open-minded.”63 Early CAD drafts included these objectives.
Early drafts o f the CAD
Despite heavy British representation in DG XV and the Commission’s Financial 
Services cabinet, and despite arguments for the superiority of London’s regulatory 
regime, early drafts of the CAD did not reflect FSA 1986 regulatory norms. Instead, they
62 GAO, "European Community: U.S. Financial Services' Competitiveness under the Single Market 
Program.”
63 Richard Lambert, "FT Conference: World Leadership in Financial Services 'within Grasp o f EC'," 
Financial Times, 17 October 1989.
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reflected capital calculation practices of universal banks and the institutional structure of 
continental European markets.64 British complaints over the “European bias” of these 
early drafts did produce subsequent amendments.
In November 1989, responding to criticism that it was developing tougher capital 
standards than those operating outside the EU, the Commission circulated amended 
language to the first CAD draft. Required capital was reduced from an initially proposed 
20% to 8% of outstanding market risk exposure, paralleling the 8% capital level 
established by the Basle Accord. But, responding to British private and public sector 
complaints that the draft was still tougher than UK domestic standards, the EU allowed 
reduction in the 8% de minimus rule through portfolio diversification and hedging.65 
These changes stirred up controversy in Germany, where regulators argued that the new 
proposed standards were too low and too flexible. Germany’s bankers agreed, concerned 
that securities firms would have operating advantages over universal banks.
In December, the EU reversed itself and, in an unpublished third draft, disallowed 
risk-based capital calculation methodologies used by securities firms in the UK. UK 
investment firms responded by ominously noting that the new language would force 
them to move their operations out of London to less expensive financial centres. For UK 
firms, an inflexible 8% capitalisation approach effectively doubled required domestic 
capital levels.66 The TSA67 warned that new language would require large increases in
/■Q
required capital as well as changes in the composition of capital.
A fourth draft was rapidly prepared and circulated in January 1990. But it 
paralleled the third draft and drew further fire from British regulators and London 
bankers. The Bank of England’s executive director, Penn Kent, reiterated that the latest
64 "Adequacies Inadequate (Capital Reserve Regulations for Securities Firms)," The Economist, 30 
September 1989.
65 This change reflected UK and US firms’ comfort with increasingly sophisticated, proprietary portfolio 
risk management models. These models evolved into the proprietary “VaR” (value at risk) models 
endorsed several years later by the Basle Committee and the DPG.
66 Richard Waters, "EC Directive on Capital Rules Could Hit UK Firms," Financial Times, 22 December 
1989.
67 See Glossary.
68 ISRR, "TSA Warns Member Firms on Latest EC Draft Capital Adequacy Directive,", 31 January 1990. 
The TSA warned about the level o f required capital, position risk requirements, increased reserves against 
settlement failure and the low level o f subordinated debt permitted in the calculation o f capital.
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draft threatened to drive securities businesses out of the EU. The DTI’s John Redwood69 
warned that non-EU financial centres would benefit if the draft was allowed to stand. He 
stressed that higher capital requirements would drive smaller investment firms - the type 
prevalent in the UK - out of the EU to more attractive financial centres such as New
70York or Zurich. Kent and Redwood also objected to the rejection of hedging, which 
they interpreted as supporting German regulatory preferences. The British lobbying 
effort against the draft now comprised the TSA, the Bank of England, the DTI, and 
private sector bankers.71
Sir Leon responded in a London speech: “A more detailed treatment of securities 
positions than has so far been agreed is desirable to reflect the risks of such positions, 
and also to produce a similar level of requirements for banks and investment firms.”72 
EU officials indicated that a further CAD revision would not be released until the spring. 
However, they commented that British concerns were likely to be addressed in more 
flexible language, permitting position-netting in the calculation of capital and 
differentiating types of risk.
The aggressive response of public and private sector City institutions to the third 
and fourth drafts and the Commission’s favourable response mark a pivotal point in the 
negotiation of the CAD. The Commission was made keenly aware of the directives’ 
significance to the future of the City, to the UK economy and to the stature of European 
capital markets more generally. The Commission’s objective was to promote regulatory 
harmonisation, but not if it would retard regional domestic markets or damage European 
regulatory precedents. Brittan’s sensitivity to City private and public sector reaction to 
Commission regulatory proposals had been previously demonstrated by the reciprocity 
debate. His decision to reconsider the directive’s language indicates the leverage of the 
City in the CAD and ISD negotiations.
69 Under-Secretary o f State for the Department of Trade and Industry.
70 David Barchard, Richard Waters, and Lucy Kellaway, "Bank Opposes Brussels Capital Directive,” 
Financial Times, 5 February 1990.
71 A veto, under the Luxembourg Accord, o f the CAD or ISD was not seriously considered by the British 
delegation. However, removing the directives from active consideration, which the UK could do during its 
tenure as Council President, was contemplated. This, among other factors, encouraged compromise on the 
final form o f  the directives.
72 Lucy Kellaway and Richard Waters, "Brittan Pledges Flexibility in EC Financial Services Rules," 
Financial Times, 6 February 1990.
73 See Chapter 6. The reciprocity debate was about an early EU proposal that “mirror-image” reciprocity 
define regulatory elations between EU and non-EU states. This would mandate equivalent permitted
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Confidential interviews indicate that the principal reason for the UK’s leverage 
with the Commission was not the City’s market size, but its technical expertise. No other 
member-state could match the City’s experience or regulatory infrastructure. While there 
is no evidence that UK negotiators ever explicitly threatened to try to veto the 
negotiations, the City’s leverage was widely acknowledged by interviewees.74
German concerns remain
While the UK successfully lobbied for more flexible language, the German 
Finance Ministry indicated its displeasure with the fourth draft. In a memo to the EU 
Banking Advisory Committee, the Finance Ministry stressed that regulations covering 
banks and investment firms should be the same -  no distinctions should be made based 
on business activity. Their memo stated, “We think that any limitation to equal treatment 
is quite unacceptable. If banks were to be disadvantaged vis-a-vis investment firms, this 
would throw the switch to changes in the banking structure which are not acceptable.”
The comment underlined continuing German institutional concerns. The EU’s 
previously negotiated Solvency and Own Funds directives, targeted at banks, addressed 
themselves to credit risk and paralleled the language of the Basle Accord. The SBD 
included language that expressly incorporated securities trading as a permitted activity. 
German negotiators had insisted on this to ensure that the SBD captured the full range of 
universal bank activities. The Finance Ministry’s comment raised the possibility that the 
CAD (or ISD) could require changes in the structure of German banking.76
In comparison with the SBD, the latest CAD draft proposed a lower minimum 
level of capital, permitted a broader variety of financial instruments to count as capital
77(principally shorter-term instruments) and encompassed a broader definition of risk.
capabilities between states for financial services institutions. This threatened London’s status, was 
vociferously opposed and, ultimately, altered. Brittan’s sensitivity to City preferences was based on its size 
and modem regulatory regime, its institutional scope and scale, its experience regulating institutional and 
retail markets, and its familiarity with contemporary capital management techniques.
74 Confidential interviews. See also Chapter 7.
75 Richard Waters and Lucy Kellaway, "Europe's Investors Seek a CAD with Sense o f Fair Play: EC Plans 
for Capital Adequacy,” Financial Times, 9 February 1990.
76 By requiring different standards for securities activities from those established under the SBD.
77 German concerns echoed their disagreement with capital adequacy proposals voiced in a September 
1989 IOSCO meeting. German representatives had argued that the proposed standardised language 
disproportionately reflected the preferences o f UK regulators and securities firms. (See: Richard Waters,
160
A fifth draft of the CAD was circulated in March 1990. The draft made changes 
in response to criticisms from British and US bankers and from regulators, but 
encountered continued German opposition over inconsistencies between securities and 
banking directives. The draft had reversed itself again and now paralleled British capital 
rules, deducting hedged trading positions from the determination of required capital. The 
new draft also permitted a five-day grace period78 on counter-party trading risks. Earlier
70drafts had permitted a two-day grace period. The British TSA expressed relief that the 
new draft was responsive to their concerns.
German negotiators did win a concession that, it was speculated, was granted to 
facilitate their agreement to other changes. The new draft allowed member-states to 
exempt bank securities subsidiaries from bank solvency rules. This meant that bank 
securities subsidiaries would be subject to the more flexible CAD rather than the more 
stringent Solvency and Own Funds directives. But German regulators were still 
concerned that universal bank asset portfolios, which combined securities and banking 
assets in one entity rather then segregating them in subsidiaries, would be subject to 
tougher bank guidelines.80
Conjecture about side agreements between negotiators peppered public 
discussion of progress on the draft directives. However, officials interviewed in 
confidence did not confirm that negotiated tradeoffs took place.
A breakthrough
At the end of March 1990, a breakthrough appeared possible. The British were 
still criticising high minimum capital levels for individual firms. The Germans felt that 
they could live with proposed language but expressed concern that the Bundesbank
"German Action Threatens Capital Adequacy Accord," Financial Times, 21 September 1989.) The 
German delegation eventually backed off its opposition to an IOSCO working party report on capital but 
only because they had earlier mistakenly approved the offending language, not because their opinion had 
changed. (See: Richard Waters, "IOSCO Conference - Germans Back Down on Capital Plans," Financial 
Times, 22 September 1989.).
78 The grace period defined the time permitted to elapse before capital needed to be calculated against 
counterparty trading positions.
79 “Counterparty trades” are trades executed with securities firms rather than end-investors.
80 Peter Lee, "Securities Houses Face Capital Clampdown," Euromoney, April 1992., "A Passport to 
Strife," The Economist, 28 April 1990.
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would not accept liberalised capital requirements for German banks’ trading activities.81 
Nevertheless, a joint statement issued by Germany and Britain at an insurance 
conference raised hope that a compromise could be found. The release contained an 
agreement “that capital requirements for those providing investment services should be 
related to the risk involved in trading financial instruments, whatever the nature of the 
institution.” This alluded to an evolving compromise solution; to segregate -  in a 
“trading book” -  trading assets from bank assets in the calculation of capital. This would 
allow for the development of CAD guidelines more closely based on UK standards while 
preserving bank credit standards acceptable to German regulators.
The draft defined a range of risks against which non-banks were to allocate 
capital, lowered the initial level of required capital, and provided for hedging in the 
calculation of capital. By moving closer to British positions on a number of issues in 
the final draft, Sir Leon risked accusations of favouritism. One German negotiator noted 
that the proposal had “a distinctly British flavour.” But the Germans also realised they 
didn’t have enough votes in the Council to overturn British preference for the 
incorporation of hedging in capital calculation. The technique was already widely 
utilised in many major international centres. As a result, German regulators agreed to the 
“trading book” proposal.84 The Commission acknowledged that the CAD regulatory 
regime they proposed was not directly comparable to the regime applicable to banks. 
Consequently, it was impossible to determine whether it was more or less onerous. 
Despite the new draft’s initial support, it was expected that further negotiation was likely 
in the next Council meeting due to begin in June. Some observers speculated that the 
latest draft actually represented an EU negotiating gambit, establishing a precedent for 
parallel discussions at IOSCO and the Basle Committee.85
After eighteen months of negotiation and six rounds of drafts, the EU published 
the CAD for comment on April 25, 1990. Acknowledging the importance of minimising 
disruption to domestic economic structures, Sir Leon noted that the draft attempted to
81 ISRR, "Latest EC Draft Capital Rule Wins Qualified U.K. Approval,", 26 March 1990.
82 Tim Dickson, "Anglo-German Boost for Single Insurance Market," Financial Times, 31 March 1990.
83 See Appendix C for a detailed description o f the CAD. See also: ISRR, "EC-Adopted Capital Adequacy 
Rule Gets Low-Key UK Approval,” 7 May 1990.
84 "A Passport to Strife," The Economist, 28 April 1990.
85 Tim Dickson, "Capital Adequacy Directive: Compromise with More Changes Likely," Financial Times, 
26 April 1990.
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bridge “widely divergent traditions.” Negotiations were characterised by a 
conscientious effort to avoid dramatically altering existing domestic regulatory/operating 
norms. These debates also highlight the balancing of national preferences that was 
characteristic of EU resolution of harmonisation disagreements. EU officials hoped that 
attention could be turned back to moribund discussions on the ISD.87
Observers speculated that the EU would adopt a “building block” approach to 
securities capital calculation, paralleling an approach being considered by the Basle 
Committee and by London market participants and regulators.88 This approach 
complemented the EU’s developing view on differentiating trading and non-trading 
assets in calculating capital and accommodated both universal banks and securities firms, 
as capital would be calculated on defined pools of assets. Assets not devoted to securities 
trading would have capital calculated using the SBD methodology.89 The operations of 
conventional securities firms would be subject to the CAD. The latest draft provided for 
three distinct levels of required initial capital -  depending on the nature of a firm’s 
trading operations -  and, in a concession to British interests, exempted investment 
advisors from any specified capital requirements.90 The compromise position was 
developed by John Carr, a British member of DG XV on secondment from the UK 
Treasury.
86 Tim Dickson, "EC Unveils Capital Adequacy Plans," Financial Times, 26 April 1990.
87 The UK actually continued to hammer away at outstanding technical issues. In September 1990, John 
Redwood reiterated his Government’s continuing unhappiness with a provision that required investment 
firms to deduct illiquid assets when calculating capital. In remarks made in connection with the release o f a 
DTI consultative document on the CAD, he noted that if  the CAD was adopted in its present form, UK 
investment firms would need to raise their capital by as much as 70 percent. While satisfied with proposals 
applicable to position and counterparty risks, Redwood echoed arguments originally advanced by 
FIMBRA, which had argued for changing the illiquid assets provision and removing minimum capital 
requirements. The UK’s capital requirement for its 8,000 independent UK financial intermediaries was a 
token £1. These firms, unique to the British market, provided advice and investment services but did not 
trade securities. They would be required to carry minimum capital o f  ECU 50,000 under the draft CAD. 
They might avoid the requirement under a “grandfathering” provision but any subsequent changes to their 
capital structure or ownership could trigger the higher requirement. See: Department o f Trade and 
Industry, “EU Capital Adequacy Directive: A Consultative Document”, September 1990, cited in Richard 
Waters, "International Capital Markets: Brokers Face 70% Capital Rise under EC Plan," Financial Times, 
27 September 1990.
88 See below.
89 Richard Waters, "The Quest for a Capital Adequacy Directive," Financial Times, 5 April 1991.
90 There were three levels o f minimum initial capital: a basic ECU500,000 level, a reduced level o f  
ECU100,000 where firms act only as agent or portfolio managers and do not hold trading positions o f their 
own and, lastly, ECU50,000 where firms are additionally not authorised to hold customer’s money or 
securities.
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Technical disagreements remain
Despite subsequent drafts, the remaining German and UK disagreements over the 
CAD were still unresolved in early 1992. The possibility of German bank capital 
requirements being “weakened” by EU securities directives still represented a threat to 
German universal banks’ domestic market dominance. Close corporate and government 
ties with universal banks ensured that German economic and political interests presented 
a united front in EU negotiations.
The negotiating posture of German regulators was also influenced by domestic 
debates over the centralisation of German securities trading in Frankfurt. The 
centralisation of securities trading in one location would enhance the stature of German 
domestic markets generally, an objective of the Kohl government. It would also enhance 
the ability of domestic markets to meet the capital demands of German reunification, 
also a government objective. However, conservative German Land interests continued to 
resist centralisation efforts; they were concerned by the potential for diminution of 
commercial revenues and economic clout. As a result, German negotiators had a strong 
incentive to finalise the CAD in a manner that would both protect the domestic franchise 
of their universal banks and permit them to focus their energies on building domestic 
markets.
In the UK, marginally capitalised institutional brokers continued to oppose 
minimum capital requirements. The precise components of a “trading book,” that 
element of a bank’s balance sheet devoted to securities trading, still needed to be 
determined. The current CAD draft proposed that assets falling outside the trading book 
be subject to higher, less flexible, bank capital requirements than those inside the book. 
The language of the directive would influence how capital financing would evolve in the 
EU.91
Opinion amongst observers and negotiators was mixed. Media speculation 
suggested that the EU’s work on capital adequacy might be rapidly pre-empted by 
contemporaneous work being undertaken by IOSCO and the Basle Committee. This 
possibility was also predicted in a study issued by accountants Coopers & Lybrand for
91 Firms would favour financing techniques that resulted in lower capital charges.
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09IPMA. In early 1991 Sir Martin Jacomb, chairman of the private British Bankers 
Association, had stated that the EU’s work should proceed in tandem with other 
international forums. George Zavros, writing the EU Parliament’s CAD report, 
responded that it was critical that the EU lead capital adequacy regulatory development
QO
and that harmonisation with competing international forums was a secondary concern. 
Negotiators asked rhetorically, “Why would the EU adopt directives that risked being 
superseded by new language developed by other regulators?”94
An EU precedent
On January 27, 1992, just one day before a Geneva meeting between IOSCO and 
the Basle Committee to discuss capital adequacy,95 the EU published a revised version of 
the CAD that clarified several controversial technical issues including the type of capital 
that investment services firms and bank trading departments would be required to carry. 
The subsequent IOSCO/Basle Committee meeting -  to which the EU was an observer -  
unsuccessfully attempted to establish its own international capital adequacy standard. As 
a result, the CAD became a de facto regional capital precedent and potential international 
standard. The new CAD draft carried 26 amendments. Article 3 described a range of 
minimum required capital levels for firms engaged in securities businesses. It also 
contained an important “grandfather clause” that permitted a firm to carry less than the 
prescribed level of capital if  it was authorised to do business before the directive was 
implemented. The new draft generally excluded from its jurisdiction credit institutions, 
“local firms,” and investment advisors and brokerage firms that did not hold funds or 
securities on behalf of customers. This addressed a major concern of UK brokers.
The directive also explicitly adopted a “building block” approach to calculating 
required capital for portfolio risk positions, which permitted different capital allocations 
for specific and general risks. Earlier drafts had generally not differentiated among the 
various components of position risk.96 Additional risk components in the CAD included
92 Report cited in Richard Waters, "Capital Questions for EC Investment," Financial Times, 22 May 
1992.Consultation between IOSCO and the Basle Committee on related proposals was scheduled to begin 
during summer o f 1992. See Chapter 9.
93 Lucy Kellaway, "Bankers Cautious over EC Capital Backing Proposal," Financial Times, 10 January
1991.
94 Richard Waters, "Capital Questions for EC Investment," Financial Times, 22 May 1992.
95 See below.
96 Position risk, the principal focus of the CAD, was the risk that a change in market conditions could 
affect the value of a securities portfolio. See: Underhill, "Private Markets and Public Responsibility in a 
Global System: Conflict and Cooperation in Transnational Banking and Securities Regulation.”
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changes in foreign exchange prices, delayed or failed settlements and credit risk. The 
Commission made these modifications after consultation with both private and public 
sector representatives in London. The building block approach based capitalisation 
requirements partly on the net value of the trading book and partly on the gross value. 
This approach allowed for a reduction in required capital through the ability of long and
Q7short risk positions to offset each other.
The wisdom of the EU’s decision to release a new CAD draft before the Basle 
Committee and IOSCO took formal action became evident following their meeting in 
Geneva. One journalist commented that the Basle Committee/IOSCO meeting “had a
QO
distinctly US feel.” That may also account for the dissension among participants 
described in the European press. But other factors promoted European concerns as well. 
Two agreements reached at the largely private Geneva meetings annoyed European 
bankers; a decision to increase capital for equity positions and a decision to fix the ratio 
o f subordinated debt to other capital at 2.5:1. It was subsequently revealed that British 
and French regulators had objected to these “meeting conclusions.” European securities 
firms and commercial banks were also distressed by the announcements. Securities firms 
were dismayed at having to increase capital levels, with no distinction made amongst 
types of risks. Commercial bankers were worried by a proposed level of subordinated 
debt that was significantly higher than allowed by the Basle Accord (but still lower than 
UK SFA rules permitted, i.e., 4:1)."
Final text
Following the Geneva meetings, the CAD moved rapidly to a final compromise 
text. A subsequent meeting in Brussels strove to develop new language based on 
understandings reached in January, particularly on the ratio of subordinated debt for 
calculating capital. This was expected to establish a benchmark for further EU 
discussions,100 which would, at 250 percent, be higher than the 150 percent level initially 
proposed by Brussels; it would still be lower than the level then permitted in Britain.101
97 Steil, ed., International Financial Market Regulation.
98 Stemming in part from Basle Committee Chairman Corrigan and IOSCO Chairman Breeden’s 
prominent roles. See: Richard Waters, "An Emotive Topic for International Regulators - the Development 
o f Capital Rules for Securities Traders," Financial Times, 31 January 1992.
99 The Basle Accord permitted a ratio o f 1:1 for subordinated debt to capital.
100 Andrew Hill, "EC Closer to Accord on Capital Adequacy," Financial Times, 3 February 1992.
101 The EC’s then current CAD proposal included a 150 percent limit on subordinated debt in the 
calculation o f capital. The UK’s SFA regulations permitted 400 percent and the Geneva discussions had 
focused on a level o f 250 percent. Under SFA rules, core capital could be supplemented up to 400 percent
166
Nevertheless, were the UK to accept the level discussed in Geneva, negotiators might 
compromise on other outstanding issues. The UK had backed the ratio proposed at the 
Geneva meeting, motivated by concern that less flexible standards discussed earlier 
would require multinational securities firms operating in London to raise new capital. 
The 250 percent level would be easier for UK-based firms to accept than the originally 
proposed level.
Should the EU wait for Basle/IOSCO?
Discussion of the CAD was severed from the ISD. At an ECOFIN meeting in 
March, ministers approved broad compromise language covering five technical areas. 
Their goal was to establish a framework for continuing CAD discussions. Reports 
indicated that the language was “heavily influenced” by the unsuccessful meeting of
i (vyIOSCO and the Basle Committee in Geneva. But further technical issues remained 
unresolved.
It was also unclear to what extent the EU was prepared to establish guidelines 
when the Basle/IOSCO group had not announced its position. The EU noted that the 
slowly evolving Basle/IOSCO discussions had not provided clear definitions of equity or 
capital. Nor had a specific perspective on the level of required capital for position risks 
been developed. The EU was caught between developing its own standard and trying to 
accommodate the thinking of the Basle Committee and IOSCO.103 They opted not to 
wait for Basle.
A compromise was fashioned, based on John Carr’s trading book proposal, which 
refocused regulation on function -  lending and securities trading -  rather than on 
institutions.104 A proposal was made to apply CAD capital guidelines solely to securities 
portfolios, functionally distinguishing capitalisation for credit and securities activities. 
Bank asset portfolios, aside from their securities trading components, would be subject to
by subordinated loans made to a securities subsidiary by its parent corporation. The amount o f capital 
required to offset a bond position was determined by the value of the securities held, their currency, 
maturity and credit quality. The result was that capital requirements for short maturity, high credit quality 
bonds could be less than 1 percent versus a 30 percent level for long-term, low quality securities 
denominated in a volatile currency. This was the essence o f the building block approach to calculating 
capital.
102 ISRR, "Compromises Sought to Move Capital Adequacy Rules Ahead,” 24 March 1992.
103 "EC's Capital Adequacy Directive Toned Down for Securities Industry," American Banker, 24 February
1992.
104 Dale and Wolfe, "Capital Standards.”
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different capital regulations. Institutions could elect which set of guidelines they applied 
to securities portfolios, the CAD or the SBD guidelines. German regulators grudgingly 
agreed to the compromise. It addressed German level playing field concerns but also 
required German banks to operate and structure themselves differently.105 If they adopted 
revised CAD guidelines for trading activities, they would need to segregate an asset 
portfolio representing their “trading book” from other assets. How this was to be 
accomplished was unclear. The proposal called for a potentially costly change in 
traditional German balance sheet composition and in the way German banks were 
operated and managed. The expense of modifying accounting and business practices was 
also likely to be high. More importantly, the revised language did change the regulatory 
playing field by creating different capital standards for securities and credit portfolios, 
which could affect the growth of lending and securities businesses.
Compromises negotiated on technical issues in the final form of the CAD 
effectively “split the difference” on contentious issues or established specific national 
preference exceptions. Among the latter were provisions exempting non-trading firms 
and third-country firms from the requirements of the CAD.
In May 1992, the EU released compromise CAD language formally incorporating 
the “trading book” concept. The prospect for agreement was strong enough that British 
Economic Secretary Anthony Nelson actually warned against fixing an agreement that 
might conflict with any subsequent agreement reached by the Basle Committee or 
IOSCO.106 The Financial Times editorialised against the EU setting capital adequacy 
rules which the Basle Committee and IOSCO were “better placed” to develop.107 Foreign 
bankers in London disagreed, noting that the revised CAD could serve as a model for 
other regulatory negotiations. “It appears to be a sensible compromise between the 
interests of banks and the interests of securities firms. It is certainly an advance over the 
system of regulation which applies in the US,”108 said one US banker.
105 David Lascelles, "Capital Adequacy Directive: EC Battles to Create a Level Playing Field for Banks 
and Securities Houses," Financial Times, 26 April 1990.
106 David Owen, "UK Plays Down Capital Adequacy Hopes," Financial Times, 4 June 1992.
107 "The Lex Column: Capital Adequacy," Financial Times, 9 June 1992.
108 Simon London, Alice Rawsthom, and Andrew Hill, "Muted Cheers for the Single Market: Attempts to 
Unify European Securities," Financial Times, 11 June 1992.
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Agreement
Final agreement was achieved by the development of compromises, brokered by 
the Netherlands and UK Council Presidencies, on the remaining technical issues. The EU 
determined not to wait for resolution of the IOSCO/Basle Committee discussions before 
setting their own regulatory precedent. Time pressure contributed to the resolution of 
these debates: pressure to complete the directives ahead of the launch of the Single 
Market (which they missed) and, in the case of Germany and the UK, pressure to accept 
compromises before Britain assumed the EU Presidency.109
As noted above, press speculation focused on the possibility of a quid pro quo 
between UK and German regulators that would enable resolution of CAD and ISD 
debates.110 Although the allegation was never confirmed during confidential interviews, 
powerful domestic preferences, public and private, clearly operated. British preference 
for the inclusion of hedging in capital calculation was accepted. Germany’s agreement 
indicated their conclusion that the CAD would sufficiently protect German universal 
banks’ domestic franchise. It also reflected Germany’s preoccupation with financing 
reunification, its lack of votes in the Council, and its desire not to antagonise EU partners 
who were already anxious over a powerful, reunified German state. The compromise 
also permitted Germany to focus on Chancellor Kohl’s Finanzplatz Deutschland 
program.111
In CAD debates, private and public sector concern with the continuity of the 
UK’s domestic capital adequacy regime was juxtaposed with German regulators’ 
concern over capitalisation standards and the domestic competitiveness of universal 
banks. Progress on the CAD during 1990 came about through accommodation of 
German and British public and private sector preferences. During 1991, a general 
consensus was reached among ECOFIN negotiators on the trading book and building 
block approaches, as a result of which, it appeared possible that the CAD could be
109Brown argues the UK would be constrained from aggressively promoting British preferences during its 
Presidency. However, British negotiators indicated they looked forward to promoting UK-devised 
compromises during their Presidency. These conflicting perceptions would have created uncertainty and 
acted as an incentive to complete the negotiations as soon as practicable. See: Brown, "The Politics o f the 
EU Single Market for Investment Services: Negotiating the Investment Services and Capital Adequacy 
Directives.”
110 Lee, "Securities Houses Face Capital Clampdown".
111 Aimed at enhancing the attractiveness o f domestic German securities markets and facilitating 
reunification financing. See Chapter 4.
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finalised by year-end.112 The resolution, which strove to minimise changes to domestic 
financial services regimes, institutional practices and relationships, demonstrated the 
EU’s sensitivity to member-state and private sector preferences and ensured that the 
resolution would be endorsed under the EU’s QMV rules. Competition to set a 
multilateral regulatory precedent led the EU to publish a revised version of the CAD just 
before the IOSCO and Basle Committee Geneva meeting. On technical issues, such as 
starting capital and subordinated debt permitted in capital, the final version of the CAD 
reflected additional compromises.
Conclusions
This review of the CAD and ISD negotiations highlights the diverse sources of 
influence and authority that produced the directives.
On a supranational level, the EU focused on balancing regional authority and 
national sovereignty. This was demonstrated through the series of compromises on the 
directives proposed by EU officials and in their desire to establish an international 
regulatory precedent.
State preferences were influenced by the wish of state negotiators to insulate the 
historic structure of national markets and institutions, and to avoid domestic political 
conflicts brought on by dramatically changing domestic legislation or business practices. 
Private sector influence, on both state and supranational negotiators, was seen in 
lobbying: in France, where it was marginally successful; and in the UK, Germany and 
EU where it was more successful. France’s Patronat was significant but did not compel 
modification of French state regulatory preferences. The state’s concern with protecting 
a nationalised industry took precedence over trading preferences held by international 
institutions.
The UK’s market and regulatory influence was sufficient only to encourage 
compromise language. The back and forth of debates and drafts, and the structure of 
compromises agreed to in the directives, demonstrated the inability of any EU member- 
state or private sector interest to impose its preferences unilaterally. It also demonstrated
112 Simon London, "Fresh Try on Securities Directive," Financial Times, 16 July 1991.
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the Commission’s sensitivity to member-state preferences. The Commission’s laborious 
efforts to broker compromises indicate the powerful motivation of QMV and the 1992 
deadline - and the EU’s efforts to alter existing national regulatory practices as little as 
possible.
These observations confirm state-centric hypotheses. Preservation of national 
sovereignty was evident in compromises in the directives brokered by the Commission. 
Dramatic regulatory convergence was not evident. Private sector interests did mobilise 
directly in the supranational arena. However, the final structure of the directives 
indicates that member-states were able to ensure their sovereignty by imposing national 
preferences.
In fashioning regulatory compromises, EU Commission and DG XV negotiators 
permitted a variety of national preferences to flourish, despite acknowledged advantages 
accruing to British regulatory norms. Domestic preferences; in Germany for a level 
playing field, in France for protection of national institutional champions, and in Britain 
for domestic regulatory precedents, all shaped the directives. Preferences derived 
predominantly from states, but they also reflected private actor influence. More 
significantly, the EU’s approach incorporated substantial differences between major 
member-states, contradicting an assumption of state/market theorists that financial 
services firms will converge on unified governance or regulatory standards to minimise 
compliance and operating costs. However, it confirms theses addressing the significance 
of structure and institutions. Domestic institutional preferences were inelastic, market 
evolution threatened the viability of national champions, of long-established domestic 
operating methodologies, and public/private sector relationships. As a consequence, it is 
unsurprising that the directives reflected a series of awkward accommodations rather 
than best market practices.
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Chapter 6
EU Policy-making Authority
Introduction
This chapter examines the history, structure and authority of key EU policy­
making institutions. In particular, it examines their role in the development of the CAD 
and ISD. The chapter also examines the EU’s interaction with external private and public 
sector authority and their impact on EU policy-formation and its ability to shape 
international regulatory development.
Background to the EU
During and after WWII, prominent Europeans encouraged the development of a 
federal Europe, in part to enhance European influence on international political and 
economic discussions that were increasingly dominated by the US and Soviet Union. 
Their efforts met with mixed success.1 The difficulties they encountered and the 
solutions they proposed were reflected in the subsequent development of the EEC and in 
the CAD and ISD negotiations.3
Early regional integration
Early efforts to promote a united Europe4 failed to achieve unanimity on 
proposals to reduce national sovereignty.5 In response, Jean Monnet proposed an
1 “Prominent Europeans” included Jean Monnet and Winston Churchill.
2 The European Economic Community, precursor to the EU.
3 See: S. Hix, The Political System o f  the European Union (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), Robert A. 
Jones, The Politics and Economics o f  the European Union, 2nd ed. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001), 
Helen Wallace, "The Institutional Setting," in Policy-Making in the European Union, ed. Helen Wallace 
and William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Helen Wallace and William Wallace, eds., 
Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). for detailed 
descriptions o f the origins and development o f the EEC.
4 A 1948 European assembly called the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity. 
Established to promote a “united Europe.”
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alternative route to supranationalism, based on functional,6 rather than 
intergovernmental, integration. An early proposal by Monnet to harmonise national 
regulatory regimes resulted in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(“ECSC”).7
o
The ECSC established a supranational (regional) bureaucracy and High 
Authority,9 which were balanced by an intergovernmental Council of Ministers 
representing member-states.10 This became the archetype for the European Economic 
Community.
Following the 1954 failure to establish the European Defence Community,11
1 ^foreign ministers of ECSC states met to discuss the formation of a customs union. The 
meeting led to the signing by six states of two treaties in Rome in 1957, the European 
Economic Community (“EEC”) and the European Atomic Energy Community treaties 
(collectively referred to as the “Rome Treaty”). By 1990, 12 countries had joined.13 The 
Rome Treaty did not create a formal framework authorising extensive EU institution 
building and, as a result, early discussions focused on simple trade and tax issues.
5 The Congress resulted in the development o f a weak Council o f Europe in 1949. Its Court o f Human 
Rights remains active.
6 Economic and, eventually, monetary and political integration.
7 Formally created through the Treaties o f Paris; signed in 1951 by six states: France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. These treaties also “reintegrated” Germany politically with 
Western Europe.
8 The ECSC was originally designed to coordinate French and German coal and steel industries, but 
received wider regional interest from Italy and Benelux countries and the US. The UK initially declined to 
participate, predicting the plan would fail, but subsequently signed an association agreement with the 
ECSC in 1954.
9 The chief operating executive.
10 The ECSC also had an appointed European Assembly, a Court o f Justice and a consultative committee.
11 A major European concern, coincident with the creation o f the ECSC, was regional defence, particularly 
concerning Germany and the Soviet Union. In 1950, French Premier Ren£ Pleven proposed the creation o f  
a European Defence Community (“EDC”) and, in 1952; the six ECSC signatories signed a regional 
defence plan. A principal objective was to tie Germany into the West European defence structure.
However, in 1954, the EDC failed to receive French parliamentary ratification and never came into 
existence, ironically because France was unwilling to give up control o f its military forces.
12 The British also proposed an alternative to Pleven’s EDC plan, the intergovemmentalist Western 
European Union (“WEU”), which contrasted sharply with the supranational EDC proposal. The WEU was 
created in 1954, expanding the 1948 Brussels Treaty, a defence alliance, and bringing West Germany into 
NATO. The UK sent an official to the foreign ministers’ meeting but withdrew when discussions advanced 
beyond governmental cooperation. UK Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, an anti-federalist, proposed a free 
trade area alternative but was rebuffed
13 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 
1986. East Germany was effectively made a member through re-unification with West Germany in 1989.
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However, in 1979, the creation of the European Monetary System (“EMS”) stimulated 
further regional co-operation and the integration of European financial services.14
This abbreviated institutional history highlights early characteristics of policy 
negotiations among EU member-states:15
1. member-states’ reluctance to sacrifice sovereignty;
2. where sovereignty was relinquished, it was incremental and functional, 
not general -  decisions were highly political;
3. contrasting with 1 and 2, original members agreed to common
objectives: developing a common market and progressively
coordinating national economic policies. Newer members had more 
difficulty reconciling loss of sovereignty with regionalism;
4. member-states’ interest in “locking-in” German participation -  
reflecting fears of German (or Italian) revanchisme and resurgent 
national economic power;
5. the creation of a powerful multi-layered supranational bureaucracy, 
designed to achieve a balance between national and supranational 
interests;
6. British reluctance to tie itself to continental Europe, politically or 
economically, and its preference for intergovernmental, rather than 
supranational solutions to policy issues, and
7. Britain’s view that its future lay in a closer relationship with the US.16
Sources of EU Authority
Following rapid progress in building EU institutions in the 1950s and early 
1960s, further regional integration was slowed by national disputes over the scope of 
institutional powers, economic recession and protracted debates over British EU entry.
17The 1985 White Paper and 1986 SEA, which were dramatic responses to a changed 
market landscape and to EU political and economic stagnation, reinvigorated the EU’s 
original objective of asserting its interests internationally. The White Paper’s goals also
14 The EMS created a new currency, the “ECU” or European Currency Unit, which had its value 
determined by reference to a basket o f currencies consisting of specific percentages o f the currencies from 
10 o f the 12 member-states.
15 As noted earlier, throughout this study, for convenience, I have referred to the EU or European Union 
rather than the EEC, EC or European Economic Community. The EU superseded the EC in 1992. 
However, where the context demands it I have retained the original language.
16 Historic British isolation from Europe, as well as relative economic and political strength following 
WWII, encouraged Britain - initially - to view its European role more as “mentor” than member-state.
17 See discussion immediately below.
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raised the profile of securities regulatory issues and moved securities regulation from an 
abstract topic to “a political problem.”18
EU institutions
EU institutional expansion was premised on ECSC and EEC objectives, codified 
by treaties and reports, which defined the structure of EU authority and member-state 
cooperation. Institutional development included the execution of core treaties, which 
formed the basis of EU legislation; the development of principles underlying financial 
services directives; and, finally, the CAD and ISD.
EU treaties and reports
Among the Treaty of Rome’s objectives was the requirement that member-states 
act to “progressively abolish” national restrictions to the movement of capital, goods, 
persons or services within the Community.19 The Treaty did not establish a formal 
framework authorising the EU to achieve these objectives. Instead, initial member-state 
discussions focused on the removal of tariff barriers and the encouragement of tax 
harmonisation. The launch of the EMS in 1979 helped stabilise member-states’ exchange 
rates and promoted further regional co-operation.
91A code of “Community laws” unique to the EU was developed to govern 
regional activities. Two legal principles serve as the basis for the EU’s legal system: 
first, that EU law, where applicable, assumes precedence over national laws and, second, 
that individuals have the right to utilise EU law in national courts. These principles give
99EU law its supranational form. More significantly, establishing the precedence of EU
9*5
law limited member-state sovereignty. By accepting this principle, the original six EEC 
member-states indicated their commitment to regional integration and to the gradual
18 Peter Koenig, "Into the Maelstrom," Euromoney, June 1987., p.76.
19 Samuel Wolff, "Securities Regulation in the European Community," Denver Journal o f  International 
Law and Policy 20, no. 1 (1991)., p. 102.
20 The EMS created a new currency, the “ECU” or European Currency Unit, which had its value 
determined by reference to a basket o f currencies consisting o f specific percentages o f the currencies from 
10 o f the 12 member-states.
21 EU laws, “droite communitaire,” are neither national nor international.
22 Van Doom & Lowe Thieffry, "The Single European Market: A Practitioner's Guide to 1992," B.C. 
International and Comparative Law Review 12 (1989).
23 Superseded only by “vital national interests,” the so-called “Luxembourg Accord.”
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migration of national authority to a supranational institution.24 This would be effected by 
member-states’ adoption of EU laws.
EU laws may take the form of directives, regulations, decisions and judgements 
of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”). A directive is an act adopted by the EU 
Council or EU Commission. The majority of EU measures covering securities and 
financial services were Council directives, emphasising their intergovernmental 
character. Re-emphasising this point, directives typically do not take immediate effect, 
but must first be incorporated into national law, usually within a specified time period. 
Directives are binding but permit member-states to determine the method of domestic 
implementation. Member-states may not “justify non-application of a directive on the 
grounds of domestic difficulties or legal rules, even when the rules deal with 
constitutional issues,” but they can delay implementation.26 Directives are not as 
powerful legislatively as regulations, which have immediate effect and apply directly to 
all member-states.27 Nevertheless, directives are powerful agreements that bind member- 
states. Failure to implement directives can lead to lengthy and expensive legal challenges 
in the ECJ.
Member-state political and business leaders recognised both the potential 
international economic and political value of an integrated Community and the 
importance of endorsing EU goals. As EU membership grew, however, the number of 
conflicting interpretations of member-states’ commitment to EU principles and 
objectives increased. As the original six member-states grew to twelve, EU objectives 
increasingly encountered entrenched national interests and preferences, forming the grist 
for subsequent Council and interstate/regional negotiations.
24 O f course, as the EU enlarged, the commitment of member-states to integration varied and conflicts 
arose. This was dramatically evident in the UK’s lengthy EU entry debate and, more specifically, in the 
willingness o f member-states to alter domestic regulations to accommodate regional harmonisation.
25 See Appendix C for a discussion o f EU law making.
26 This was the case with the CAD.
27 Directives are “the classic method o f integrating European Community policy into the national law o f  
the member-states.” Thiefffy, Van Doom & Lowe, The Single European Market: A Practitioner’s Guide to 
1992,1 2  B.C. Int’l. & Comp. L. Rev. 357, 360 (1989), as quoted in Warren, 1990, p.196.
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EUfinancial services legislation
In 1985, the European Commission released a White Paper prepared by Lord 
Cockfield of the UK, which specified a plan for the development of a “European 
financial common market.” The White Paper envisioned the removal of “physical, 
technical and fiscal barriers between EU countries by the end of 1992,” an objective 
known as the “1992 Single Market Plan.” This was to be achieved through regulatory 
harmonisation. The White Paper detailed almost 300 legislative steps to achieve the 
common internal market. The majority were proposed as directives, which typically 
provided member-states with a two-year window for national implementation following 
Council adoption. Consequently, in order to complete the Single Market by the end of 
1992, directives would need to be adopted by the Council by the end of 1990. However, 
the large number of proposed directives and the EU’s emphasis on consensus law­
making made achievement of the 1992 goal problematic from the outset. Additionally, 
much of the legislation would require unanimous agreement from the Council of 
Ministers.
Recognising these potential difficulties, reform of EU legislative procedures was 
undertaken in 1986 to replace the treaty-based balance of EU institutions. The most 
significant changes instituted qualified majority voting on internal market matters and a 
prescriptive “cooperation procedure” for review and adoption of legislation.30 Member- 
states entered into a new treaty, the Single European Act,31 which amended the Treaty of 
Rome. The SEA represented a significant alteration in the EU’s approach to Council 
votes on internal market legislation, replacing unanimous voting on Council directives 
with “qualified majority voting.”33
28 “Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council” (COM 
No. 85) 310 (June 14, 1985). Also, the “Cockfield Report.”
29 Also referred to as the Single European Market Plan (“SEM”).
30 Potter, "Implications o f the Single European Act on European Community Law-Making: A Modest Step 
Forward.”
31 Single European Act o f 17 February 1986, 30 O.J. European Commission (No. L. 169) 1 (1987). The 
Single European Act is not a legislative act but rather an amendment to a treaty, as quoted in Wolff, 1991, 
p.103.
Manning Gilbert Warren III, "Global Harmonisation o f Securities Laws: The Achievements o f  the 
European Communities," Harvard International Law Journal 31, no. 1 (1990)., p.24.
33 In “qualified majority voting” voting weights are assigned to each member-state based generally on its 
population and economic power. However, social and tax matters still required unanimous approval under 
the SEM. See Appendix C.
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The EU’s early legislative objective was uniform regulatory harmonisation. The 
SEA changed this objective to the development of common minimum standards subject 
to mutual recognition by member-states. This change generated identifiable legislative 
progress and optimism for achievement of the 1992 Plan.34 The SEA encouraged 
member-states to follow the more involved and compromise-oriented cooperation 
procedure in reviewing legislative proposals. This procedure exposed legislative 
proposals to a variety of influences, both internal and external, and subjected them to 
strict time limits during their “second reading.”35 More importantly, this development 
moved EU policy-formation away from uniform harmonisation.
The SEA explicitly recognised that for the EU to achieve its objectives, 
compromises between member-states would be necessary. More significantly, that these 
compromises would not represent the migration of state authority to a supranational 
body, but rather agreements that allowed the continuation of distinctive national regimes.
The SEA had several implications for EU directives. First, it provided a more 
active legislative review function for Parliament. Second, the amendments increased the 
level of interaction between the intergovernmental Council and the supranational 
Commission. More fundamentally, QMV eliminated the ability of a member-state to veto 
or filibuster legislation. This meant that issues were more closely reviewed and subject to 
greater interaction between member-states and the EU. As was evident in the resolution 
of disagreements over the CAD and ISD, QMV acted as a powerful incentive for 
negotiators to broker compromises in order to resolve controversial issues and finalise 
legislation. It also acted as a vigorous incentive for the Commission and Council to 
consider each other’s views and develop consensus solutions to issues arising out of 
national preferences.
While the SEA was designed to facilitate the SEM it was not an unqualified 
improvement in EU regulatory review procedures. The Treaty overtly politicised 
legislative review by mandating compromise and coalition formation. Also, certain EU
34 Warren III, "Global Harmonisation o f Securities Laws: The Achievements o f the European 
Communities.”
35 Previously, second reviews by the Commission, Council and Parliament were not subject to time limits 
See: GAO, "European Community: U.S. Financial Services' Competitiveness under the Single Market 
Program,” p. 12-13, for a useful outline o f the EU Cooperation Procedure. See also: Appendix C.
178
legislative topics36 remained subject to unanimous vote of the Council.37 Finally, the
1 0
SEA did not address the informal 1966 “Luxembourg Accord.”
The White Paper and SEA appeared to represent a dramatic shift of authority to 
EU institutions from member-states. Potentially, the SEA and QMV could force 
member-states to adopt legislation they opposed. But the SEA also increased the 
influence of the Council in developing legislation. While only the Commission could 
propose legislation (an agenda-setting privilege), the Council had final voting approval. 
This arrangement forced the Commission to be responsive to national Council concerns, 
particularly member-state domestic interests. This was graphically reflected in the 
development of compromises facilitating final agreement to the ISD and CAD. In 
particular, neither of the voting blocs on ISD issues, the Club-Med39 and Northern 
European40 groups, represented qualified majorities. As a result, they were forced to 
compromise in order to develop a consensus position on the ISD. Instead of crafting 
language that defined a middle position (or reflected member-state concessions), the 
Council and Commission permitted member-state derogations and the inclusion of 
ambiguous language in the final directives. Both concessions were consequences of the 
political pressure to which the SEA subjected Council debates. Additionally, both the 
ISD and CAD were subject to intense political pressure associated with the 1992 
deadline. Consequently, the SEA represented two important developments: the 
establishment of the policy-setting authority of EU institutions and, conversely, the 
politicising effect of EU principles that promoted legislative compromise to preserve 
momentum toward regional integration. The SEA indicated the EU’s acknowledgement 
that policy-making authority would remain predominantly with member-states.
In the mid-1980s, the EU and member-states took decisive legislative action to 
facilitate achievement of the SEM. EU membership represented nationally ratified 
acknowledgement of shared regional goals and values -  and of delegated authority. The
36 Including fiscal matters, the movement o f persons and the treatment o f employees.
37 Potter, "Implications o f the Single European Act on European Community Law-Making: A Modest Step 
Forward.”
38 Darrel S. Lew, "The EEC Legislative Process: An Evolving Balance," Columbia Journal o f  
Transnational Law  27 (1989)., cited in Potter, "Implications o f the Single European Act on European 
Community Law-Making: A Modest Step Forward.” See footnote 7 above.
39 France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece represented 43 votes in the Council.
40 Germany, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland represented 33 votes in the 
Council.
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SEA acknowledged the difficulty of balancing integration, sovereignty and authority. 
Nevertheless, the goals of the Cockfield Report were strongly endorsed by all member- 
states, including the UK, which would begin to question SEM objectives several years 
later.41
While at one level, member-states’ commitment to the SEM was underscored by 
their sacrifice of sovereignty to achieve regional goals, the spirit of political compromise 
was also evident in the EU’s decision to implement financial services objectives through 
directives rather than regulations, reserving implementation to national legislatures. The 
subsequent detailed negotiations over the CAD and ISD reflect member-states’ 
preference for preserving domestic regulatory institutions over the creation of a uniform 
regional EU regulatory regime. The balancing of supranational and national interests 
reflects a continuing tension in EU rule-making.
The development of a single market for financial services was a vital EU goal in 
its own right and a critical step toward longer-term monetary and fiscal harmonisation. In 
1989, Commission President Jacques Delors released the “EMU Report,” which 
proposed three stages for achieving economic and monetary union. The EMU Report 
extended the original SEM program by proposing that exchange rates between member- 
states’ national currencies be fixed. The report also proposed the development of a single 
EU currency and central bank.42 At the EU’s 1989 Economic Summit, Community 
members agreed to hold an intergovernmental conference on July 1, 1990 to amend the
41 In 1988, the EU released the Cecchini Report, a complex economic analysis arguing the Single Market 
would promote regional price convergence. The report suggested that economic gains from the SEM 
would amount to somewhere between ECU82 and ECU 142 billion for the nine member-states, or between 
2.8 and 4.8 percent o f GDP. Employment and balance o f payments benefits were also predicted. The 
report’s strong economic case for the SEM bolstered public and private political support for the goals of 
the SEA and the White Paper. See: Paolo Cecchini, Michel Catinat, and Alexis Jacquemin, The European 
Challenge 1992: The Benefits o f  the Single Market (Aldershot: Wildwood House, 1988). Also based on 
confidential interviews, London, February 2001.
Responding to speculation over the UK’s early SEM commitment, a UK participant in the CAD 
negotiations, noting Cockfield’s British nationality and government resume, commented, “Do you think 
the British government would allow Cockfield to say what he did if  they didn’t support it?” See generally: 
Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the 
European Community,” and Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht.” Quotation is 
from confidential interviews, London, February 2001.
42 The Delors Committee Report proposed three stages for EMU: 1) Greater EU member-state co­
ordination o f economic and monetary policy. This required all members to join the EMS. 2) A second 
phase established an institutional procedure for fixing budget deficit and macroeconomic targets. 3) A  final 
stage that would fix exchange rates and set rules for the co-ordination o f economic and budget polices. The 
final stage also required the creation o f a European central bank and a single European currency.
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Treaty of Rome further and to start the first phase of EMU. The decision to proceed 
reflected member-states’ continuing endorsement of 1985 White Paper goals.
Financial services directives
Early securities regulatory directives included the “Stock Exchange Directives,” 
which covered admission,43 listing,44 and reporting requirements of bourses. Separately 
adopted directives covered prospectuses, mutual funds, and insider trading.
In 1987 the EU Council amended the Listing Particulars Directive with the 
Mutual Recognition Directive,45 which was designed to improve trading efficiency and 
uniformity between domestic capital markets by requiring listing particulars approved in 
one member-state to be recognised in all member-states.46
The Mutual Recognition Directive established two conditions for recognition of 
non-member-state regulatory standards. First, there must be equivalent investor 
protection under EU and non-EU regulations and, second, non-EU states must provide 
reciprocity to EU member-states.47 Reciprocity came up again in debates over banking 
directives.48
The Second Banking Directive
The most significant early EU financial services directive was the 1989 SBD.49 
The SBD amended the First Banking Directive (“FBD”)50 and authorised a single 
license, valid throughout the EU, for the provision of banking and related financial
43 Directive 79/279, “Council Directive Co-ordinating the Conditions for Admission o f Securities in 
Official Stock Exchange Listing”, 22 O.J. European Commission (No. L 66) 21 (1979). This Directive was 
amended in 1982 by Directive 82/148, 25 O.J. European Commission (No. L 62) 22.
44 Directive 80/390, “Council Directive Co-ordinating the Requirements for the Drawing Up, Scrutiny and 
Distribution o f Listing Particulars to be Published for the Admission o f  Securities to Official Stock 
Exchange Listing”, 23 O.J. European Commission (No. L 100) 1 (1980).
45 Directive 87/345, “First Amendment to the Listing Particulars Directive”, 30 O.J. European Commission 
(No. L 185)81 (1987).
46 Even where a member-state mandated more stringent domestic regulations than required by the EU, it 
was required to accept listing disclosure meeting the lower standard. This diminution in member-state 
authority provided ample room for regulatory arbitrage and prompted remedial language.
47 Manning Gilbert Warren III, "Regulatory Harmony in the European Communities: The Common Market 
Prospectus," Brooklyn Journal o f  International Law  16 (1990)..
48 See below for discussion o f the reciprocity debate.
49 Other directives addressed bank capital, deposits and related issues. These included the Solvency Ratio 
Directive, the Own Funds Directive, the Second Consolidated Supervision Directive, the Large Exposures 
Directive and the Deposit Guarantee Directive. Respectively; 89/646/EEU, 89/647/EEU, 89/229/EEU, 
92/30/EEU, 92/121/EEU, and 94/19/EU.
50 Directive 77/780, “First Banking Co-ordination Directive,” 12 December 1977.
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services. The directive specifically disallowed host states from requiring additional 
authorisation or capitalisation beyond that required by a financial institution’s home 
state. With a single “passport” a bank could transact business anywhere in the EU.
The SBD relied on mutual recognition and “home country control.” A “credit 
institution”51 was not permitted to pursue operations in a host state that were not 
permitted by its home state. Conversely, under the SBD, if a home state permitted a bank 
to pursue a “listed” business or activity,52 the bank was permitted to pursue that activity 
anywhere in the EU, irrespective of rules pertaining in the host country. In particular, 
universal banks would be permitted to underwrite securities throughout the EU. It was 
expected that regulatory competition between member-states would result in the gradual 
adoption of a “universal banking” institutional model throughout the EU.
“Home country control” reinforced mutual recognition and the single passport. 
Under this provision, a financial firm was subject to home country supervisory and 
regulatory constraints, irrespective of where its services were provided. The primary 
responsibility for supervision resided with an institution’s home country. As a result, 
host countries had very limited supervisory responsibility for foreign institutions.
The EU planned to implement the SBD by the SEM deadline of January 1, 1993, 
and simultaneously to harmonise bank capital standards, closely following the 
framework developed in the 1988 Basle Accord.
51 Defined as “an institution that receives deposits or other payable funds from the public and grants credits 
for its own account.” See: Sydney J. Key, "Mutual Recognition: Integration of the Financial Sector in the 
European Community," Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 9, 1989 (1989).
52 Listed activities included: 1. Accepting deposits or other funds from the public, 2. Lending and 
factoring, 3. Financial leasing, 4. Money transmission services, 5. Issuing means o f payment such as credit 
cards or travellers cheques, 6. Trading for own or client accounts in money market instruments, foreign 
exchange, futures and options, exchange and interest rate agreements and securities, 7. Issuing guarantees, 
8. Participating in share issues, 9. Providing consulting services and advice, 10. Money brokering, 11. 
Providing portfolio advice or management, 12. Safekeeping and administration, 13. Credit reference 
services and, 14. Custody services.
53 See “1992 Spurs Call for U.S. Banking Reforms”, Europe-1992: The Report on the Single European 
Market 592 (April 1990) and “1992 and Banking Institutions: Markets, Mergers and Margins”, Europe- 
1992: The Report on the Single European Market 316, 317 (Aug. 30, 1989) which indicated the following: 
“Ultimately, therefore, countries whose regulatory systems are more restrictive than that envisioned by the 
Commission would come under pressure to liberalise their markets to prevent domestic institutions from 
being placed at a competitive disadvantage against foreign institutions within their own national 
boundaries.” Cited in Warren, "Regulatory Harmony in the European Communities: The Common Market 
Prospectus,” p. 122.
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By 1990, the EU had adopted approximately 30 financial services directives. 
These related to company law, banking, investment services and securities.54 They 
underscored member-states’ commitment to creation of a cooperative regional regulatory 
regime and their sensitivity to the location of authority. These directives also 
underscored EU regulatory tensions; they developed standards that preserved national 
regulatory distinctiveness while they simultaneously promoted regional regulatory 
harmonisation.
EU  regulatory concepts
The regulatory concepts underlying EU directives show how EU regulatory 
evolution attempted to balance the allocation of authority between member-states and 
EU institutions. EU regulatory concepts acknowledged that nationally distinct regulatory 
and legal systems would persist. The White Paper and SEA developed regulatory 
principles based on this conclusion. The core concept was “competition among rules” 
facilitated by “mutual recognition.” Woolcock55 traces the evolution of these principles 
to an early 1980s Franco/German trade dispute over manufacturing standards56 whose 
resolution established both the principle of mutual recognition and a precedent for 
compromise political solutions to member-state preference conflicts.
Mutual recognition meant that member-states acknowledged each other’s 
standards, laws and regulations. This encouraged the free flow of capital, labour and
r*7
services without extensive regulatory harmonisation. A closely related, counter­
balancing principle was “harmonisation of minimum standards.” This operated as a 
restraint on regulatory competition by requiring member-states to conform to base-level 
standards. These principles reflected the EU’s desire to avoid a competitive regulatory 
race to the bottom (or other negative externality) and the difficulty of achieving full
co
regional regulatory harmonisation. The Cassis decision also established the ECJ as a
54 See Glossary. The terms “investment banking” and “securities business” are used interchangeably.
55 Stephen Woolcock, "Competition among Rules in the Single European Market,” in International 
Regulatory Competition and Coordination, ed. William Bratton, et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
56 German DIN (Deutsche Industrie Normen) standards and French AFNOR standards
57 The European Court o f Justice (“ECJ”) established the principle o f mutual recognition in the famous 
1979 Cassis de Dijon decision, mandating that products suitable for sale in one member-state must be 
admitted for sale in all member-states. See: Eur. Ct. Reports 649, Rewe-Zentral AG  v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltungfur Branntwein, Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78, 1979 Common Mkt. Law 
Reports 494.
58 Steil, Competition, Integration and Regulation in EC Capital Markets., p. 18.
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potential participant in the evolution of EU regulation, creating a significant incentive for 
the Council to negotiate minimum standards, or risk having the ECJ do it for them.59
The EU’s regulatory approach combined compromise with the threat of unilateral 
political or legal action. This was a practical solution to the difficulties entailed in 
harmonising regional standards in an area of evolving authority. Tension between 
harmonisation and competition demonstrated a “constructive ambiguity” in the design of 
the EU regulatory process.60 This ambiguity arose from a desire to preserve national 
regulatory distinctions and authority, while enabling regional regulatory responses to 
external developments. The underlying assumption of mutual recognition was that it 
would both foster and restrain competition between member-state regulatory regimes.
The extension of EU regulatory principles to financial services is seen in the 
adoption of the single passport, home country control, and “reciprocity”61 provisions. 
These principles reassured EU financial institutions that regulations protecting domestic 
markets would not be used to competitively disadvantage foreign firms. However, these 
provisions also implied that firms from countries with liberal regulatory regimes would 
have an operational advantage relative to firms from more conservative jurisdictions; 
they would be able to offer a wider range of services in conservative jurisdictions than 
local firms could offer. This construction was designed to encourage convergence of 
regulatory norms around a market-based model62 reflecting minimum standards and 
broad permitted powers.63
The evolution of EU legislation confirms the importance placed on balancing 
regional integration with member-state preferences in order to preserve the Union and 
the harmonisation process. EU legislation mandated cooperation and compromise 
through EU institutions by establishing fixed public deadlines, by solidifying agreements 
through treaty and by imposing a cooperation procedure and QMV. These supranational 
agreements effectively kept policy-making authority in member-states. Member-states,
59 Woolcock, "Competition among Rules in the Single European Market,” p. 294.
60 Ibid.
61 Discussed immediately below.
62 See: Majone, "Cross-National Sources o f Regulatory Policymaking in Europe and the United States,"., 
p. 101-102, R. Dehousse, "Integration v. Regulation? On the Dynamics o f Regulation in the European 
Community," Journal o f  Common Market Studies 30, no. 4 (1992)., p. 392-393 and Woolcock, ibid.
63 GAO, "European Community: U.S. Financial Services' Competitiveness under the Single Market 
Program,” p. 14.
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through the Council, retained authority over final legislative implementation. EU 
regulatory principles were well developed by the time negotiations on the CAD and ISD 
began in earnest in 1989. Discussions with negotiators revealed common agreement on 
the powerful commitment of member-states to achieving the objectives of the Cockfield 
Report -  and to the offsetting objective of protecting national regulatory preferences, 
markets and institutions.
The reciprocity debate
The reciprocity debate shows how EU regulatory concepts operated in resolving 
contentious issues. It also demonstrated how private actors and policy networks 
influenced the development of regulatory norms, inserting their expertise and market 
knowledge into the deliberative process.
The SBD initially sought “mirror-image” reciprocity between EU and non-EU 
jurisdictions. “Reciprocity” aimed to create equivalent permitted capabilities between 
jurisdictions. It meant, for example, that a US financial firm would be permitted the same 
range of capabilities in the EU as were permitted to EU-headquartered financial 
institutions in the US. One implication of this was that restrictions would be imposed on 
US firms operating in Europe. Under Federal Reserve Regulation K, US commercial 
banks had been permitted limited underwriting capabilities in European capital markets. 
Because of the separation of lending and underwriting mandated by the Glass-Steagall 
Act, these activities were prohibited to US commercial banks (and most non-US banks) 
in US domestic markets. Reacting to complaints from financial institutions, the Council 
approved amended SBD reciprocity language in December 1989. The amended language 
specified that the EU would combine reciprocal national treatment with open-market 
access. This meant that the operational scope available to home country institutions 
would be made available to foreign institutions’ operations in that country. Rather than 
limit foreign financial institutional capabilities in liberal regulatory environments, this 
compromise accommodated differing regulatory approaches by not extending EU 
jurisdictional authority beyond its regional market.64 The EU’s actions indicated a 
legislative approach of tailored compromise, responsiveness to national and market 
sentiment and constructive ambiguity. How the EU arrived at its compromise reveals
64 The US/SEC’s approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction was the opposite o f the EU’s. US courts, in 
particular, and the SEC did not restrain themselves from extending US regulation offshore. See Chapter 
10.
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how the interaction of EU institutions with state and private interests shaped EU 
regulation.
A 1988 draft of the SBD stipulated that non-EU banks wanting SBD benefits 
must first allow the EU to “examine whether all credit institutions of the Community 
enjoy reciprocal treatment regarding the treatment o f subsidiaries...in the third 
country.”65 This language encouraged the EU to review banking practices of non-EU 
countries to determine whether they paralleled EU legislation. The provision was 
controversial because US and Japanese banking laws separated investment and 
commercial banking. US banks’ concern with reciprocity was increased by draft 
language that argued against “grandfathering”66 and by proposals for automatic 
reciprocity review. If adopted, the language could bar US and Japanese firms from 
operating in certain EU markets. An ISD draft approved by the Commission in 
December 1988 contained the same language.67
The draft also stipulated that any change in the scope of a foreign bank’s EU 
business, enacted after adoption of the SBD, could prompt a reciprocity review. Reacting 
to criticism, EU Commissioner Leon Brittan indicated that the objective of reciprocity 
provisions was to strengthen the EU’s negotiating position in discussions with third 
countries over market access.68
The draft reciprocity language also reflected a more basic EU objective: ensuring 
that differentiated national markets were encouraged to migrate to a universal banking 
model.69 Within the EU, universal banking was the prevalent bank operating style, but it 
appeared in different forms.70 The Commission had earlier acknowledged, through the
65ISRR, "Reciprocity Should Extend to Bank Branches, MPs Say,” 29 March 1989.
66 See Glossary.
67 Additional concerns were raised by a private 1989 UK legal study examining the potential consequences 
o f SBD reciprocity provisions. The study identified conflicts between the SBD and FSA 1986 and 
questioned the ability o f the UK, under the SBD, to enforce FSA 1986 against credit institutions from other 
member-states. The report also confirmed that, following SBD adoption, banks established in certain non- 
EU jurisdictions would be unable to establish EU subsidiaries, or acquire significant equity positions in EU 
banks. The report, “Banking in the European Community -  1992”, Norton Rose, London, is cited in ISRR, 
"U.K. Financial Services Legislation May Conflict with EC Banking Directive.”
68 ISRR, "Reciprocity Should Extend to Bank Branches, MPs Say.”
69 Differentiated refers to the separation o f investment and commercial banking services. These states 
included EU member-states, the US and Japan.
70 In Germany, universal banking predominated. In the Netherlands and UK, universal banks operated 
alongside domestic and multinational securities firms -  but market segmentation predominated. A similar 
situation existed in France and Italy.
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inclusion of securities underwriting in the draft SBD, that it favoured a universal banking 
model. In the US, concurrent developments indicated a possible weakening in US 
legislative opposition to universal banking.71 Commission actions indicated that it 
wanted to encourage these trends through SBD and ISD reciprocity provisions.
The controversial proposal sparked public debate in the UK and the US. 
Reciprocity was seen as a threat to the City’s pre-eminent market position because it 
would constrain the Euromarket operations of foreign banks in London. Peter Lilley, 
Economic Secretary to the Treasury, indicated that the Thatcher government would 
contest reciprocity provisions. Lilley described the provision as “potentially very 
damaging.” “The threat to London’s position as a major financial centre is 
incalculable.”72 EU officials admitted the language was “obscure.”73
Meanwhile, The Securities Association (“TSA”), the largest of the UK financial 
services SROs, issued a report opposing draft ISD reciprocity provisions.74 The TSA’s 
report made three points: first, that London had become an international financial centre 
owing to its openness to international firms; second, that the draft ISD language was 
unclear; and, third, that the proposed language could discourage foreign firms from 
operating in the EU. The report cited the potential consequences arising from German 
universal banks operating in the US. Glass-Steagall prohibited them from underwriting 
securities in US domestic markets; this prohibition could be used to restrict currently 
permitted EU underwriting activities of US commercial banks.75 The TSA urged that 
reciprocity be more flexible.
In April 1989, reports indicated that the EU was backing off its strict reciprocity 
position. Private sector financial executives, testifying before a US House of 
Representatives Foreign Affairs subcommittee examining the 1992 plan, indicated that 
the US government, working together with US businesses, would ensure that the EU did
71 The development o f so-called “Section 20” subsidiaries o f commercial banks permitted to underwrite 
securities and the Federal Reserve approved restructuring o f CS First Boston that increased ownership o f  a 
domestic US securities firm by a (foreign) commercial bank -  Credit Suisse.
72 Tom Lynch, "EC Bank Plans Threaten City's Role, Says Minister," Financial Times, 10 February 1989.
73 ISRR, "Commission Approves Single License for Providers o f Investment Services,” 4 January 1989.
74 The Securities Association, "Investment Services Directive - a Commentary and Analysis,” (London: 
The Securities Association, 1989).
75 Clive Wolman, "TSA Opposes the Reciprocity Provisions o f EC Directive," Financial Times, 5 April
1989.
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not “discriminate against outsiders.”76 Coincident with the House hearings, a 
Commission spokesman, responding to a letter sent by the private US Bankers 
Association for Foreign Trade (“BAFT”), indicated that strict reciprocity would not be 
required. He emphasised the Commission’s global -  not regional -  approach to 
regulation, and that the Commission only wanted EU banks operating in the US to be 
treated like domestic US banks.77
Shortly thereafter, Leon Brittan travelled to the US for a series of public and 
private meetings to quell US bankers’ fears that their EU operations would be restricted. 
Speaking at BAFT’s annual meeting, Brittan indicated that the Commission wanted to 
prevent market access discrimination against EU banks, not to exclude third-country 
banks from the EU. US bankers were apparently mollified. The EU’s mirror-image 
reciprocity proposal was quietly dropped and “national treatment” became the regulatory
no
standard. In Europe after his US meetings, Brittan addressed London’s International 
Stock Exchange, assuring them that the SBD and ISD would not threaten the City’s 
status. He reiterated that national treatment would be the legal standard established.79
The reciprocity debate demonstrated the interaction and influence of private, 
national and supranational actors in shaping EU financial services regulation. It also 
highlighted the role of national economic structure in shaping the evolution of directives. 
First, the debate showed that a preference for compromise influenced EU directive 
development. Second, it confirmed the Commission’s sensitivity to public and private 
sector reaction to draft directives, particularly to reaction from London and US markets 
and actors. At the same time, it acknowledged the Commission’s authoritative role in the 
evolution of EU regulatory standards. Third, it revealed the EU’s sensitivity to existing 
domestic economic structures and its - modest -  encouragement of future institutional 
evolution. Finally, by amending the directives in response to criticism, in particular to
76 The executives also used the hearings to note that European banking was evolving to a universal banking 
model and that US banks, prohibited from universal banking and interstate branching, would increasingly 
be at a competitive disadvantage to their international peers. ISRR, "EC Appears to Have Backed O ff from 
"Mirror Image' Proposal,” 12 April 1989.
77 ISRR, "Commission Spokesman Tries to Calm Reciprocity Concerns,” 12 April 1989.
78 ISRR, "EC Commissioner Upbeat on Talks with US Officials,” 10 May 1989.
79 ISRR, "London to Remain Competitive, Brittan Tells Stock Exchange,” 7 June 1989. While advocating 
reciprocal flexibility, Brittan stressed three core objectives for the SBD and ISD: first, the Commission 
must be capable o f assessing whether EU banks enjoyed effective access to third country markets, second, 
where access was not permitted, the Commission wanted the ability to propose bilateral negotiations, and, 
finally, if  negotiations were unsuccessful, to have the right to restrict new bank branches from offending 
countries. See: ISRR, "Reciprocity Should Extend to Bank Branches, MPs Say.”
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commercially damaging aspects of early drafts, the EU indicated its awareness of the 
competitive aspects of its directives. It also revealed its goal of promoting and protecting 
the international competitiveness of EU markets, even as it circumscribed the 
extraterritorial reach of EU regulation.
The iterative review and amendment of draft directives was promoted by EU 
cooperation procedures. Balancing Commission, member-state, third country, private 
sector and trade association preferences necessitated that the Commission back away 
from explicit regulatory harmonisation. In its place, national treatment and mutual 
recognition advanced the EU’s larger objectives.80
Was the Commission independent?
Despite the Commission’s efforts to remain neutral in directive negotiations, 
German and French negotiators periodically complained about their lack of allies in DG 
XV and on the Commission. In particular, DG XV’s staff included several British 
Treasury secondees and was headed by Geoffrey Fitchew, himself seconded from the 
UK Treasury.81 Fitchew reported to Commissioner Leon Brittan, another Briton.82 The 
number of British secondees in EU financial services positions was explained by the 
greater experience of British regulators in managing large, diversified markets. EU 
practice was to appoint experienced personnel to Directorates General. This practice 
resulted in DG XV and Leon Brittan’s financial services cabinet being dominated by 
British nationals, and DG VI, responsible for agricultural issues, by French nationals, 
reflecting that country’s agricultural prominence within the EU. DG XV staffers 
vigorously defended their neutrality, arguing that their credibility with the EU’s 
bureaucracy and with member-states depended on it.83
80 Also -  possibly -  facilitating adoption o f these principles (empirical evidence is anecdotal) was the EU’s 
contemporaneous adoption o f the principle o f national treatment in the Uruguay Round o f negotiations o f  
the GATT, reflected in the settlement o f trade differences between the EU and US in the 1992 Blair House 
Accord and in the 1994 Uruguay Round Final Acts. See: “Rules o f  Origin” - 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/22-roo.pdf.
81 A  British Treasury secondee, John Carr, did much o f the drafting for the CAD. Leon Brittan’s cabinet 
member responsible for the CAD and ISD was also British.
82 Martin du Bois, "EC Considers Plan to Revamp Securities Rules," The Wall Street Journal, 16 March
1990.
83 Despite protestations o f neutrality, confidential interviews indicate that, EU staffers favoured British 
regulatory perspectives, particularly as they learned more about the operations o f sophisticated financial 
markets, primarily from London-based US and UK market participants. London-based regulators and 
market practitioners had greater experience with large, institutionally-driven markets. The EU was 
interested in developing a regulatory template that would survive market evolution and regulatory 
competition (at least in the short-term) and replace one that reflected outmoded trading technologies. As a
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Regulatory Principles and the ISD and CAD
This section considers whether principles developed by the White Paper, SEA 
and QMV were apparent in the evolution of the CAD and ISD. These characteristics 
include: commitment to the achievement of the Single Market, home country control, 
single passport, mutual recognition, competition among rules, and harmonisation of 
minimum standards. Home country control and the single passport are baseline 
characteristics of the ISD and CAD -  and all EU financial services directives -  
consequently, analytical focus is directed to the remaining characteristics.
Regulatory principles
Interviews with CAD and ISD negotiators reveal three factors considered critical 
to the directives’ successful adoption: member-state commitment to Single Market 
harmonisation objectives, the adoption of QMV, and time pressure to meet the Single 
Market deadline. All three factors are based on state preferences or commitments. CAD 
and ISD negotiations also reveal the influence of EU regulatory principles, notably, the 
Commission and member-states’ persistence in pursuing acceptable compromises that 
would be approved by a qualified majority. However, empirical evidence tying 
regulatory principles to unambiguous progress on the CAD and ISD is anecdotal rather 
than explicit.
At a May 1989 meeting of the International Bar Association, Commission official 
Christopher Cruikshank affirmed that EU regulatory principles and member-state 
preferences would be reflected in developmental work on the CAD. He noted that 
discussions were being held to develop a CAD proposal because early ISD drafts had 
been criticised for not being as comprehensive as EU banking directives.84 Cruikshank 
indicated that the EU would consider the regulation of institutional market risk -  an issue 
not addressed by the ISD -  and would provide broad operational guidelines that 
endeavoured to avoid “trying to put each of the member-states into a mold ” by instead 
defining “broad rules,” which, at a “minimum,” states would “respect.” This meant that 
directives had to be flexible enough to encompass a range of national banking styles
result, the Commission’s “independence” must be viewed in light of its regulatory objectives and bias 
toward contemporary regulatory technology.
84 Among other things, it did not define “sufficiently capitalised.”
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Of
while being sufficiently specific to achieve market opening and prudential objectives. 
The directives sought to achieve both member-state and Commission objectives.
Timing pressure and commitments
Timing pressures were also evident early in the CAD and ISD discussions. 
Negotiators were aware that unless talks were resolved by the agreed 1992 deadline two 
problems would occur: first, the SBD would become active before the ISD and CAD, 
providing an advantage to universal banks relative to securities firms, and second, 
negotiators would fail to complete Cockfield’s blueprint on time, a goal to which all 
member-states had publicly committed themselves. Thus, deadlines were a consistent 
concern in EU debates. For example, in the UK, the House of Commons Trade and 
Industry Select Committee noted that British negotiators in the EU Council should insist 
that the ISD be implemented simultaneously with the SBD. The Committee’s report, 
entitled “Financial Services and the Single Market,” noted, “If satisfactory progress on 
the directive is not made by the end of June 1990, that will be a clear signal of a risk that
Of
it will not come into effect simultaneously with the Second Banking Directive.”
Qualified majority voting
As has been previously noted, the SEA increased the Council’s influence in 
legislative development. This, in turn, required the Commission to be responsive to 
member-state interests in proposing legislation.87 This was evident in the negotiation of 
compromises that facilitated Council agreement to the ISD and CAD. Neither of the ISD
oo
voting blocs represented a qualified majority, and they had to resolve stalemates in 
order to approve the ISD. Rather than develop compromise language, however, the 
Council and Commission simply permitted exceptions to the directives, in the form of 
member-state derogations and by including ambiguous language. They were responding 
to domestic political pressure, particularly deadline pressure, created by SEA 
commitments. As a result, the SEA and QMV both had a material impact on the final 
form of the CAD and ISD.
85 ISRR, "New Directive Underway on Capital, Market Risk,” 7 June 1989.
86 ISRR, "MPs Urge Speedier Adoption o f Investment Services Rules,” 16 August 1989.
87 While only the Commission could propose legislation, the Council carried final voting approval.
88 The “Club Med” group - France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece - represented 43 votes in 
the Council. The “Northern Europe” group - Germany, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg 
and Ireland - represented 33 votes in the Council.
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Pressure to Fix Regulatory Precedents
As mentioned in the last chapter, pressure to establish international regulatory 
precedents shaped the course of directive negotiations and demonstrated the desire of the 
EU and its member-states to define their international regulatory authority. The first 
international standard established for determining capital adequacy would provide a 
benchmark against which other standards would be measured.
Several factors indicate that the EU wanted to finalise its deliberations. SEC 
Chairman Breeden revealed himself to be a vigorous opponent of EU building block 
capital proposals, surprising European negotiators. With EU and SEC negotiators 
unlikely to agree on a capital standard in IOSCO, attention turned to the Basle
OQ
Committee. Basle Committee Chairman Corrigan had endorsed building block capital 
proposals, but the timing for the Basle Committee’s review did not coincide with the 
EU’s 1992 deadline -  and Corrigan’s support was, at best, tepid.90 The path for creating 
an EU regulatory precedent was clear.
Pressure was also evident in rumours of “horse-trading” among EU negotiators 
over directives. As noted earlier, bankers suspected that German support for British ISD 
preferences were a quid pro quo for British and Commission efforts to develop a CAD 
acceptable to Germany.91 Britain’s goals in satisfying German regulatory objectives were 
two-fold. First, the development of a CAD acceptable to Germany and the UK meant 
that the US could not count on German support in IOSCO for US capital adequacy 
preferences. This relieved British anxiety that it might be compelled to accept a stringent 
IOSCO capital standard endorsed by the US and Germany.92 Second, it circumvented the 
possibility that Germany might vote against the UK and France on the CAD, creating 
difficulty in establishing a qualified voting majority or resulting in higher capital charges
O'!
for Paris and London-based firms. These conjectures clarify French COB Chairman
89 In addition to the governance concerns associated with IOSCO, there was an additional disincentive to 
pursue intense public negotiations in IOSCO -  if  EU members and the SEC disagreed on a regulatory 
standard, their disagreement could undermine broad acceptance o f any subsequent EU standard. This 
incentivised EU negotiators but, as predicted, resulted in the broad acceptance o f EU capital directives.
90 Confidential interviews.
91 This was not, however, explicitly confirmed in research interviews. Lee, "Securities Houses Face Capital 
Clampdown.”
92 This seemed possible in light o f Germany’s domestic capital preferences.
93 Nicholas Bray, "Capital Norms Have a Way to Go," The Wall Street Journal, 3 February 1992.
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Saint-Geours’ comment at the conclusion of the January 1992 Geneva meetings that the 
EU could not wait for IOSCO or the Basle Committee before establishing its own capital 
precedent.
Finally, in parallel with the EU’s CAD discussions, IOSCO and the Basle 
Committee were working to develop international capital adequacy standards. Richard 
Breeden, IOSCO’s Technical Committee Chairman, preferred a capital standard 
significantly higher (and more costly) than the EU’s emerging model. Awareness of US 
preferences -  and of the parallel work of IOSCO and the Basle Committee -  intensified 
French and British concern with delays in finalising EU CAD discussions.
In December 1989, a meeting between representatives of IOSCO, the EU and the 
OECD was held.94 The meeting highlighted the important role the 1992 Plan played in 
focusing regulators on developing internationally consistent regulations -  and on the 
EU’s interest in setting precedents. EU representatives stressed their leadership in laying 
the groundwork for international standards and indicated that the EU’s evolving financial 
services directives could serve as a model for IOSCO’s efforts to develop a broader set 
of guidelines for financial services regulation.95 If the EU did not establish a precedent 
before IOSCO or the Basle Committee, it might be compelled to follow imposed, rather 
than negotiated, guidelines. This had been the EU’s unhappy experience with the 1988 
Basle Accord.96
The Basle Accord “surprise”
The Cooke Committee that drafted the Basle Accord had included EU member- 
states. Thus, it was surprising that both the EU Commission and DG XV felt they had
07not been sufficiently consulted when the Basle Accord was initially circulated in 1987.
94 ISRR, "IOSCO and EC Officials Meet to Map out Harmonization Effort,” 6 December 1989.
95 ISRR, "Re-Regulation Trend Emerging in the Financial Markets,” 31 January 1990.
96 IOSCO’S regulatory work was stimulated, in part, by Breeden’s desire to position IOSCO as the 
securities equivalent o f  the Basle Committee and as a competitor o f the EU Commission and Council in 
setting securities regulatory precedents. IOSCO’S work was encouraged by early ISD and CAD debates. 
IOSCO’S proposals could also influence ongoing EU discussions. Also, IOSCO’s research was a response 
to calls from senior national regulators for the development o f a supranational securities regulatory body 
similar to the Cooke Committee. See: David Lascelles, "Securities Rules Closer to Global Harmonisation," 
Financial Times, 14 August 1989., and Chapters 9 and 10.
97 Confidential interviews, London, May 2000. The Commission was not, o f course, a Basle Committee 
member. However, there was considerable overlap between EU member-states and the Basel Committee’s 
G-10 members -  (although not necessarily between actual negotiators -  See Chapter 12). As a result, the 
EU Commission, a major multilateral actor, was surprised when the Accord was released without its direct
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They were surprised by the content and timing of the Accord, and they were concerned 
the Accord had been drafted by a small group of central bankers without referencing the 
EU’s Single Market regulatory efforts. The EU was working on the Minimum Solvency 
Ratio directive at the same time that the Cooke Committee was finalising and releasing 
the Accord in 1988. The release of the Accord effectively pre-empted Commission 
discussions. Once the Basle Committee had endorsed the Cooke Committee’s 
recommendations, it was a foregone conclusion that the EU and member-states would
QO
endorse them as well. For the Commission, most galling was not that they had to adopt 
Basle Accord standards, but that they had not participated in their development. What 
also disturbed Commission officials was that core provisions of the SBD, as well as the 
Solvency and Own Funds directives, were effectively dictated by the Cooke Committee.
The Commission’s predicament also highlighted domestic institutional 
competition within member-states; in the UK between the Treasury, DTI and Bank of 
England, in France between the Tresor and Banque de France, and in Germany between 
the Finance Ministry, Lander and Bundesbank."  With only minor exceptions, the 
language of EU directives paralleled the language of the Basle Accord. International 
regulatory authority, at least for commercial bank capitalisation, rested firmly within the 
Basle Committee.
Adding complexity to international policy-making, representatives of different 
regulatory agencies represented a given country at the different capital adequacy 
meetings. In EU and IOSCO meetings, the SIB, which reported to the Treasury, was the 
UK’s official representative. At the Basle Committee, the Bank of England officially 
represented the UK although the SIB attended as an observer. The SEC represented the 
US at IOSCO while the Federal Reserve attended Basle Committee meetings. Despite 
efforts to keep parties informed, coherently organising differing perspectives, 
jurisdictions and prescriptions proved difficult. It was also apparent that domestic 
bureaucratic rivalries carried over to international discussions. As noted earlier, John
participation or prior notification -  especially as it was widely known they were developing Single Market 
standards. It is doubly surprising if  we accept French and German accusations that the Commission 
reflected a UK bias. Peter Cooke, chairman o f the Cooke Committee, was, o f course, British, and a Bank 
of England secondee.
98 If a state opted for a different or, particularly, weaker, capital standard than stipulated by the Basle 
Committee’s guidelines, that state’s banks risked being penalised by their international peers.
99 See paragraph immediately below.
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Redwood, Anthony Nelson and David Walker disagreed over the vigour with which 
British regulatory preferences should be promoted. This problem also became apparent 
at the January 1992 Geneva meeting to discuss capital adequacy, where disagreements 
between Richard Breeden,100 Gerald Corrigan101 and IOSCO representatives102 over 
capital adequacy caused discussions to break down. Basle Committee and IOSCO 
attendees’ had different interpretations of understandings reached prior to that meeting. 
Their disagreements spurred Leon Brittan to pre-emptively release the Commission’s 
own regulatory standard on capital adequacy, derailing any possible IOSCO 
agreement.104 While the “regional” work of the Commission would not have the same 
global impact as that of the Basle or Barnes Committees,105 establishing an EU precedent 
would potentially influence recommendations made by these Committees.
Following its Basle Accord experience, the Commission determined to remain 
more closely involved in international discussions over capital adequacy and related 
regulatory matters. Subsequent to the release of the Accord, Commission officials were 
invited to attend Basle Committee meetings as observers. As a result, they were able to 
incorporate in their own negotiations relevant work on capital adequacy and investment 
services carried out by the Basle Committee. From this experience, EU officials became 
more sensitive to the importance of regulatory precedents, and subsequently, decided not 
to delay the release of their regulatory capital standards.
EU member-states’ desire to participate in establishing a regulatory precedent 
was coupled with their decision to set a precedent through the EU rather than IOSCO. 
Bank of England Director Penn Kent acknowledged the difficulty of developing a 
broadly acceptable capital adequacy standard. He also remarked on the absence of a 
supranational forum comparable to the Basle Committee106 for examining regulatory
1 (VIissues relating to securities firms. In this he echoed the Bank Governor’s earlier 
comments volunteering the Bank for that role. This observation was presented as an
100 SEC Chairman and IOSCO Technical Committee Chairman but representing IOSCO at the meeting.
101 Chairman o f the FRBNY and the Basle Committee, but representing the Basle Committee.
102 David Walker o f  the SIB and Jean Saint-Geours o f the COB.
103 See Chapters 8 and 9.
104 See below, “The Geneva meeting.”
105 See next section for description o f the Barnes Committee.
106 His comment, surprisingly, ignored IOSCO.
107 ISRR, "Bank o f England Chief Urges Liberal Regulatory Regime.” 5 November 1991.
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opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its international authority and to develop a capital 
benchmark that would serve as an international precedent. As negotiations in both the 
EU and IOSCO progressed, it became clear to EU member-states that IOSCO was 
unlikely to develop an internationally acceptable standard and that the EU now had an 
opportunity to take the lead.108
International Regulatory Competition
In addition to precedent competition between the EU, IOSCO and the Basle 
Committee, international focus on capital standards spawned a multitude of groups 
examining the topic. Despite their declared intent of improving international 
understanding, cooperation and convergence, the many meetings and reports increased 
regulatory competition, encouraging the EU’s precedent-setting ambitions but also 
blurring regulatory authority. These developments underline the dispersion of 
international institutional authority with respect to the evolution of securities regulation 
and the potential for aggressive institutions to establish regulatory precedents.
Outside the EU, capital adequacy held a prominent place on the agendas of 
international and national regulators. State and/or supranational regulatory precedents 
could be established before the EU finalised the CAD or ISD.
In Japan, the Ministry of Finance began to require, from the beginning of August 
1989, that Japanese securities firms increase their capital bases in order to decrease their 
potential vulnerability to risks associated with funds management. New guidelines109 
were scheduled for implementation in 1990.110
Also in August 1989, IOSCO released three reports for a one-year public review 
and comment period that addressed the harmonisation of international securities 
regulation. The reports covered uniform capital requirements for multinational securities
108 Confidential interviews, London, February 2001 and May 2000.
109 Supplementing existing rules covering minimum paid-in capital and leverage. See Glossary.
110 ISRR, "New Rules Will Tighten Capital Adequacy Requirements," 2 August 1989.
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firms as well as recommendations for standardisation of multinational securities 
offerings and harmonisation of accounting and auditing standards.111
In addition to the EU and IOSCO, other groups actively studied capitalisation 
with the goal of developing regulatory responses to market developments. Frequently 
incorporating state participants from the IOSCO and EU discussions, these groups 
included: first, a series of regular meetings referred to as the “Hexagonals,” attended by 
bank and securities regulators from Japan, the US and the UK. Securities regulators from 
these three countries also met separately on a regular basis. Second, the Basle Committee 
established a sub-committee, the “Barnes Committee,” modelled after the Cooke 
Committee, to examine regulation of equity position risk in commercial banks. Because 
of its relevant experience, the UK’s SIB was invited to participate in the Barnes
119Committee’s work. Eventually, other EU representatives were invited as well. Barnes 
Committee recommendations eventually superseded those of the EU and IOSCO. Third, 
Leon Brittan established an informal, private sector “think-tank,” comprised of members 
of Brittan’s Commission “cabinet” and external experts from London’s private sector, to 
independently examine financial regulation. Fourth, a “convention” of European 
securities regulators (including the UK, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and 
Belgium) had met twice to discuss regulatory co-ordination and cooperation. Fifth, 
overlying these specialised multilateral meetings were active, as well as newly 
established, bilateral agreements113 that addressed specific regulatory issues.
These meetings, ostensibly arranged to examine regulatory issues and to promote 
harmonisation, had national competitive objectives as well. No domestic regulator 
wanted to be surprised by precedents set in other markets or between other states, 
particularly precedents with which they disagreed. Consequently, these meetings had 
both cooperative and competitive purposes.
111 ISRR, "Three Harmonization Reports Are to Be Released in Venice,” 16 August 1989. The EU and the 
IASC also addressed these latter two topics.
112 In the SIB’s 1989 annual report, Chairman David Walker noted Barnes Committee discussions were 
critical to achieving “broadly consistent approaches to capital requirements applied to securities firms and 
to banks undertaking similar securities business on their balance sheets.” While endorsing this initiative, 
Walker went on to note that the SIB would continue to work actively on other international initiatives, “in 
particular involving U.S. and Japanese regulators.” ISRR, "SIB Joining BIS Group on Equity-Position 
Risk Study," 2 July 1990.
113 Some formalised through Memoranda o f Understanding (“MOU”). See Appendix E for discussion o f  
MOUs.
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In September 1990, securities regulators from the US, UK, and Japan met to 
discuss regulatory harmonisation. On the agenda were mutual recognition, regulatory 
harmonisation and capital adequacy.114 Following the meeting, SEC Chairman Breeden 
indicated that the SEC expected to release a multi-jurisdictional disclosure proposal 
(“MJDS”) before year-end. MJDS would make it easier for Canadian and US companies 
to issue securities in each other’s domestic markets. MJDS was intended to function 
similarly to the EU’s mutual recognition principle but had additional objectives:115 
making US markets more attractive to foreign borrowers and investors; setting an 
international regulatory precedent; and promoting US regulatory standards.116
The SIB’s David Walker announced that a proposal similar to MJDS, but 
designed to facilitate securities offerings in UK and US markets, was making progress. 
The DTI’s John Redwood commented that British mutual recognition and harmonisation 
proposals were “willingly accepted” by representatives from Japan and the US at the 
September meeting.117 Participants indicated that considerable progress had been made
I 10
and a consensus reached on closer cooperation.
Like the MJDS, memoranda of understanding (“MOUs”) formalised bilateral 
regulatory procedures affecting issues such as information exchange, investigations and 
dispute resolution.119 However, because states that aggressively pursued MOU 
development, such as the US and UK, had sophisticated regulatory regimes, their MOU 
agreements often served as precedents for regulatory reform in less sophisticated states. 
These MOUs served to promote domestic US and UK regulatory norms internationally.
Competing policy-making organisations resented the EU with a choice. If the EU 
cooperated with other international organisations, agreements would have to 
accommodate different perspectives, potentially diluting EU authority and complicating 
EU regional negotiations. Conversely, establishing an EU regulatory precedent would fix
114 Richard Waters, "International Capital Markets: Regulators to Discuss Co-Operation Moves," Financial 
Times, 14 September 1990.
115 Cathy Jordan, "Regulation o f  Canadian Capital Markets in the 1990s: The United States in the Driver's 
Seat," Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 4, no. 3 (1995).
116 See Chapter 11 for a fuller explanation o f  this proposal.
117 ISRR, "Trilateral Meeting o f Securities Regulators Focuses on Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure Issues,” 
24 September 1990.
118 Nevertheless, no MJDS-type agreements were ever concluded by the US, UK and Japan.
119 See generally: Tobin, "Global Money Rules: The Political Economy o f  International Regulatory 
Cooperation".
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an international benchmark.120 In addition, the 1992 deadline acted as a stimulus to EU 
negotiations. Public commitment to 1992 objectives was reinforced by broad agreement 
among European politicians, business leaders and voters that Single Market objectives 
benefited national and regional economies.121
The EU was represented indirectly at the Basle Committee and IOSCO. This 
intensified the EU’s interest in developing its own capital standard. The EU’s 
deliberations were initially influenced by its desire to develop a standard that would 
conform to both IOSCO’S and the Basle Committee’s. It made little sense for the EU to 
adopt a regional capital adequacy standard that could conflict with succeeding 
international standards. However, the path negotiated by EU representatives between 
regional interests and those of IOSCO and the Basle Committee, as one EU official put 
it, “sometimes seems non-existent.”122
The EU’s early cooperative attitude toward IOSCO changed to a decision to 
develop their own standard, after it became clear that the Commission’s approach was 
adamantly opposed by the SEC. Additionally, it appeared to EU observers at Basle 
Committee meetings that the Committee would not develop a consensus on capital 
adequacy for securities positions until 1993 or 1994 at the earliest, after the 1992 
deadline.123 Adding to the EU’s sense of urgency, discussions in IOSCO and the Basle 
Committee were becoming increasingly public by 1990/1991, and the potential for 
conflict or redundancy was increasing. Finally, EU administrators were being told by EU 
bankers and national regulators that legal and political commitment to the Single Market 
would ring hollow if the CAD and ISD were not simultaneously available with the SBD.
IOSCO asserts itself
IOSCO attempted to set a regulatory precedent before the EU at its September 
1991 annual conference. IOSCO’s Technical Committee approved a memorandum to the 
Basle Committee outlining IOSCO’s views on minimum capital requirements for
120 Richard Waters, "Survey o f International Capital Markets: Drexel's Fall May Spur Talking-Shop - 
Regulation," Financial Times, 2 July 1990.
121 Margaret Thatcher’s concern with the potential loss o f UK political or monetary sovereignty did not 
dissuade her -  or her political and business colleagues -  o f the economic/commercial benefits o f the Single 
Market, which they strongly endorsed.
122 Andrew Hill, "Capital Adequacy Rules Delayed," Financial Times, 19 December 1991.
123 The Basle Committee released guidelines for discussion in 1993, and again in 1995.
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institutions active in securities businesses. The memorandum achieved several 
objectives. It positioned IOSCO as an authoritative international forum for the 
development of capital standards, enhancing IOSCO’s credibility and strengthening its 
working relationship with the Basle Committee. Additionally, the memo established, at 
least temporarily, an international consensus on minimum capitalisation for debt 
securities.
The memorandum, which bypassed the EU, offered “principles” rather than hard 
rules, reflecting IOSCO’s continuing internal disagreement over standards.124 The memo 
defined where the SEC and EU disagreed over capital. Technical Committee Chairman 
Breeden reaffirmed that the SEC would continue its “comprehensive” approach to capital 
calculation, which mandated higher capital levels than required by proposed EU or Basle 
Committee building block regulations.125 UK and French regulators in IOSCO argued in 
support of the EU’s approach but were rebuffed by the SEC, despite EU standards being 
offered as minimum levels, subject to discretionary (and potentially higher) national 
implementation. Breeden’s persistence stymied IOSCO’s progress and encouraged the 
EU to adopt its own standard.
The Technical Committee memorandum focused international capital adequacy 
discussions on the US-dominated IOSCO and the EU-absent Basle Committee. The EU, 
in an effort to bolster its international regulatory authority, signed a “Joint Statement on 
the Establishment of Improved Cooperation” with the SEC in September 1991. The 
Statement noted that the signatories “will begin a regular dialogue to review 
developments in securities markets and to discuss the principles underlying securities 
regulation in the United States and in the European Community.”127 The Statement 
acknowledged limited prior communication between the parties and recommended that 
negotiation of future international standards should accommodate US and EU practices, 
traditions and principles. The Statement was, if nothing else, an admission of the EU’s
124ISRR, "Technical Committee Sends Capital Memorandum to Banking Supervisors; MOU Principles 
Approved,” 7 October 1991.
125 The comprehensive approach required that capital be set against long and short positions and limited 
netting. It also required higher capital levels for specific and general risks.
126 Despite capital standards being presented as minimum levels - subject to discretionary higher national 
implementation - Breeden never altered his opposition to capital levels that permitted a lower (than US) 
starting base level.
127 ISRR, "SEC, EC in Co-operation Agreement,” 23 September 1991.
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difficulty in asserting its international regulatory authority unless, as was subsequently 
demonstrated, it teamed up with the Basle Committee.
Limits to Authority
This denouement helps to define the boundaries of the SEC’s, the EU’s and the 
Basle Committee’s international regulatory authority. The SEC, a national regulator, 
“won” its initial capital adequacy debate in IOSCO but subsequently lost out to the 
supranational Basle Committee’s proposals. A similar pattern was true for the EU -  it 
adopted a weak compromise regional standard after failing to sway IOSCO, but 
subsequently, the Basle Committee issued guidelines that superseded EU directives.
The boundaries of authority were defined by predominantly by state actors and 
institutions. The SEC’s and Breeden’s authority came predominantly from a national 
base; the combined influence of domestic capital markets, regulatory history, and
1 92political support. The EU’s regulatory authority was both national and
190supranational. Member-states, interacting with EU institutions and private actors, 
promoted EU regulatory preferences. Additionally, the magnitude of the Euromarkets 
bolstered EU regulatory decisions and advocacy, helping the EU offset US/SEC 
interests. The Basle Committee’s authority130 was supranational; derived from its elite, 
powerful membership and its policy development procedures.
The Geneva meeting
The January 1992 Geneva meeting between IOSCO131 and the Basle
119Committee addressed minimum capital guidelines for firms engaged in securities 
trading. The meeting further convinced the EU that its independent ability to influence 
international regulatory evolution was increasingly circumscribed by the Basle 
Committee and IOSCO.133
128 As discussed in Chapters 10 and 11.
129 Leon Brittan was a widely respected figure who represented international regulatory authority.
130 Discussed further in Chapter 9.
131 Represented by Richard Breeden and David Walker.
132 Represented by Gerald Corrigan.
133 The meeting took place on January 28 and 29. The EU was an observer. Geoffrey Fitchew, head o f DG 
XV, attended on behalf o f the EU.
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The meetings took place one day after the EU’s release of a new CAD draft that 
adopted a building block approach for both debt and equity position risk. The draft 
conflicted with Breeden’s preferred comprehensive approach, particularly on equity risk. 
The EU argued that the building block approach “allows for a more accurate measure of 
the risk reduction associated with hedging.”134 The timing of the draft’s release reflected 
the EU’s desire to shape international capital negotiations.
The EU received lukewarm support from the Basle Committee on the building 
block approach. But the EU and the Basle Committee were actually addressing different 
issues. The Basle Committee was addressing market risk for bank portfolios, while the 
EU was addressing market risk for securities firms. Nevertheless, despite the fact that 
they were contemplating a building block methodology, the Basle Committee did not 
endorse the CAD draft or its timing. In fact, the Committee did not release market risk 
guidelines136 until 1993.137
After the Geneva meeting, the EU understood the impediments to its goal of 
setting a collective international regulatory standard. The SEC would oppose its capital 
preferences in IOSCO. The Basle Committee had been assured by EU representatives 
that the CAD and ISD were not “carved in stone” and were “still subject to 
modification.”138 It contemplated a more leisurely timetable, with different objectives, 
and constituents, than that of the EU. The EU, facing an unfriendly IOSCO and muted 
Basle Committee support, decided to set its own capital adequacy precedent.
The COB’s Saint-Geours urged the EU to move rapidly: “the United States 
would like to influence what is happening in Europe. I would like us to complete our 
[directives] before starting negotiations aimed at coordination with the United States.” If
134 ISRR, "Revised Draft Capital Rules Reflect Technical Changes,” February 25, 1992.
135 A subject not covered in the 1988 Capital Accord.
136 And then, only for consultation.
137 The Basle Committee’s 1993 proposed guidelines were never officially adopted. They were superseded 
in 1995 by the Basle Committee’s endorsement o f bank’s internal “Value at Risk” models. See Appendix 
B for a complete history.
138 Confidential interviews, New York, January 2001.
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discussions in Europe on the CAD remained stalemated, Saint-Geours said, “Perhaps we 
will accept that the rules are not the same in the United States and Europe.”139
Additional Incentives to Finalise the Directives
In addition to the Geneva meetings, several developments encouraged completion 
of the CAD and ISD. First, successful adoption of SEM directives was positively linked 
to political support for greater European integration and adoption of the Maastricht 
Treaty.140 Second, simmering competition between Germany and the UK over the 
location of the European central bank dominated the finance ministers’ agendas, 
hindering them from focusing on resolution of the CAD and ISD negotiations. Third, 
negotiations continued to be pressured by the 1992 deadline. Finally, the Geneva 
meeting convinced EU negotiators that they needed to respond to the SEC’s regulatory 
aggressiveness. These events highlighted constraints to the EU’s international regulatory 
authority and encouraged EU negotiators to finalise the directives.
Conclusions
The contours of the EU’s authority were demonstrated in a number of ways. EU 
legislative principles and treaties established a supranational basis for EU authority, 
distinct from national authority, and created principles for the development of EU 
regulations and directives. But, while these principles facilitated working relationships 
with member-states and with multilateral and non-state actors, they also demonstrated 
the inability of the EU to achieve its early legislative objectives. In response, the SEA 
and QMV were adopted; they were designed to moderate national autonomy, but 
ironically they reinforced it by politicising decision-making and promoting regulatory 
compromises that retained national preferences. Politicisation of decision-making
139 ISRR, "Differences on Equity, Technical Details Suggest Long Wait for Global Capital Rules,” 11 
February 1992.
140 The Maastricht Treaty (the “Treaty on European Union”), signed in February 1992, dominated 
European newspaper headlines and ministers’ in-boxes during 1991/92. It was an extension o f the SEA 
and SEM as well as the original Treaty o f Rome; setting out a comprehensive approach to stronger 
European integration and laying the foundation for economic and monetary union. Opposition to the 
Treaty was surprisingly strong, resulting in domestic referenda in Denmark (June 1992, rejected, May 
1993, accepted), France (September 1992, accepted) and Ireland (September 1992, accepted). The UK 
opted out o f the Treaty’s Social Charter and monetary union provisions.
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diminished the EU’s ability to assert its regulatory authority and influence in opposition 
to member-states.
In the case studies, EU regulatory principles did not promote the effective 
regulatory convergence they were designed to achieve. The reciprocity debate 
highlighted the interaction of supranational, national and subnational levels of influence. 
It also demonstrated the influence of national economic structure on policy formation. 
The energy and persistence of EU negotiators helped drive the negotiations forward. 
Policy outcomes were, however, determined by state preferences. The limitations of the 
EU’s authority were also apparent in its efforts to avoid regulatory marginalisation by 
establishing international precedents, and in its interaction with IOSCO and the Basle 
Committee. The legislative principles of the EU, the agenda-setting and negotiating roles 
of the Commission, and the balancing of EU supranational objectives with those of other 
supranational and national agencies, all shaped the structure of the CAD and ISD. 
However, EU authority was dependant on the authority, preferences, and concurrence of 
member-states, particularly as expressed through the Council and Parliament. This was 
evident in the EU bureaucracy’s bias toward UK/Euromarket regulatory preferences, in 
the EU’s thwarted precedent-setting ambitions, in the emphasis on compromise in EU 
regulatory principles and negotiations, and in the EU’s inability to promote its regulatory 
preferences internationally without Basle Committee support.
The next chapter addresses private actor authority in the CAD and ISD 
negotiations.
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Chapter 7
Private Sector Influence in the EU Negotiations
Introduction
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 identified sources of state and supranational authority and 
efforts to promote those regulatory preferences in the EU negotiations. This chapter 
assesses the role of sub-state actors and institutions in the negotiation of the CAD and 
ISD.
The role of sub-national networks and actors in lobbying and educational efforts 
associated with the CAD and ISD was significant, lending support to non-state centric 
hypotheses. As discussed previously, private sector networks actively educated policy­
makers, assisted in conflict resolution and enhanced the dissemination of relevant policy­
making information. These actors and institutions also promoted their own interests 
across levels of authority. Empirical evidence is anecdotal. While not unambiguous, it 
indicates influential connections between private lobbying, information dissemination 
and policy determination.
Examples of Private Sector Influence
The debate over reciprocity, discussed in Chapter 6, involved the EU 
Commission in an extended dialogue with US and EU private and public sector actors 
and institutions. The debate’s resolution demonstrated that private sector institutions 
wielded considerable influence. By exploiting their ties to the national and supranational 
public sector, private sector institutions and actors helped persuade the Commission to 
alter its original regulatory objectives.
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Additional examples of private sector influence are available. Private sector 
Euromarket actors actively promoted British/Euromarket regulatory preferences. In 
particular, US securities firms, in an effort to maintain the flexible capital rules operative 
in London-based markets, aggressively lobbied EU and member-state officials.1 These 
efforts demonstrated several characteristics: first that US firms were successful; second, 
that lobbying efforts were initiated predominantly by large multinational US and UK 
banks and securities firms; third, that these firms proactively asserted their interests and 
regulatory preferences directly to supranational as well as state institutions; and finally, 
that these characteristics confirm the influence of a globalising securities industry, as 
described in Chapter 2.
During 1990 and 1991, US banks and securities firms began to focus on the 
implications of the ISD and CAD for their European operations. Over 80 US- 
headquartered banks and securities firms were active in the EU. Their anxiety over the 
coordination and timing of banking and investment directives was similar to that 
expressed by a UK Commons Committee in 1989. In late February 1990, 18 US 
securities and banking firms issued a statement through the American Chamber of 
Commerce in London, expressing concern with delays in the ISD, particularly as the 
SBD had already been finalised.3 This statement was directed at both the EU 
Commission and member-state regulators. It urged that financial services directives be 
adopted simultaneously and that capital adequacy requirements for banks and securities 
firms be harmonised.4 The Chamber’s statement followed a private letter to Leon Brittan 
written by four leading US securities firms operating in London.5 That letter reiterated 
concerns previously expressed by British private sector officials that adoption o f the 
CAD, as proposed in the most recent, fourth, draft, “could lead to a relocation of 
substantial [securities] activities to non-EC centres, with resulting loss of market
1 Confidential interviews, London, May 2000 and February 2001.
2 See Chapter 6.
3 David Lascelles, "US Groups Seek Air Treatment from EC," Financial Times, 21 February 1990.
4 More specifically, that regulations for the securities operations o f  commercial banks be harmonised with 
securities firms. US banks operating outside the US were permitted to establish securities subsidiaries, 
pursuant to Reg. K, and operated in virtually all respects like stand-alone securities firms. Consequently, 
US commercial banks in Europe operated similarly to German universal banks although banking and 
investment activities were legally separated. US securities firms such as Merrill Lynch or Goldman Sachs 
operated outside the US as they did in the US market -  as securities firms. They did not extend their 
activities materially into banking with the exception being certain limited bridge financings.
5 The firms were Merrill Lynch & Co., Morgan Stanley & Co., Salomon Brothers Inc., and Shearson 
Lehman Brothers, Inc.
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liquidity, returns and employment.”6 The potential migration of a substantial element of 
London’s Euromarket infrastructure and staff to a continental non-EU city represented an 
enormous economic and political threat to Britain and the EU.
Lobbying was not restricted to US firms. The City, traditionally short-sighted, 
had paid little attention to the SEM when it was announced, concluding that its impact 
was in the distant future. However, public debate over directives, combined with 
impending UK general elections and Single Market deadlines, galvanised private sector 
interest. In discussions with EU officials, it became evident to City executives that EU 
representatives were unaware of the potential regulatory implications of recent market 
developments. Hedging and capital management technologies had advanced dramatically 
during the 1980s, coincident with the growth of futures, options and related derivatives 
markets. These developments facilitated more sophisticated capital management 
modalities, particularly for the larger US and UK securities firms active in these markets. 
British SROs had responded to these developments in their regulatory regimes, but 
“financial engineering,”7 beyond basic hedging techniques, was not yet widely addressed 
by other member-states’ domestic regulatory regimes. As a result, UK and US private 
sector financial institutions active in London’s markets began to take on the role of 
educator and advocate, a role they considered critical to the successful development of 
the CAD and ISD.
As the 1992 Single Market deadline approached and negotiations intensified, the 
Euromarket private sector focused more closely on the ISD and CAD’s potential impact 
on their institutions. Mutual interests prompted these discussions. Private sector actors 
were concerned that flexible UK/Euromarket capital rules be preserved, and public 
sector actors were concerned that the directives accurately reflect market practices and 
regulators’ objectives. During 1991, the UK Treasury, DG XV and the Commission’s 
Financial Services cabinet each consulted with private sector representatives from 
London’s markets. To enhance their lobbying, several US and UK firms began pro­
actively to advise the EU Commission and DG XV. Consultation took place primarily
Q
via an informal private “think-tank,” with whom Leon Brittan’s cabinet consulted
6 Richard Waters, "US Houses Condemn EC Directive," Financial Times, 6 March 1990.
7 “Financial engineering” refers generally to techniques, using predominantly the derivatives, futures and 
options markets, to manage financial risk.
8 Assembled by the Commission and composed o f prominent private sector London bankers and attorneys.
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frequently on the implications, potential structure and proposed language of the CAD 
and ISD. These discussions began as seminars, conducted by Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs, among others, to educate UK and EU officials on recent market and 
product developments, particularly the implications of derivative and related hedging 
products for regulatory capital.9 As these relationships deepened, EU negotiators 
consulted with these same bankers on specific language associated with CAD and ISD 
drafts.10
Lobbying by the City
In the run-up to the 1992 UK General Election, Labour’s plans for financial 
services reform and promotion of London’s markets attracted the attention and support 
of senior private sector financial figures. Maijorie Mowlam, a member of Labour’s 
shadow cabinet, lobbied hard to convince bankers that her party’s traditional social 
reformist agenda did not extend to City institutions. Senior bankers responded positively, 
counselling Labour MPs on market and regulatory developments.11 In contrast, the 
Tories missed an opportunity to develop City support, by only passively addressing City 
bankers’ regulatory concerns. Several interviewees commented on the Conservative 
party’s incomplete understanding of recent capital market developments and their 
connection to the City’s continued viability. This situation stimulated further private 
sector efforts12 to educate Labour MPs, who were more supportive of the City and its 
capitalisation preferences. They were also considered strong candidates to replace Tory 
MPs in the 1992 General Election.
The European Round Table
Confidential interviews indicate that in 1991 and 1992 non-state, non-SRO actors 
began to participate actively in shaping the CAD and ISD. This was done through private 
seminars, publicly released reports and direct lobbying. The impetus for their 
involvement came from two sources: the solicitation by EU and domestic officials of 
their views on technical issues, and heightened focus by the private sector on the
9Other firms undoubtedly lobbied EU Commission and UK regulatory officials, however, these two firms 
were specifically mentioned in confidential interviews.
10 Confidential interviews, London, April/May, 2000.
11 Confidential interviews, London, April/May, 2000
12 These efforts were mainly in the form o f private seminars and individual presentations made to 
politicians by investment and commercial bankers.
208
directives’ potential impact on their business interests. This was not the first instance, 
however, of private sector participation.
The European Round Table (“ERT”) demonstrates the involvement of the private
sector in EU policy formation. The ERT’s genesis has been traced to discussions in 1982
1 ^between EU Industry Commissioner Etienne Davignon and Volvo CEO Pehr 
Gyllenhammar. These conversations came about in response to private/public concern 
with stagnant EU growth and persistent European economic “malaise.”14 Gyllenhammar 
assembled a diverse group of European industrialists,15 representing progressive 
commercial views and domestic political influence, with the objective of providing EU 
representatives with independent advice on European regional initiatives and industrial 
development.16
The group’s membership included a range of EU corporate executives, but 
French representation was stronger than that of other European states. Gyllenhammar’s 
project enjoyed the active participation of Davignon and Francois Xavier Ortoli, a 
prominent French political figure and former President of the European Commission. 
French ERT members also represented the largest national grouping within the 
organisation.17 The ERT met initially in Paris in 1983 and established its secretariat 
there. The group enjoyed special access to French officials, thanks to Gyllenhammar’s 
close professional relationship with Mitterrand and Jacques Attali. Further contributing 
to this close relationship were: French interest in Sweden’s socialist development model; 
the close correspondence of social and educational backgrounds between French ERT 
members and government ministers; and the physical location of ERT’s headquarters in 
Paris. French ERT members were aggressive younger representatives of French industry, 
schooled in competitive global business practices. They were also members of the
1RFrench Patronat. French ERT representatives were distinguished from their British 
counterparts by a French emphasis on the execution of concrete projects rather than the
13 The Sweden headquartered auto and aircraft manufacturer.
14 "Alas, Poor Europe," Economist 1982.
15 Initially called the “Gyllenhammar Group.”
16 This section adapted from: Maria Green Cowles, "Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: The ERT and 
EC 1992," Journal o f  Common Market Studies 33, no. 4 (1995).
17 Roger Fauroux o f Saint Gobain, Olivier Lecerf o f Lafarge Coppee and Antoine Riboud o f BSN.
18 The Patronat, an informal group o f Presidents and Chief Executive Officers o f major French companies, 
reflected industry views to government on a range o f topics. H. Weber, Le Parti Des Patrons: Le CNPF, 
1946-1990 (Paris: Seuil, 1986).
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simple lobbying of EU politicians. As a result, the ERT enjoyed unique access to the 
highest echelons of French industry and government, and it was in turn influenced by 
French emphasis on the concrete execution of projects.
The importance of the ERT’s close relationship with EU and national government 
officials in encouraging the adoption of the 1992 objectives is described by Green 
Cowles.19 She identifies ERT influence in the shift in Mitterrand’s policy preferences 
away from nationalisation and toward greater regional cooperation. She argues that this 
shift came about largely as a result of Mitterrand’s 1983 economic decision to remain in 
the ERM.20 ERT members were also responsible for persuading Mitterrand that 
nationalised French industries could not compete on a global basis unless they
•y i
established stronger regional research, development and capital relationships. The 
ERT’s successful promotion of several regional commercial enterprises, including 
Airbus22 and Ariane,23 further encouraged the shift in Mitterrand’s own thinking. This 
was seen in September 1983 in domestic industrial initiatives that encouraged greater 
regional cooperation.24 Despite its strong start, however, Mitterrand’s project stalled 
because it was seen as a French, not an EU, initiative.25
The ERT rescued Mitterrand’s initiative with the publication of the “Dekker 
Plan” in January 1985. This plan was authored by Wisse Decker, who was CEO of 
Philips26 and a member of the ERT. Dekker’s proposal, presented to an audience of 
private sector and EU officials, outlined “a simple plan for a unified market.” His 
proposal transformed Mitterrand’s initiative into a European initiative. Just three days 
later, Jacques Delors spoke before the EU Parliament and completed the transformation 
by outlining SEM objectives that contained virtually the same proposal. Delors, formerly
19 Green Cowles, "Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: The ERT and EC 1992.”
20 Moravcsik also argues persuasively that Mitterrand’s ‘turn toward Europe’ began with his 1983-84 
rejection o f the “Riboud Plan,” which urged removing France from the ERM. Mitterrand was persuaded by 
then Minister of Finance Jacques Delors to remain in the ERM and avoid devaluation o f the French franc 
and the widespread unemployment that would ensue. See: Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European 
Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community.”
21 Green Cowles, "Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: The ERT and EC 1992.”
22 For joint European aircraft development.
23 For joint European spacecraft development.
24 When France assumed the Presidency o f the European Council in January 1984, Mitterrand launched a 
complementary regional initiative. Outstanding issues included the Common Agricultural Policy, proposed 
changes in the Structural Funds, enlargement issues and the EU budget.
25 It was also accused o f lacking an overall strategy.
26 The multinational Dutch electronics and household goods company.
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the head of the French Treasury, was the new president of the EU Commission and 
became the spokesman for EU, as opposed to French, regionalisation. The ERT remained 
active in the promotion of EU initiatives, pressing for the adoption of the SEA in 1985 
and the implementation of the 1992 Single Market directives.
These events confirm several important observations regarding the relationship of 
the private sector with EU regional initiatives: first, that the private sector supported 
regionalisation; second, that they participated in regional development; and finally, that 
private sector endorsement of regional harmonisation facilitated EU regionalisation 
initiatives.
The Patronat
The involvement of French industry in the evolution of the CAD and ISD was 
evident in the resolution of British and French disagreements over concentration. The 
close relationship of French industry and government officials facilitated the inclusion of 
commercial interests in regulatory negotiations. The government’s primary focus was, 
however, to protect and promote existing domestic market and institutional regulatory 
procedures, and, at least anecdotally, it was insensitive to contrary private sector 
preferences. In explaining the rationale behind the limited French concessions on the 
ISD, a private sector participant made reference to a confidential meeting between the 
Patronat, the French Tresor and the COB in 1992.27 Speaking at a meeting called by the 
Tresor to solicit industry support for the government’s ISD concentration position, the 
Chairman of ELF, the French multinational oil company, bluntly stated that he would 
only endorse the Tresor’s position when French domestic markets could demonstrate the 
same level of liquidity, depth and pricing as existed on London-based exchanges such as 
SEAQ-I. Absent that demonstration, he urged the government to change its position. A 
compromise on the ISD was reached soon afterwards.
Barclays and the Tresor
Barclays Bank, a private UK clearing bank, exploited EU directives in order to 
promote a new product in France that conflicted with traditional French banking 
practices. France was unable to block Barclays from doing this, although it was
27 Confidential interview, London, February 2001.
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ultimately the use of a domestic French regulation, not EU directives, that compelled a 
change in French banking practices,.
The French Tresor had historically supported a business understanding, which 
was maintained by the Association of French Banks, that covered the pricing of French 
domestic retail banking services. The arrangement stipulated that Association members 
would not charge for basic banking services. In exchange, the Tresor discouraged the 
introduction of domestic interest-bearing current accounts. In 1992 Barclays, citing the 
SBD’s single passport provision, introduced interest-bearing checking accounts in 
France, which provoked French Finance Minister Michel Sapin to intercede. When 
Barclays protested Sapin’s intercession to the EU, the Tresor defended itself by invoking 
another provision of the SBD known as the “monetary policy escape clause.”30 Barclays
i
ultimately prevailed by exploiting a loophole in French domestic banking regulation.
The episode demonstrated three aspects of authority and influence in EU policy- 
formation: first, member-states’ willingness to ignore EU regulatory objectives (e.g., 
mutual recognition or home country control) if they conflicted with domestic or 
commercial priorities; second, the ability of sub-national actors to exploit supranational 
EU directives and institutions to their commercial advantage and, as a result, to change 
domestic practices; and, third, the prevalence of Commission-initiated directive “escape 
clauses” designed to placate national interests and to promote closure on disputes.
28 Such as cheque processing.
29 The Tresor endorsed the arrangement to facilitate banks’ subsidy o f services for small account-holders.
30 Art. 14.2 o f the SBD, which says, in part, “Without prejudice to the measures necessary for the 
reinforcement o f the European Monetary System, host Member States shall retain complete responsibility 
for the measures resulting from the implementation o f  their monetary policies. Such measures may not 
provide for discriminatory or restrictive treatment based on the fact that a credit institution is authorised in 
another Member State.” The Tresor argued that interest-bearing accounts would interfere with domestic 
liquidity flows and monetary policy. Their argument was weak, since the clause could be used to hinder 
virtually any financial innovation.
31 See: Benn Steil, Illusions o f  Liberalisation: Securities Regulation in Japan and the EC  (London: Royal 
Institute o f International Affairs, 1995).
32 “Art. 15.5 of the ISD, the ‘new market’ exception to the single passport for trading systems, is perhaps 
the most obvious and significant escape clause in the Directive.” See: Benn Steil, "Equity Trading IV: The 
ISD and the Regulation o f European Market Structure," in The European Equity Markets, ed. Benn Steil, 
et. al. (London: European Capital Markets Institute, 1996).
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The SIMs law
Another example of private sector influence in EU regulatory debates came in the 
form of complaints about non-compliance with provisions of the Treaty of Rome and the 
evolving ISD.
Italian securities deregulation in 1989 and 1990 eliminated several categories of 
financial intermediaries, replacing them with Societa de Intermediazione Mobiliare 
(“SIM”). Only SIMs were authorised to transact securities business in Italy. To qualify as 
a SIM a company had to be incorporated in Italy. This requirement appeared to 
contravene the Treaty of Rome and ISD single passport provisions.33 In response to the 
SIMs law, and in anticipation of the Single Market, several international securities firms 
went to the expense of setting up locally incorporated securities subsidiaries in Milan.34 
Other international firms, principally US and UK firms, complained directly to DG XV 
and the UK Treasury about the Italian law.35 In response, the UK filed a formal 
complaint with the Commission in September 1991. Following further lobbying by 
securities firms after Italy ignored the initial complaint, the Commission filed an “Article 
169 letter” with the ECJ in October 1992,36 threatening legal action against Italy.37
Private sector participation in the SIMs dispute was comprehensive. DG XV 
consulted actively with private firm representatives on specific aspects of their 
negotiations with Italian regulators and even solicited comments on drafts of their Article 
169 letter.38 The fact that private sector protests were made to both DG XV and the UK 
Treasury confirms the close association of US and UK London-based private institutions 
with these public institutions in the evolution of regional regulation -  and the leveraging 
effect this association had on both parties’ influence.
TheAIBD
33 Brian Scott-Quinn, "EC Securities Markets Regulations," in International Financial Market Regulation, 
ed. Benn Steil (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1994).
34 Including the US firms Salomon Brothers and Goldman Sachs.
35 Richard Bacon, "EC Finance Rules Face Fresh Obstacles," Euromoney, May 1993. and confidential 
interviews, London, February 2001.
36 Article 169 o f the Treaty o f Rome provides for the EU’s Internal Market Financial Services Commission 
to deliver a “reasoned opinion” warning a member-state o f potential legal action if  it fails to comply with 
an explicit Commission request.
37 In June 1996, the ECJ declared the SIMs law illegal, five years after it was originally adopted.
38 Confidential interviews, London, February 2001.
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In mid-1991, the Association of International Bond Dealers (“AIBD”), a private 
London-based Eurobond SRO, attacked French concentration and transparency 
amendment proposals. The AIBD, in a letter to its members, noted that French proposals 
were “contrary to the interests of the international securities markets” and “conflict 
directly with the international self-regulatory nature of the market.”39 The letter noted 
that supranational Eurobond markets would not qualify as “regulated markets” because 
they did not specify formal listing requirements. The AIBD also noted their concern that 
the EU had not adequately analysed the potential market impact of their directives nor 
had they consulted adequately with affected groups like the AIBD. The AIBD letter 
carried the “general support” of the EU Commission and unspecified member-states. The 
AIBD urged its members to lobby their national representatives on behalf of the EU, 
confirming an observation of MLG theorists. Driving its point home, the AIBD 
cautioned its membership: “in the current political climate, there can be no guarantee of 
success in [our] arguments. The proposing countries apparently remain unchanged in 
their view.”40
AIBD views reflected the opinions of sub-national Euromarket actors. Financial 
firms active in the Euromarkets, including most EU financial firms, benefited from 
Euromarket trading and from regulatory norms established and monitored by the AIBD. 
The AIBD letter highlighted regulatory tension between market participants and national 
regulatory institutions. Member-state officials negotiated to protect domestic institutional 
norms while, simultaneously, domestic private sector institutions benefited from 
Euromarket developments and regulatory regimes that conflicted with domestic norms. 
The AIBD acted similarly to UK SROs (see below) and multinational investment banks, 
educating national and supranational regulators on market preferences and 
developments. As national negotiators became more aware of market developments and 
private sector regulatory preferences, through letters like the AIBD’s, information 
dissemination was enhanced, shaping the form of policy ultimately adopted.
Lobbying by UK SROs
UK SROs were also active in promoting the views of their private sector 
members on regulatory matters. Their lobbying focused principally on domestic
39 ISRR, "EC Sets up High Level Working Group to Boost Investment Services Directive,” 11 March 
1991.
40 Ibid.
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institutions and technical issues but extended to supranational institutions and broader 
questions. In 1990, draft CAD language on position risk41 raised private sector UK 
concerns. In the UK, regulations developed by SROs allowed investment firms to net 
portfolio positions in calculating capital. UK market complaints arose over the draft’s 
different methodology for determining required capital. Both the TSA and FIMBRA 
began aggressive lobbying to amend the draft. Discussions also took place between 
private sector representatives and EU Commission officials, including representatives of 
DG XV, the Economic Secretary’s office of the Treasury, and the SIB.42
The TSA’s concerns focused on the Commission’s inexperience with 
sophisticated, risk-based capital adequacy systems, such as those used by UK 
institutions. The majority of their experience had been with credit-based systems 
prevalent among continental Europe’s universal banks. In particular, TSA rules on 
capital adequacy permitted UK institutions to net long and short securities inventory 
positions, potentially reducing required capital significantly. A large position in 
securities might not require a capital allocation if it could be demonstrated that the 
position was hedged by an offsetting position. The draft capital adequacy directive did 
not permit netting for equity securities.
The TSA was also concerned with the draft’s language on portfolio 
diversification. TSA rules reflected their view that diversified securities portfolios were 
less risky than concentrated portfolios. The EU’s CAD draft did not consider 
diversification in determining required capital.
FIMBRA’s concerns centred on the draft’s required minimum capital level for 
financial intermediaries of ECU50,000. The UK financial services market included many 
small financial advisory firms. In continental Europe fewer, and significantly larger, 
firms dominated domestic markets. The high initial capital requirements of the CAD 
draft threatened to force small UK intermediaries into liquidation or into merger with 
larger firms.
41 The risk of holding securities in inventory.
42 Confidential interviews, London, February 2001.
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TSA and FIMBRA argued that the draft CAD language threatened UK domestic 
market business practices and, potentially, the long-term attractiveness of London as a 
wholesale financial centre. Estimates ranged broadly, but the overall effect of the 
proposed language was to dramatically increase the capital required to maintain 
securities inventories and, as a result, operating costs, particularly in the London market.
The SROs’ lobbying was apparently effective, as the sixth and final draft of the 
CAD responded to TSA concerns. The final draft introduced the securities trading book 
concept as a compromise between universal banks’ and securities firms’ capital 
methodologies. But British SROs remained concerned that the directive would change 
again when it reached the Council43 and they continued to follow negotiations closely, 
also pressing FIMBRA’s as-yet-unaddressed objections.44 Underlining Commission 
sensitivity to domestic reception of its proposals, Leon Brittan commented about the 
draft, “the objective is to allow banks and non-banks to carry on with their activities,” 
rather than to force changes to domestic securities practices.45
The Coopers & Lybrand Report6
The promotion of sub-national preferences was further facilitated by a report 
commissioned by IPMA,47 another Euromarket SRO. In May 1992, IPMA asked 
Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte,48 to investigate what the impact of draft CAD and ISD 
proposals would have been on the capitalisation requirements of seven major Eurobond 
firms, based on their underwriting positions over the 12 months preceding March 1992. 
The report concluded that implementation of the directives, as then proposed, would 
probably have resulted in “a substantial part of the Euro capital market leaving 
Europe.”49
43 See Appendix B for discussion o f EU regulatory review and approval procedures.
44 ISRR, "EC-Adopted Capital Adequacy Rule Gets Low-Key UK Approval.”
45 Ibid.
46 See also discussion o f remarks by David Barnard and Norton Rose regarding early ISD drafts in Chapter 
5 for further examples o f private sector influence.
47 International Primary Markets Association. See: Filipovic, Governments, Banks and Global Capital: 
Securities Markets in Global Politics., p. 130ff.
48 A major international accounting and consulting firm.
49 “If the Euromarket is in effect priced out o f the European Community by excessive capital requirements, 
the overall interests o f the Community will have been changed.” See: International Financial Review, 
"International Capital Markets,” (London: IFR, 1992).
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The report’s blunt language intensified private lobbying efforts by London 
bankers against draft language in the CAD and ISD. The report’s release was timed to 
coincide with an ECOFIN meeting in May to discuss the CAD.
The report pointedly noted that the EU had poorly researched the CAD.50 As an 
example, the report indicated that neither the UK nor Germany’s domestic capital 
regulations required capital allocations against “no risk” underwriting positions. The 
CAD did not endorse this view. Further, the UK SFA’s51 endorsement of sophisticated 
hedging techniques in calculating capital contrasted with the CAD’s simple, sliding time 
scale methodology.52 These observations indicate a limited role for policy network and 
sub-national actor influence in the early evolution of the CAD and ISD.
Simultaneous with the release of the Coopers & Lybrand report, Geoffrey 
Fitchew, Director General of DG XV, announced a significant breakthrough on the 
CAD. Member-states that had insisted on tough restrictions on underwriting positions 
were now prepared to accept more relaxed guidelines. This change represented 
movement on one of the CAD’s most contentious issues and one of the major concerns 
of financial institutions engaged in securities underwriting. The new draft amended 
controversial language that prohibited firms from taking single underwriting positions in 
excess of 25 percent of their capital and replaced it with graduated capital requirements. 
This permitted continuation of a risky though profitable industry practice of “bought 
deals” whereby firms individually underwrote entire securities offerings rather than 
utilising a group of firms in a joint underwriting.54 The practice was dramatic and 
popular with large, well-capitalised, particularly US, securities firms, the same group that 
was aggressively courting negotiators.
The report demonstrated the effectiveness of private sector lobbying in specific 
areas, particularly where the private sector had specialised expertise. The early absence 
of sophisticated capital management techniques in CAD drafts reflected both the EU’s 
failure to consult with the private sector and its poor understanding of contemporary
50 The AIBD made a similar observation in its report.
51 See Glossary. The SFA succeeded the SIB, the UK’s securities regulator.
52 The CAD’s capital formulation was based on time elapsed since an underwriting commitment was made, 
and it ignored hedging.
53 Simon London, "IPMA Urges EC to Revise Proposals for New Rules," Financial Times, 13 May 1992.
54 David Owen and Richard Waters, "EC Poised to Rule on Capital," Financial Times, 18 May 1992.
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capital management. During confidential interviews, representatives from DG XV and 
the EU Commission indicated that they favoured British regulatory standards.55 
Nevertheless, early drafts of the CAD and ISD did not reflect a British regulatory bias. 
The slow evolution of the CAD to a more “Euromarket/British” structure reflects the 
impact of British and US seminars and lobbying devices such as the Coopers & Lybrand 
report. Once representatives from international securities firms and consultancies 
educated supranational negotiators on current techniques and the consequences of 
proposed directive language on current business practices, their efforts resulted in 
subsequent drafts incorporating more sophisticated Euromarket practices endorsed by 
British regulators and City bankers.56 Private sector lobbying was critical in shaping the 
final form of the directives.
US and UK Firms Dominate Lobbying
Although private sector lobbying came predominantly from British and American 
firms, lobbying from France and Germany indicated that private sector regulatory 
preferences were not uniformly held. The Coopers & Lybrand report, as well as the 
earlier AIBD report and the SIMs controversy, were reflective of the preferences of a 
cross-section of financial services firms operating in London markets. Nevertheless, the 
larger EU financial services private sector did not uniformly back London’s preferences. 
Domestic negotiators from France and Germany, arguing for regulation at odds with 
London’s regulatory regime, reflected their national and domestic private sector 
preferences, which sought to insulate domestic regulatory or institutional/economic 
structures. This diversity of national preferences reflected differences in the structure, 
capabilities and histories of financial institutions operating in the Euromarkets.
Experiential and cultural advantages contributed to the predominance of British 
and American firms in lobbying.58 British firms had a long-standing tradition of 
consultation with the Bank and other regulatory authorities, which facilitated their 
promotion of domestic regulatory preferences. American firms also had a well-
55 Specifically, they “gave greater weight” to British opinions.
56 Confidential interviews, London, February 2001.
57 As described in Chapter 4.
58 US and UK firms more aggressively sought to develop new products and markets than firms from other 
countries largely because they came from home markets that stressed market competition.
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established domestic tradition of lobbying government and state regulators on matters of 
interest to their industry or firms. In addition, big American securities firms dedicated 
more of their human and capital resources to lobbying than other firms did. Significantly, 
US securities firms, together with a handful of British, Swiss, and Japanese firms, 
operated as true multinationals, dominating global markets. They stood to benefit the 
most from regulatory liberalisation. Finally, the American houses, in addition to being 
the largest firms, were also the most comfortable with the financial engineering involved 
in sophisticated capital management.
French and German firms, while dominant in home markets, could not match US 
or British securities firms in market expertise or leadership. French banks59 were 
involved in international investment banking, but on a smaller scale than US and UK 
firms. They were also strategically statist and uncomfortable with certain risks associated 
with regulatory liberalisation. German banks, which were traditionally lenders and 
government partners, had little experience in multinational securities markets, expertise 
they only gained through the acquisition of UK merchant banks.60 Swiss banks UBS61 
and Credit Suisse followed the German model, developing securities expertise through 
the acquisition of UK merchant bank E.M. Warburg and the US securities firms White 
Weld and First Boston, respectively.
Based on earlier discussion of the influential roles of the ERT and Patronat, it is 
surprising that French private institutions were not more successful in lobbying. In 
addition to the constraining influence of dirigisme and nationalisation, French financial 
firms were smaller, less sophisticated and less significant in international markets than 
their US and UK peers. Additionally, early lobbying by French banks was directed 
predominantly at French government actors rather than at the EU. The US and UK
59 Particularly Banque Nationale de Paris, Credit Commercial de France, Indo-Suez and Societe Generale.
60 Deutsche Bank acquired Morgan Grenfell in 1989. Dresdner Bank acquired Kleinwort Benson shortly 
afterward.
61 Union Bank of Switzerland.
62 Both Swiss firms (the “third” big Swiss bank, Swiss Banking Corporation, was eventually merged with 
UBS) rapidly developed securities expertise, faster than their French and German counterparts, and 
promoted Euromarket regulatory norms. Credit Suisse became a peer o f major US firms when it acquired 
the well-established “bulge bracket” US firm First Boston, with whom it shared ownership o f Euromarket 
pacesetter Credit Suisse First Boston during the 1980s and 1990s.
63 “Smaller” refers to their capital markets expertise. Certain French banks were among the largest in the 
world.
219
established inroads earlier into DG XV and the Commission.64 Finally, French domestic 
securities regulation was not internationally endorsed, as was UK regulation. It is highly 
likely, based on the Patronat’s comments to the Tresor, that nationalised French banks 
did not press their government’s regulatory arguments aggressively with the EU or their 
private sector peers.
Private Sector Lobbying Increases
The British position on capitalisation reflected aggressive lobbying over the 
language of the CAD by the UK Treasury and London representatives of private sector 
Euromarket institutions. Both were concerned with continued attempts by German 
negotiators to promote tough capital rules for securities firms based on those applicable 
to universal banks.65Early in June 1992 British negotiators, fearing that the Portuguese 
Council President might push for an unsatisfactory political resolution as his term ended, 
tried to slow a quick resolution of the outstanding disagreements on the directives.66 The 
negotiators’ position was supported by British lobbyists, who shared their desire that any 
final resolution of the CAD and ISD debates should come during the UK’s EU 
Presidency, which would follow Portugal’s. EU officials tried to reassure British 
negotiators that they would not do anything to drive markets offshore or to jeopardise 
London’s market position.
The influence of UK and private sector lobbying was confirmed in resolutions to 
several outstanding technical CAD issues reflected in the final draft. Tier Three 
(subordinated debt) capital was permitted up to 250 percent of core equity capital. No 
fixed upper limit on underwriting positions over 25 percent of a firm’s capital was 
established. Instead, a 10-day underwriting window was allowed during which normal 
capital limits would not apply. In a further “win” for British negotiators, "repo" and share 
borrowing arrangements were made subject to flexible CAD guidelines rather than to 
tougher bank guidelines. London bankers had opposed the proposed guidelines because 
they would have constrained liquidity, raised costs and damaged profitability.
64 This was facilitated by the Commission and DG XV’s preference for British regulatory norms.
65 "Status o f City Preserved," The Daily Telegraph, 8 June 1992.
66 Owen, "UK Plays Down Capital Adequacy Hopes.”
67 Confidential interviews, London, April 28, 2000 and May 8, 2000.
68 Repo and other share borrowing arrangements were critical to funding the operations o f financial 
institutions.
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Commissioner Brittan noted of the final draft, “I have been well aware of the concern 
expressed by some in the City of London and also in other financial centres in the 
Community about the potential pitfalls in this area. I’m glad that agreement has now 
been reached on a set of proposals which in no way prevent the continuation of present 
trading activity in the Community or anywhere else.”69
The London private sector’s success in influencing the final language of the CAD 
was not, however, unequivocal. A recommendation from the British Bankers Association 
that CAD discussions be tied to the Basle/IOSCO negotiations was ignored by EU and 
British negotiators. EU Ministers negotiating the CAD wanted to move ahead rapidly 
given the impending Single Market deadline, and any attempt to coordinate with Basle or 
IOSCO would delay development of a harmonised capital standard. As well, over the 
summer of 1992, ministers’ attention shifted to debates over the Maastricht Treaty.
Despite agreements, private, technical concerns with the CAD persisted. 
Securities firms had successfully lobbied to end limits on underwriting positions but, on 
closer scrutiny, they were dismayed by the compromise resolution.70 It frequently took 
underwriters longer than 10 days to distribute securities positions. More critically, a 
change in market conditions could affect liquidity and profitability, especially if a firm 
was forced to unwind its position simply to meet a 10-day limitation.
Multinational, principally American, securities firms also protested the necessity 
of increasing their capital bases to accommodate large underwriting positions. They 
argued that the compromise language advantaged institutions with immediate access to 
large capital resources such as universal banks and securities firms affiliated with banks. 
The chief financial officer of a leading US securities firm, commenting on the latest
71CAD revisions, noted, “It smells of a European universal bank conspiracy.” But despite 
complaints, the position of securities firms had improved dramatically from the situation 
reviewed by Coopers & Lybrand several weeks earlier.
69 London, Rawsthom, and Hill, "Muted Cheers for the Single Market: Attempts to Unify European 
Securities.”
70 Review, "International Capital Markets.”
71 Ibid.
221
Private Interests and Harmonisation
As mentioned, information provided by private market participants may have 
hindered international harmonisation. In the instances cited, information provided by 
private actors or institutions, even institutions with a national focus, generally supported 
London’s regulatory objectives. However, policy communities had national as well as 
regional perspectives. Domestic French and German policy communities and regulators
77such as the COB, the Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs, La Societe des Bourses 
Frangaises73 or the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wertpapierbdrsen74 may have 
supplied information to negotiators that supported parochial national regulatory 
objectives. Arguments made by Rudiger von Rosen of the German Federation in IOSCO 
negotiations endorse this view. It would be reasonable to conclude that these institutions 
provided information that promoted national distinctiveness rather than regional 
harmonisation. This conclusion is, however, contradicted by the advice provided by the 
French Patronat to national negotiators and by the support provided to the UK by 
Germany on the CAD.
Conclusions
Aggressive US and UK private sector promotion of UK/Euromarket regulatory 
values to state and EU officials demonstrates the contextual authority and influence of 
private actors and policy communities in information dissemination and advocacy. The 
roles of UK SROs, the ERT, the Patronat, the AIBD and the Coopers & Lybrand reports, 
and the reciprocity debate resolution support this view.
State and supranational officials’ awareness of the significance of market 
globalisation, while varied, was initially limited. As a result, they were receptive, 
especially in the UK and the EU, to private sector tutorials. Leon Brittan even created a 
private/public think-tank to address technical issues. As knowledge limitations were 
addressed, state and supranational officials became more cognisant of the Euromarket’s 
operating advantages. Non-UK state negotiators’ receptivity to compromises on the CAD 
and ISD was, in part, an indication of this development.
72 See Glossary, “CBV”.
73 See Glossary, “SBF”.
74 See Glossary.
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UK private and public sector objectives generally overlapped, which encouraged 
public/private consultation (this was also the case in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in 
France). These overlaps were not solely a function of private educational or lobbying 
efforts and they do not indicate whether state and private sector policy agreement 
preceded or succeeded private lobbying efforts. There is little evidence of private sector 
preferences being translated directly into policy. The reciprocity debate resolution is an 
exception. Capture is not demonstrated by public/private preference overlap. 
Consequently, state autonomy was preserved.
In the UK, the objective of preserving Euromarket regulatory standards 
confirmed the government’s reliance on City revenues as much as it reflected private 
lobbying. In Germany, both the private and the public sector prioritised the preservation 
of domestic operating relationships over regulatory evolution. In France, the Patronat’s 
influence was limited by statist interest in protecting nationalised industries. These 
observations qualify arguments for the migration of authority from the state to private or 
supranational actors and institutions. Private actors used their context-based authority to 
advise policy-makers. However, regulatory debates and language compromises were 
executed by member-states influenced by state and non-state factors.
Evidence has been presented that French and German private sector institutions 
promoted UK-style market preferences domestically, sometimes in opposition to 
positions argued in EU negotiations by their own governments.75 However, private actors 
did not always agree on regulatory preferences. While instances of private sector 
influence in France and Germany are noted, the evidence suggests that French and 
German negotiators were more concerned with encouraging the growth (and protection) 
of domestic markets than they were with opposition to a London-based regulatory 
regime. Private influence was present but had a specific, limited influence on negotiators.
These observations do not unequivocally demonstrate migration of authority 
away from the state. State policy preferences and negotiating positions were influenced 
by private actor lobbying and educational efforts. But, states retained the predominant
75 This is evident in the French Patronat’s comments and the German Finanzplatz Deutschland program. 
See Chapter 4.
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role in shaping the CAD and ISD. National governments’ fundamental regulatory 
preferences remained intact, despite lobbying, and states were able to preserve their 
decision-making autonomy. Early member-state and EU consultation with the private 
sector was limited. As negotiations intensified, the negotiators sought out private sector 
expertise in order to better understand the technical ramifications of policy options. 
These discussions clarified, but did not necessarily resolve, disagreements. The 
intensification of the discussions also demonstrated the desire of private sector actors to 
be involved in the negotiations, as they became more aware of the 1992 deadline and the 
potential impact of the directives. Their influence was based on their expertise and 
credibility in defining the consequences of proposed regulatory constructions and on 
their access to public authority. However, their advice did not resolve issues, the final 
language of the directives indicates that many disagreements were left unresolved.
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Chapter 8
The IOSCO Negotiations
Introduction
This chapter outlines the evolution and issues that defined capital adequacy 
negotiations under IOSCO’s auspices. Identifying the range of supranational, national 
and subnational factors shaping these negotiations is important for comparing and 
contrasting the different outcomes of the EU and IOSCO negotiations. It also permits 
identification of the sources of authority and influence in the negotiations. The overview 
in this chapter will focus primarily on intergovernmental relationships. Other 
relationships will be addressed in succeeding chapters.
Two distinctions between the EU and IOSCO negotiations are important to note. 
First, the historic factors that encouraged the EU’s 1992 initiative were not shared by all 
members of IOSCO, most importantly by the US. EU member-states had been 
incentivised, for political and economic reasons, to create the EEC. But IOSCO’s most 
significant member, the US, did not share important harmonisation motivations and 
objectives with IOSCO’s EU member-states.
A second important distinction is that US capital markets were “balanced”1 by 
the Euromarkets. Using a structural perspective, this predicts difficulty in identifying 
predominant or hegemonic states or actors. Nevertheless, the SEC and its Chairman, 
Richard Breeden, dominated the IOSCO negotiations.2 The reasons behind this 
dominance are located in IOSCO’s structural weakness, in EU members’ prioritising 
1992 objectives, in Breeden’s intransigent regulatory views, and in the support his views 
received domestically. These observations preliminarily locate regulatory authority with
1 “Balanced” refers to being matched in terms o f market size, depth and diversity.
2 Breeden’s tenure as SEC chairman began in 1989.
225
the SEC. However, as we are aware from examination of the CAD and ISD negotiations, 
authority may be organised on a multi-level basis or expressed through private actors or 
networks. Chapters 8, 9 and 10 explore these levels of analysis in the IOSCO 
negotiations.
This analysis will argue that IOSCO’s US and European members approached 
harmonisation negotiations from strikingly different, and largely incompatible, 
perspectives. EU member-states focused on expanding their regional harmonisation 
initiatives, while the US was focused on unilaterally exporting domestic regulatory 
norms. Additionally, both groups faced powerful domestic or regional incentives to 
protect regulatory precedents. Private actors and policy networks were surprisingly 
passive in the IOSCO negotiations. As a result, IOSCO’s capital adequacy negotiations 
evolved into a confrontation between EU and US regulatory preferences and finally 
resulted in stalemate -  but for more complex reasons than predicted by conventional 
state-centric paradigms.
Early IOSCO Negotiations
In 1987 and 1988 IOSCO began, through its Technical Committee’s working 
group apparatus, to develop policy recommendations for an international capital 
adequacy regulatory regime. Financial services globalisation and contemporary market 
crises stimulated early research. In addition, competition between the EU, Basle 
Committee and IOSCO to develop regulatory standards encouraged the creation of new 
regulatory institutions. These factors fit conventional institutional definitions of market 
failure recognition and responsive regime creation. However, IOSCO’s failure to foster 
international cooperation indicates that other factors may have influenced IOSCO’s 
regulatory development capacity, deliberations and international authority.
Initial Report on Capital Adequacy
In August 1989 IOSCO announced that, after two years of discussion, the 
Technical Committee would release a common approach for determining securities 
firms’ capital adequacy and an administrative mechanism for national regulators to 
exchange market information. The report, “Capital Adequacy Standards for Securities
3 Particularly in comparison with their assertiveness in the EU negotiations.
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Firms,”4 was accompanied by two further reports, one on standardization of 
multinational securities offerings and one on accounting and auditing harmonisation. The 
major report was developed by a working party, headed by LSE Chairman Jeffrey 
Knight, which included representatives from the twelve IOSCO members with the 
largest securities markets.5 IOSCO officials noted that the report’s objective was the 
establishment a common regulatory approach and that US and UK capital adequacy 
models had served as starting points. The report indicated agreement on the “need for a 
common conceptual framework” but little on specific details.6 Nevertheless, IOSCO’s 
membership viewed the announcement as significant, timed in part to ensure that IOSCO 
established its place in an increasingly crowded field, including the EU and the Basle 
Committee, devoted to developing international capital adequacy standards.7
However, difficulty in balancing disparate member interests was already 
apparent. At IOSCO’s September 1989 annual meeting, disagreement between British 
and German representatives over the Report was only resolved shortly before the 
meeting concluded. The Report’s framework for assessing capital adequacy was less 
than a formal policy statement. It urged that capital requirements be premised on a risk- 
based assessment of a firm’s asset portfolio rather than simply on the maintenance of 
high capital levels. German disagreement with the Report reflected differences between 
domestic German and British capital calculation methods. The Federation of German 
Stock Exchanges argued that IOSCO’s proposed risk-based capital standard would 
potentially permit smaller institutions, including non-banks, to operate on German 
exchanges using more lenient capital standards than applicable to universal banks. The 
same “level playing field” concern had surfaced at a BIS capital adequacy meeting the
o
previous week, where Germany abstained from supporting the BIS proposal, as well as 
in earlier EU CAD discussions.
At the annual meeting, a compromise was engineered that allowed the report to 
be published with a comment that negotiations with the German Federation were
4 The report was released at the September 1989 annual meeting. IOSCO, "Capital Adequacy Standards for 
Securities Firms.”
5 This included Canada, France, Australia, West Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the US and the UK.
6 IOSCO, "Capital Adequacy Standards for Securities Firms.”
7 Lascelles, "Securities Rules Closer to Global Harmonisation.”
8 ISRR, ""Convergence," More Than Harmonisation, Is Key Word in Cautious Working Group Sessions,” 
September 27, 1989.
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continuing. Knight commented, “It is our intention to arrive at convergent views. It is 
important for us to ensure multinational securities firms don’t migrate to areas with low 
capital adequacy requirements. In this, the needs of regulators and operators come 
together.”9 A British Working Group member noted that progress had been “very 
satisfactory” and that differences were not insurmountable.10 Follow-up discussions were 
scheduled for January 1990 and the following summer.11
Debates in IOSCO echoed debates in Brussels. First, regulatory perspectives of 
statutory regulators such as Britain’s SIB and the French COB would need to mesh with
the perspectives of SROs such as the German Federation. IOSCO members expressed
10concern that SROs were biased against newer capital approaches.
A second concern was that differing domestic financial services standards would 
be difficult to reconcile. Capital adequacy regulations for securities firms in the UK were 
based on risk analysis for stand-alone firms. Hedging was permitted. But in Germany, 
universal bank regulators focused on credit and interest rate risks, rather than market 
risks, and required high minimum levels of capital. In the US, securities regulation 
focused on investor protection and, like the Germans, the maintenance of high capital 
levels. The SEC might endorse risk-based capital standards, but not if  they reduced 
minimum capital levels.
A final concern was that members’ domestic regulatory regimes reflected 
differing market, economic and political histories and, significantly, different levels of 
market development and operating experience. In continental Europe and Japan, and 
even in the UK, institutional regulatory experience with securities firms and markets was 
modest. Nevertheless, newer regimes might more readily accept newer regulatory 
technology. In contrast, the US regulatory regime was robust and well-established. The 
SEC, founded in 1933, operated from a regulatory foundation thoroughly tested by 
markets and courts, and it benefited from the support of the US Congress and the private
9 Ibid.
10ISRR, "Progress on West German-IOSCO Accord to Resolve Capital Adequacy Row,” October 25,
1989.
11 German private and public sector concern with a “level playing field” was later resolved by development 
of the trading book. This resolution brought private sector interests into alignment for “Euromarket” 
capitalisation methodologies.
12 This was an ironic concern considering the proactive role o f British SROs in the CAD and ISD 
discussions.
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sector. However, there was a danger that the SEC’s bureaucratic, lawyerly traditions 
might hinder its potential ability to embrace new regulatory approaches. These contrasts 
highlight a critical distinguishing issue for the IOSCO discussions -  US participation. 
The regulatory issues addressed by IOSCO were closely related to those raised in EU 
discussions; however, US participation changed the deliberative landscape significantly.
By the end of IOSCO’s annual meeting, members’ expectations had already 
moved from regulatory harmonisation, a goal still espoused by the EU, to regulatory 
“convergence,” a less ambitious but more “balanced” objective. Rudiger von Rosen of 
the German Federation stressed that “value should be attached to the possibility of giving 
issuers and investors a choice between quite different rules and regulations.”13 The 
Technical Committee’s report on capital adequacy concluded differently. It indicated that 
a more specific harmonised conceptual framework was needed, which would encompass 
liquidity and solvency issues, mark-to-market provisions, and risk-based requirements 
covering risk assets. A one-year industry comment period was proposed.
At the meeting, outgoing SEC chairman David Ruder promoted the SEC’s own 
distinctive approach to international regulatory convergence. He urged IOSCO members 
to examine the SEC’s MJDS proposal, then under discussion with Canada, as a potential 
regulatory harmonisation model,14 and he encouraged members to discuss similar 
bilateral arrangements with the SEC. Ruder’s comments appeared to contradict IOSCO’s 
goal of developing an inclusive conceptual framework.
Ruder also verbally endorsed UK-style risk-based capital adequacy standards. 
His endorsement did not correspond with then current SEC regulations, however, which 
mandated a “comprehensive” capital adequacy standard premised on high minimum 
capital levels.15
13ISRR, ""Convergence," More Than Harmonisation, Is Key Word in Cautious Working Group Sessions.”
14 See Chapter 9 for a discussion o f MJDS.
15 The SEC calculated capital on both long and short positions and limited the extent to which matching or 
hedging reduced required capital. The EU’s evolving CAD standard contemplated greater consideration o f  
hedging. “Risk-based” standards may have referred to the EU’s nascent building block approach, which 
considered both general and specific position risks. Scott-Quinn describes three capital approaches: the 
SEC’s comprehensive, the EU’s building block and the UK’s portfolio approach. The UK approach 
permitted the greatest amount o f hedging to reduce required capital. See: Scott-Quinn, "EC Securities 
Markets Regulations.”
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The purpose behind Ruder’s contradictory statements is unclear, but there is no 
evidence to indicate that he was urging a fundamental change in US capital adequacy 
standards. Rather, his comments appear to have been encouraged by the general tone of 
IOSCO’s recommendation, “a capital adequacy test that reflects liquidity, solvency, and 
the risks faced by securities firms,”16 and his deeper conviction that bilateral agreements 
would better promote US interests. Ruder’s lame-duck status as SEC Chairman may also 
have encouraged him to endorse UK standards.17
Given that Ruder was prepared to think unconventionally about developing 
capital standards, it is also unclear why he did not more aggressively support German 
capital preferences, which more closely matched SEC practice. By the time Ruder’s 
successor, Richard Breeden, became actively involved in the IOSCO discussions almost 
a year later, the EU had proposed resolving German concerns by segregating securities 
and loan assets in calculating capital. This made it more difficult for the SEC to 
influence the EU negotiations and subsequent IOSCO discussions. The SEC’s failure 
made it easier for the EU to endorse both universal banking and the use of hedging 
technology in capital calculation, practices that were anathema to Breeden.
Should the EU and IOSCO cooperate?
The IOSCO report’s emphasis on regulatory convergence prompted IOSCO’s EU 
members to suggest that the EU’s work on the ISD and CAD be incorporated into 
IOSCO’s research. They felt there was no need to duplicate work already well-advanced 
in the EU. Non-EU IOSCO members were less vocal, acknowledging the potential
benefits of collaboration but also the difficulty of success unless convergence was widely
1 8accepted as an explicit objective. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, in 
testimony before the US Senate, acknowledged this difficulty. Cautiously endorsing 
harmonisation efforts, Greenspan noted, “the nature and regulation of securities markets 
have been sufficiently diverse that a multilateral regulatory approach along the lines of
16 IOSCO, "Capital Adequacy Standards for Securities Firms.”
17 However, had Ruder remained SEC Chairman after 1989, and pursued risk-based capital standards 
legislatively, he would likely have been rebuffed by a US Congress concerned with financial services 
standards challenged by market events and scandals and a public concerned with the solvency o f securities 
firms. Ironically, the US representative to the Basle Committee, and its current Chairman, Gerald Corrigan, 
who had recently endorsed risk-based capital standards, would have supported Ruder.
18 Lascelles, "Calls to Bring Watchdogs into Line: Moves to Harmonise Securities Rules Worldwide.”
230
the Basle agreement on capital guidelines for commercial banks may be difficult.”19 An 
unnamed EU official cited by the Financial Times was more candid: “there is a desperate 
need to ensure that rules in Europe are not developed which are wholly incompatible 
with those in the UK and the US.”20
Potential regulatory convergence also raised competitive concerns for US 
regulators, markets and participants. The EU’s detailed Single Market objectives led US 
regulatory officials to consider whether their complicated domestic regulatory 
infrastructure might need to be streamlined in order to compete with the EU. “The US 
deals with two regulators and the rest of the world may be able to speak with one voice,” 
commented Brandon Becker, an SEC director, referring to the long domestic history of 
conflicts and overlaps between SEC and CFTC jurisdictions.21 CFTC Commissioner 
William Albrecht, concurred, “What we’re going to need to see in the future is an 
international super-regulator.”22
These developments mark the starting point for a regulatory harmonisation 
discourse between IOSCO (and the SEC), the EU and eventually, the Basle Committee. 
The challenges facing IOSCO negotiators appeared initially to be the same as those faced 
by the EU. As has already been noted, differing domestic regulatory histories had created 
entrenched bureaucracies and national preferences. To avoid regulatory arbitrage and to 
preserve competitive fairness, it was considered essential that the securities activities of 
universal banks and securities firms be treated similarly. A complicating factor was that 
the SEC and EU member-states did not share harmonisation perspectives or objectives. 
Further, IOSCO’s capital adequacy working party had not consulted with market 
participants before developing its recommendations. IOSCO acknowledged this failure 
in the Report, noting “there’s a great deal of consensus on some of the issues... [but] we
' j ' l
still need some feedback from industry.”
Two additional early factors distinguished the EU and IOSCO deliberations: 
timing and scale. The EU faced a 1992 Single Market deadline. IOSCO, like the Basle
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Of course, US financial institutions dealt with more than two regulators (The Fed, the SEC, the CFTC, 
The Comptroller o f the Currency, state agencies, and the Treasury, in addition to various SROs).
22ISRR, ”1992 Spurs US Agencies to Regulatory Cooperation,” October 25, 1989.
23 ISRR, "Three Harmonisation Reports Are to Be Released in Venice,” August 16, 1989.
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Committee, had no immediate deadline. In addition, the EU, with 12 participants, 
operated on a smaller stage than did IOSCO, with approximately 100 members.
The SEC promotes US regulatory norms
The SEC’s international response to the 1987 stock market crash was twofold: to 
provide leadership in developing international regulatory reform proposals and to use its 
market position to promote US regulatory standards. Its response differed from the 
response of EU member-states, which stressed regulatory harmonisation through 
multilateral forums, coupled with modest domestic reforms. The differing approaches 
also exposed contrasting views of IOSCO’s international role.
David Ruder, SEC Chairman from 1986 to 1989, outlined the SEC’s principles 
for international cooperation in a speech at IOSCO’s 1988 annual meeting.24 Attendees 
interpreted his speech as a statement of the SEC’s view that it should assume a 
leadership role in the development of international securities regulation. Ruder 
commented: “As regulators seek to minimise differences between systems, the goal of 
investor protection should be balanced with the need to be responsive to the realities of 
each marketplace.” Ruder’s remarks highlighted the historic SEC regulatory emphasis, 
investor protection, over market promotion or institutional efficiency, which were 
primary regulatory objectives in European domestic markets. His comments also 
underlined the SEC’s conviction that international regulatory harmonisation was driven 
by individual “marketplace realities,” state preferences rather than harmonisation. He 
indicated that regulatory change sponsored by supranational institutions could be 
acceptable, but only if sensitive to national, i.e., American, preferences. Underlying 
Ruder’s comments was a firmly held belief that American domestic securities regulation 
should be the model for international regulatory cooperation.
Ruder’s beliefs were based on several factors. First, US capital markets were the 
largest and most sophisticated in the world. Only the Euromarkets could be compared to 
US markets in terms of size or sophistication. However, aside from the modest authority 
of standardised market practices and private SROs, the Euromarkets were largely 
unregulated, and had limited experience with institutionalised public regulatory
24 John Dune, "Regulation Easy as SEC," Australian Financial Review , 11/16/88.
25 Chris Sherwell, "SEC Chief Draws up Global Blueprint," Financial Times, 11/16/88.
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mechanisms. Domestic capital markets in Europe were significantly smaller than US 
markets. Japan’s domestic Yen markets were enormous in US dollar terms but a poor 
alternative regulatory model to the US. In Japan, domestic market access by foreign 
firms was restricted, regulation was based largely on US models, and Japanese regulators 
were reluctant to lead internationally. In addition, the SEC had over 50 years of applied 
and codified regulatory experience, significantly more than any other national or 
supranational securities regulatory agency. Finally, US court cases and years of practical 
application had thoroughly tested the SEC’s regulatory apparatus. This combination 
encouraged US regulators to conclude that their securities regime was the best model 
available, nor was there domestic political support for changing US regulatory 
standards.26 Considering these factors, it was not surprising that the US asserted its 
leadership position in regulatory harmonisation initiatives.
Ruder’s efforts to export domestic regulatory norms included precedent-setting 
domestic market liberalisation designed to attract foreign firms. It also included bilateral 
and multilateral efforts.27 Recent European domestic securities regulatory reform had 
resulted in the creation of new regulatory bureaucracies and regulatory juridification, 
making domestic European regulatory regimes appear more like the US. However, the 
US distinguished itself by passing domestic legislation to facilitate international 
information sharing, cross-border investigations, and foreign access to US domestic 
capital markets. The US also increased the number and scope of its bilateral securities 
regulatory agreements, which typically adopted a US regulatory model. As the 
intransigence of the SEC’s approach to international regulatory harmonisation became 
clearer, EU member-states refocused their international regulatory harmonisation 
energies on EU-sponsored initiatives, where they had powerful political commitments 
and the incentive of regional market share competition. The US, without regional capital 
market competitors, focused its efforts on promoting US regulatory standards through 
IOSCO and bilaterally. This entailed both domestic and multilateral initiatives.
Steps to improve international coordination
To better coordinate regulatory discussions, representatives of IOSCO, the EU 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) met in
26 See Chapter 10.
27 See Chapter 11.
28 This was, o f course, not the case for domestic capital adequacy standards.
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December 1989 to discuss IOSCO’s capital adequacy work. Their objective was to 
ensure that regulatory developments in the world’s major capital markets “converged.” 
Jean-Pierre Cristel of IOSCO’s General Secretariat was optimistic, indicating that the EU
90“is .. .quite willing to look at what we are doing and try to cooperate.”
Yet despite optimistic pronouncements, the difficulty of harmonising 
international regulatory standards was already evident in parallel, though further 
advanced, efforts to harmonise international accounting standards. Paul Cherry, 
Chairman of IOSCO’s working party on accounting and auditing standards 
harmonisation,30 pessimistically commented that regional “standards blocs” would defeat 
international harmonisation. Speaking in 1990, Cherry indicated that IOSCO and the 
IASC were working to develop harmonised international accounting principles. But the 
US national accounting standards body, the FASB,31 resisted adopting IASC and IOSCO
9^approved standards. Cherry presciently foreshadowed a further potential problem in 
harmonising regulatory norms: the possibility that the EU might develop its own regional
' j ' j
accounting standards that would not conform to IASC, IOSCO or FASB models.
In July 1990, Paul Guy, IOSCO’s Secretary General, provided a status report on 
the work of the capital adequacy working party. The group had “been working on the 
banking side, and we have integrated some members that have universal banking 
systems,” a reference to the difficult reconciliation of securities firm and universal bank 
capitalisation. IOSCO’s debates paralleled those in the EU. The working party had begun 
to coordinate its work with the Basle Committee by inviting Committee members to 
attend its meetings and had stepped up the pace of its work, increasing Technical 
Committee meetings from two to three a year.34
In September 1990, securities regulators from the US, UK and Japan met to 
discuss enhancing international securities market cooperation. Topics included IOSCO’s 
efficacy, information sharing and capital adequacy. The meeting also addressed mutual 
recognition and harmonisation, particularly in the context of the pending US-Canadian
29 ISRR, "IOSCO and EC Officials Meet to Map out Harmonization Effort.”
30Cherry was also Canada’s representative to the International Accounting Standards Committee.
31 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”).
32 FASB concluded IASC proposals often codified reductions in accounting disclosure.
33 ISRR, "IOSCO: EC Moves Could Doom Global Accounting Harmony,", January 17, 1990.
34 ISRR, "IOSCO Sees Major Effort on Futures and Ethics in Chile,” July 16, 1990. However, contrast this 
with the Basle Committee’s monthly meetings and the EU’s almost daily work on the CAD and ISD.
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MJDS agreement, which referred to “parallel development of minimum regulatory 
standards” and enhanced information exchange. No changes to existing bilateral 
information sharing, enforcement, or mutual recognition agreements were announced.35 
The meeting produced a communique on cooperation, marked by a delicate balancing of 
divergent market preferences, very similar to the conditions defining the EU 
negotiations. The UK’s DTI indicated that both the SEC and Japanese MoF agreed to 
British proposals for a degree of mutual recognition and harmonisation.36 The meeting 
was significant in signalling states’ desire to preserve domestic regulatory authority by 
limiting the scope of international regulatory harmonisation.
Commercial bank regulators met in Frankfurt in October 1990 to discuss 
supervision of financial conglomerates. Supervisors were aware that bright line legal 
distinctions between banks, securities firms and insurance companies were becoming 
increasingly anachronistic. While the US continued to legally separate securities 
underwriting and bank lending, most other countries had given up the legal distinction.37 
The Bundesbank proposed a functional model that matched the businesses pursued by 
operating groups within a financial services conglomerate with specific regulatory
-JO
standards. This proposal contributed to the “trading book” language eventually adopted 
in the CAD. It did not, however, surface in IOSCO’s working party discussions even 
though level playing field considerations did. Unlike EU CAD and ISD deliberations, 
where multiple financial services operating models influenced regulatory development, 
IOSCO’s emphasis on securities capitalisation focused discussions on capital adequacy 
definitions rather than broader issues.
Discussions at the bankers’ meeting underlined potential disagreements between 
the EU, IOSCO, and the Basle Committee. The meeting had been called to discuss Basle 
Committee work on extending the 1988 Capital Accord to encompass market risk. 
Market risk included equity portfolio risks incurred by universal banks. Anglo-Saxon 
banks with minimal equity operations were little affected by the Basle Committee’s
35 Richard Waters, "Regulators to Discuss Cooperation Moves," Financial Times, 14 September 1990. See 
Chapter 11 for a detailed discussion o f bilateral MJDS (multilateral jurisdictional disclosure system) 
agreements.
36 ISRR, "Trilateral Meeting o f Securities Regulators Focuses on Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure Issues.”
37 The distinction in the US was weakening, however, beginning with the 1989 development o f  “Section 
20” commercial bank subsidiaries being allowed limited underwriting privileges.
38 Underhill, "Keeping Governments out o f Politics: Transnational Securities Markets, Regulatory 
Cooperation, and Political Legitimacy.”
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discussions, but new guidelines addressing equity-related risks were very important to 
universal banks. German objections to the application of commercial bank capital 
standards to equity portfolio risks had been expressed in earlier IOSCO and EU 
negotiations. And, in an effort to keep affected parties advised of its deliberations, the 
Basle Committee had included IOSCO in its meetings. But, while the meeting carried 
important implications for universal banks -  and potentially for securities firms, -  no 
recommendation was made that securities-related regulatory developments be formally 
coordinated.39
IOSCO’s 1990 annual meeting
At IOSCO’s 1990 annual meeting the Technical Committee adopted five working 
party reports, including one on capital adequacy.40 Richard Breeden, Ruder’s successor 
at the SEC and Chairman of IOSCO’s Executive Committee, indicated that he 
considered an international capital adequacy standard a top priority. He noted that 
IOSCO was under pressure to agree on a standard in order to ensure that its views were 
incorporated in EU and Basle Committee deliberations. He also confirmed that the 
capital adequacy report had identified specific capital standards and that the working 
party was endeavouring to bring standards for bank and non-bank securities activities 
into conformity.
The Technical Committee invited Huib J. Mueller, chairman of the Basle 
Committee, to its annual meeting. At the meeting, Mueller called for “one-world” 
solutions to regulatory problems, which reflected the impact of globalisation and the 
blurred distinction between banks and non-banks. Mueller defined a framework for 
developing minimum capital adequacy standards for securities firms and financial 
conglomerates, suggesting presentation of proposals, initially to the Basle and Technical 
Committees, and subsequently to the G-10. Jeffrey Knight, presenting IOSCO’s capital 
adequacy report, noted that among working party members there was sufficient 
consensus to warrant further work. But consensus had been achieved only after intense 
negotiating. The German delegation had objected to the report’s “direction,” once again 
citing fears that universal banks would be made subject to tougher capital rules than 
those applicable to securities firms; the report was adopted over German protests.
39 Katherine Campbell, "Regulators Discuss Financial Giants," Financial Times, 10 October 1990.
40 IOSCO, "Capital Requirements for Multinational Securities Firms.”
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Additional progress was predicted, particularly given the Technical Committee’s newly 
streamlined organisational structure based on recommendations of the SEC-drafted 
Strategic Assessment.41
Meeting delegates were optimistic that IOSCO could begin to act as an equal 
partner with the Basle Committee. A member of the Technical Committee commented, 
“IOSCO is now at a watershed. At this meeting, it has essentially made up its mind as to 
what it wants to be... that is, the securities regulatory equivalent of the Basle Committee. 
I think that’s what is behind the push of the SEC,42 the result is that IOSCO is a much 
more powerful organisation than it has been. There are people within IOSCO that don’t 
agree with the SEC asserting its role, but as far as I’m concerned, the SEC is the most 
powerful securities regulator in the world.”43
Stewart Douglas-Mann, executive director of the LSE, also commented on the 
consolidation of authority in IOSCO.44 He noted that IOSCO’s research was actually 
executed by a small group of senior regulators and, describing members’ “investments” 
in IOSCO policy deliberations, Douglas-Mann offered, “I think that most would agree... 
the US and the UK are tackling the major tasks. They have the largest work burdens, 
closely followed by Canada and France.”45 Douglas-Mann’s comment confirms that the 
disproportionate “investment” of the US and the UK made their agreement critical to the 
resolution of the IOSCO debates. It also underscores the continuing significance of state 
authority in developing regulation.
1991 Deliberations
International capital adequacy harmonisation appeared to be stalemated in early 
1991. EU negotiations were deadlocked. Concrete progress was needed by June 1991 if 
directives were to be adopted by the 1992 SEM deadline.46 Political commitment and
41 See Chapter 9 for a discussion o f the Strategic Assessment Report.
42 Referring specifically to the Strategic Assessment Report.
43 ISRR, "U.S. SEC Forges New Global Role within IOSCO; Breeden Chairs Strengthened Technical 
Committee,” November 19, 1990.
44 During the 1990 Annual Meeting, Breeden was made Chairman o f the newly empowered Technical 
Committee, after retiring by rotation as Executive Committee Chairman. The SIB representative replaced 
him as Executive Committee Chair.
45 ISRR, "ISE's Douglas-Mann Gives IOSCO's Strategic Report a Cautious Welcome,” December 3, 1990.
46 Lucy Kellaway and Tim Dickson, "Painful Birth o f Single Market: The Deregulation o f Financial 
Services in the European Community," Financial Times, 19 December 1990.
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national interests clashed in EU debates,47 but despite disagreements, the EU was clear 
on its objective.
IOSCO did not share the EU’s sense of urgency or purpose. The Strategic 
Assessment improved IOSCO’s operating procedures but had not clarified the objective 
of capital adequacy discussions. Was an international standard being established, or was 
a set of principles being developed? The priority of IOSCO’s EU member-states was to 
establish harmonised rules, definitely through the EU and, ideally, in tandem with 
IOSCO. The SEC’s objectives were made clear at a Technical Committee meeting in 
Hong Kong in March 1991.
The Hong Kong meeting was intended to iron out details of working party reports 
scheduled for delivery in July. The capital adequacy working party was reportedly 
unsuccessful in developing a capital formula that would satisfy the conflicting demands 
of universal banks and US and Japanese brokerage firms. Reports indicated that it was 
Richard Breeden’s questioning of a proposed building block approach to capital 
calculation, adapted from Basle Committee deliberations and EU CAD discussions, that 
had prevented the Technical Committee from making further progress.49
Differences are clarified
The Hong Kong discussions highlighted the issues dividing the EU, IOSCO and 
the Basle Committee. The EU had resolved disagreement over the CAD by allowing 
banks to segregate securities trading for capital calculation. Their solution applied to 
both universal banks and more highly differentiated banking and securities operations, 
and it facilitated the eventual adoption of a building block approach to capital 
calculation.
The Hong Kong meeting had been an opportunity for IOSCO to approve a 
building block calculation method that had been advanced by the Basle Committee for 
banks involved in securities business. IOSCO had reportedly agreed in principle with the 
Basle Committee’s recommendations prior to their last annual meeting. However, the
47 Richard Waters, "The European Market: Securities Firms Look across Borders - How Bankers and 
Brokers Are Preparing for Battle," Financial Times, 7 January 1991.
48 Capital adequacy was considered by the working group on the regulation o f market intermediaries 
chaired by Roy Croft o f the UK Securities and Investment Board.
49 ISRR, "Technical Committee Meeting Sets Stage for Standards Reports,” March 25, 1991.
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Technical Committee delayed an endorsement and sought more time for review. Breeden 
questioned the Committee’s earlier agreement and won the support of the Japanese 
delegation.50 Breeden's concern was that the building block approach51 was different 
from US standards, particularly in its use of hedging to reduce required capital. His 
reluctance to consider an early compromise between US and EU/Basle Committee 
approaches arose from both international and domestic considerations.
Internationally, Breeden wanted to prioritise SEC regulatory perspectives in 
multilateral debates. Breeden believed that the proposed building block approach was an
C 'J
untested, risky methodology and a “Basle problem” in the making. SEC (or IOSCO) 
endorsement of the building block approach did not present any obvious international 
conflicts. The EU had already adopted the policy and the Basle Committee had generally 
endorsed it. In hindering IOSCO’s consideration of the approach, Breeden used his bully 
pulpit on the Technical Committee to ensure that the SEC’s domestic political and 
bureaucratic interests, which were opposed to any weakening of US regulatory standards, 
were supported. The failure of the Technical Committee to agree to a common approach 
for capital adequacy caused a six-month postponement of a planned April 1991 meeting 
of the Basle Committee with IOSCO.53
Breeden’s intransigence brought the nascent three-way international discussion 
over capital adequacy to a shuddering halt. This was not a matter of great concern to the 
Basle Committee or to IOSCO, which did not face policy deadlines, but the implications 
were more dire for the EU.
The EU was concerned that its CAD proposal not conflict with formulations 
under consideration by the Basle Committee and IOSCO. But, having achieved regional
50 Japan had adopted new capital adequacy guidelines a year earlier and was unhappy at the prospect o f  
revising them so shortly after adoption.
51 The ‘building block” capital adequacy approach favoured by the EU and Basle Committee involved 
assessing the various risks o f holding securities. Risks were broken down into credit and market 
components, each o f which was used in calculating required capital. The approach also allowed hedging or 
matching to offset required capital. The approach encompassed provisions for minimum capital levels, but 
at lower percentages than stipulated by comprehensive approaches.
52 Some observers accused the 1988 Basle Accords o f unwittingly contributing to the 1990/91 economic 
recession by encouraging restrictions on lending. See Peter Cooke, "Bank Capital Adequacy and Capital 
Convergence,” (London: Price Waterhouse, 1991). Breeden saw potentially lower capital requirements as 
increasing bank vulnerability to economic or business setbacks, what he referred to as a “Basle problem,” 
i.e., a problem o f  unforeseen consequences. See also discussion on page 306 and in footnote number 80 in 
Chapter 10.
53 David Lascelles, "Reforms Fail to Keep Pace with Changes in the Markets," Financial Times, 24 May 
1991.
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agreement on the building block approach through difficult negotiations, the EU was 
loath to re-open the issue and set back its 1992 objective.54 More fundamentally, the EU 
did not want its standards superseded by IOSCO or Basle recommendations, particularly 
if they differed materially from its own. Uncertain how to proceed, the EU initially 
determined to wait for the outcome of discussions in IOSCO and the Basle Committee 
before formally adopting its own proposal. In any event, the ISD remained bogged down 
in disputes over trading,55 although EU negotiators were optimistic that the CAD could 
be agreed to by the end of 1991.56
In yet another effort to enhance regulatory coordination, representatives from 
IOSCO, including Breeden, and the Basle Committee met in Paris in July 1991 to 
discuss regulatory harmonisation. The meeting produced a memorandum on ten 
principles to govern bilateral agreements but failed to achieve consensus on capital 
adequacy. Breeden used the opportunity to dampen expectations further: “The 
development of the Basle capital formulas took 14 years, reflecting the fact that global 
banking supervisors had many of the same difficulties that confront securities 
supervisors -  differences of markets, differences of regulatory traditions, differences of 
principle.” Breeden added that his regulatory objective was not harmonisation but the 
development of “common principles.”
These comments marked Breeden’s first public acknowledgement of difficulties 
encountered in developing an international capital adequacy standard and of his limited 
objectives for IOSCO. His comments also help in resolving whether his thinking on 
capital adequacy changed during the IOSCO negotiations. IOSCO members accused 
Breeden of changing his position on capital adequacy in 1992; this was cited as the 
primary reason for the collapse of IOSCO’s discussions. However, Breeden voiced his 
objections to EU and Basle Committee capital adequacy formulations as early as March 
1991. Where the EU had vacillated over member-state preferences, Breeden had 
consistently opposed building block standards proposed by the EU and the Basle 
Committee. Breeden’s inflexibility ultimately encouraged EU member-states to focus on 
finalising EU directives rather than on broader harmonisation initiatives. After the Paris
54 Waters, "The Quest for a Capital Adequacy Directive.”
55 ISRR, "Investment Service Directive Remains Stalled among Ministers,” July 15, 1991.
56 London, "Fresh Try on Securities Directive.”
57 George Graham, "Regulators Lay Basis for Fraud Fight," Financial Times, 18 July 1991.
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meeting, Breeden publicly rejected suggestions of any internal IOSCO feud stemming
CO
from the failure of the March Hong Kong meeting of the Technical Committee.
IOSCO’s 1991 annual meeting
At IOSCO’s September 1991 annual meeting, a majority of the Technical 
Committee approved a memorandum outlining IOSCO’s views on minimum capital 
adequacy requirements for securities firms and for banks involved in securities 
businesses. The 12-page memorandum, addressed to the Basle Committee, was, 
according to Breeden, intended to “form the basis for discussions.”59 The memorandum 
did not recommend hard rules; it offered instead principles for developing standards for 
market risk and capital. The absence of unanimity over the memorandum’s 
recommendations reflected the divide between supporters of the SEC’s “comprehensive” 
approach and supporters of the building block approach favoured by the Basle 
Committee and the EU.60 The Technical Committee indicated its willingness to accept 
the building block approach for debt securities, but with alterations to the Basle 
Committee’s formulation. In particular, the Technical Committee endorsed tougher SEC- 
sponsored standards for allowable reductions in required capital for matched positions.
On required capital for equity positions, Technical Committee members 
continued to disagree on an overall approach while agreeing on some issues. A majority 
of Committee members agreed that for diversified, highly liquid portfolios, an 
international minimum standard utilising the building block approach should be 4 
percent on gross position risk61 and 8 percent on net position risk.62 An 8 and 8 position 
was recommended for other securities. Breeden commented that “there has been a major 
disagreement among some countries who felt the 4+8 standard is too high -  the United 
Kingdom and France, in particular.” The disagreements were not surprising since 
domestic regulations in the dissenting countries permitted both lower capital levels and 
greater flexibility in the determination of required capital. The SEC’s tougher approach
58 Ibid.
59 ISRR, "Technical Committee Sends Capital Memorandum to Banking Supervisors; MOU Principles 
Approved.”
60 The comprehensive approach, the traditional approach used by the SEC, Canada and Japan, set a fixed 
percentage of a firm’s asset portfolio as its capital requirement. A minimum capital level, higher than 
permitted under the building block approach, was required.
61 This is a charge o f 4 percent on long positions and 4 percent on short positions.
62 After deducting offsetting long and short positions, a net position is the remainder.
63 Breeden also added, “In some areas, the Japanese have expressed concern.” ISRR, "Technical 
Committee Sends Capital Memorandum to Banking Supervisors; MOU Principles Approved.”
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would penalise these countries. The UK had initially proposed a 2+8 approach but finally 
allowed the 4+8 standard to be published.64
The memorandum also recommended that regulators using the building block 
approach fix minimum capital levels or that they at least maintain minimum capital 
consistent with the building block method. The approach was designed to prevent 
regulatory arbitrage. The memorandum, while reflecting majority endorsement of a 
building block approach for equities, still did not resolve basic disagreements between 
the SEC and European regulators. Breeden explicitly noted that the SEC would not 
abandon its domestic approach to capital. “We have no intention of changing the 
comprehensive approach. We believe it works very well here in the United States. We 
have a lot of experience with it. It has gone through major market downturns. It ain’t 
broke and we’re not going to fix it.” In allocating blame for continuing disagreements, 
Breeden asserted that the SEC’s approach, “is not the problem.. .because our rule is 
much higher than the rules in other major markets.”65 Breeden was unconcerned that the 
SEC’s approach might disadvantage US securities firms internationally. “Yes, there can 
be a competitive effect if the competitors of American firms were more highly leveraged 
than American firms were. The focus of the discussion has been that when you have 
sharp market downturns that [they] did not trigger failures of firms in the marketplace. 
So it’s the issue of stability.”66
Any concern Breeden had with potential damage to US securities firms’ 
competitiveness was allayed by three principal factors: statistics indicating US firms’ 
international market dominance; US firms’ reluctance to press for capital reductions; and 
the SEC’s focus on protecting investors.67 A further consideration was the 
SEC/Breeden’s stature (personal, bureaucratic and professional) in Washington and in 
the securities industry. This combination of factors helped insulate the SEC from
64 As indicated on page 243, the UK proposal permitted UK (and US) firms to exploit their expertise in 
developing proprietary risk management models (so-called “VaR” models). This development was 
adamantly opposed by Breeden.
65 ISRR, 'Technical Committee Sends Capital Memorandum to Banking Supervisors; MOU Principles 
Approved,".
66 Ibid.
67 See Chapter 11 for a discussion o f competitive statistics and firms’ reluctance to lobby and Chapter 10 
for the SEC’s institutional regulatory focus.
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commercial and political pressures on capitalisation, dramatically distinguishing the 
agency from its peers in Europe.
Breeden had also concluded that EU member-states’ advocacy of the building 
block approach reflected regional political considerations and the relative 
uncompetitiveness of European firms, not their belief in the superiority of their approach 
to risk mitigation. Additionally, he surmised that the EU’s advocacy reflected Single 
Market deadline pressure, rather than market experience or research.69 Most non-US 
securities firms were capitalised at significantly lower levels than US firms. This 
stemmed from the fact that many non-US firms were privately owned and US firms 
increasingly were publicly listed.70 Breeden had concluded that US firms’ market 
dominance, particularly in the Euromarkets, came in large part from their strong capital
71positions. Additionally, universal banks’ competitive securities expertise had been 
retarded by their focus on lending. Market disintermediation had also pressured bank 
profitability encouraging their search for additional sources of revenue and lower costs.
Domestic political considerations made it difficult for private sector Wall Street 
firms to contest Breeden’s conclusions, even if they disagreed.72 Hobbled by recession 
and embarrassed by scandals, investment banks were reluctant to press the politically 
powerful Breeden for liberalisation of domestic capital regulations. Additionally, long­
term disintermediation and securitisation trends discouraged US securities firms from 
further attracting the ire of commercial banks by provoking a regulatory battle with the 
SEC over capital adequacy. Commercial banks’ efforts to reform Glass-Steagall would 
only intensify if  they could argue that these securities firms’ regulatory regime provided 
advantages not available to commercial banks, such as hedging to reduce capital.
IOSCO’s failure to negotiate unanimous agreement to a capital standard 
encouraged speculation that another group’s proposal, either the EU’s or Basle
68 This is discussed in succeeding chapters. The SEC was not, however, immune from political or 
economic pressure on other regulatory issues that affected the securities industry.
69 A contemporaneous research project by the London Business School argued that the portfolio capital 
approach adopted in the UK, which took into account portfolio diversification, and the EU’s building block 
approach, were both superior to the SEC’s comprehensive approach in managing securities firms’ risk 
exposure. See Dimson and Marsh, ”City Research Project: The Debate on International Capital 
Requirements - Evidence on Equity Position Risk for UK Securities Firms, Subject Report VIII.”
70 O f the major US firms, 6 (Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, Morgan Stanley, First Boston, Kidder 
Peabody, Lehman Brothers) were public (or subsidiaries o f public companies) and only 1 (Goldman Sachs) 
was private.
71 Confidential interviews, New York, April 2001. See discussion in Chapter 9.
72 See discussion, Chapter 9.
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Committee’s, would be adopted internationally. Breeden denied this was the case, 
asserting that the Basle Committee and IOSCO were not “negotiating” multilateral 
capital standards, which were, in any case, only applied by national regulatory 
authorities.73
Breeden’s comment is revealing; as it confirms his perception that IOSCO’s 
discussions were over regulatory principles, not rules, and, more importantly, that the 
SEC would not implement IOSCO guidelines with which it disagreed. As the nearly 
universal adoption of the Basle Capital Accords had demonstrated, if  US and UK 
regulators endorsed a capital standard, that standard had a high likelihood of being 
widely adopted. The Basle Accord’s success also indicated that both US and UK assent 
were necessary for successful adoption of international standards. Each represented a 
vast market and broadly accepted regulatory regimes. Disagreement between US and UK 
securities regulators would delay development of a harmonised international regulatory 
regime, irrespective of multilateral institutional involvement.
This gave each domestic regulator effective veto power over regulatory 
standards. Moreover, it would be awkward if  IOSCO, the EU, and the Basle Committee, 
endorsed differing standards. If the SEC refused to conform its domestic standards to EU 
or Basle-endorsed standards, it would make general adoption of those standards highly 
problematic.74 This was particularly likely since, as Breeden was later to claim, Japanese 
and Canadian regulators agreed with him, and together their three markets represented 75 
percent of global equity trading. There was no real alternative to universal agreement on 
the one hand or the perpetuation of national/regional standards on the other. Other 
options, such as the declaration of an irreconcilable stalemate or the adoption of 
incompatible standards, were unattractive. Breeden reiterated his position at the end of 
IOSCO’s annual meeting. His statement confirmed the centrality of state authority in 
regulatory harmonisation and his view that the objective of capital adequacy discussions 
should be the development of a common view on principles, not the development of
73 ISRR, "Technical Committee Sends Capital Memorandum to Banking Supervisors; MOU Principles 
Approved.”
74 Disagreement between the SEC and Basle Committee would likely imply disagreement between the 
SEC Chairman and the President o f the FRBNY, the U S’ Basle Committee representative. This would 
reflect a more profound domestic disagreement over international regulatory standards, making 
international agreement that much more difficult. This was, o f course, the case with capital adequacy until 
Breeden left the SEC in 1993. Ironically, despite Breeden’s (and Corrigan’s) departure, agreement over 
international capital standards for securities firms continued to prove elusive.
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rules. When that was achieved, regulators would “go back to their home statutes and
n c
make whatever changes would be necessary to conform [to] those principles.” This 
approach to regulatory evolution differed significantly from the harmonisation approach 
advocated by the EU and the Basle Committee.
Following its September meeting, the Technical Committee announced that it 
would meet again with the Basle Committee in November. However, the failure to 
produce unanimous guidelines raised speculation that the Basle Committee might 
assume IOSCO’s role. Pressure increased on the EU to finalise its standard and fix a 
precedent before IOSCO fixed theirs. Rather than meet in November, the Basle 
Committee and the Technical Committee announced that they would meet in Geneva in 
January 1992. The Technical Committee’s capital memorandum would serve as the basis 
for discussion.
Privately, the SEC reiterated to IOSCO members its inflexibility and its 
expectation that further meetings would not produce different results from either the July
7 fkor September meetings. The Basle Committee continued research into equity portfolio 
risks for banks but elected not to pressure the SEC to alter its views. Gerald Corrigan, the 
US representative on the Basle Committee, endorsed the Committee’s regulatory 
recommendations but chose not to use the Committee’s stature to pressure the SEC to 
accept Committee or EU regulatory preferences. Such lobbying would have been 
unusual, as the Committee operated consensually. It could also have created domestic 
political problems for Corrigan who, as President o f the FRBNY, was scrupulously 
apolitical. Participants also speculate that Corrigan, either for political or risk 
management reasons, decided not to pressure Breeden because he was unconvinced by
77EU arguments supporting the building block approach.
The Geneva meeting
Representatives from the Technical and Basle Committees met in Geneva on 
January 28th and 29th, 1992.78 Before the meeting, Breeden reiterated his limited vision of 
the Technical Committee’s objectives and his opposition to altering US regulations. EU
75 ISRR, "Technical Committee Sends Capital Memorandum to Banking Supervisors; MOU Principles 
Approved,” October 7, 1991.
76 Confidential interviews, New York, April 2001.
77 Confidential interviews. See discussion in Chapter 9.
78 Richard Waters, "Securities Regulators Close to Capital Rules,1" Financial Times, 27 January 1992.
245
member-states, under 1992 political and business pressure, pressed ahead with the 
building block approach and released new CAD guidelines the day before the Geneva 
meetings began. The new CAD language appeared to complement the general position 
reached by IOSCO and the Basle Committee at the Geneva meeting. However, it actually 
underlined the gulf between SEC and EU positions on capital adequacy. Breeden agreed 
only to “consider” a building block approach for equity risk while EU regulators had 
already committed themselves to it. The ensuing French and British complaints over 
SEC obstinacy are unsurprising, considering that they had committed themselves to a 
capital calculation approach that the SEC opposed. Further EU negotiations in March, 
finalising CAD language, were “heavily influenced” by the unproductive Geneva 
meeting.79
The Geneva meeting failed to produce agreement. The SEC, pursuing a unilateral 
harmonisation strategy dictated largely by domestic political considerations, was unable 
to sway European regulators. For their part, European regulators were compelled to 
focus on domestic and regional, rather than international, concerns. Their inability to get 
the SEC to adopt their harmonisation objectives defines the limit of their authority and 
their interest in the IOSCO process.
The official report on the Geneva meeting stated that substantial progress on 
capital adequacy had been made. It soon became obvious, however, that major 
disagreements persisted. The interplay between IOSCO, the Basle Committee, and the 
EU discussions became clearer. The Geneva meeting promised that a public consultative 
document on capital adequacy would be released over the summer, but remaining 
differences appeared substantial. One of the participants gave a more realistic 
assessment: “There is no way these guidelines will be issued this summer without 
another meeting.”80 But no additional meetings were planned.
Disagreements
The remaining disagreements centred on specific capital levels. For debt 
securities, a building block approach was reaffirmed. Breeden and Corrigan indicated 
that either comprehensive or building block approaches to calculating capital for equity
79 ISRR, "Compromises Sought to Move Capital Adequacy Rules Ahead.”
80 ISRR, "Differences on Equity, Technical Details Suggest Long Wait for Global Capital Rules.”
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position risk might be applied. They further indicated that a “general consensus was 
reached on percentages applied to gross and net portfolio values.” Consensus turned out 
to be strained, however. In subsequent testimony before the SEC’s Congressional Market 
Oversight and Financial Services Advisory Committee, William Heyman, Director of the 
SEC’s Division of Market Regulation, indicated that Corrigan and Breeden had agreed 
on an 8 percent standard for net position risk and a 4 percent standard for gross positions. 
The British and the French however, did not share this “agreement.” The British 
delegation indicated that the 4 percent standard would cause financial hardship for UK 
firms, a position the SEC disputed. Japanese, British and French delegations had again 
urged a 2 percent ratio on gross equity portfolio risk, with a majority of other countries 
favouring 4 percent and the US holding out for 8 percent. The issue was complicated by 
prior agreements in EU negotiations.
The depth of disagreement, not evident in public statements, was well appreciated 
by EU member-states. The 2 percent capital level advocated by the British and French 
had been the basis for the EU’s own discussions. There was speculation that the majority 
advocating a 4 percent level had been encouraged by German and Dutch representatives; 
who used the Geneva meeting to leverage EU discussions. Media speculation of a 
possible negotiating alliance between SEC, German and Dutch regulators to promote 
higher capital levels was cancelled by the SEC’s insistence on levels that were 
considered anti-competitive in the EU and by its general antipathy to the building block 
approach. Treatment of arbitrage portfolios was another point of contention, particularly 
between the US and UK. William Heyman reiterated the SEC’s position, noting the US 
tried to be flexible but, “we feel [US standards] have served our country well.”57
The failed Geneva discussions re-energised EU CAD discussions.82 COB 
President Saint-Geours noted that the SEC disagreed both with this level and with the 
concept of specifying different capital levels for differing risks. Saint-Geours urged the 
EU to agree on its own capital standard in order to counterbalance SEC preferences more 
effectively. He noted, “The United States would like to influence what is happening in 
Europe. I would like us to complete our [directives] in Europe before starting 
negotiations aimed at coordination with the United States.”83 Saint-Geours bluntly
81 Ibid.
82 Bray, "Capital Norms Have a Way to Go.”
83 ISRR, "Differences on Equity, Technical Details Suggest Long Wait for Global Capital Rules.”
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indicated his concern that the Geneva talks could create problems for the EU; “Points on 
which we have reached a difficult agreement in Europe may be put into question by the
OA
positions taken at Geneva. I fear that new complications have been introduced.”
Speaking to the Institute of International Bankers on May 27th, Breeden indicated 
he still hoped for agreement on capital adequacy standards, but his comments reinforced
o r
the impression of SEC obstinacy. Breeden singled out the Basle Accord as an example 
of a regulation that was not “market neutral;” he argued that the Accord encouraged 
investment in government securities (with low capital allocations), rather than loans
or
(with higher capital allocations) and consequently served as a credit allocation system. 
This comment reflected SEC officials’ opinion that the Basle Committee was overly 
political and insular, driven by consensus rather than best practices and insensitive to 
securities-related risks.
EU steals a march on IOSCO
Meeting on June 29th, the EU Council agreed to final language on the ISD and 
CAD, formally closing the door on any immediate agreement with IOSCO. With the 
Single Market deadline looming and their attention focused on the Maastricht vote, 
finance ministers in Europe decided that waiting for resolution of the Basle/IOSCO 
discussions would not guarantee a better, and certainly not a speedier, capital formula. 
The adoption of compromise language was viewed as a political breakthrough and an 
example of EU ministers’ determination to successfully develop solutions to difficult 
technical issues.
In July, IOSCO’s Technical Committee met to review progress on capital 
adequacy. The meeting was described as “acrimonious.” One participant said, “Breeden 
talked well over half the time, and many saw it as an abuse of power of the chair. I think 
the feeling of most of the people at the meeting was that he didn’t want an agreement. So 
he reverted to a hard and fast position which he knew the others wouldn’t adopt.”
84 Bray, "Capital Norms Have a Way to Go.”
85 ISRR, "SEC Chairman Urges Capital Rules That Cover All Types o f Securities,” June 16, 1992.
86 Underlying these comments was a conviction that market risk had been dropped from the Basle Accord 
for political reasons - assigning country risk ratings was too sensitive for regulators. As a result, bank 
portfolio risk had been distorted, banks could zero risk-weight government securities, but securities firms 
were required to mark-to-market the same securities. This was Breeden’s “Basle Problem.”
87 ISRR, "Disagreement Plagues Committee Discussions on Harmonised International Capital Standards,", 
July 28, 1992.
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Breeden was accused of back-pedalling on his earlier “acceptance” of the building block 
approach in Geneva. The SEC countered that it had never wavered in its stated 
preference for a comprehensive approach.
Breeden argued that the building block approach was fatally flawed; it was 
impossible to perfectly match long and short positions. Participants argued over capital 
for gross position risk, over the percentage of subordinated debt in capital, and whether 
commercial banks’ investment books, as opposed to their trading books, should be
OQ
exempt from capital standards. Breeden even raised new questions about the treatment
QQ
of swaps and futures for capital purposes.
By August it was clear that release of draft capital adequacy guidelines by 
IOSCO would be further “delayed.” Roy Croft, the UK’s representative, confirmed that 
members had asked for more time to review the CAD rules in order to determine their 
impact on IOSCO’s deliberations.90
IOSCO’s 1992 annual meeting
IOSCO’s 1992 annual meeting was described as the “last, best hope to head off 
pressure on Basle to go it alone” on capital adequacy standards.91 The Basle Committee 
had made progress developing a capital standard for commercial banks’ securities 
positions, but agreement with IOSCO had proved impossible. Richard Breeden was held 
responsible.92
At the annual meeting the SEC opposed a building block proposal by the SIB, 
arguing that a minimum capital floor was the only basis on which a calculus could be 
developed. Breeden also rejected the UK’s reiterated 2+8 proposal, saying, “The 
standard that has been proposed would represent the lowest standard in the world. 
Setting that as the minimum doesn’t accomplish anything. It should be clear by now that
88 “Investment books” referred to portfolios o f securities held ‘for investment’ rather than ‘for trading’ 
purposes. Breeden was concerned that hanks would switch securities portfolios from trading to investment 
as a way o f minimising their capital costs.
89ISRR, "Disagreement Plagues Committee Discussions on Harmonised International Capital Standards,".
90 Richard Waters, "International Capital Markets: International Draft Rules on Capital Delayed," 
Financial Times, 12 August 1992.
91 International Reports, "Banking & Finance - the Securities Summit: Consensus with Basle?” (IBC USA  
Licensing Inc., 1992).
92 Richard Waters, "Search for Security: Last-Ditch Efforts to Reach an Agreement on Capital Adequacy 
in the Securities Markets," Financial Times, 23 October 1992.
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2+8 without a floor is unacceptable to us in any way, shape or form.”93 Andrew Large, 
newly appointed SIB chairman, replied, “We think it’s desirable to encourage people to 
have balanced, matched books.”94 Large’s argument coincided with the compromise 
adopted on the CAD.
IOSCO would not adopt the CAD formulation over the SEC’s objections. SEC 
abstention from an IOSCO standard would undermine the legitimacy of the standard and 
the institution. For domestic reasons as well, it was impossible for Breeden to endorse 
the SIB’s proposal.95
Breeden’s warning was loud and clear: “The levels of capital under the CAD are 
highly unsafe.”96 Leon Brittan, the CAD’s principal architect, responded by calling 
Breeden’s comments “ill-informed.” He pointedly accused the SEC of bullying IOSCO 
members, saying, “In today’s global markets no single national regulator...can expect to
07impose their system on everyone else.” Breeden retorted, “If we have many more ill- 
informed comments like Sir Leon’s, the prospects for an agreement are not too good.” 
He added, “We do not seek to ask or suggest anyone around the world should use US 
standards. It’s important that people respect the judgment of professionals. The
QQ
politicians need to stay out of it.”
Breeden reaffirmed his view that IOSCO was a discussion forum, not a rule- 
making body,99 and he commented, “There is no earthly reason why it is important to 
have an agreement at this meeting, or at next year’s meeting in Mexico City, or the year 
after that. I don’t get paid to weaken the protection to US investors.” Discussing the 
possibility that CAD adoption would prevent agreement in IOSCO, Breeden commented, 
“Who cares? We don’t think you ever have to bridge the gap.”100 The heated discussions
93ISRR, "US, Europe Split on Capital Adequacy Standards; Breeden Firmly Rejects UK Approach as 
'Unsafe',” November 3, 1992.
94 Ibid.
95 This will be discussed in Chapters 10 and 11.
96 Robert Peston and Tracy Corrigan, "Breeden Opposes IOSCO Capital Standard: SEC Chairman 
Condemns Proposal as 'Imprudent' - Chance o f Agreement Recedes," Financial Times, 28 October 1992.
97 Robert Peston and Tracy Corrigan, "International Capital Markets: Sir Leon Brittan Joins Row over 
Capital Standards - IOSCO Conference," Financial Times, 29 October 1992.
98 Dow Jones News Service, "Sec's Breeden Calls Brittan Remarks '111 Informed'," Dow Jones News 
Service - Ticker, 10/29/1992 1992.
99 Robert Peston and Tracy Corrigan, "International Capital Markets: Hopes Dwindle for New Agreement 
on Capital Requirements," Financial Times, 28 October 1992.
100 ISRR, "US, Europe Split on Capital Adequacy Standards; Breeden Firmly Rejects UK Approach as 
'Unsafe'.”
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carried over to the formal closing dinner, where Breeden and Brittan continued to debate, 
raising their voices and, according to one observer, nearly coming to blows.
At the end of the meeting, Andrew Large, newly appointed Executive Committee 
Chairman, stated that IOSCO would continue capital discussions, with the Basle 
Committee for debt and internally for equity. Saint-Geours was elected to replace 
Breeden as chair of the Technical Committee.101 In February 1993, less than four months 
after the annual meeting, the Technical Committee formally abandoned work on capital 
adequacy.102 At a minimum, this meant that in the near term, significant differences in 
domestic capital regulations would persist. A year earlier, at the Geneva meeting, 
agreement had still been considered possible.
Conclusions
Breeden considered IOSCO an immature organisation, still developing its 
potential and its authority. For him, IOSCO was a forum for discussion and modest 
multilateral initiatives, particularly if they embraced SEC positions. It was not a rule- 
making peer of the EU or the Basle Committee -  or of the SEC. The SEC used its 
membership on the Executive and Technical Committees to enhance IOSCO’s 
capabilities and to promote US regulatory values, particularly through the Strategic 
Assessment. The SEC preserved US regulatory sovereignty, in part by imposing its 
preferences on IOSCO and in part by impeding policy formation. As described in 
Chapter 11, the SEC also imposed its preferences through bilateral agreements. Sub­
national interests are addressed in Chapter 10.
Three factors are significant in locating authority in the IOSCO debates; at 
IOSCO the US was involved, members’ commitment to policy formation was weaker 
than in the EU, and, as a result, timing issues were less pressing. The SEC was able to 
dominate IOSCO debates by refusing to compromise. Additional factors are important as 
well in locating authority. First, IOSCO’s working parties initially failed to consult with 
the private sector, nor is there evidence that they subsequently established effective 
consultative relationships. Second, the IOSCO negotiations highlighted the importance
101 Breeden’s term had expired.
102 Richard Breeden, an appointee o f the outgoing Bush administration, stepped down from his post as SEC 
Chairman in July 1993.
251
of US and UK regulatory agreement. Third, the IOSCO discussions confirm the 
influence of powerful individuals on the negotiations. Arguably, the negotiations failed 
because of Richard Breeden’s intransigence. The background to Breeden’s intransigence 
is important to defining policy-making authority and the preservation of state autonomy. 
The same observation can be made with respect to Leon Brittan’s role in the EU. These 
observations prompt investigation into the source of the US/SEC’s authority. They also 
confirm state-centric hypotheses.
For Breeden, IOSCO did not represent supranational authority. The SEC 
effectively vetoed progress on harmonisation initiatives. This observation does not 
clarify, however, how or why this occurred. The next three chapters will address the 
roles of IOSCO, of private authority, and of the SEC and Richard Breeden in defining 
authority in the IOSCO negotiations.
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Chapter 9
IOSCO’s Authority and Private Sector Influence
This chapter is divided into two sections. Part A analyses the impact of IOSCO’s 
institutional history and structure on its authority, and Part B assesses the nature of 
private sector authority in the IOSCO negotiations.1
A. IOSCO’s Authority
Introduction
IOSCO’s authority and influence are assessed through an examination of its 
organisational and governance procedures and the effect of the SEC-sponsored 
“Strategic Assessment” on IOSCO’s operating structure and procedures. IOSCO is 
subsequently compared with the Basle Committee to isolate comparable and contrasting 
characteristics that make up and facilitate institutional authority. IOSCO’s governance 
structure is identified as a significant source of institutional dysfunction, stifling 
international consensus and communication among members and the private sector.
The International Organization of Securities Commissions
Founding characteristics
IOSCO’s predecessor organisation, the InterAmerican Association of Securities 
Commissions, was founded in 1974, largely at the urging of the US, which wanted to 
encourage the development of Latin American domestic capital markets. This was 
intended to help diversify regional funding sources in an area that had historically relied
1 An analysis o f the SEC is presented in Chapter 10.
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on bank borrowing, with mixed consequences for borrowers and lenders. It was an 
informal, regional forum designed to examine securities regulatory developments and to 
aid in capital-raising in North, South and Central America. Membership was extended to 
all states in the region.3
Starting with its founding, the Association evidenced a powerful US influence. 
Originally structured as a hemispheric forum, it was not meant to be a rule-making body 
that could potentially challenge US regulatory norms. Initial meetings were so informal 
that annual reports were not published.4 In 1983, the Association was renamed5 and 
reorganised as a global organisation headquartered in Montreal.6 IOSCO’s mandate was 
expanded to encompass international regulatory cooperation and enforcement. However, 
formal steps to institutionalise either its international legitimacy or its authority did not 
accompany IOSCO’s dramatic expansion in scope. The organisation itself characterised 
this transformation as evolutionary. But the new IOSCO had no formal operating charter 
or treaty-based authority. As a consequence, its ability to enforce rules and to promote 
international cooperation was limited. These gaps in IOSCO’s “formal” authority were 
similar to gaps in the Basle Committee’s authority and are examined in detail below.
Objectives
IOSCO’s bylaws defined its new objectives: “to cooperate to ensure better 
regulation of the markets, on domestic as well as on the international level; to exchange 
information.... to promote the development of domestic markets; to unite their efforts to
2 Bank lending crises in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and other Latin American countries had been 
devastating to US financial institutions as well as to local economic development, infrastructure and 
populations. Guy, "Regulatory Harmonisation to Achieve Effective International Competition.”
3 In the early 1970s, before capital market globalisation took root, US commercial banks had more 
extensive and longer standing banking relationships with Latin American businesses and governments than 
with their counterparts in Asia (ex. Japan), Africa or the Middle East. Latin America was, after Europe 
(and for some banks after 1972/73, the Middle East), the most important source o f international business 
for many US institutions. However, in sharp contrast with US and Canadian financial institutions, Latin 
American banks were not active in international securities markets.
In 1975, international bond offerings (including both Eurobonds and foreign bonds) by non-oil LDCs and 
“Other Countries” (excluding US, Japan, UK, Canada, Germany, Australia, Switzerland, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, other OECD, Oil Exporters and Eastern Europe) totalled just 5.4 percent (US$1,084 million 
out o f a total o f US$19,960 million) o f all international bond offerings. The comparable figures were 10.7 
percent in 1980 and 5.3 percent in 1985. In 1978, market capitalisation o f  “All Other” stock markets (after 
US, UK, Japan, Germany, Canada, France, Switzerland, Italy, Australia and the Netherlands) was US$75 
billion, or 4.5 percent o f total world stock market capitalisation (US$1,685 billion). See: Chuppe, Haworth, 
and Watkins, "The Securities Markets in the 1980s: A  Global Perspective.”
4 IOSCO’s first annual report was published in 1988.
5 The formal name was changed to: The International Organization o f Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”).
6 IOSCO was incorporated by act o f the Quebec Parliament under Quebec law as a non-profit, private 
corporation.
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establish standards and effective surveillance of international securities transactions; and 
to provide mutual assistance to ensure the integrity of the markets by rigorous 
application of the standards and by effective enforcement against offences.”7 IOSCO’s 
focus on markets and regulatory change meant that its main connection with its 
membership was through the national regulatory organisations responsible for securities 
markets.
This, of course, constituted a major distinction between IOSCO and the Basle 
Committee and the EU. Myriad official connections between member-state and EU 
authority existed. Basle Committee members were typically senior central bank officials. 
They frequently were the most important national regulators and had economic and/or 
political authority. But because many countries did not have official governmental 
securities regulators, IOSCO’s principal connection with member-states often came 
through informal or quasi-public authorities. National representatives to IOSCO were a 
disparate group including national securities regulatory institutions, SROs, trade 
associations and stock exchange managers.
It was unclear how IOSCO would develop or enforce regulatory guidelines 
without an officially recognised international mandate or a cohesive membership. The 
organisation had transformed itself from a regional discussion forum into an ambitious 
international securities regulatory body without taking any steps to lend credibility or 
legitimacy to its work. In addition, the organisation operated with a very small secretariat 
and no enforcement staff. It was also based in Montreal, a capital markets backwater. 
Unlike the Basle Committee or the EU, IOSCO did not have access to significant 
financial or human resources. Consequently, its ability to develop or enforce regulatory 
standards relied on the cooperation of domestic authorities, particularly of its largest 
members, the SEC and SIB.
There are three possible explanations for the genesis of IOSCO’s transformation 
from regional to international entity. As discussed in Chapter 2, the rapid growth in debt 
and equity markets in the early 1980s, coupled with the impact of market globalisation,
7 International Organization o f Securities Commissions (IOSCO), "1995 Annual Report,” (Montreal: 
IOSCO, 1996).
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are potential market-based causes. US authorities claim, however, that the initiative 
came from the SEC. Finally, in the mid-1980s, US and UK central banks concluded that 
Basle Committee progress in developing capital standards for commercial banks was 
“too slow.” They took collaborative steps to accelerate the development of what became 
the 1988 Basle Capital Accord.9 This has encouraged conjecture that IOSCO’s expansion 
was caused by competitive factors, that the US and UK encouraged IOSCO’s upgraded 
international stature to address both international securities concerns and to ensure that 
the US and UK continued to exert their influence over international regulatory initiatives.
Unlike the Basle Committee or the EU, IOSCO was not directly associated with 
sovereign entities or with recognised supranational authorities. Its authority was derived 
from its large membership. Operationally, the 1983 reorganisation did not change 
IOSCO; it continued to hold extravagant annual meetings and to facilitate member 
information exchange. Many national regulators considered IOSCO a “talking shop,” 
rather than an international standard-setter. Its regional history, limited track record, and 
lack of resources further circumscribed its legitimacy and potential authority. This had 
the consequence of placing disproportionate research and developmental burdens on 
IOSCO’s largest member, the SEC and, after 1986, on the SIB. Despite its democratic 
organisational structure, this brought into greater prominence the regulatory perspectives 
of members from larger markets. IOSCO’s democratic aspirations contrasted with the 
structure of the Basle Committee, which made no pretence of democratic operations or 
membership.
In setting up an inter-American regulatory association, the US had endeavoured 
to promote both the development of local capital markets and the utilisation of US 
domestic markets. Another objective was the promotion of US regulatory standards for 
regional securities markets.10 The expansion of IOSCO’s remit in 1983 was a mixed 
opportunity for the US. On the one hand, it established an international securities forum 
and filled a gap in the international financial services regulatory infrastructure that had 
been highlighted by globalisation. It also created a potential platform for the SEC to
8 Related stimuli included contemporaneous regional financial crises and the success o f the Basle 
Committee in developing the 1975 Basle Concordat. (See: BIS: Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 
"Basle Concordat," (Basle: 1975).)
9 Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the State.
10 Confidential interview, New York, May 2001.
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promote domestic US regulatory norms to a wider audience. But these developments 
raised risks for US authority. Expanding IOSCO’s membership could dilute US 
regulatory leadership. This tension was reflected in IOSCO’s “split personality.” 
Although it expanded national representation and the international visibility of securities 
regulation, the diversity of IOSCO’s membership (and their resources) and its lack of an 
official mandate constrained the organisation’s effectiveness and had the paradoxical 
consequence of enhancing US authority. IOSCO’s governance procedures, combining 
limited voting opportunities with powerful committees, also ensured that the 
organisation’s authority would be limited.
Membership
IOSCO membership was divided into three categories: regular, associate and 
affiliate. Regular membership was reserved for government regulators of national 
securities markets, but it was extended to SROs, such as stock exchanges, if  no securities 
regulator existed.11 Associate membership applied to public regulatory agencies with 
supervisory responsibility from countries where a national regulator was already a 
regular member.12 Affiliate memberships were created for international organisations 
whose objectives included the regulation or development of securities markets. As a 
result, IOSCO’s membership represented a large, disparate “policy community” rather 
than a tightly defined group -  such as the 12 central banks represented on the Basle 
Committee.13 At year-end 1992, when discussions over capital adequacy ended, 
IOSCO’s combined membership totalled 102, including associate and affiliate 
members.14
IOSCO’s multi-layered membership policy contributed to its institutional 
weakness. Because IOSCO had grades of membership, several national regulators, all 
from the same country, could be members at the same time.15 This introduced the 
prospect of domestic disputes entering IOSCO’s deliberations and diluting national
11 The Federation o f German Stock Exchanges is an example.
12 For example, the SEC was the US ‘s regular member, the CFTC was an associate member.
13 Underhill, "Keeping Governments out o f Politics: Transnational Securities Markets, Regulatory 
Cooperation, and Political Legitimacy".
14 International Organization o f  Securities Commissions (IOSCO), "1992 Annual Report,” (Montreal: 
1993).
15 This was true for the US (the SEC was a full member, the CFTC was an associate member) and the UK 
(the SIB was the full member, the DTI was an associate member).
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representatives’ authority, particularly since associate members were also permitted to sit 
on working parties.
These issues were highlighted during IOSCO’s 1989 annual meeting, when 
Britain’s DTI attempted to join IOSCO as a regular member.16 Britain’s SIB was the 
official UK representative. The DTI argued that it was responsible for regulating certain 
aspects of the UK securities industry17 and should therefore be granted full membership.
1 ftSeveral President’s Committee members, including France and Italy, reportedly 
objected to DTI’s application, citing the Committee’s desire to remain independent of 
political processes and to avoid similar applications and potential conflicts.19 The 
President's Committee considered DTI’s application privately and elected to maintain its 
associate membership.
The decision to allow DTI to retain a foothold in IOSCO came at a sensitive time 
for the organisation, which was trying to burnish its international reputation and establish 
itself as a peer of the Basle Committee. By this compromise, IOSCO confirmed its 
discomfort with tough decisions and opened the door for other governmental agencies to 
seek membership.
A similar dilemma confronted IOSCO at its 1990 annual meeting, where Richard
0C\Breeden proposed organisational changes to IOSCO’s working parties, which would 
have had the effect of reducing or eliminating the CFTC’s21 influence.22 The President’s 
Committee rejected Breeden’s proposal. However, by keeping the CFTC as an active 
member of its working parties, IOSCO ensured that domestic policy and institutional 
disputes could influence international policy debates.
16 DTI was a “limited” national regulator and a branch o f the government.
17 Including insider trading and investment exchange authorisation.
18 See page 259 for a discussion o f the President’s Committee.
19 Richard Waters, "IOSCO Conference: French and Italians Turn Down DTI Membership," Financial 
Times, September 21, 1989.
20 Restricting Working Party membership to Regular members only.
21 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission. See Glossary.
22 See below under “The Strategic Assessment.”
23 See: Jr. Coffee, John C., "Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance o f Organizational 
Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation," The Business Lawyer 50, no. 2 (1995). for a description 
o f the SEC’s longstanding domestic jurisdictional battles with the CFTC.
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In summary, IOSCO’s organisational structure inhibited the development of 
mutual member benefits. Additionally, its governance mechanisms limited and 
constrained policy-making, as did the diversity of its membership. These limitations 
vested significant responsibility and influence with a small group of members, giving 
them effective veto power over policy decisions. Lastly, the organisation’s thin 
regulatory track record limited its international authority.
Committees
Committees carried out IOSCO’s governance and policy development projects. 
The President’s Committee, composed of representatives of regular and associate 
members, was the senior IOSCO committee and operated as a general congress. It met 
once a year (at the annual meeting); it was responsible for approving official policy 
recommendations; and it operated in secret. In addition, it elected members of the 
Executive Committee, which operated as IOSCO’s principal governing organ. Limiting 
President’s Committee meetings and policy votes to the annual meeting further 
constrained IOSCO’s standard-setting capabilities, and it reposed significant 
responsibility in the Executive and Technical Committees.
The Executive Committee had twelve members,24 elected by the President’s 
Committee to two-year terms.25 The Committee met periodically26 and approved 
statements or recommendations made by the Technical Committee. It focused on 
governance rather than on policy-formation27 and it took “all decisions necessary to 
achieve the purpose of the Organization in accordance with the guidelines of the 
President’s Committee.”28
The Technical Committee was responsible for assessing the status of mature 
markets and for making policy prescriptions. This committee comprised representatives 
from the national securities agencies responsible for regulating the world’s larger 
securities markets. The Technical Committee generally determined its own membership
24 It currently carries 19 members.
25 After the 1990 Strategic Assessment (discussed below ). It included the chairs o f the Technical and 
Emerging Markets Committees and a representative from each regional standing committee. The 
Executive Committee also nominated members o f the Technical and Emerging Markets Committees.
26 Typically 3 or 4 times annually.
27 A. A. Sommer, "IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement," Northwestern Journal o f  Law and Business 17, 
no. 1 (1996).
28 By-Laws o f  the International Organization o f  Securities Commissions.
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and agenda, although the Executive Committee approved its nominations. The
90Committee’s work was allocated among seven working groups, each representing a 
distinct area of international securities activity, including market intermediaries, which 
considered capitalisation.30
The Basle Committee
After its 1983 restructuring, IOSCO emerged as a multilateral organisation
i
devoted to developing international regulatory standards for securities markets. 
However, IOSCO’s presumptive prominence contrasted with the long-standing 
international regulatory stature of the Basle Committee and of the EU, both of which had 
been involved in the development of international regulatory standards before the 
creation of IOSCO.
The Basle Committee was formed in 1974 in response to two major commercial 
bank failures.32 It had no constitution, by-laws, staff or facilities; it operated in secret and 
it did not publish minutes. In many of these respects, it resembled IOSCO. The BIS and 
Basle Committee members seconded staff from their national organisations for 
Committee projects and research. Central bank governors of the G-10, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands made up the Committee, whose broad brief encompassed supervisory 
issues associated with the operations of credit institutions. Because its research 
encompassed universal banks it was concerned with the operation and regulation of 
securities markets and institutions. Thus it was inevitable that overlaps and competition 
between IOSCO and the Basle Committee would occur.
The Basle Committee operated informally, meeting at least monthly, and 
developed agreements and policy recommendations by consensus. The Committee was 
(and is) notable for its reliance on personal contacts and an “interactive and decentralized
29 As o f the early 1990s.
30 The working group on the Regulation o f Market Intermediaries considered capital adequacy. See: 
(IOSCO), "1995 Annual Report.”
31 See: Filipovic, Governments, Banks and Global Capital: Securities Markets in Global Politics. 
Porter, States, Markets and Regimes in Global Finance.
Underhill, "Keeping Governments out o f Politics: Transnational Securities Markets, Regulatory 
Cooperation, and Political Legitimacy.”
32 The failure o f the German bank IG Herstatt and o f the US bank Franklin National.
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method of ensuring compliance” with its policy recommendations. The Committee’s 
notable accomplishment, the 1988 Basle Capital Accord, established minimum 
international capitalisation standards for credit institutions. Near universal compliance 
with the Accord reflected the Basle Committee’s legitimacy and international regulatory 
authority.34 A Basle Committee Chairman explained the Committee’s success as based 
on “shared goals and vision, open-minded perspectives, collegiality and trust.” A “non-
or
political” approach to the Committee’s work was also cited. Peter Cooke, a former 
Committee chair, summarised its rule-making approach as follows: the Committee 
“formulates broad supervisory standards, practices, and guidelines which individual 
authorities use to implement the detailed arrangements -  statutory or otherwise -  which 
are best suited to their own national systems. In this way, the Committee encourages 
convergence toward common approaches and common standards without attempting 
detailed harmonisation of member countries’ supervisory techniques.”36
Cooke’s comments parallel Richard Breeden’s observations about IOSCO’s 
methodology, made during capital adequacy discussions. This, of course, raises the 
question of why Basle Committee capital guidelines for credit institutions were 
universally adopted while IOSCO’s guidelines for securities firms were never even 
finalised. A second question will be addressed in Chapter 12; whether multilateral 
regulatory institutions (or other factors) promote regulatory convergence, as suggested 
by state/market theorists.
IOSCO and Basle Committee Compared37
-jo
The Basle Committee and IOSCO were different in several critical respects:
• They differed in size. The Basle Committee comprised 12 members, while 
IOSCO had 102. Unlike the Basle Committee’s small, homogeneous, and
33 David Zaring, "International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence o f International Financial 
Regulatory Organizations," Texas International Law Journal 33 (1998).
34 GAO, "International Banking: Strengthening the Framework for Supervising International Banks,” 
(Washington, D.C.: The United States General Accounting Office, 1994).
35 Confidential interview, New York, January 2001.
36 Zaring, "International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence o f International Financial 
Regulatory Organizations,” p. 269.
37 See generally: Tobin, "Global Money Rules: The Political Economy o f International Regulatory 
Cooperation".
38 And continue to be different.
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overwhelmingly western central bank membership, IOSCO’s large membership 
was geographically and represented a wide spectrum of organisations associated 
with securities markets.
• Central bankers represented traditional, long-standing regulatory authority, a 
status unmatched by securities regulators.
• The Basle Committee was founded to address specific market failure whereas 
IOSCO’s predecessor organisation was created for informational and commercial 
purposes.
• The Basle Committee operated by developing policy consensus. IOSCO required 
a unanimous vote of the President’s Committee to promulgate policy 
recommendations.
• IOSCO’s President’s Committee voted only once a year to adopt policy 
recommendations. The Basle Committee, with a smaller cast, met frequently -  in 
informal and private sessions -  to discuss proposals.
• The Basle Committee had no stated objectives, rules or governance procedures. 
IOSCO was more formally structured with committees, discrete objectives and 
operating procedures.
• The Basle Committee’s proposals were discreetly circulated for consideration by 
members and were revised into guidelines following a review of pubic/private 
sector feedback. IOSCO was still developing procedures for proposing and 
reviewing policy guidelines.
•  The Basle Committee’s smaller, more uniform membership facilitated the 
development of focused guidelines reflecting the objectives of major economic 
actors and markets. This practice was followed in the development and revision 
of the Basle Capital Accord. IOSCO’s policy review and approval procedures 
encouraged the development of general, broadly acceptable principles. This 
ensured passage by the President’s Committee but, as with the EU, also 
encouraged potentially differing national applications.
This analysis reflects the different objectives of the Basle Committee and IOSCO and, in 
part, the differing traditions and statutory bases of central banks and securities regulators. 
The Basle Committee’s approach more closely resembled the EU’s regulatory process 
and objectives than it did IOSCO’s.
Because, early on, IOSCO members failed to specify precisely the organisation’s 
objectives, expectations for capital adequacy discussions differed, with the SEC 
emphasising principles and EU states seeking to duplicate regional regulatory 
harmonisation. Additionally, it is clear that the traditions sustaining the Basle
262
Committee’s work did not characterise relationships on IOSCO’s Technical Committee. 
Technical Committee relationships reflected wide disparities in experience and 
institutional stature, both internationally and within home markets. These factors 
contributed to the prominence of the SEC, SIB and COB within IOSCO regulatory 
debates. Each was a statutory, governmental institution representing well-defined 
regulatory traditions and markets. Each contributed “more than its fair share” to 
executing IOSCO’s research and developmental workload. But these institutions had no 
history of working together. During the period in which IOSCO was considering capital 
adequacy guidelines, the SEC occupied the chairmanship of the Executive Committee 
and then of the Technical Committee.
Disagreements among this small group arose from differing national regulatory 
preferences; they paralysed IOSCO’s policy-making ability, and they help to explain 
IOSCO’s inability to forge international cooperation or to project international authority. 
But the EU was able to build agreement on the CAD and ISD, and the Basle Committee 
was able to build agreement on the Capital Accord, despite differing national regulatory 
traditions. Why was agreement not possible in IOSCO? Additional factors, beyond 
differing national preferences are indicated. IOSCO’s complicated organisational 
structure and membership contributed to its failure to foster international cooperation. Its 
organisational governance required unanimity. Without institutional or political 
incentives for cooperation or a consensual tradition, it was possible for senior members 
of the Technical Committee (or the Executive Committee) to assert their preferences and 
to veto or stalemate regulatory proposals.
The Strategic Assessment
At IOSCO’s 1990 annual meeting, the membership unanimously approved a 
strategic assessment report that had been initiated and prepared by the SEC. It outlined a 
major overhaul of the Technical Committee’s organisational structure and installed SEC 
Chairman Richard Breeden in a two-year term to the newly created post of Technical 
Committee Chairman. Before assuming his new post, Breeden completed his one-year 
term as chairman of the Executive Committee. His move to the newly strengthened
39 Sir David Walker, then chairman o f the UK Securities and Investments Board, succeeded Breeden as 
IOSCO Executive Committee Chairman.
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Technical Committee ensured that he remained in a position to exert influence over 
IOSCO’s research agenda and rule-making processes.40
The Strategic Assessment was begun in 1989, closely following the successful 
1988 promulgation of the Basle Capital Accords. Its objective was a bold attempt to 
position the Technical Committee internationally as a regulatory peer of the Basle 
Committee. However, IOSCO’s membership had not yet agreed whether IOSCO should 
establish harmonised international regulatory standards or should continue to operate as a 
clearinghouse for the examination of national standards. The US was particularly 
reluctant to consider adoption of standards that might affect domestic regulation. This 
brought the US into conflict with EU members, whose perspective on IOSCO’s 
objectives was influenced by their work on harmonising EU standards.
The Strategic Assessment represented a concerted effort to strengthen IOSCO’s 
organisation, in order to make it more effective in developing international regulatory 
policy. The report was in part a response to IOSCO delegates’ concern that 
disagreements over capital adequacy guidelines had delayed the release of definitive 
regulatory principles41 As a consequence, the EU and the Basle Committee had 
overtaken IOSCO in developing international standards. The Strategic Assessment was 
designed to ensure that neither the Basle Committee nor the EU would establish a 
regulatory regime without first considering IOSCO’s views.42
The Strategic Assessment addressed factors constraining policy-formation: 
IOSCO’s unwieldy size, lack of effective governance and imprecise agenda-setting. The 
recommended changes clarified objectives and provided a platform from which a strong 
Technical Committee chairman could promote a policy agenda. Because many Technical 
Committee members were also Executive Committee members, adoption of policy 
recommendations by one committee helped ensure adoption by the other. In assuming 
the Technical Committee chairmanship, Breeden positioned himself to influence 
IOSCO’s regulatory policy agenda, ideally in line with US interests.
40 The SEC also remained a member of the Executive Committee.
41 Which had been recommended in IOSCO’s 1989 report on capital adequacy.
42 Richard Waters, "Regulators Seek to Give IOSCO Greater Influence," Financial Times, 12 November 
1990.
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As Executive Committee Chair, Breeden had proposed the strategic assessment 
exercise and, when his recommendation was adopted, had appointed Michael Mann, an 
SEC official, to manage it. Previously, Mann had led vigorous SEC extraterritorial 
enforcement efforts against violations of US securities laws. These actions indicate 
Mann’s support for the offshore application of US securities regulations. Mann’s 
aggressiveness had led non-US regulators to view him as intolerant of those who did not 
agree with SEC regulatory perspectives.43 In 1989, demonstrating his interest in 
expanding the SEC’s international regulatory influence, Breeden had created an SEC 
Office of International Affairs and named Mann its director.44 In this position he was 
responsible for coordinating the Commission’s international regulatory activities. In 
conducting the strategic assessment, he equated IOSCO publicly with the Basle 
Committee. But privately Mann had concluded that IOSCO needed further maturation 
before it could be a peer of the Committee or take precedence over the SEC’s own 
international regulatory efforts.45
The initial draft of the Strategic Assessment met with complaints when it was 
circulated to Technical Committee members in June 1990. But, after revision, the final 
version was approved at the fall annual meeting and praised for its reform of the 
Technical Committee and its incorporation of British, Japanese and French regulators’ 
perspectives. Breeden gave his view of the Technical Committee’s role at the annual 
conference: the “principal standard-setting focus of IOSCO is in the Technical 
Committee, and the Committee (the Strategic Assessment policy group) felt it was 
important as it evolved to have a somewhat more formal leadership structure to review 
the progress of the working groups and to try to push some of the more substantive work 
along more quickly.”46
At the 1990 annual meeting, Breeden noted that work on developing capital 
standards was proceeding well and that the Technical Committee would take the lead in 
developing specific harmonisation approaches. Recommendations would be passed to
43 Christina Morton, "Michael Mann: Making a Mission o f International Enforcement," International 
Financial Law Review, (1990).
44 See Chapter 11.
45 Mann commented that “IOSCO is growing into a much more mature organisation for multilateral 
discussions.” Alluding to the Strategic Assessment he noted that “W e’re working very hard to develop 
within IOSCO a context for developing multilateral initiatives.”ISRR, "SEC's Michael Mann Sets Active 
Pace and New Initiatives for the Recently Formed Office o f International Affairs,” April 23, 1990.
46 ISRR, "U.S. SEC Forges New Global Role within IOSCO; Breeden Chairs Strengthened Technical 
Committee.”
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the Executive Committee, which would decide whether to present them to IOSCO’s full 
membership. Among the Strategic Assessment recommendations adopted were that the 
number of Technical Committee meetings be increased,47 that the number of working 
groups and committee memberships be reduced,48 and that each representative be a high- 
ranking official from the member’s national regulatory organisation. This had two 
consequences: a potential reduction in the democratic scope of the committee’s 
operations and a concentration of policy-making authority. But the revamped Technical 
Committee still lacked the stature of the Basle Committee, though it had been redesigned 
to emulate it. Since IOSCO’s governance procedures resulted in the President’s 
Committee largely rubber-stamping recommendations made by the Technical and 
Executive Committees, enormous authority was placed in the hands of committee chairs.
One reason for the Strategic Assessment’s unanimous adoption was that Breeden 
had agreed to modify his early attempts to exclude the CFTC, an Associate IOSCO 
member, from any meaningful IOSCO role. Members of the Technical Committee had 
challenged Breeden’s attempt to bring the SEC’s domestic jurisdictional competition 
with the CFTC into IOSCO’s deliberations 49 By amending his posture, Breeden was 
able to have his broader objectives approved. Nevertheless, his attempt to exclude the 
CFTC, viewed together with his promotion of the strategic assessment, helps to define 
his aggressiveness in promoting SEC views and leadership within IOSCO’s immature 
organisation. One Technical Committee member indicated, “The significance of this 
annual meeting is that now IOSCO has a clear leadership structure in place, made up of 
major regulators and led by Breeden. IOSCO is not a group where you can build 
consensus by bullying people. Under Breeden...a new consensus has emerged, that 
consensus on tough issues will be built through a process of flexible dialogue and by 
getting behind a strong leader.”50 Another Technical Committee member was less 
sanguine, noting that the annual meeting was, “a high stakes poker game, with 
nobody...calling Breeden’s bluff. He’s winning because he’s calling their bluff, and 
because they’re afraid to call his.”51 A senior European member of the Technical
47 From 2 to 3 annually.
48 From 17 to 12 members.
49 Breeden had been forced to alter draft language that called for limiting Committee memberships to full 
voting members o f IOSCO. See Chapter 10 for a detailed history.
50 ISRR, "U.S. SEC Forges New Global Role within IOSCO; Breeden Chairs Strengthened Technical 
Committee.”
51 Ibid.
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Committee summarised the meeting, “If you leave the conference with an impression 
that the SEC and Breeden didn’t get all they wanted, I’d be very interested in knowing 
what they didn’t get.” The same official noted that policy development “needs to be 
approached with a degree of flexibility, which the Europeans and others like the 
Australians and Canadians don’t always think the American regulators exhibit.”
Breeden’s objective in initiating the Strategic Assessment was to improve 
decision-making at IOSCO and, ideally, to shape IOSCO’s policy recommendations. 
What is unclear, however, is the degree to which Breeden also expected IOSCO’s 
members, particularly other Technical and Executive Committee members, to support 
SEC regulatory preferences. Comments from the annual meeting indicate that Breeden 
wanted to steer IOSCO’s policy recommendations explicitly and to position the 
organisation to produce international regulatory guidelines congruent with SEC 
preferences. The adoption of the Strategic Assessment was an indication of Breeden’s 
authority and influence within IOSCO.
The Strategic Assessment did not specify the content of IOSCO’s regulatory 
output. Considering the SEC’s aggressive promotion of the Strategic Assessment, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the SEC expected IOSCO to produce definitive regulatory 
prescriptions, ideally in line with SEC preferences. However, as IOSCO’s capital 
adequacy harmonisation discussions bogged down, Breeden’s opinion of IOSCO’s 
ability to establish policy changed, and he began to emphasise his preference for 
producing policy guidelines rather than explicit rules. Whether this represents a shift in 
preferences is uncertain. However, it does reflect the SEC’s inability (despite the 
Strategic Assessment) to comprehensively assert its authority in IOSCO debates.
The Strategic Assessment exercise suggests several important observations on 
IOSCO. First, IOSCO was still a maturing organisation, needing guidance and support 
from senior national regulators in developing its policy prescriptions. Second, the SEC 
had taken a leadership role in redesigning IOSCO’s operating style and policy agenda. 
Third, IOSCO’s other members had not seriously challenged the SEC’s authority -  at 
least initially. As noted below, this does not indicate members’ agreement with SEC 
regulatory policies but rather acquiescence with the SEC’s IOSCO reorganisation
52 Ibid.
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strategy. Fourth, the SEC had been successful in executing a portion of its strategy, 
concentrating policy-making authority in a few national securities regulators. Finally, 
however, the exercise did not facilitate the SEC’s promulgation of its regulatory 
preferences.
The SEC’s authority and IOSCO’s weak governance regime were confirmed by 
the SEC’s leadership in IOSCO’s reorganisation and by its refusal to change its 
regulatory preferences. These actions stymied IOSCO’s policy output and retarded its 
ability to establish itself as a peer of the Basle Committee. The cost to the SEC of taking 
these actions was low. Conversely, the cost to EU member-states of adopting the SEC’s 
regulatory preferences was high, especially in light of their Single Market commitments. 
Finally, however, the strategic assessment also indicated that there were limits to the 
SEC’s authority. If members disagreed with SEC preferences, they could block or veto 
SEC-sponsored proposals.
The SEC’s ability to ignore IOSCO’s EU members’ international regulatory 
preferences is explained by two factors: the size and attractiveness of the US markets 
and a strong domestic preference for preserving regulatory standards. Domestic US 
support for existing regulatory arrangements is explored in Chapters 10 and 11, but it 
derived, in large part, from political considerations. If Breeden were compelled to alter 
domestic regulations, particularly in response to EU pressure, the SEC would be 
weakened bureaucratically and the Bush Administration’s re-election chances might be 
damaged. Preserving domestic regulatory standards constituted a safer political course of 
action for Breeden than domestic regulatory change. Additionally, market globalisation 
had not progressed to a point where arbitrage and regional regulatory differences would 
have penalised US firms sufficiently to provoke them to lobby for regulatory change. 
Moreover, in 1991/92, US securities firms, weakened by two market crashes, a recession 
and damaging publicity concerning operating practices and products, were in no position 
to challenge the SEC in the courts of public or legislative opinion. There was a third 
factor in the SEC’s successful protection of domestic standards: IOSCO’s EU members 
prioritised their 1992 EU objectives when it became apparent that Breeden’s regulatory 
obstinacy was deeply entrenched.
53 Which provided the US with both negotiating leverage and a funding alternative to the Euromarkets.
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Geneva -  Redux
The January 1992 Geneva meetings are significant to assessing the IOSCO 
negotiations in several respects. First, regulatory stalemate indicated that a balanced 
allocation of authority existed among national regulators and, possibly, that agreement 
was not the most important objective to negotiators. Second, it was surprising that 
IOSCO’s EU Technical Committee members did not argue their regulatory perspectives 
more aggressively in Geneva. Third, the Basle Committee, despite its endorsement of a 
building block approach for equity securities, did not vigorously support regulators who 
opposed the SEC.
These observations lead to several conclusions. First, policy-making preferences 
and authority in IOSCO were evenly balanced and were concentrated in states rather than 
in IOSCO or in private actors. Second, SEC veto power and inflexibility encouraged EU 
member-states to focus exclusively on establishing a regional EU capital standard rather 
than an international one. Third, the subdued role of the Basle Committee can be 
explained by the absence of a fixed deadline and by conjecture (see immediately below) 
that it had concerns about the efficacy and politics of the building block approach. SEC 
and EU observations can be explained by reference to domestic support and 1992 
commitments, respectively. The SEC’s intransigence was also premised on the low cost, 
domestic and international, of disagreeing with the EU Commission, with IOSCO’s 
European members or even with the Basle Committee. European intransigence, national 
and supranational, was based on the high domestic cost of agreeing to an inflexible 
standard rather than to the more flexible CAD.
During the Geneva meetings, the EU (by proxy) and the Basle Committee did, in 
fact, go head to head with the SEC on capital adequacy. David Walker o f the SIB and 
Gerald Corrigan, both negotiating with Richard Breeden, felt they were very close to a 
consensus for a building block capital standard for both debt and equity. Negotiations 
progressed far enough that press releases announcing an agreement were drafted. 
However, in reviewing draft releases, Breeden and Corrigan realised that they still 
disagreed significantly. Breeden reiterated that the SEC would not agree to standards that 
weakened current US regulation. Corrigan and Walker were frustrated because they were 
attempting to coordinate capitalisation standards for both securities firms and universal 
banks, and Breeden, who was only concerned with securities firms, was holding up
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progress across the board. Walker and Corrigan also felt that the SEC’s regulatory 
emphasis on investor protection was too narrow and that Breeden, despite his IOSCO 
position, reflected only SEC perspectives. Their regulatory concerns, encompassing 
safety and soundness, systemic risk and related issues, were closer to European capital 
perspectives than to the SEC’s.54 Left unstated were Breeden’s domestic political 
constraints.55
The SEC defended its “spoiler” role by noting that it had previously indicated it 
never intended to alter US capital standards and that it had only reluctantly agreed to 
attend the Geneva meeting. Going into the meeting, the SEC was aware it would not 
compromise with EU member-states or the Basle Committee. As a result, it had a 
significant negotiating advantage; it never intended to change domestic US regulation.
But how was Breeden able to hinder cooperation and reflect only SEC views? 
Two explanations suggest themselves: first, that he deliberately used the power of the 
Technical Committee Chairmanship to advance the SEC’s regulatory agenda. This seems 
unlikely, as it would have provoked a storm of protest from the SIB and COB, who were 
not in fact intimidated by Breeden. A more plausible explanation is that Breeden vetoed 
a harmonised regulatory standard that he could not accept philosophically or politically. 
He was aware that he could do this without negative domestic repercussions.
Participants disagree on whether the Basle Committee strongly supported EU 
perspectives at the Geneva meetings. The Basle Committee certainly did not share the 
EU’s sense of urgency. Additionally, the SEC and FRBNY56 were working jointly to 
“stress-test” the proposed CAD, applying it to the balance sheets of international 
securities firms, using 1987 market crash data for their test case. Their research revealed 
that 17 firms would have failed if the CAD had been used to determine capitalisation 
during the crash. The EU and several prominent scholars disputed the study’s 
methodology and findings.57 Meeting participants speculate, however, that the Basle 
Committee, concerned about the results of the stress tests, distanced itself from EU and
54 Confidential interviews, London and New York, 2000 and 2001.
55 See Chapters 10 and 11.
56 Basle Committee Chairman Gerald Corrigan was President o f the FRBNY.
57 Richard Dale and Benn Steil have both disputed the stress test’s; methodology. See: Dale and Wolfe, 
"Capital Standards,” and Steil, Competition, Integration and Regu lation in EC Capital Markets.
270
IOSCO discussions after Geneva, convinced that neither the EU nor IOSCO would 
develop a widely acceptable international standard.58
Prior agreements
IOSCO’s weak authority is also traceable to its brief track record. Created in 
1983, it had not had a significant opportunity to execute agreements among its members 
before beginning research into capital adequacy harmonisation in 1986/87. IOSCO’s 
members had entered into separate bilateral and multilateral agreements, but not through 
IOSCO. These agreements, to the extent they covered financial issues, primarily 
addressed capital liberalisation59 and the facilitation of cross-border business. For 
precedents analogous to the ones IOSCO was endeavouring to develop, negotiators had 
to look to the Basle Committee and the EU.60 This circumstance derived from the fact 
that capital market globalisation was a relatively recent phenomenon and that the need 
for international regulatory coordination prior to 1985 had been limited. Events such as 
the 1972/1973 oil crisis, the 1974 Herstatt crisis and the 1982 Mexican debt crisis had 
not resulted in the creation of international securities regimes. Additionally, as discussed 
above, the context in which Basle Committee and EU agreements were developed 
differed significantly from IOSCO.
Conclusions
The success of Basle Committee and EU agreements does influence our 
interpretation of why the IOSCO deliberations failed. Several factors contributed to the 
success of the Basle Capital Accord. These include early US/UK collaboration and 
agenda-setting, subsequent consultation and consensus building in the Basle Committee 
and, finally, international implementation uniformly supported by the Committee and 
enforced domestically by Committee members and the marketplace. The success of the 
EU process is primarily attributable to political and legislative commitments made by 
EU member-states in the agenda-setting process, which itself was influenced by prior 
agreements among EU member-states. As discussed above, the IOSCO process
58 Confidential interviews. New York, April, 2001.
59 The OECD “Codes o f Liberalisation o f Capital Movements and o f Current Invisible Operations,” first 
promulgated in 1961.
60 For a general discussion o f international agreements in banking and finance see: White, "International 
Agreements in the Area o f Banking and Finance: Accomplishments and Outstanding Issues.”
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encountered disagreement at the agenda-setting stage, did not build a consensus among 
its members and, as a result, did not consider implementation. This analysis points to 
failure in the agenda-setting stage of IOSCO’s policy-making process. Failure derived 
from the inability of IOSCO’s governance processes to resolve member disagreements. 
These were principal reasons why the organisation lacked authority and why individual 
states pursued their own policy preferences.
IOSCO’s failure to develop a regulatory regime was a result of its inability to 
foster mutual member benefits or to assert its putative international authority. 
Additionally, because Richard Breeden was able to impede IOSCO’s policy-making 
process, regulatory harmonisation benefits were vague, and the cost of cooperation -  to 
EU members in particular -  was high. This combination of factors locates authority -  
initially -  in members’ veto power, rather than through support for regulatory evolution 
from public, private and supranational sources. In the CAD and ISD, diverse sources of 
authority worked together to facilitate closure on directives. The absence of prior 
agreements meant that IOSCO’s membership did not have a history of cooperation, 
through IOSCO, on which to build consensus.
National governments imposed their preferences on the IOSCO process, in part to 
preserve their sovereignty, and, in part, to preserve the EU deliberations. Decision 
making was not shared across levels of authority.
Additional reasons behind the SEC’s negotiating rigidity and its imperviousness 
to international pressure will be explored in Chapters 10 and 11, which consider the SEC 
and Richard Breeden.
B. Private Sector Authority 
Introduction
This section assesses the role of policy networks, private actors, and multi-level 
lobbying in the IOSCO negotiations.
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Policy networks
Non-state centric hypotheses predict that private interests will mobilise directly in 
the supranational arena or use it to pressure state executives. This focuses analysis on the 
role of policy communities in promoting cooperation through lobbying and educational 
efforts. As with the CAD and ISD analyses, non-state centric perspectives develop 
significant, though not sufficient, observations for explaining policy-formation and 
authority. Private sector policy communities educated policy-makers regarding the 
regulatory preferences of industry participants. Lobbying efforts enhanced the 
dissemination of policy-making information. In the US, however, policy networks were 
inhibited from aggressively promoting industry views and from promoting international 
harmonisation by a combination of factors. These factors affected the domestic US 
securities industry generally and encouraged divided views on capital adequacy among 
industry participants. Empirical evidence is anecdotal and sometimes ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, connections between lobbying, information dissemination, policy 
decisions and authority can be identified.
According to the SEC, domestic US policy networks, in particular the NASD and 
the SLA, supported the SEC’s position on capital adequacy standards. The SEC also 
claimed strong support from firms in the US securities industry.61 European policy 
networks focused their attention on EU deliberations rather than on IOSCO. To the 
extent that they commented on IOSCO’s deliberations at all it was in the context of 
delaying EU regulatory decisions to ensure they complemented the slower IOSCO or 
Basle Committee regulatory deliberations.62 Private sector opinion on IOSCO’s work 
was very limited with most comments addressed to the EU’s work. Conversations with 
private sector European and American institutions indicate a significantly greater 
awareness of the EU’s work on capital adequacy than with IOSCO’s. This reflects 
IOSCO working parties’ limited private sector consultation and the comparatively 
private nature of their work. It also is indicative of the private sector’s judgement that 
the EU and Basle Committee deliberative processes were more likely to generate 
definitive policy guidelines than were IOSCO’s.
61 Confidential interview, New York, April 2001.
62 The British Bankers Association took this step.
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The limited role of the private sector in IOSCO’s discussions may also reflect 
disagreement within the US securities community over capital adequacy. Large 
institutions with a sophisticated appreciation of capital management techniques preferred 
capital provisions that incorporated hedging and related techniques to minimise required 
capital allocations. This was the case with large US and UK institutions active in the 
Euromarkets. However, unlike most European states, the US securities industry was 
comprised hundreds of local, state, regional and national financial institutions, of which 
only a handful (estimates range from 10 to 25) aggressively promoted sophisticated 
capital management techniques. Consequently, the SEC’s comments regarding industry 
support for conservative capital preferences likely obscured divisions within the industry, 
which constrained the industry’s ability to lobby aggressively. As described elsewhere, 
where the industry was united, their lobbying efforts were successful.64
US and European policy communities65 shared an appreciation of IOSCO’s 
limitations as well as of the different commercial implications of the EU’s and the SEC’s 
capital adequacy preferences. Consequently, the SEC’s claimed “support” from US 
policy networks for its capital preferences better indicates policy networks’ domestic 
political and economic weakness, their relative ambivalence with the IOSCO process, 
and their potentially divided views, than it does their affirmative endorsement of SEC 
preferences. EU policy networks (which also included US institutions) similarly 
recognised IOSCO’s weaknesses, but they also recognised their own greater influence in 
the EU’s deliberative processes, as well as the EU’s supranational authority -  and the 
commercial advantages of the EU’s capitalisation proposals.
The NASD, SIA and industry disputes
In the US, the two principal securities industry policy networks were (and are) 
the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) and the Securities Industry 
Association ("SIA").66 As securities industry lobbying and research organisations, these 
groups reflected industry opinions on legislative and regulatory issues to the SEC and
63 The UK, with 5-8,000 investment advisors, is the obvious exception. However, many o f  these advisors 
operated as 1-2 person operations unlike the many state and regional organisations in the US.
64 The is was the case where the SEC amended accounting regulations in 1993
65 These policy communities included private sector lobbying groups such as the SIA and NASD in the 
US and the FSA in the UK as well as private firms.
66 The Public Securities Association (PSA) is a third domestic industry lobbying group but maintains a 
narrower public profile.
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relevant Congressional institutions through educational and advocacy efforts.67 Thus, in 
order to determine whether policy networks influenced policy formation through 
information dissemination or otherwise, it is useful to identify domestic US industry 
preferences for international regulatory harmonisation.
Domestic industry opinion regarding international regulatory harmonisation was 
pragmatic; harmonisation was a useful objective as it would clarify, simplify, and 
ideally, lower costs for multinational securities firms -  while maintaining safety 
standards. Global securities firms operating in numerous markets and jurisdictions were 
required to follow a confusing array of national regulatory standards. Mutual recognition 
and related regulatory principles were not universally endorsed and would not simplify 
international operations in any event. The swelling ranks of compliance and legal 
personnel required to operate internationally evidenced the expense of meeting different 
regulatory standards. Consequently, the SIA and NASD were generally supportive of 
SEC regulatory initiatives that promoted the more efficient and transparent operation of 
markets. Interviews indicate that large US securities firms preferred liberalisation of US 
capital standards in order to approximate more closely the flexibility afforded their 
European securities operations under the CAD and FSA 1986. However, smaller, 
regional US securities firms, without the hedging needs or expertise of their larger 
colleagues, were ambivalent about proposed capital adequacy changes. They could even 
be potentially hostile to change if harmonisation was construed as a risky means of 
reducing operating costs at the expense of safety. The explosion in derivatives trading, 
commencing in the late 1980s, had been popularly portrayed in this way. Consequently, 
it would not be surprising if smaller firms objected, as the SEC claimed they did, to 
capital harmonisation proposals.
Multinational US securities firms were world leaders in the exploitation of new 
techniques to hedge portfolio positions and, under the CAD and FSA 1986, to lower 
required capitalisation.69 Richard Breeden’s expressed preference for historic US capital
67 See Filipovic, Governments, Banks and Global Capital: Securities Markets in Global Politics, for an 
overview o f industry epistemic communities.
68 See: GAO, "Financial Derivatives: Actions Needed to Protect the Financial System,” (Washington D.C.: 
United States General Accounting Office, 1994).
69US securities firms had also supported the SEC’s Rule 144A, Reg. S. and MJDS initiatives as they 
helped US domestic markets compete with Euromarket offering procedures. However, these SEC 
initiatives did not affect capitalisation. See Chapter 11 for a discussion o f  Rule 144A and Reg. S.
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standards conflicted with the capital preferences of large securities firms. These firms did 
not persuade Breeden to change his opinion on capitalisation -  as the breakdown of the 
IOSCO negotiations bears out -  and as a result, they did not influence the negotiations. 
As we will see below, the failure of large domestic firms to make their case for 
liberalised capital standards was predominantly a result of industry conditions, 
disagreements within the industry, and lack of support from industry lobbying 
organisations.70
The preference of large US securities firms for flexible discretionary capital 
management -  the building block approach -  was confirmed in numerous interviews. 
Despite their preference, however, the US securities industry did not aggressively lobby 
the SEC to change domestic capital standards. The SEC has indicated that domestic 
lobbying groups and securities firms actually endorsed arguments it made in IOSCO 
promoting US capital standards. The SEC’s opinion was that higher US capital 
requirements enhanced the ability of US firms to penetrate new markets and introduce 
new products.
In the fall of 1989, the SEC proposed significant increases in minimum net 
capital levels for US securities firms. Despite the potentially anti-competitive nature of a 
capital increase, the private sector supported the SEC’s action. The NASD and the SIA 
also endorsed the increases, prompted by a review of problems with four securities firms 
following the 1987 market crash.71 This action confirms the SEC and Breeden’s opinion 
of industry support for higher capitalisation. However, the US securities industry’s 
apparent “endorsement” of the SEC’s capital preferences is problematic, as it was in the 
economic and commercial interest of securities firms to endorse a capital standard 
permitting greater use of hedging. This was particularly true for large, multinational US 
securities firms, as they were generally more adept in the use of hedging instruments 
than non-US firms.
There are several reasons behind the decision of US securities firms not to 
vigorously lobby the SEC directly or through the SIA. Large US securities firms
70 As described in Chapter 10, the NASD and SIA did on occasion openly disagree with the SEC, as was 
the case on the question o f whether the SEC should have the right to halt trading on bourses in 
emergencies. However, their success in that instance -  the SEC did receive the right through the Market 
Reform Act -  did not indicate consistency in their regulatory influence.
71ISRR, "SEC Asks Major Capital Hike for US Securities Firms,” September 13, 1989.
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typically operated internationally through locally incorporated and separately capitalised 
operating entities. This made their local operations subject to local capital requirements. 
As a result, they benefited from lower UK capital standards for their London-based 
operations. The principal benefit of international harmonisation -  regulatory uniformity -  
might mean higher or lower capital levels for these firms.
Additionally, large securities firms were aware that one of Breeden’s arguments 
was correct; their higher relative capitalisation had facilitated their entry into new 
markets and their introduction of new products by cushioning the risks inherent in new 
ventures. US securities firms typically maintained high levels of excess capital to 
accommodate unanticipated funding needs, abrupt market changes, and new product 
opportunities. They also maintained higher capital to reduce their cost of borrowed 
funds. Higher capital levels had been a critical variable in their successful penetration of 
foreign markets through the provision of new products and expertise, particularly in the 
provision of risky, often capital intensive, M&A, equity and junk bond products. 
Consequently, for large US firms, an increase in regulatory capital did not necessarily 
increase their cost of capital nor complicate their allocation of capital.
Lobbying for capital liberalisation would also have confronted substantial 
opposition. It would have entailed a domestic battle with an SEC convinced of the 
investor benefits of domestic capital standards and supported by a Congress and 
executive branch still trying to recover from an S&L crisis caused, in part, by liberalised 
capital regulations. As the Congress and White House approached 1992 domestic 
elections, the likelihood they would support liberalising domestic capital standards 
appeared slim.72
Trading scandals, poorly managed product introductions and bloated 
compensation schemes damaged the industry’s reputation and credibility in the late 
1980s and discouraged aggressive lobbying. The securities industry itself was also in
72 As noted elsewhere, US firms, already scarred by market disruption and scandal, and suffering from 
public scepticism aggravated by poor publicity surrounding high compensation levels and new products, 
decided not to take a strong stance on “lowering” domestic capital standards. Wall Street’s occasionally 
egregious compensation packages, combined with over-excited press coverage regarding the potentially 
dire consequences o f  new financial products, particularly derivatives, served to undercut the credibility o f  
potential Wall Street initiated or endorsed regulatory reforms.
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poor competitive shape.73 The recession of 1989/91 had led to a decline in securities 
underwriting that weakened industry profitability. The industry was rapidly increasing 
employee redundancies, a significant one-time expense. Most significantly, Glass- 
Steagall restrictions separating investment and commercial banking were increasingly 
under attack by commercial banks. A securities industry request for additional 
capitalisation flexibility in the context of industry financial weakness would only 
encourage commercial banks to press for more rapid Glass-Steagall reform. These 
factors argue that securities industry weaknesses discouraged aggressive lobbying for the 
liberalisation of domestic capital standards. Additionally, the SEC’s well-regarded 
chairman was a powerful Washington insider with whom securities firms were 
disinclined to clash in the current environment. Finally, as noted above, the domestic 
securities industry was not uniformly supportive of amending capital adequacy 
regulations.
In the early 1990s, large US securities firms had begun to develop proprietary 
models, based on unique portfolio risk valuation methodologies, for generating 
capitalisation targets. These models evolved into so-called “Value at Risk” (“VaR”) 
models, which came to dominate capital calculation technologies in the late 1990s.74 
What is most distinctive about these models is that they are based on proprietary 
valuation technologies developed by individual securities firms rather than regulatory 
agencies. They represent a new form of self-regulation.75 Their development was 
spurred, in part, by the increasing complexity of financial instruments that made up 
securities firms’ portfolios and by the difficulty of applying the SEC’s conventional 
“comprehensive” capitalisation requirements to instruments whose risk valuation could 
vary dramatically. Self-regulation was, of course, far removed from capital adequacy 
methodologies favoured by Richard Breeden. Breeden’s vehement opposition to 
EU/Basle Committee regulatory approaches discouraged US firms from promoting or 
actively endorsing alternative approaches until after Breeden retired as SEC Chairman in 
1993.
73 After hitting a peak o f US$5.5 billion in 1986, pre-tax profits for the domestic securities industry 
declined to a net loss o f US$200 million in 1990. Corporate bond underwriting volume was flat between 
1986 and 1990 and more profitable equity underwriting declined by 50% over the same period
74 See Appendices.
75 Firms’ proprietary VaR models differed significantly, further dividing securities firms over capitalisation 
policy - making opposition to the SEC more difficult.
76 Nevertheless, less than two years after Breeden stepped down as SEC Chairman, the SEC began to 
delegate a degree o f self-regulatory authority to securities firms.
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Despite industry weaknesses, securities industry lobbyists and private firms were 
powerful and did influence domestic regulatory development -  when the largest firms 
were united, when they felt they could be effective, or when they were compelled to act. 
This was seen in the SIA’s decision to abandon opposition to Glass-Steagall reform. In 
December 1989, after a hiatus of nearly sixty years, the SIA endorsed a plan permitting 
commercial banks to underwrite securities, reversing long-standing opposition from 
securities firms and the SLA.77
Glass-Steagall had slowly eroded over the preceding five years, and modification
78had been debated for at least a decade prior to the SIA’s policy change. Nevertheless, 
the SIA’s decision to change its policy came as a surprise to many securities industry
70participants, including Breeden. While praising the SIA’s decision, he noted that they
80were also acknowledging market evolution to a universal banking model. Nevertheless, 
the SIA announcement influenced the structure of domestic financial services regulation. 
While government regulators and Congress had advocated Glass-Steagall reform for 
many years, the securities trade association, bolstered by the SEC, had delayed it. When 
the securities industry elected to exert its influence in Congress to shape policy, through 
the SIA or directly, it could be influential. However, on the issue of capitalisation, for the 
reasons discussed above, the SIA decided not to lobby for domestic regulatory change.
77 The SIA’s decision was encouraged by a 1989 US Federal court’s denial o f an SIA lawsuit that sought to 
enjoin Bankers Trust’s commercial paper trading operations. Following the court decision, several larger 
domestic securities firms dropped their defence o f Glass-Steagall and the SIA joined them. For a detailed 
history o f the Glass-Steagall Act’s evolution see: Reinicke, Banking, Politics and Global Finance: 
American Commercial Banks and Regulatory Change, 1980 - 1990.
78 In 1987, the Federal Reserve changed its interpretation o f Glass-Steagall language prohibiting federally 
chartered commercial banks from affiliating with firms “engaged principally” in underwriting non­
government securities. The change permitted subsidiaries of bank holding companies to underwrite new 
classes o f securities. An SIA court challenge failed. In 1989, the Federal Reserve, through a 
reinterpretation o f Sec. 20 o f the Glass-Steagall Act, indicated it would expand the type and volume o f  
debt securities commercial banks could underwrite through specialised “Section 20” subsidiaries. Market 
participants expected that equity underwriting would be permitted in 1990 or 1991.
79 The policy change was the work o f three o f the largest US securities firms: Goldman Sachs, Morgan 
Stanley and First Boston. These firms met privately to draft the SIA’s new policy, had their approach 
endorsed by the SIA’s ten member legislation committee (which included the three firms) and, finally, by 
the Association’s Board.
80 William Power, "Securities Industry Accepts Bank Role, but on Its Terms," The Wall Street Journal, 
December 4, 1989. The affirmative role o f private US firms in shaping US regulatory policy is evidenced 
through the initiative o f US investment banks in altering SIA policy and the efforts o f Bankers Trust and 
Morgan Guaranty in challenging Glass-Steagall. However, the decision to endorse Glass-Steagall change 
was as much a grudging reflection o f inexorable US domestic market evolution to universal banking, and a 
desire to proactively manage regulatory change, as it was a positive decision to adopt universal banking.
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But private US securities firms were not consistently successful in lobbying the 
SEC or Congress. The SEC unfailingly rebuffed industry efforts to obtain reductions in 
disclosure requirements for listing foreign clients on US bourses.81 Consequently, the 
role of private actors or policy communities in shaping the course of US regulatory 
evolution was variable but occasionally significant, depending on the nature of the issue 
and on policy agreement between the SEC and the private sector. As noted above, their 
role in determining the evolution of negotiations in IOSCO was very limited.
For their part, US securities firms did not lobby IOSCO, because of IOSCO’s thin 
bureaucratic infrastructure. IOSCO’s work was carried out by its working parties, which 
were staffed by representatives of member-states. Private sector lobbying efforts were 
directed to national regulatory agents, not to IOSCO. The critical domestic agency 
accessible to US industry lobbyists was the SEC, which had already indicated its lack in 
interest in changing US domestic capital regulation. As a result, both US and European 
private sector lobbyists turned their attention to the EU.
Despite encouraging better coordination with the Basle Committee and IOSCO, 
European policy networks strongly endorsed the EU’s building block approach. This 
resulted from their negative judgement of IOSCO’s capabilities and their own deeper 
penetration of EU deliberations.
One European policy community’s argument82 that the EU should delay adoption 
of regulatory standards, in deference to IOSCO and the Basle Committee, indicates the
0*3
value that European actors placed on multilateral harmonisation. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the initial positive response of European policy communities to the 
possibility that a broader multilateral agreement on capital might be developed by 
IOSCO or the Basle Committee was a recommendation to delay adoption of the CAD. 
However, domestic and regional political considerations, together with the greater 
likelihood of the EU producing a preferred capital standard, finally outweighed more
8] See section entitled “Daimler Benz” in Chapter 11.
82 The policy community was the British Bankers Association.
83 The EU’s preference for multilateralism can be traced to the Treaty o f Rome and SEA.
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altruistic inclinations, and the CAD was adopted before IOSCO and Basle Committee 
recommendations were issued.84
Conclusions
IOSCO’s governance structure constrained the institution’s ability to adopt policy 
prescriptions, to exert international authority, and to facilitate mutual benefits. Effective 
veto power allocated to IOSCO’s principal members frustrated the development of 
policy recommendations. The SEC’s attempt to improve IOSCO’s policy output (and to 
dominate IOSCO’s policy-making process) failed to generate mutual benefits or to foster 
cooperation. More fundamentally, it did not increase the SEC’s policy influence and 
further inhibited policy formation. The absence of prior agreements meant that IOSCO’s 
membership did not have a history of cooperation through IOSCO on which to build.
Private sector policy networks present an ambivalent picture. European 
communities promoted international cooperation but, frustrated by IOSCO’s frailties and 
pressed by regional political priorities, they opted for a regional regulatory resolution. 
US communities appeared to discourage international cooperation by supporting the 
SEC. This claim (made by the SEC) is problematic, however, as it was in the securities 
firms’ economic interest -  and within their commercial expertise -  to endorse EU states’ 
preferred capital formulations.
US policy networks’ failure to lobby IOSCO or the SEC is explained by several 
factors. First, opportunities to lobby IOSCO were limited. Second, IOSCO’s governance 
weaknesses and SEC obstructionism encouraged policy networks (and EU members) to 
focus on the EU and 1992 priorities rather than on IOSCO. Finally, in the US, private 
actor commercial weakness and regulatory sensitivity, combined with the SEC’s 
confident assertiveness, inhibited aggressive lobbying on capitalisation. As a result, the 
SEC was able, in this case, to act autonomously and to inhibit the development of
84 As discussed previously, conversations with European participants indicate that they were motivated to 
establish an EU regulatory precedent ahead o f IOSCO or the Basle Committee because the EU had been 
“surprised” by the contents o f the Basle Capital Accord in 1987 and was determined not to be surprised 
again by exogenous regulatory announcements.
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standards it could not accept. Individual state sovereignty was ensured and the 
mobilisation of sub-national interests was constrained.
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Chapter 10
The SEC and the Structure of Domestic Authority
Introduction
Since the SEC had a prominent role in shaping IOSCO and EU negotiations, it is 
important to understand the composition and history of SEC authority. This history 
influenced SEC (and Richard Breeden’s) responses during the IOSCO and EU 
negotiations. The present chapter observes that the SEC’s authority was shaped by its 
legislative and regulatory origins, by the nature of its work, and by bureaucratic battles, 
managerial missteps and enforcement challenges. These factors gave the SEC 
considerable domestic authority, but they also placed it under pressure to respond to 
market developments and bureaucratic challenges. They shaped not only the SEC’s 
authority, but also its response to international harmonisation initiatives.1
Identifying the sources and expression of institutional preferences is critical in 
analysing authority. Institutions are broadly construed to include bodies of rules and 
regulations as well as administrative agencies. State-centric perspectives argue that 
assessing the policy-making authority of state institutions is critical to understanding the 
development of authority and influence. Non-state centric approaches stress the influence 
of supra and sub-national interests. This chapter examines both perspectives in its 
assessment of the development and application of the SEC’s regulatory authority and 
influence in the IOSCO negotiations.
The chapter concentrates analytically on the SEC. There are several reasons for 
this emphasis. The SEC and Breeden dominated IOSCO’s capital adequacy negotiations 
by virtue of Breeden’s successive chairmanships o f  the Executive and Technical 
Committees. The SEC’s influence was also strengthened by IOSCO’s relative
1 The next chapter will focus on Richard Breeden and SEC-initiated responses to harmonisation initiatives.
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inexperience with policy development and by its governance structure.2 The SEC’s 
discomfort with regulatory harmonisation further distinguished it from its international 
peers. The origins of the SEC’s approach are found in its history and experience with 
domestic market crises. Finally, during the IOSCO negotiations, EU member-states were 
also focused on the development of the CAD and ISD and on related Basle Committee 
research. EU member-states prioritised 1992 Single Market objectives. Contributing to 
their decision was their judgement that the SEC would veto EU preferences in IOSCO. 
They effectively left the SEC to dominate IOSCO deliberations.
The analysis is divided into two parts. First, the character of the US domestic 
securities regulatory regime and the SEC are assessed. Second, the policy-making 
authority of the SEC is analysed through a review of regulatory challenges and 
responses.
The SEC’s Authority
Between 1987 and 1993, the SEC’s domestic political and economic authority 
was considerable. Its powerful domestic position derived from its political 
independence, its regulatory authority, and strong industry and Congressional support.
The SEC was not, of course, immune from political influence or from conflict 
with the President, the Congress, other governmental agencies, or the private sector. Its 
independence varied over time and from issue to issue. Its domestic regulatory autonomy 
was also constrained by bureaucratic competition and weak leadership after the 1987 
crash. However, a combination of factors, detailed in this and the following chapter, 
outlines how the SEC’s autonomy remained intact in addressing international capital 
adequacy standards and globalisation more generally. Prominent amongst these factors
2 This made adoption o f policy recommendations problematic, since a powerful member, such as the SEC, 
could veto contentious policies and stalemate progress. It is, o f course, also argued that agreement between 
the US and UK, the most prominent market regulators, was necessary for the successful implementation of  
international, harmonised regulatory standards.
3 The SEC remains a prominent and influential government agency. However, today the SEC Chairman is 
greatly overshadowed in policy-making authority by the Treasury Secretary, the President’s personal 
Economic Advisor and by the Chairman o f the Federal Reserve Board. During Breeden’s tenure as SEC 
Chairman, a new incumbent, Alan Greenspan, chaired the Federal Reserve and Nicholas Brady, a 
Washington outsider and investment banker (though, like Breeden, a close Bush friend), was Treasury 
Secretary. Consequently, Breeden, a Washington insider and loyal Bush political ally, enjoyed greater 
senior level access and, particularly international, policymaking influence than did his immediate 
predecessors (or, arguably, successors).
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was Richard Breeden’s personality and relationship with the President. However, 
securities industry weakness, recession, a successful regulatory track-record in 
preventing investment bank failures, industry division and market crises all reinforced 
SEC autonomy and domestic authority.
The SEC’s prominence derived in no small measure from Breeden’s close 
relationship with President Bush4 and from his aggressiveness in asserting his regulatory 
preferences both domestically and internationally. These characteristics gave the SEC 
considerable independence and authority in developing policy positions and in 
representing the US in international regulatory forums.5
Mission and governance
Congress founded the SEC in 1934, decades before its international peers were 
created, to address market operations and practices that had contributed to the 1929 stock 
market crash. More specifically, the Commission’s creation reflected a government 
desire to protect investors, to restore market confidence and to stimulate economic 
growth. Two laws adopted to address these concerns after the 1929 crash authorised the 
SEC to pursue market fraud or manipulation and to regulate the marketing, distribution 
and trading of securities.6
A committee of five individuals, including a designated chairman, all nominated 
by the President and approved by the Senate Banking Committee, governs the SEC. 
Three committee members may be from the same party as the sitting President. These 
provisions were designed to preserve the political independence of the SEC. The 
President and Congress jointly oversee SEC activities; however, in practice, the SEC 
operates largely independently.
4 References to President Bush or the “Bush Administration” are to the 41st President o f the U.S., George 
H.W. Bush. His administration extended from 1989-1993.
5 This analysis is adapted from Anne M. Khademian, The SEC and Capital Market Regulation: The 
Politics o f  Expertise (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992). and from Corinne Bronfman, 
Kenneth Lehn, and Robert A. Schwartz, "US Securities Markets Regulation: Regulatory Structure," in 
International Financial Market Regulation, ed. Benn Steil (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1994).
6 The Securities Act o f 1933 (“‘33 Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act o f 1934 (“’34 Act”).
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Political independence
The SEC’s independence derives from the nature of its regulatory decisions, 
client bases and enforcement history.
SEC activities and budget authorisation are subject to the oversight of the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee and the Senate Banking Committee. These 
committees are responsible for the integrity of US financial services. As a result, 
Congress is involved administratively and has a limited degree of authority over the 
SEC. However, Congress’ ability to influence SEC policy is limited, due to the 
politically sensitive and technical nature of the SEC’s regulatory remit and decisions. 
Regulatory policies affect markets, public and private institutions, and political and 
economic constituencies. The fact that consequences of regulatory policy choices are 
often difficult to predict has made Congress reluctant to become too deeply involved in 
issues such as capital adequacy, where the impact of policy is uncertain and regulation 
often highly technical. Legislators have preferred to leave the majority of technical 
regulatory issues to the SEC’s highly regarded legal staff. On capital adequacy, Congress 
was persuaded by Chairman Breeden’s testimony that US standards should not be 
lowered through international harmonisation. Influencing their decision were recent 
market scandals and the absence of compelling arguments from market lobbyists that 
retaining existing US capitalisation standards would disadvantage US firms.
A second reason for the SEC’s independence and authority is that the agency’s 
clients are highly diversified, representing a broad cross-section of interests. Clients’ 
regulatory preferences frequently compete, diluting their ability to influence SEC 
regulatory decisions. The securities industry comprises distinct constituencies: 
brokerages of varying size catering to individual and institutional investors, investment 
banks focused principally on the interests of large institutional and sovereign entities, 
and investment advisors, mutual funds and insurance interests. The preferences of this 
disparate group coincide in their preference for regulation promoting market stability and 
investor confidence. However, their preferences otherwise diverge, based on their size, 
client bases and trading objectives. Additionally, where their activities do overlap, 
intense competition further dilutes their ability to influence SEC regulatory actions.
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SEC authority can also be found in its notable success in enforcing regulatory 
statutes.7 Its strong track record has reinforced Congress’ reluctance to become too 
closely associated with its investigations for fear of attracting negative publicity or 
tainting an investigation. Its effectiveness has also made Congress hesitant to politicise 
the agency.8 Congress has generally left SEC enforcement and regulatory decisions to 
Commission experts.9
These characteristics traditionally afforded the SEC significant independence and 
authority in pursuing its domestic and international regulatory preferences.10
Regulatory principles and legislative influence
The SEC’s perspective on regulatory priorities helps define the Commission’s 
reluctance to cooperate internationally in the development of harmonised capital 
adequacy standards.
Prior to the 1929 stock market crash, exchanges in the US were governed by a
combination of state laws, market customs and private governing organisations.11 Laws
10adopted in 1933 and 1934 principally addressed practices that hurt individual investors.
7 The SEC’s investigation o f Bernard Comfeld and Robert Vesco’s investment companies revealed that 
President Nixon’s 1972 re-election campaign received contributions from Vesco. In the late 1970s, the 
SEC investigated foreign bribes allegedly made by major US companies including Lockheed, Exxon and 
Gulf Oil. During the Carter administration, the SEC investigated the finances o f Bert Lance, President 
Carter’s Budget Director. The SEC participated in investigations leading to indictments o f  Dennis Levine, 
Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken. In each instance, the SEC successfully concluded high profile 
investigations. This track record was enormously attractive to Congress, which enjoyed any association 
with the SEC’s success. See: Khademian, The SEC and Capital Market Regulation: The Politics o f  
Expertise.
8 SEC Chairman John Shad (appointed by President Reagan) was the first Chairman with an overtly 
political agenda (principally deregulation) evident in his policy preferences.
9 Recent (2002/2003) US regulatory scandals (the Enron bankruptcy, the compensation and accounting 
scandals involving, inter alia, Global Crossing, WorldCom and Tyco, the concern about connections 
between investment banking business and favourable equity research, and insider trading concerns with 
Imclone) have animated Congressional interest in SEC oversight and regulatory weaknesses and 
compelled the SEC Chairman’s (Harvey Pitt) resignation.
10 Notwithstanding these comments, the SEC was not insensitive to private sector preferences or, 
potentially, capture, as the discussion in the immediately preceding chapters highlights, nor to competition 
from other federal, state and supranational competitors (see below).
1 ] Similar to European bourses up to the late 1980s.
12 A core principle o f the ‘33 Act was that investors needed to make informed investment decisions. To 
achieve this, securities issued in the US were required to be registered with a federal agency and meet 
prescribed disclosure standards. Initially this was the Federal Trade Commission and, after 1934, the SEC. 
The ‘34 Act brought exchanges under federal supervision. Early enforcement actions were used primarily 
to implement disclosure regulations rather than change exchange trading practices, although margin 
requirements, a notorious source o f exchange problems, were changed. This reflected the SEC’s desire to 
objectively address its varied constituencies - Wall Street firms, Congress and investors, both individual
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However, the SEC was not insensitive to market developments. In 1975, in 
response to the confrontation of domestic trading growth with antiquated settlement and 
clearance procedures, the SEC proposed legislation to update market practices, 
simultaneously addressing varied SEC, market and Congressional regulatory concerns. 
The review process produced a legislative package that enhanced the SEC’s 
enforcement, rule-making and market oversight capacities. This legislation strengthened 
the agency’s domestic reputation and its authority.
The SEC’s technical expertise and proactive role in legislative development and
enforcement gave it the profile of a powerful law firm. Because much of its work
involved investigation and enforcement of securities laws, many of the SEC’s staff were 
11securities lawyers. Attorneys often joined the SEC following law school, worked with 
the Commission for a number of years and then left to pursue private practices, 
frequently with law firms that worked with the SEC. As a consequence, the SEC trained 
many prominent private securities lawyers, a relationship that reinforced the support of 
the private legal community for the SEC’s operations and created a large policy 
community.
The securities industry was itself a strong Commission advocate. The SEC’s 
rules-based approach to securities regulation provided unambiguous operating guidelines 
for a highly competitive industry. This helped to minimise industry conflicts, and it 
provided confidence and clarity to market operations. Additionally, the SEC’s well- 
publicised enforcement successes increased public confidence and bolstered markets by 
reminding market participants of the SEC’s powerful policing resources.
SEC staffers were also highly regarded, principally because they were apolitical. 
The staff maintained a professional distance from its politically-appointed 
commissioners and paid scrupulous attention to the independence of its regulatory 
judgements.
and institutional - and promote economic recovery. The ’33 and ’34 Acts also emphasised that SEC rules 
meet very high legal standards and explicitly address investor concerns. This further encouraged an SEC 
focus on investor and disclosure legislation rather than market structure or trading practices. See generally: 
Khademian, The SEC and Capital Market Regulation: The Politics o f  Expertise.
13 In 1988, 62 percent o f the SEC’s professional staff were securities lawyers. (SEC, Self-Funding Study, 
1988, II-1)
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This combination of factors contributed to the SEC’s powerful reputation in 
Washington. There was a closely related perception that the SEC’s endorsement was 
critical for the passage of securities-related legislation. As noted, the SEC’s opposition 
to Glass-Steagall reform was instrumental in delaying formal legislative reform until 
1998/99.
The SEC’s enforcement activities encouraged legislative development. SEC 
actions brought against Drexel Burnham Lambert were considered critical in the 
adoption of the 1988 Insider Trading Bill, which had not attracted significant attention 
before SEC indictments and legislative endorsement. A former SEC Commissioner 
commented on the SEC’s legislative authority, “It is just short of being decisive...It 
almost totally has a veto on securities legislation that it opposes...When [legislation] 
passes, it is always satisfactory to the Commission. Part of it is the agency’s 
expertise...it is also that the Commission is seen as... responsible, prudent.... Congress 
gives a great deal of weight to its opinion.”14 But despite the SEC’s authority, its powers 
were limited: by Congress, by domestic courts and by the ambitions of other domestic 
regulatory agencies.
Comparing the SEC with non-US Regulators
Because the SEC’s regulatory mandate grew out the 1929 stock market crash, its 
regulatory priorities differed from those of its European peers. The SEC focused on 
investor protection rather than support for the commercial preferences of securities 
institutions. This perspective led the SEC to develop a detailed set of rules and 
procedures stressing disclosure and operational transparency for securities registration, 
issuance and trading well before its international peers did. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the SEC’s conservative capitalisation requirements were inflexible and unilateral. They 
were also effective. Defaults by US securities firms, even during periods of financial 
stress, were rare. The SEC’s regulatory perspective was also influenced by the 
significant roles of securities markets and of private individual and institutional investors
14 Khademian, The SEC and Capital Market Regulation: The Politics o f  Expertise.
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in funding US economic growth. This contrasted sharply with the more prominent 
political and economic role of bank lending in European markets.15
In Europe and Japan, domestic securities market development, with few 
exceptions, remained rudimentary until the development of the Euromarkets in the 
1960s. In contrast to the comprehensively regulated US markets, the Euromarkets were 
substantially unregulated. Such rules as existed for securities issuance and trading were 
developed in response to market and institutional, as opposed to investor, preferences. 
Domestic markets were operated by cartels under idiosyncratic rules designed largely to 
accommodate the interests of market participants, governments and large institutions 
rather than those of investors. The proximity of European domestic markets to each other 
encouraged regulatory competition. The relatively isolated US capital markets operated 
under an entirely different, longer-standing and more highly codified regulatory regime 
that emphasised investor, rather than institutional, interests.
US Regulatory Preferences
Scandals and crises affecting US financial services during the late 1980s 
confirmed the value of the SEC’s regulatory regime and discouraged domestic regulatory 
reform that would liberalise capital calculation methodologies. In the opinion of US 
legislators and the SEC, regulatory capital conservatism had minimised long-term 
damage from the 1987 stock market crash. They also believed that deregulation had been 
responsible for the 1988 domestic savings & loan (“S&L”) crisis. Additional events -  the 
bankruptcy of investment bank Drexel Burnham Lambert, the Salomon Brothers 
Treasury auction rigging scandal, and suspicion that the Basle Accord had contributed to 
the 1989-1991 recession -  corroborated the SEC’s and Chairman Breeden’s belief that 
changing the US capital adequacy regime was foolhardy. More significantly, these 
events convinced US regulators that the appropriate US response to international 
regulatory harmonisation initiatives was to export US regulatory norms. The SEC, 
despite Congressional and private sector support for regulatory export initiatives, still 
confronted domestic bureaucratic constraints. These were reflected in domestic
15 Ibid.
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competition over resources and regulatory jurisdiction. These events established the 
shape of US regulatory authority.16
International regulatory leadership
In the US, the 1987 crash generated numerous government investigations and 
proposals for better managing market crises.17 Most proposals recommended some form 
of supervisory and regulatory consolidation. These recommendations intensified the 
competition already existing between governmental regulators over the scope of their 
responsibilities. But one issue not considered problematic was capital adequacy. 
Research indicated that domestic markets and securities firms had survived the crash 
relatively unscathed. The crash did, however, highlight the connection between market 
globalisation and increased price volatility. As a result, many regulators recommended 
that international regulatory coordination be increased and that certain technical market 
amendments be considered. Changes to domestic securities regulation were focused 
primarily on settlement and trading issues. These conclusions dampened enthusiasm for 
significant regulatory reform of the domestic securities industry but encouraged the 
export of the US regulatory regime. The GAO, in a 1988 summary of issues affecting the 
financial services industry, recommended that the US “take the lead in developing 
mechanisms for establishing and enforcing any necessary international standards for 
regulation of financial markets.” Their report urged the US to lead the development of 
4 cooperative international information and coordination initiatives.18 The SEC adopted 
the GAO’s recommendation and announced its intention to lead international regulatory 
harmonisation at the 1989 IOSCO annual meeting.
But SEC vulnerabilities are revealed by the crash
At the time of the 1987 crash, the SEC chairman was David Ruder, a law 
professor who had little market experience. On the day of the crash, he publicly 
contemplated a temporary closure of the securities markets. It was pointed out to him 
that he did not have the authority to close markets, and he came under considerable 
personal criticism; and his comments were blamed for exacerbating the market’s decline.
16 See below and Chapter 11 for discussion o f these events.
17 See below for further discussion.
18 GAO, "Financial Services Industry Issues,” (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting 
Office, 1988).
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His gaffe cast him as a “slightly dazed academic” to both Wall Street and Washington. It 
damaged his credibility and, briefly, the SEC’s as well.19
The market crash highlighted other problems with the SEC. The agency’s 
declining manpower and outdated market monitoring technology were noted in 
Congressional testimony. The GAO commented, “We think their [SEC’s] resources 
have been outstripped by the market. Since 1980, the markets have exploded, the number 
of (securities-related) employees has skyrocketed and trading volume has gone off the
91scale. You’ve got to wonder if they can handle it.” These observations prompted a re-
99examination of the regulatory preferences of former SEC Chairman John Shad. Richard
9^
Jenrette, a respected banker, observed, “The mass pursuit of deregulation has been 
dealt a blow. There will be some re-regulation.”24 But any attempt by Ruder, the current 
chairman, to change regulatory philosophy would need the support of the four other SEC 
Commissioners, all appointed by President Reagan.
Response to the crash
The 1987 crash and the 1988 collapse of US securities firm Drexel Burnham 
Lambert intensified domestic examination of market risk and securities firm 
capitalisation.25 The SEC, having decided to initiate rather than react to regulatory 
concerns, focused its attention on domestic legislation and the export of US regulatory 
precedents.
Reflecting this decision, SEC Chairman Ruder requested a 1990 SEC budget 
US$10 million greater than the US$168 million proposed by the new Bush 
administration. Ruder requested the extra funding for a special SEC group organised to 
anticipate significant risks to US markets and investors and to encourage greater
19 Thomas E. Ricks and Tim Carrington, "Challenging Job: In Aftermath o f Crash, Many Ask If SEC Chief 
Is up to His New Post," The Wall Street Journal, 11/3/87.
20 As part o f Reagan-era government “downsizing,” the SEC’s budget had been constrained and the 
agency’s resources had not kept pace with market growth.
21 Ricks and Carrington, "Challenging Job: In Aftermath o f Crash, Many Ask If SEC Chief Is up to His 
New Post.”
22 Shad, like many Reagan appointees, believed strongly in de-regulation.
23 Jenrette was a founder o f the investment bank Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette.
24 Ricks and Carrington, "Challenging Job: In Aftermath of Crash, Many Ask If SEC Chief Is up to His 
New Post.”
25 Drexel’s collapse was not, however, associated with the crash. See longer discussion o f Drexel collapse 
below.
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international regulatory cooperation.26 In September 1989, the Senate Banking 
Committee approved Ruder’s request, granting a 25% increase in the SEC’s fiscal year 
1990 budget27 and a 19% increase in the fiscal 1991 budget.25 The increases confirmed 
continued Senate support for the SEC, its regulatory initiatives and its increased 
responsiveness to market internationalisation.
Domestic legislative initiatives targeted causes of the crash. The 1988 Insider 
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act authorised the SEC to cooperate with 
foreign governments in investigating securities fraud cases.29 The bill reflected 
Congress’ growing awareness of cross-border trading and acknowledged that the SEC 
was virtually alone in vigorously enforcing insider-trading statutes. It also reflected 
Congressional and SEC concern that cross-border efforts to regulate international capital 
markets should promote American interests, if  possible by extending domestic regulatory 
standards beyond national boundaries. The presence of existing reciprocal cooperation 
agreements between governments, and the potential for cooperation to “prejudice the 
public interest of the United States,” were to be considered in any future international 
cooperative efforts.30
Of the eight bills drafted to address regulatory concerns raised by the crash, only 
one made it out of committee for wider debate. The complexity of the issues underlying 
the crash defied straightforward regulatory solutions. Other factors had discouraged new 
legislation as well: the waning Reagan administration had been divided over financial 
services regulatory initiatives, the medium-term consequences of the crash were not 
considered dire, Wall Street -  a traditional supporter of Republican administrations -  
resisted regulatory change, and it had been an election year. Finally, conflicting 
regulatory reform recommendations hindered legislative development.
The Brady Commission had endorsed the creation of an intermarket regulator to 
improve emergency domestic regulatory coordination. But support for the Brady 
commission’s recommendation waned in the face of strong disagreement from regulatory
26 Peter Riddell, "Ruder Explains SEC's Stance on Drexel," Financial Times, 4/19/89.
27 To $178 million.
28 To $212.6 million.
29 Drexel’s securities law violations had come to light because o f foreign regulatory cooperation.
30 John R. Cranford, "Drexel Case Seen Spurring Support: House Votes 410-0 to Stiffen Penalties for 
Insider Trading," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 9/17/88.
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agency chairmen.31 President Reagan had requested a second study,32 which reached the 
same conclusions as an earlier GAO study: increased regulatory co-ordination was 
desirable, but an intermarket regulator was unnecessary. The conflicting 
recommendations resulted in legislative gridlock. Inaction, however, had also prevented 
a political confrontation over the scope of SEC regulatory jurisdiction. And this, given 
Chairman Ruder’s indifferent leadership, benefited the SEC. The second study also noted 
the transitory nature of damage from the crash and the absence of a compelling rationale 
for dramatic regulatory change.
Following the 1988 Presidential election, the path was cleared for new financial 
services legislative initiatives. The SEC submitted the International Securities 
Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1989 to Congress, which built on the 1988 Insider 
Trading Act. The bill authorised the SEC to conduct domestic investigations on behalf 
of non-US regulatory agencies. But its objective was, in fact, reciprocity. The bill was 
designed to encourage foreign regulators to cooperate with SEC investigations, which 
increasingly extended beyond US borders.34 Because many non-US jurisdictions had 
little experience with securities fraud investigations or enforcement, the legislation 
further facilitated the export of US regulatory norms and enhanced the SEC’s ability to 
strengthen bilateral regulatory enforcement agreements - as it had been encouraged to do 
by the GAO.35
In recommending the legislation, the SEC noted instances where the negotiation 
of bilateral assistance agreements had been impossible due to the SEC’s inability to
31 Brady may have been persuaded by his former colleagues in the securities industry to retreat from his 
recommendation for an intermarket regulator, particularly if  that regulator was to be the Federal Reserve 
and not the SEC. It is also possible the Federal Reserve indicated its discomfort at being nominated for the 
role. See below under “Intermarket regulator debate”.
32 The study was chaired by Treasury Under-Secretary George Gould.
33ISRR, "SEC Funding, Data-Sharing Bill Receives Senate Panel’s OK,” September 27, 1989.
34 Key provisions o f the bill gave the SEC authority to exempt from US disclosure requirements 
confidential documents received from foreign regulators and included a reciprocal right for the SEC to 
provide confidential documents to overseas regulators. The bill gave the SEC broad discretion in 
cooperating with foreign regulators, extended its investigative capabilities, granted emergency powers, and 
mandated closer cooperation among domestic regulators. See: Pamela Jimenez, ''International Securities 
Enforcement Cooperation Act and Memoranda o f Understanding," Harvard International Law Journal 31, 
no. 1 (Winter 1990).
35The SEC’s earlier efforts to establish bilateral agreements had been frustrated by foreign regulators’ 
concern with US disclosure laws. See: ISRR, "SEC Asks for More Authority in International 
Investigations.” March 15, 1989.
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ensure the confidentiality of information provided by foreign authorities. This 
observation was particularly significant because a 1988 version of the bill, which 
coincided with the SEC’s Drexel investigation, had died just as the House published a 
report concluding that the SEC did not investigate the majority of suspicious securities 
trades of non-US origin brought to its attention by US exchanges.
The legislation was one of several bills the SEC sent to Congress in response to
• IQ
the internationalisation of securities markets and recent market scandals. Key 
Congressional Democrats and the securities industry trade association, the SIA,
I Q
supported the SEC’s International Securities Enforcement Cooperation initiative. This 
support, viewed together with the SEC’s budget increase, confirmed continuing 
Congressional and private sector endorsement of SEC sponsored legislation and 
regulatory objectives -  despite Ruder’s weak leadership.
The Treasury Department positioned the US to export its regulatory values. 
Speaking at the World Financial Summit in September 1989, Treasury Under-Secretary 
Glauber urged that US regulators40 develop a domestic forum where they could discuss 
regulatory issues and build a consensus on “common rules of the road” for international 
regulatory discussions.41 Glauber’s proposal acknowledged the increasing integration of 
securities with options, futures and commodities, but it also highlighted Congressional 
opposition to an SEC/CFTC merger.47 Glauber’s recommendation was not adopted, but it 
confirmed US intentions to develop and promote international regulatory standards.
36 ISRR, "SEC Asks for More Authority in International Investigations.”
37 "SEC and Congress Again Seek Foreign Co-Operation," Australian Financial Review, 3/10/89. The 
House committee was the Government Operations Sub-committee.
38 See below for discussion o f Drexel, S&L, and Salomon scandals.
39 Representative Dingell (D-MI), Chairman o f the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and 
Representative Markey, together with Senator Dodd (D-CT), Senate Securities sub-committee Chairman, 
and Senator Riegel (D-MI), Chairman o f the Senate Banking Committee, all endorsed the legislation. See: 
"Riegel Promises Prompt Action on Securities Legislation," Dow Jones News Service - Ticker, 4/18/89. 
and "Dingell, Markey Intent on Stock Market Reform Legislation," Dow Jones News Service - Ticker, 
4/4/89.
40 Glauber recommended the CFTC, Federal Reserve, SEC, and commodities and securities exchanges 
create the forum. See also discussion immediately below: “Domestic Turf Wars” and “SEC/CFTC 
Jurisdictional Conflicts.”
41 Securities Week, "US Regulators Need Forum for International Issues, Glauber Says," in Securities 
Week (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1989).
42 House and Senate Agriculture Committees and the powerful House Ways and Means Committee all 
opposed a merger.
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In October 1989, an SEC official, speaking at a legal conference, noted that US 
regulators needed to harmonise their regulatory response to market internationalisation. 
Other speakers suggested that the SEC and CFTC might be under pressure to cooperate 
as a consequence of competitive pressures stemming from the EU’s 1992 objective. SEC 
official Brandon Becker agreed, “There is pressure from globalisation to have our 
[domestic] standards harmonised in terms of entry and exit. The US deals with two 
regulators and the rest of the world may be able to speak with one voice.”43 CFTC 
Commissioner William Albrecht was more direct. Commenting on pressure to harmonise 
regulations in response to the Single Market, he noted, “What we’re going to need to see 
in the future is an international super-regulator.”44
Congress had reconfirmed its support for the SEC’s objectives and operations in 
the wake of the crash and scandals. Nevertheless, the Commission was under pressure to 
improve its performance and to better position itself, domestically to respond to potential 
financial services and regulatory consolidation, and, internationally, to respond to 
regulatory harmonisation.
Domestic turf wars
Competition between federal bureaucracies responsible for the regulation of 
financial services in the US was intense, made worse by the rapidly blurring operational 
lines between the securities, banking and insurance industries. The desire of regulatory 
bureaucracies to maintain and expand their jurisdictional footprints provoked domestic 
institutional conflicts.
In December 1987, two months after the stock market crash, Alan Greenspan, the 
new Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, had testified before the Senate Banking 
Committee that he endorsed the concept of an umbrella regulatory agency to supervise 
US financial markets, a recommendation also made by the Brady Commission.45 
Greenspan also proposed the liberalisation of Glass-Steagall, but, addressing concern 
that regulatory reform would provoke an SEC/Federal Reserve turf battle, he also
43 ISRR, "1992 Spurs US Agencies to Regulatory Cooperation.”
44 Ibid.
45 The Brady Commission, headed by investment banker Nicholas Brady (subsequently Treasury Secretary 
under President Bush), was established by President Reagan to investigate the causes o f the Crash.
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recommended the functional separation of lending and underwriting.46 His 
recommendation attempted to combine two related Senate bills proposed in the wake of 
the crash.47
These three proposals, all closely following the 1987 crash and reflecting cross­
party support, made it appear probable that Congress would adopt major banking reform 
legislation. This prospect raised sensitive domestic regulatory jurisdictional issues. It was 
possible the SEC would remain sole regulator of functional securities-related activities, 
as Greenspan had recommended, but there was also the possibility that Greenspan’s 
proposal was intended to position the Federal Reserve to become the senior domestic 
regulator. The SEC’s concerns were complicated by the recent missteps of Chairman 
Ruder.
Domestic regulatory competition was further intensified by legislative changes, 
adopted in the late 1980s, that expanded the permitted activities of commercial banks. 
These activities included the ability to solicit brokerage business, to underwrite and 
distribute commercial paper, and to establish separate subsidiaries to underwrite a broad 
range of securities.48 These changes presaged the emergence of bank-led financial 
conglomerates that owned securities firms, but for which the Fed had primary regulatory 
oversight.49 Regulation of commercial bank securities underwriting by the Fed or 
Comptroller of the Currency50 posed a clear jurisdictional conflict with the SEC. 
Anticipating these developments, the SEC had asked Congress in 1987 for unambiguous 
authority to regulate commercial bank brokerage activities. Then-SEC Chairman Shad 
argued that the Commission was not seeking to regulate the “internal activities” of 
commercial banks, but was seeking to clarify “functional regulation.” His objective was 
to have banking regulators oversee credit functions and the SEC supervise securities
46 Greenspan’s proposal was also endorsed by FRBNY President Corrigan. See: "Greenspan Backs Move 
for New Regulatory Body," Australian Financial Review, 12/3/87. Ironically, his proposal was similar to 
one made by SEC Chairman Shad several years earlier.
47 The first by Senators Wirth (D-CO) and Graham (D-FL) and the second by Senators Proxmire (D-WI) 
and Gam (R-UT) both permitted affiliations o f commercial banks and securities firms through bank 
holding companies but did not recommend an intermarket regulator. See: "Issue o f Capital Adequacy May 
Improve Outlook for Glass-Steagall Repeal," Securities Week, 11/30/87.
48 These changes were approved by the Federal Reserve.
49 Financial conglomerates (entities with significant securities and lending operations) did not come into 
existence in the US until the mid-1990s.
50 The Comptroller o f the Currency supervised national banks together with the Fed.
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activities.51 Although Shad’s initiative failed, the SEC successfully deflected further 
bureaucratic encroachment.
SEC/CFTC jurisdictional conflicts
This was not the SEC’s first encounter with bureaucratic encroachment. The SEC 
had a history of aggressively -  if not always successfully -  protecting its self-defined 
regulatory jurisdiction. The most prominent of these efforts was reflected in the SEC’s 
acrimonious relationship with the CFTC.53 Over an eight-year period, the SEC lost three 
court battles with the CFTC over regulatory jurisdiction.54 The jurisdictional fights 
culminated in an awkward 1982 ceasefire agreement, known as the “Johnson/Shad 
Accord,” which formally allocated jurisdiction between the SEC and CFTC.55
The SEC’s attempt to expand its jurisdiction was a response to market change, 
bureaucratic ambition, and jurisdictional overlap. The 1987 stock market crash reignited 
these conflicts by stimulating recommendations for regulatory consolidation.
51 Bruce Ingersoll, "SEC Will Seek Authority from Congress to Regulate Bank Brokerage Activities," The 
Wall Street Journal, April 30, 1987.
52 The SEC had previously attempted to have a federal court impose a registration requirement on the 
banking industry when their powers were expanded to encompass brokerage, which would have brought 
banks’ brokerage activities within the SEC’s regulatory ambit. However, the courts ruled against the SEC. 
The Commission responded by requesting Congress adopt legislation giving them regulatory authority. 
However, they failed to wrest regulatory authority away from powerful banking regulators.
53 In 1974 Congress authorised the CFTC to regulate futures transactions in economically significant 
commodities such as wheat and sugar. The mandate effectively excluded the SEC from jurisdiction over 
commodity options, which the SEC had previously attempted to obtain.
54 In 1975, the SEC objected to the CFTC granting the Chicago Board o f Trade’s (“CBOT”) request for 
permission to trade futures contracts on Government National Mortgage Association (“GNMA”) 
certificates. The SEC lost. In 1978, the SEC again attempted to gain responsibility for a CFTC regulated 
product by asking Congress to grant it jurisdiction for derivative products (futures) with securities as their 
underlying instrument. The SEC again lost. The SEC’s failures reflected the CFTC’s powerful 
Congressional (Agricultural Committee) support and the rapidly increasing complexity o f financial 
products that did not adhere to defined regulatory boundaries. After their 1978 setback, the SEC adopted 
new tactics. That year, the SEC approved the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s (“CBOE”) application to 
trade GNMA options, creating an instrument similar to the GNMA futures contract already traded on the 
CBOT. The CBOT and CFTC sued to halt trading in the new instrument. The courts concurred and 
declared that options fell within the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction. See: Coffee, "Competition Versus 
Consolidation: The Significance o f Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation,".
55 The agreement granted the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over futures contracts and options contracts on 
commodities and currencies. However, each agency was granted jurisdiction over instruments related to 
securities indices, the SEC over options on equity indices and the CFTC over futures on securities indices. 
As markets and products evolved, securities that represented combinations o f options and futures were 
developed, re-opening jurisdictional conflicts. As a result, the agreement only survived until the 1987 stock 
market crash. See: Philip M. Johnson, "Reflections on the CFTC/SEC Jurisdictional Dispute," in 
Regulating International Financial Markets: Issues and Policies, ed. Franklin R. Edwards and Hugh T. 
Patrick (Norwell, Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992).
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The intermarket regulator debate
Speaking at the 1987 Senate Banking Committee hearings on the crash, Ruder 
argued for tighter statutory market regulation to discourage equity trading practices the 
SEC had concluded were a major cause of the crash. Ruder supported the Brady 
Commission’s intermarket regulator recommendation, but he disagreed with its 
nomination of the Federal Reserve to fill that role. Ruder argued that Congress should 
transform the SEC into a super-regulator with powers to halt trading in equity and 
options markets during emergencies. Ruder also asked for legislation to transfer the 
CFTC’s authority to regulate equity index futures to the SEC.56 But, underscoring 
Ruder’s political weakness, his recommendations were not unanimously supported by 
the other SEC Commissioners.57 Ruder’s nomination of the SEC for intermarket 
regulator also ran counter to the SEC’s traditional political neutrality. These disputes 
isolated Ruder within the Commission and made it unlikely that his proposals would be 
adopted.58
The Fed and CFTC had reacted differently to the proposal for an intermarket 
regulator. The Fed, like the SEC, was proud of its reputation for independence and 
political neutrality and was unenthusiastic about assuming a role with major political 
characteristics. In recommending the creation of an intermarket regulator, the Fed had 
endorsed the idea but had assumed that its traditional policy independence would protect 
it against interference from an umbrella supervisor.59
But the CFTC’s new Chairwoman, Wendy Gramm, told Congress she would not 
accept a secondary regulatory role. Speaking at an industry conference, she argued
56 "SEC Chief Urges Congress to Expand Agency's Power," Houston Chronicle, 2/4/88.
57 Including Edward Fleischmann, who spoke out against the SEC and CFTC turf battle. The internal SEC 
debate surfaced again during a Commission meeting where Ruder and Commissioner Joseph Grundfest 
argued over Ruder’s desire to reduce CFTC regulatory responsibilities. Grundfest and Fleischman both 
objected and called for greater domestic regulatory cooperation. See: Deborah Hargreaves, "Futures 
Industry Chief Fights Off Regulation," Financial Times, March 11,1988.
58 Ruder failed to win a majority on several other proposals including increasing margin and minimum 
payment requirements for futures. His lone success was in finding internal agreement to ask Congress for 
authority to halt stock trading in emergencies. David A. Vise, "Battling for Market Control; SEC, Led by 
Ruder, Votes to Ask Congress for Index Futures Role," The Washington Post, 5/27/88.
59 Lionel Barber, "Survey o f Financial Futures and Options: Brady Sets Framework for Debate - the 
Regulatory Impact," Financial Times, 3/10/88 1988.
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against dramatic regulatory changes and said she would resist attempts to merge the SEC 
and CFTC.60
At the conclusion of hearings on the crash two options for amending the US 
financial services regulatory apparatus were proposed. The first, as we have seen, was to 
create a federal intermarket regulator. The second, based on the argument that existing 
market regulatory mechanisms had managed the crisis well, was a more modest 
encouragement of closer agency cooperation. A 1988 GAO report endorsed the second 
option, recommending that preparation be made for future market crises by improving 
domestic regulatory coordination.61 The report also urged US leadership in establishing 
international regulatory harmonisation modalities and cited the Cooke Committee as a 
potential model.62
SEC capitalisation regulations had helped firms and markets weather the 1987 
crash and contemporaneous scandals. Nevertheless, the agency was under domestic 
political pressure to consolidate market supervision.
Market Events Shape the SEC’s Authority
Despite lukewarm support for regulatory change in Congress and in the new 
Bush Administration, domestic capital adequacy standards for securities firms remained 
an important political topic following the crash. The immediate reason was related to 
fall-out from the massive case brought in 1989 by the SEC against domestic securities 
broker-dealer Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (“Drexel”). Additionally, the collapse of 
the savings and loan industry, a US equity market mini-crash, a Treasury bond price-
60 The intermarket regulator debate extended to the conflicting conclusions drawn on causes o f the 1987 
crash. The futures industry (represented by the CFTC) argued its blamelessness in responding to 
accusations that heavy trading volumes in stock index futures had provoked equity price swings. The 
accusation was that stock index futures trading had led to growth o f stock index futures on cash equity 
securities. Trading strategies based on futures had, in turn, significantly increased the velocity and 
concentration o f equity trading. These strategies increased trading risks for exchange specialists and 
strained their ability to provide market liquidity and to smooth trading volatility. Traders in cash markets, 
regulated by the SEC, blamed derivatives. (See Glossary. Derivatives represent transactions whose value is 
derived from an index or unrelated market transaction or event.) The SEC’s analysis focused on the 
consequences o f rapid growth in futures, related products and trading strategies. The SEC concluded that 
equity and equity related products should be subject to coordinated “mandated” regulation. See: Janet 
Bush, "Smoke Starts to Rise over the Battle for Regulation o f US Markets," Financial Times, 2/4/88.
61 See: GAO, "Financial Services Industry Issues.” pp. 1-22. Washington, D.C., 1988.
62 The SEC reiterated this objective in Chairman Ruder’s presentation to the next IOSCO annual meeting. 
Barber, "Survey o f Financial Futures and Options: Brady Sets Framework for Debate - the Regulatory 
Impact.”
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rigging scandal, and concern with the Basle Accord’s unanticipated impact on bank 
credit allocation reminded regulators and legislators of the critical value of capital.
The Drexel scandal
Initiated by insider trading charges brought against Drexel investment banker 
Dennis Levine in 1986, the SEC built a case against Drexel that accused the firm of 
committing the “most massive and pervasive scheme of fraud on Wall Street since the 
1920s.”64 Levine’s indictment and guilty plea were quickly followed by the indictment 
on insider trading charges of Ivan Boesky, the head of a private firm that speculated in 
shares of public companies. Other prominent traders and, by association, their firms were 
implicated in the investigation.65 In January 1988, Drexel was advised that the SEC 
intended to bring insider trading and other charges against the firm and certain 
employees, including Michael Milken, the head of its hugely profitable and influential 
“junk bond”66 operation. Indictments followed in September.
At the time of the indictments, there was speculation that the SEC’s actions 
would provoke a junk bond market collapse, potentially harming other firms active in 
trading junk securities.67 SEC officials, together with the New York Stock Exchange, 
indicated that they would carefully monitor market developments.68 The power and 
profitability of junk bonds had seduced many firms on Wall Street, most notably Drexel, 
into building large junk bond positions. When the market soured, many securities firms 
found themselves hurriedly seeking new capital.69
63 The “mini-crash” came in October 1989.
64 Bruce Ingersoll, "The SEC’s Case against Drexel: Charges Likely to Add Pressure for Tougher Insider- 
Trading Law," The Wall Street Journal, September 8, 1988.
65 The firms included Kidder Peabody and Goldman Sachs.
66 See Glossary: Typically rated below investment grade, investors historically shunned speculative high- 
yield bonds -  so-called “junk bonds”. Milken became famous, powerful and wealthy by developing 
investor interest in these previously obscure, risky financial instruments. Thru merger and acquisition junk 
bond financing he was responsible for a significant segment o f domestic corporate restructuring and 
created huge profits for Drexel by dominating the underwriting, distribution and trading o f  these 
instruments.
67 If junk bond portfolios became illiquid, it would make day-to-day funding difficult for securities firms 
heavily engaged in that market as junk securities would no longer be accepted as collateral for borrowing. 
This would increase capitalisation requirements.
68 Milken and Drexel were responsible for providing liquidity to the junk bond market. Milken’s 
indictment did reduce liquidity and lowered the market value o f junk bond portfolios. Ingersoll, "The 
SEC's Case against Drexel: Charges Likely to Add Pressure for Tougher Insider-Trading Law.”
69 On February 2, 1990 the SEC became aware that Drexel (the broker-dealer) had “up-streamed” 
approximately US$400 million in excess capital to its parent company, the DBL Group (“DBL”). This was 
necessary because DBL was experiencing liquidity problems following a US$650 million legal settlement
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The broker-dealer subsidiary of DBL70 was subject to the SEC’s capital 
requirements -  but the parent company was not. Significantly, it was Drexefs parent 
company that experienced confidence and liquidity problems, not its subsidiary, when 
the junk bond market did -  temporarily -  collapse. For domestic legislators and 
regulators, the Drexel crisis reaffirmed the value of SEC-mandated capital regulation and 
the potential value of expanding SEC regulatory jurisdiction. The experience also 
reaffirmed the expertise of the SEC’s investigative and enforcement arms. Despite 
Drexel’s dramatic failure, the firm’s peers and the markets where they operated 
continued to function normally.71 The SEC’s rules also functioned as predicted; Drexel’s 
assets were rapidly liquidated to reduce its liabilities and the company ceased to 
operate.72
The savings and loan crisis
A disastrously designed deregulation of the US savings and loan (“S&L”) 
industry in the early 1980s, combined with mismanagement, fraud, and depressed local
H'Xeconomies, had, by 1988, left almost one third of the domestic S&L industry insolvent. 
Deregulation had permitted S&Ls to expand funding sources beyond their traditional 
long-term deposit base and dramatically increase leverage and lending parameters. When 
interest rates on borrowed funds rose in the late 1980s, interest expenses exceeded the 
return that thrifts earned on home mortgages, and many institutions were forced into 
bankruptcy. Other industry problems included the capture of the federal thrift supervisor, 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (“FHLBB”), by the thrift industry trade association, 
the US League of Trade Associations, and Congress’ timidity in interfering with a
with the US Government stemming from the insider trading investigation. However, rather than reduce 
securities trading and lending operations, DBL continued to rely on external borrowing to keep operating. 
A significant percentage o f that borrowing was collateralised by junk bonds. Drexel’s legal settlement 
temporarily damaged the viability o f the junk bond market by decreasing market liquidity and making junk 
bonds unacceptable as loan collateral. As confidence in Drexel’s viability waned, its risk profile increased 
and lenders withdrew financial support. As a result, DBL’s financing, commercial paper and repurchase 
agreements that relied on the support o f securities firms, banks and brokers, dried up. This forced DBL to 
seek emergency funding from its more financially stable broker-dealer subsidiary. The parent company 
was finally forced to file for bankruptcy protection after its attempt to secure a bank loan failed.
70 The DBL Group (“DBL”)was Drexel’s parent company. See footnote 69 in this chapter.
71 The junk bond market effectively disappeared for several years following the Drexel scandal but 
reappeared in the mid-1990s.
72 The Drexel case (brought September 7, 1988) encouraged a unanimous vote in the House o f  
Representatives on September 14, 1988 to increase penalties for insider trading and to pressure securities 
firms to more closely police their employees trading activities.
73 See Glossary. S&Ls are also referred to as “thrifts.”
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federal agency responsible for promoting home ownership, a powerful force in US 
politics.74
Like the contemporaneous Drexel crisis, the S&L crisis was a seminal event for 
Congress and US regulators, in particular for Richard Breeden, who, before he became 
SEC Chairman in 1989, was a senior member of the task force appointed by President 
Bush to assess and to develop solutions to the S&L crisis. Breeden’s task force findings 
reinforced for him the value of conservative capitalisation, and drove home the 
importance of high core capital and the potential folly of dramatically altering existing
*7 c
US financial services regulatory standards, whether in the S&L industry or elsewhere.
The expense and political damage from the industry bailout served as a warning 
for regulators supervising domestic financial institutions. Richard Breeden was closely 
associated with the thrift bailout, and he concluded that thrift deregulation had been 
politically motivated rather than based on improving the S&L’s financial performance or 
capabilities. To Breeden, political exigency, rather than thoughtful practice, had 
motivated S&L reforms. Federal administrators and legislators damaged by the scandals 
agreed. But the sensitivity to regulatory change induced among Washington’s elected 
and appointed officials by the cost of the thrift bailout was enormous. The crisis 
encouraged elected and appointed officials to resist proposals to amend prudential 
financial services regulation or risk being called to explain their actions to Congress.
The Salomon scandal
In 1990, the SEC began to investigate market rumours that the prominent Wall 
Street firm of Salomon Brothers was rigging its bids on US Treasury bill auctions. 
Salomon was eventually found to have falsified bids in an attempt to manipulate the 
Treasury auction market. The SEC pursued the allegations aggressively and expanded its 
investigation to determine whether other parts of the US debt markets were subject to
74 L. William Seidman, Full Faith & Credit: The Great S&L Debacle and Other Washington Sagas (New 
York: Beard Books, 2000).
75 During 1989, Congress committed US$150 billion o f taxpayers’ funds to bail out bankrupt domestic 
savings and loans. Less than US$4.0 billion in tangible capital backed over US$1.3 trillion in deposits. The 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the federal agency guaranteeing S&L deposits, had 
liabilities exceeding assets o f US$14.0 billion. In 1988, it had been estimated US$50.0 billion was needed 
to bail out bankrupt thrifts. The final total would approach US$500 billion. GAO, "Financial Services 
Industry Issues.”
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collusion or manipulation. Ultimately, Salomon was fined, and several senior executives 
were forced to resign.
The scandal was particularly damaging to Wall Street because it revealed that the 
lessons of the earlier Drexel crisis had not been learned. It was also a blow to the federal 
government, for which an honest and open Treasury market was crucial. If the Treasury 
market were deemed unfair, the result would be higher federal government borrowing 
costs. The scandal further damaged Wall Street’s reputation. Nevertheless, the regulatory 
system appeared to have worked, and the Treasury market recovered unscathed. Gerald 
Corrigan, head of the FRBNY, noted, “Until this unfortunate, tragic event, the auction 
system has worked incredibly well...”76 The effect was to strengthen the hand of those in 
the Bush administration who preferred a continuation of the existing regulatory regime 
and to undermine any nascent private sector support for regulatory liberalisation in the 
securities industry.
Unanticipated consequences of regulatory reform77
The 1988 Basle Capital Accord, an affirmative precedent for international 
regulatory harmonisation, had the contradictory effect of discouraging SEC Chairman 
Breeden from promoting international harmonisation. Richard Breeden and others within 
the SEC focused on the Accord’s unanticipated side effect -  bank credit allocation
7ftpolicies that, in their view, contributed to global recession in 1990/91. The Accord 
addressed only bank credit risk, setting aside market and related risks. As a result, for the 
SEC, the Accord represented a political compromise, a result of the Basle Committee’s 
discomfort in addressing politically sensitive rating issues. An SEC Commissioner 
commented, “This led to the anomalous situation where the risk of a loan to the world’s
76 Jack Egan, "A Bond Scandal That Won't Stop,” US News & World Report, 9/16/91.
77 See detailed discussion in: Granirer, "A Modem Great Power Concert: New York, Tokyo, London and 
the Political Economy o f Transnational Regulatory Cooperation".
78 The US/UK collaboration that preceded detailed Basle Committee capital discussions served as a 
positive model for subsequent cooperative actions initiated by securities regulators. Through the Capital 
Accord, the Fed and Bank o f England were able to achieve both domestic and international regulatory 
objectives. Commercial banks were compelled to raise capital and Japanese regulators obliged to change 
domestic capital calculation procedures. Additionally, the Basle Committee served as a model for 
Breeden’s recommendation that IOSCO’s undertake a Strategic Assessment. However, for Breeden, the 
Basle Accords were also examples o f unanticipated problems associated with harmonising international 
regulations. (See generally: Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the 
State, and Oatley and Nabors, "Redistributive Co-Operation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the 
Basle Accord,".)
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strongest company was considered higher than a loan to the world’s weakest nation.”79 
This exaggerated the Accord’s intent but accurately characterised market concern; the 
Accord encouraged banks to favour higher-rated borrowers and to adjust their portfolios
O A
accordingly. Some observers even blamed the recession on banks’ decision to curtail 
lending to lower rated borrowers in order to meet new Basle requirements.81
The SEC was not alone in criticising the Basle Accord. However, the SEC acted 
on its criticism by developing a bilateral approach to international regulatory 
harmonisation that competed with multilateral efforts. The “Basle Problem” further 
encouraged the SEC to conclude that weakening US securities regulation to achieve 
international harmonisation was misguided. As described in the next chapter, the SEC 
decided the best response to harmonisation pressures was to promote US regulatory 
norms, as they were clearly superior -  or so the SEC concluded.
Conclusions
These events and the SEC’s history shaped the agency’s willingness to exercise 
its authority domestically and influenced its international regulatory harmonisation 
efforts. As mentioned above, the 1987 market crash highlighted the SEC’s limitations as 
well as missteps by its Commissioners and bureaucratic challenges. The SEC was 
unwilling to import foreign regulatory norms because that might threaten its domestic 
jurisdiction. With this as background, and convinced that US norms were superior, it 
responded to international harmonisation pressure by exporting US regulatory standards 
(See Chapter 11).
The developments and observations described define the contours of SEC 
domestic authority. The SEC was, despite its powerful standing in Washington, under 
domestic pressure to improve oversight and regulation of securities firms and markets.
79 Confidential interview, New York, February 2001.OA
See Peter Cooke, "Bank Capital Adequacy and Capital Convergence,” (London: Price Waterhouse,
1991).
81 The SEC cited additional problems caused by the Accord. In order to meet implementation deadlines, 
commercial banks had to scramble to raise capital. Capricious equity and fixed income markets, combined 
with recession, made new capital very expensive. (See: Simon London, "Banks Struggle to Achieve 
Capital Adequacy," Financial Times, 30 November 1990.) These factors, combined with weak commercial 
bank loan portfolios and poor profitability, were blamed for poor overall bank performance. (See: Simon 
London, "Banks Face Hope and Frustration - Moves on the Stony Road to Capital Adequacy," Financial 
Times, 27 March 1991.)
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At the same time, it was fighting to protect and to expand its domestic regulatory 
jurisdiction and to respond to industry and government pressure for regulatory reform 
and consolidation. Market events had encouraged the SEC to export existing domestic 
regulatory precedents despite the fact that both the crash and securities scandals had 
focused attention on international and domestic regulatory coordination and 
harmonisation. These observations define the complex pressures on the SEC’s domestic 
authority -  and its response. The SEC was powerful and well respected, but its domestic 
authority was circumscribed by bureaucratic competition, Congressional and institutional 
pressure for regulatory reform, and the need to revitalise the agency.
The contours of SEC authority were shaped by the agency’s long history and 
strongly-held regulatory preferences, by market events (such as the crash), and by 
bureaucratic in-fighting (with the CFTC and over the selection of an intermarket 
regulator). The SEC was a flash-point for domestic political/regulatory turf battles, for 
private sector preferences and for market events (both positive and negative). Richard 
Breeden carried this history into the IOSCO negotiations convinced that the US should 
export domestic regulatory norms rather than harmonise standards internationally and 
risk undermining his -  or the SEC’s -  bureaucratic authority and regulatory legacy.
The next chapter will explore the origins and content of the SEC’s international 
regulatory harmonisation strategy and its implications for the location of authority.
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Chapter 11
Richard Breeden and the SEC’s Response to 
Globalisation
Introduction
This chapter addresses the responses of the SEC to Commission weaknesses, 
market internationalisation and pressures to harmonise regulatory standards. The 
structure and efficacy of the SEC’s response further define the agency’s domestic and 
international authority and influence. Rather than harmonise internationally, the SEC 
developed or encouraged a series of policies designed to export domestic regulatory 
norms. This enabled the SEC to avoid the politically undesirable course of persuading 
the Bush Administration and the Congress to support domestic regulatory liberalisation. 
This strategy was complicated by the fact that the SEC was recovering from the political 
impact of market crises, bureaucratic battles and market scandals.
Richard Breeden joins the SEC
David Ruder never recovered from his costly gaffes and administrative 
confrontations, and he resigned in the summer of 1989 after only two years as SEC 
chairman. Richard Breeden, a close ally of President Bush, was appointed to replace him 
in October.
Background
Breeden’s career included service in the public and private sectors. His public 
sector career began when he joined the Reagan Administration in December 1982 as 
staff director of the Special Task Force on Regulation of Financial Services. The task 
force was headed by then Vice President Bush and included senior members of the 
government’s financial services regulatory agencies. The task force’s goal was to
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examine the US financial services’ regulatory apparatus and to recommend steps to 
reduce inefficiencies and regulatory burdens. The task force concluded that regulatory 
agency consolidation was unwise because it conflicted with a US bureaucratic tradition 
of reposing regulatory authority within discrete independent agencies. This practice 
prevented the consolidation of regulatory power. Breeden had concluded that 
bureaucratic consolidation risked removing administrative and bureaucratic conflicts 
from public scrutiny, which could constrain democratic oversight. Breeden’s task force 
experience expanded his understanding of domestic capital markets and regulatory 
bureaucracies. It helps to explain his resistance to recommendations that the US 
regulatory infrastructure be consolidated in the aftermath of the 1987 crash and that the 
US harmonise regulatory standards internationally.
Breeden had close ties to President Bush, who worked with him on the task force 
and appointed him to investigate the S&L bailout before nominating him as SEC 
Chairman in 1989. Following his Senate confirmation, Breeden immediately encountered 
a market crisis. On October 13, 1989 the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 190 
points, the second largest point and percentage decline in its history.1 This “mini-crash” 
highlighted SEC administrative shortcomings in monitoring and responding to market 
crises. However, Breeden’s adroit handling of the crisis was a significant improvement 
over the less assured style of his predecessor.
In response to the market decline, Breeden pursued an agenda intended to 
modernise securities regulation and to give the SEC better tools to monitor market 
activity and improve US firms’ global competitiveness. His objective was the 
aggressive promotion of US regulatory and commercial interests rather than 
harmonisation. Breeden’s agenda was considered achievable based on his effective 
management of thrift bailout legislation, his close relationships with the White House 
and Congress, and his positive handling of the mini-crash.
1 The 1987 market crash was, at that point, the largest point and percentage decline in the Exchange’s 
history.
2 Kevin G. Salwen, "Breeden Turns Plunge in Stock Market to Advantage in Pushing SEC Agenda," The 
Wall Street Journal, 10/26/89.
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Breeden’s First Year
Richard Breeden’s initial domestic priority was to reassert SEC regulatory 
authority after the Ruder years. His objectives were shaped by his experiences on federal 
task forces, by recent market events, and by a desire to maintain Congressional support. 
Breeden also planned to continue his predecessor’s efforts to assert the SEC’s authority 
internationally. But Breeden’s objectives were not universally shared by his domestic 
regulatory peers or by all members of the Congress. During Breeden’s early SEC tenure 
he clashed with domestic peers over responses to the mini-crash, to Wall Street trading 
practices, and to bureaucratic and regulatory reform. As a consequence, his international 
options were constrained by the extent to which they would undermine his domestic base 
of support.
Domestic initiatives
Shortly after the 1989 mini-crash, Breeden endorsed legislation, opposed by the 
powerful Treasury Department, that would compel Wall Street firms to disclose 
information about their financing of risky corporate takeovers and would allow the SEC 
to limit program trading during periods of market turbulence.3 Breeden also disagreed 
with the Treasury Department and with Ruder over granting the SEC emergency power 
to close stock markets. At the time, only the President could close markets. Continuing 
debates also revealed continuing disagieement among domestic regulators over Glass- 
Steagall reform. All of these issues highlighted Breeden’s legislative independence, as 
well as the depth of divergence within the government and the private sector over reform 
of market governance and regulatory authority.
3 The bankruptcy o f the Campeau Corporation demonstrated the lengths to which Wall Street firms would 
go (and the risks to which they would expose themselves) in financing corporate takeovers. In 1988, The 
First Boston Corporation assembled a US$1.1 billion bridge loan to finance Campeau’s acquisition of  
Federated Department Stores. Initially hailed as an audacious example o f Wall Street’s financing expertise, 
the short-term bridge loan remained unpaid for two years as Campeau suffered from economic recession 
and the benefits o f its acquisition failed to appear. First Boston retained a US$250 million exposure to 
Campeau, large enough to threaten its capitalisation. Breeden expressed concern that Campeau illustrated 
the risks inherent in bridge credit facilities, the need to closely monitor securities firms’ capital, and the 
related requirement that the SEC monitor the capital o f securities firms’ holding companies, which were 
frequently the lender for bridge loans but were supervised only indirectly by the SEC. See: "Campeau 
Debacle May Fuel Debate over Market Reform Bill," Dow Jones News Service - Ticker, 1/18/90.
“Program trading” referred to securities trading triggered by computer programs that monitored capital 
market movements. Program trading was accused o f creating a “herd trading mentality” on Wall Street.
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The market closure issue arose as part of Congressional4 consideration of the 
Market Reform Act of 1989 (S.648).5 The bill would have increased the information the 
SEC received from market participants and would have broadened the Commission’s 
emergency powers, particularly its authority to halt trading. Breeden had concluded that 
giving the SEC expansive discretionary authority would increase market uncertainty. He 
preferred predictable automatic “circuit breakers,” triggered when markets exceeded 
predetermined trading or pricing thresholds.
Treasury Secretary Brady disagreed with Breeden, but he hedged his 
recommendation to the Senate Banking Committee, indicating that the SEC’s authority 
should require consultation with the President, the Federal Reserve and securities SROs.6
Private sector opinion was split. The NASD called the proposal unnecessary, 
while the New York and American stock exchanges supported it. Breeden agreed with 
the NASD and argued that SROs had already taken steps to address problems raised by 
the 1987 crash. In light of these conflicting opinions, House and Senate versions of the 
bill were allowed to die. Congressional Committees would, however, revive this 
proposal in 1990.7
On Glass-Steagall reform, opinions over the future structure of financial services 
in the US were polarised. Advocates for repeal included senior members of the Bush 
administration, who argued that financial services deregulation and regulatory 
consolidation were needed if the US were to compete internationally. This view 
confronted a long history of Congressional resistance to change in financial services 
regulation, which was reflected in two failed attempts by the Reagan administration to 
repeal Glass-Steagall. It was also seen in opposition to new regulations addressing 
problems associated with the market crashes of 1987 and 1989 and with the thrift crisis. 
In addition, Glass-Steagall split private sector opinion on Wall Street. The securities 
industry vehemently opposed any infringement of their securities underwriting
4 By the Senate Banking Committee and the House Telecommunications and Finance Sub-committee.
5 Also called the Securities Market Stabilisation Act o f 1989, HR 1609.
6 SROs would include both the American and New York stock exchanges.
7 ISRR, "House Panel Passes Bill to Expand SEC Authority,” November 22, 1989.
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monopoly, while commercial banks used every opportunity to chip away at their 
franchise.8
Breeden’s concerns with Glass-Steagall liberalisation and regulatory 
consolidation were raised in testimony before Congress in July 1990. He argued for the 
alteration of the current securities regulatory structure, but he stopped short of 
advocating a complete overhaul, urging “two-way” deregulation instead. If Glass- 
Steagall were repealed, he argued, the Bank Holding Company Act should also be 
repealed, so that non-banks could acquire banks, thereby levelling the financial services 
playing field.
Breeden also revealed his negative opinion of universal banking and his 
association of expanded bank powers with the thrift crisis. He described universal 
banking as “fatally flawed,” arguing that it would extend federal deposit insurance 
guarantees to risky insurance and securities activities and would increase potential 
taxpayer liability. He noted that it would be impossible for a single federal regulator to 
assemble the expertise necessary to supervise the disparate activities of universal banks.9 
Breeden argued for clear operating and regulatory distinctions between lending, 
underwriting and insurance.
Following his confirmation by the Senate, Breeden aggressively asserted his 
domestic priorities. He asked for expanded powers io police securities trading,10 urged 
that trading rules for equity index futures be changed and that regulatory jurisdiction for 
futures-related products be extended to the SEC.11 Breeden’s goal was to put the SEC 
into the strongest possible position in the domestic regulatory bureaucracy and, 
subsequently, to improve the SEC’s ability to promote its regulatory preferences 
internationally.
8 As discussed earlier, the securities industry would drop its opposition to Glass-Steagall reform late in 
1989 (see p. 279).
9 John M. Doyle, "SEC Chief to Congress: Banking, Securities Regulation Must Change," The Associated 
Press, 7/11/1990.
10 Associated Press, "SEC Chief as Congress to Broaden His Powers," The Atlanta Journal Constitution,
mm.
11 Treasury Secretary Brady and Breeden both saw the division o f responsibilities between the SEC and the 
CFTC as weakening US credibility in international regulatory forums. David A. Vise, "SEC Chairman 
Warns Congress on Futures," The Washington Post, 2/2/90.
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Breeden affirmed his concern that continuing jurisdictional disputes with the 
CFTC were keeping innovative financial products, such as derivatives, out of US
markets. He cited a federal appeals court ruling in Chicago, which concluded that the
12SEC had overstepped its authority in approving a new hybrid financial instrument. 
Until the litigation was resolved, the courts would not permit the instrument to be traded 
in the US. Litigation over new financial instruments was “a direct threat to American 
competitiveness,” stated Breeden, who noted further, “Our foreign competitors have not 
imposed this type of restriction on themselves.”13
As part of its effort to gain control of equity index futures, the SEC brought suit 
against the CFTC, contending that the SEC should have authority to regulate index 
participations. However, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the CFTC.14 The ruling 
was not surprising, as the Supreme Court was not expected to overturn an earlier Appeals 
Court ruling. The protracted lawsuit underscored the extent to which the SEC was 
determined to expand its regulatory authority.
Breeden’s stature and aggressiveness combined with the challenges facing the 
CFTC15 led observers to predict that the SEC would achieve its domestic objectives. 
Treasury Secretary Brady, a Breeden supporter, testified, “We don’t need more 
regulation. But we do need to move toward more unified regulation.”16 Fed Chairman
| n
Gieenspan also supported Breeden. In testimony before Congress, Breeden clashed 
with CFTC Chairwoman Gramm over CFTC independence. Breeden testified that the 
SEC was unable to investigate intermarket fraud because it could not get information 
about futures trading. Gramm retorted that any market information the SEC did receive 
came through the CFTC, because the SEC did not have adequate monitoring capabilities. 
Their conflict was exacerbated by an SEC Staff Report on the October 1989 mini-crash
12 The instrument was an “index participation,” which combined elements o f securities and commodities 
futures.
13 "SEC Creates Overseas Office to Work with Foreign Regulators," Star-Tribune Newspaper o f  the Twin 
Cities, December 19, 1989.
14 "Futures Commission Wins Crucial Ruling, Battle with SEC Now Shifts to Congress," The San 
Francisco Chronicle, 6/19/1990.
15The CFTC was in the midst o f a two-year long probe by the Federal Bureau o f Investigation into 
allegations o f fraud and inadequate monitoring o f the CBOT and Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). 
Additionally, the Chicago-based exchanges were losing market share to foreign exchanges. These 
challenges arose just as the CFTC was undergoing its reauthorisation examination by Congress.
16 Kevin G. Salwen, "SEC, Seeking Hostile Takeover o f CFTC’s Power to Regulate Financial Markets, Is 
Favored to Win," The Wall Street Journal, 4/20/90.
17 Before the House Energy and Commerce Committee.
312
that blamed the CFTC for the market fall.18 The CFTC’s own study provided starkly 
different conclusions.19
In June 1990, the Bush administration sent a revised Market Reform Act (S.648) 
to Congress. The bill sought to transfer equity index futures jurisdiction from the CFTC 
to the SEC. It also gave the SEC the right to review and approve margins on commodity 
exchanges.20 Senator Leahy (D-VT),21 a prominent CFTC supporter, attacked the bill, 
arguing that it was “riddled with loopholes and legal inconsistencies.”22 Breeden 
maintained that it would protect investors and reiterated the SEC’s objective of 
increasing international regulatory cooperation. His comments reaffirmed his belief that 
expanded domestic powers would yield greater international influence. He noted that 
later in June he would be travelling to Luxembourg, to sign a cooperation agreement, and 
to Hungary, where he would speak at the re-opening of the Budapest Stock Exchange. 
He informed the Senators that an advisory committee on East European markets would 
hold its first meeting in Washington later in June under SEC auspices.24
In July 1990, the GAO released a study that criticised both agencies for their 
conflicting analyses of the mini-crash. The GAO’s report concluded that the agencies 
used the same data to derive self-serving conclusions. This led Senator Dodd (D-CT) to 
conclude, the “SEC-CFTC jurisdictional dispute continues to detract from their working 
relationship... This untenable situation must be resolved.” Breeden took a considerable 
risk in antagonising Senators. In addition to controlling his budget, the Senate Banking 
Committee would have to approve any significant change in the structure of the US 
financial services industry. Breeden’s ability to position the SEC to benefit from Glass- 
Steagall reform would depend on his relationship with the Congress.
18 The report concluded that equity index arbitrage, which was transacted through futures markets, had 
accelerated the market decline. Instead o f stabilising markets, equity index floor traders had sold their 
positions into a falling market. Equity index floor traders had represented over 50 percent o f sell volumes.
19 Reports cited in Gregory Robb, "SEC, CFTC Chiefs Fight in Congress," The New York Times, 5/25/90.
20 Low margins were held responsible for excessive trading and volatility.
21 Chairman o f the Senate Agricultural Committee.
22 John M. Doyle, "SEC Chief Rebuts Critics o f Bill to Shift Power on Stock Index Futures," The 
Associated Press, 6/1/90.
23 The bill was adopted in October 1991. It increased market monitoring, established the Large Trade 
Reporting System and improved clearance and settlement procedures. However, the SEC’s CFTC dispute 
remained unresolved.
24 The committee would represent “some o f the best and the brightest" in the U.S. financial industry. See: 
Doyle, "SEC Chief Rebuts Critics o f Bill to Shift Power on Stock Index Futures.”
25 John M. Doyle, "GAO Criticizes 2 Agencies for Conflicting Views o f Crash," Associated Press - Los 
Angeles Daily News, 7/24/1990.
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The Office o f International Affairs
Breeden announced the creation of an SEC Office of International Affairs in 
December 1989, two months after taking office. Michael Mann, from the SEC’s 
Enforcement Division, was named to head the office. The new office was designed to 
carry out the SEC’s goals of responding to market globalisation, expanding cooperative 
ties with foreign peers, and, through the selection of Mann, extending SEC enforcement 
authority offshore. Mann commented that IOSCO would be an appropriate venue for 
international regulatory discussions, saying, “ .... the players are coming to IOSCO, ... 
and are asking IOSCO to provide a multilateral infrastructure for... discussions.”
In talking about his office’s role, Mann provided insight into the SEC’s 
international priorities and into IOSCO’s place in their plans. He commented that the 
SEC’s authority in developing trade and Eastern European policies should be expanded 
owing to the role of financial services in trade and economic development. He also 
wanted to formalise and publicise the SEC’s leadership in international securities 
regulatory matters, and he confirmed his desire to expand the SEC’s role in the 
negotiation of international trade agreements. “As, more and more, financial services is a 
component of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, it’s critical that the views of a 
regulatory agency, like the SEC, be taken into account.”27 This objective placed the SEC 
in conflict with the US Trade Representative’s office, further demonstrating the SEC’s 
aggressive posture toward the scope of its regulatory responsibilities.
Mann prioritised his office’s roles, and thereby defined the SEC’s perspective on 
regulatory harmonisation, international regulatory authority and IOSCO’s capabilities: 
“If we were to order these, we started with Eastern Europe and coordination; MOUs, and 
expanding them to develop contacts abroad; coordinating foreign country needs within 
the Commission; GATT trade and financial services negotiations; and IOSCO. I think 
IOSCO is growing into a much more mature organisation .... we’re really working very 
hard to try to develop within IOSCO a context for developing multilateral initiatives.” 
Mann’s listing placed IOSCO dead last in order of priority.
26ISRR, "Re-Regulation Trend Emerging in the Financial Markets.”
27 ISRR, "Interview: SEC's Michael Mann Sets Active Pace and New Initiatives for the Recently Formed 
Office o f International Affairs,” April 23, 1990.
28 Ibid.
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The SEC concluded that it would be more effective in promoting US regulatory 
standards abroad through bilateral agreements than through multilateral organisations. 
IOSCO was an important venue for international discussion, but it came last in Mann’s 
ordering of international priorities. More important were efforts to influence the 
development of securities regulatory standards in Eastern European countries and to 
monitor international trade negotiations.
Breeden’s reformist enthusiasms were tempered by his desire to maintain a 
positive relationship with the Congress. In addition, a mild recession between 1989 and 
1991 dampened Administration enthusiasm for regulatory liberalisation. These factors 
further moderated Breeden’s willingness to enter into international, particularly 
multilateral, agreements that would “weaken,” in Breeden’s or Congress’ opinion, 
domestic securities legislation.
In his first year as SEC Chairman, Breeden expanded the SEC’s authority and 
repositioned the agency within Washington’s regulatory hierarchy. His personal 
successes included the revival and passage of two pieces of legislation, the Market 
Reform Act30 and the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act,31 
both of which dramatically strengthened the SEC. These laws represented the most 
significant changes to securities laws in twenty yeais. Breeden’s close relationship with 
President Bush and his ability to cultivate important representatives were critical to their 
success.32
Breeden’s forcefulness brought critics, however. His desire to absorb the CFTC, 
to expand the international reach of the SEC, and to shape the direction of domestic and
29 The SEC’s interest in GATT negotiations arose for two reasons. The SEC argued that its expertise 
should be utilised because the negotiations addressed financial services and because the SEC’s 
involvement in high profile international trade negotiations would enhance the agency’s international and 
domestic stature.
30 The Market Reform Act amended the Securities Exchange Act o f  1934 and provided additional 
discretionary power to the SEC to prevent disruptions in national securities markets, particularly during a 
market crisis. The grant o f power represented a substantial degree o f Congressional deference to the SEC.
31 The Remedies Act amended the Securities Act o f 1933 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to add a 
requirement that federal banking agencies notify the SEC o f any instances where federal banking 
regulators became aware o f activities by banks or individuals that might pose a threat to firms regulated by 
the SEC.
32 Kathleen Day, "Tough Cop at the SEC; Chairman Richard Breeden, in Office a Year, Aggressively 
Seeks to Expand Agency's Authority," The Washington Post, 10/14/90 1990.
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international regulatory evolution generated controversy. Nevertheless, his support from 
Congress and the Administration appeared solid. Senator Dodd compared Breeden to the 
“trust-busting, reform-minded Republicans of Teddy Roosevelt’s Cabinet.”33 His first 
year as chairman solidified his domestic institutional authority and positioned him to 
promote initiatives aimed at extending the SEC’s regulatory authority abroad.
Breeden’s Second Year
In Breeden’s second year, he tackled a'simmering domestic debate over the 
international competitiveness of the US securities industry and began aggressively to 
encourage international regulatory initiatives begun by former Chairman Ruder. These 
initiatives were designed to promote US capital markets to foreign issuers and investors. 
Another objective was to export domestic securities regulatory norms, exploiting the 
SEC’s authority and the US securities industry’s market expertise. Breeden built on the 
pending MJDS agreement with Canada34 and initiated bilateral MJDS discussions with 
Japan and the UK. Expansion of existing MOUs with Japan and other countries were 
also discussed. The SEC examined proposals for the inclusion of US investors in 
foreign equity rights offerings36 pursuant to Rule 144A,37 further opening US markets to 
foreign issuers.1 As described in Chapter 10, the SEC began the aggressive reform of 
IOSCO’s governance structure and introduced proposals to encourage greater 
cooperation between securities regulators.
Evidence of declining US market authority
A 1989 SEC-sponsored study38 examining the international competitiveness of 
US securities markets concluded that US capital markets had seen their pre-eminent 
international position diminish. According to the study, global stock market 
capitalisation had grown from US$2.5 trillion in 1980 to US$8.2 trillion in 1988, but US 
market share had declined from 56 percent to 34 percent over the same period. Between 
1980 and 1988, the study reported, Japanese equity markets had replaced US markets as 
the world’s largest. The study also reported that US stock exchanges “lagged (behind)
33 Ibid.
34 The SEC approved the MJDS on May 30, 1991. Approval by Canadian authorities came in June 1991.
35 ISRR, "SEC and MoF Expand Enforcement Coordination; Multijurisdictional Disclosure Pact Expected 
Soon,” January 14, 1991.
36 See Glossary. An offering o f a “right” or claim to purchase equity shares at a point in the future, 
typically at a pre-agreed price.
37 See below for discussion o f Rule 144 A.
38 Chuppe, Haworth, and Watkins, "The Securities Markets in the 1980s: A Global Perspective.”
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foreign markets in their ability to attract new foreign listings.” It went on to point out 
that foreign companies might be reluctant to list on a US exchange owing to differences 
in disclosure standards between US and foreign markets.40 The study also identified 
longer-term securitisation trends in capital-raising, re-emphasising the importance of 
securities markets and related regulation. While the decline in the US share of 
international stock market capitalisation may have been due, in part, to exchange rate 
fluctuation and the rapid growth of less mature markets, the message to US lawmakers 
and regulators was that US capital markets, in order to remain pre-eminent in an 
increasingly competitive global market, needed to consider responsive strategies.
Adding to Congressional and SEC concerns, Japanese inroads into US markets 
had become front-page news, raising the political significance of international financial 
services leadership. Japanese-owned financial institutions controlled 25 percent of the 
California bank market. Tokyo-headquartered Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank had invested 
US$1.4 billion in the US finance company CIT,41 gaining a 60 percent ownership 
position. After the 1989 mini-crash, rumours had circulated that Japanese investors were 
responsible for halting the market’s slide. Landmark purchases by Japanese investors of 
New York’s Rockefeller Center and California's Pebble Beach golf course captured 
tabloid headlines. Worries were expressed on Wall Street that Tokyo had more influence 
over world markets than New York or London.
Concern with EU efforts to harmonise financial regulation added to these worries 
about the competitiveness of US institutions. The chief economist of Security Pacific 
Bank, who was also chairman of the American Bankers Association’s economic advisory 
committee, told Congress, “The EU is proceeding with financial modernisation. The US 
must do so as well if our financial institutions are to remain competitive domestically 
and internationally.”42
Widely followed international rankings appeared to confirm the shrinking stature 
of US commercial banks and securities firms. In 1985 Citicorp, the largest US bank,
39 Ibid.
40 See Daimler Benz below.
41 At the time, CIT was a subsidiary o f US money-centre bank Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company.
42 Peter Koenig, "Has the US Got the Bottle for a Fight?" Euromoney, January 1, 1990.
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ranked as the largest commercial bank in the world by total assets. Another American,43 
three French and five Japanese banks rounded out the top ten. By 1989, by the same 
measure, Citicorp had fallen to tenth and was now preceded by one French and eight 
Japanese banks. Securities firm rankings revealed a similar picture. In 1989, six of the 
world’s ten largest securities firms ranked by capitalisation were headquartered in the 
US. The other four were Japanese. However, the profitability of these same firms 
indicated a different story. The six US firms were estimated to have collectively earned 
US$1.9 billion in 1988. The four Japanese firms reported consolidated net income of 
US$3.9 billion, twice that of the US firms. The numbers underlined the growing 
financial power of Japanese firms. “It would be impossible politically, but in purely 
economic terms the Japanese could buy the world’s financial system,”44 said Robin 
Monro-Davies, a senior bank analyst.
Senate testimony ensured that Congress was aware of the changing nature of 
international securities markets and the implications these changes had for both 
regulatory evolution and the competitiveness and influence of US firms and markets. 
SEC domestic and international regulatory initiatives coincided with increasing 
Congressional concern, incentivising Congress to support SEC actions. “Today the US 
has lost to international competition” in the securities field, commented Senator Dodd 
(D-CT) in June 1989. Dodd indicated that reversing the US decline required “action at 
home” rather than erecting barriers to market entry. Bills introduced by Senators Heinz 
(R-PA) and Dodd were intended to reverse the “reactive” posture taken by Congress on 
financial services issues.45 In addition to the International Securities Enforcement 
Cooperation Act, Dodd and Heinz introduced five additional bills. These included 
measures to increase the SEC’s budget46 and to provide the SEC with emergency 
authority during periods of market turmoil47
Alan Greenspan spoke before Dodd’s subcommittee, saying, “Cross-border 
trading in securities will continue to expand rapidly for the foreseeable future. As a
43 Bank o f America.
44 Koenig, "Has the US Got the Bottle for a Fight?
45 ISRR, "Lawmakers Set Agenda Amid Growing Worry That US Has Lost Edge in Global Capital 
Markets,” June 21, 1989.
46 The bill was intended to increase the SEC’s budget by up to US$168 million and lift pay ceilings for 
SEC employees.
47 The Market Reform Act o f 1989 (S. 648).
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consequence, we can expect to see the move to around the clock trading extending to 
more securities.”48 Greenspan listed three necessary responses: first, modernisation of 
the domestic settlement system; second, renewed focus on the financial soundness of 
large multinational securities firms, particularly the strength of their capital positions; 
and finally, Glass-Steagall reform.
While disagreeing on Glass-Steagall, Robert Hormats, vice-chairman of Goldman 
Sachs International, testified before the same subcommittee that common international 
regulatory standards would prevent regulatory arbitrage. Hormats noted that recent 
market events confirmed the vulnerability of financial markets in one country to events 
in other countries. This was a “compelling argument to come to common standards.” 
Hormats also stated that the US needed “a parallel effort internationally as the EU effort 
is going on.”49 He urged the US to develop its own international regulatory agenda, 
either in competition or in cooperation with the EU, to ensure US interests were not 
relegated to a secondary position.
Breeden demurs
Breeden disagreed with evidence of US securities industry decline, citing 
securities firms’ successful domestic and international track record in winning new 
business and in entering new markets. But he supported a proactive international policy 
agenda. He noted that, unlike the concerns that had prompted the Basle Accord,50 no 
similar vulnerabilities affected US securities firms, other than expressed concern with 
international income rankings. US firms had survived the 1987 and 1989 market declines 
in good shape. Drexel Burnham Lambert’s bankruptcy had disrupted the junk bond 
market but without long-term negative consequences. A 1990 GAO report on the 
implications of the EU’s 1992 program provided a basis for Breeden’s conclusions and a 
rationale for SEC initiatives.51 US securities firms had long complained that domestic 
regulation put them at a competitive disadvantage relative to European firms, particularly 
to universal banks. The GAO report concluded that the EU’s 1992 plan actually afforded 
US financial services firms many new business opportunities. The report supported the
48 ISRR, "Lawmakers Set Agenda Amid Growing Worry That US Has Lost Edge in Global Capital 
Markets.”
49 Ibid.
50 Generally, these were commercial bank leverage and loan portfolio concentration problems.
51 GAO, "European Community: U.S. Financial Services' Competitiveness under the Single Market 
Program.”
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SEC’s view that US securities firms were competitive internationally, but it also 
concluded that US markets could be made more competitive. The report found that US 
securities firms were well represented in the EU’s major capital markets and, in 
particular, it found that they ranked favourably against non-US firms in a number of 
significant product categories:
• 5 of the top 10 lead managers (50%) of international equity 
offerings were US firms.
• 7 of the top 20 lead and co-lead managers (35%) of 
international equity offerings were US firms.
• 12 of the top 25 mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) advisers 
(48%) worldwide were US firms.
• 11 of the top 20 M&A advisers (55%) for European 
acquisitions in the US were US firms.
• The top 5 M&A advisers (100%) for US acquisitions in 
Europe were all US firms.
The report supported Breeden’s contention that US securities firms were global 
leaders in M&A and equity underwriting. These were the most profitable and visible 
areas of investment banking. More importantly, Breeden contended that US securities 
regulations had not hindered US firms’ performance or competitiveness. To the contrary, 
Breeden argued that US regulations, particularly capitalisation regulations, actually 
enhanced the competitiveness of US securities firms by enabling their entry into new 
markets. He concluded that international regulatory harmonisation was, in fact, an 
attempt to level the regulatory playing field by making non-US securities firms more 
competitive with successful, highly-capitalised US firms.
The GAO report did, however, confirm the findings of a 1989 SEC report53 that 
US disclosure regulations made US markets less attractive to foreign issuers and US 
investment products less attractive to foreign investors.54 These findings shaped the
52 Source: Euromoney, February, March 1989.
53 Chuppe, Haworth, and Watkins, "The Securities Markets in the 1980s: A Global Perspective,".
54 Non-US investors preferred to hold bearer securities, which were prohibited in US markets. 
Additionally, European investors, accustomed to the anonymity o f bearer securities, were put off by US 
requirements for mandatory investor disclosure on acquisitions in excess o f 5 percent o f capital or
320
SEC’s response to market globalisation and multilateral harmonisation initiatives: 
improving the attractiveness of domestic markets to foreign investors and issuers and 
influencing the development of international regulatory standards.
The first piece of the SEC’s response involved amending domestic regulation in a 
targeted way. Rather than make regulatory changes that ran counter to the mood of a 
Congress sensitised by financial scandals, the SEC amended domestic regulation 
incrementally, with changes driven by SEC objectives and not by external pressure. The 
GAO’s observations meshed well with two SEC domestic regulatory initiatives, Rule 
144A and Regulation S.55 The second piece, exporting domestic norms, included 
multilateral and bilateral components and helped define the SEC’s objectives in 
influencing international regulatory development.
The SEC*s response to globalisation
Richard Breeden extended regulatory initiatives begun by his predecessor, most 
significantly, Rule 144A, Regulation S and the MJDS plan with Canada.56 He shared 
Ruder’s perspective on promoting multilateral regulatory harmonisation around US 
standards.57 Breeden did not, however, accept arguments that domestic deregulation and 
concessionary international harmonisation were necessary to improve domestic firms’ 
competitiveness. More critically, he felt international regulatory harmonisation would 
dilute US regulatory standards that had helped US firms withstand market volatility and 
build strong international franchises. He also felt that harmonisation could damage the 
SEC’s relationship with Congress and the Administration. He based his beliefs on his 
work with the 1982 Bush Task Force, as well as on more recent experience with the S&L 
crisis. Rather than harmonise domestic regulation, Breeden argued that other countries 
should adopt US norms, which had proven themselves over time through crises and 
scandals. Breeden concluded that international harmonisation of securities regulation, to 
the extent it resulted in divergence from US regulatory norms, was dangerous.
following a takeover. Also difficult for foreign issuers were SEC requirements that financial statement 
disclosure conform to US GAAP.
55 See below.
56 See below.
57 See: Durie, "Regulation Easy as SEC".
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Rule 144A and Regulation S
Beginning in 1988, the SEC initiated a series of domestic securities rule changes 
that represented a dramatic effort to make US markets more competitive with the 
Euromarkets and thereby influence the evolution of securities underwriting, trading, and 
regulation outside the US.
In October 1988, the SEC released for public comment its proposed Rule 144A,
co
which exempted from SEC registration requirements securities issued in US markets to 
“institutional investors” pursuant to “private placement” rules.59 The rule, crafted in 
response to comments from public and private sector market participants, was aimed at 
non-US securities issuers that had resisted entering US markets because of concern about 
the scope of corporate, particularly financial, disclosure required by the SEC.60
Rule 144A proposed that private placements, offered to a potentially large pool of 
“qualified institutional investors,”61 could trade freely in the secondary market. Because 
the proposed rule widened the universe of potential investors and reduced secondary 
trading restrictions, Rule 144A securities would be priced similarly to SEC-registered 
securities, but without needing to meet onerous public disclosure standards. Foreign 
borrowers had resisted issuing securities in the US because public disclosure 
requirements mandated detailed analyses of hidden reserves, executive compensation 
packages and segment revenue and expense figures. The new lule would permit non-US 
companies to issue securities in the largest and deepest capital market in the world
58 Securities “registration” with the SEC involves the filing o f detailed disclosure documentation, 
according to detailed rules laid down by the SEC, regarding the issuer and the offering and the payment o f  
a filing fee. If the material is “accepted” by the SEC (deemed adequate) a “public” offering a securities can 
be made.
59 See Glossary for definitions o f “institutional investor” and “private placement.”
60 Issuers (“Issuer” and “borrower” are interchangeable in a securities issuance context) o f securities in US 
markets had two principal offering methodologies: either “publicly” register securities with the SEC in 
accordance with stringent disclosure guidelines, or issue securities in a “private placement.” A private 
placement was neither registered with the SEC nor required to meet SEC disclosure standards. A 
significant difference between the two offering methodologies was reflected in who could purchase the 
securities. SEC-registered securities could be offered and traded without significant restriction on 
investors. However, the offering, sale and trading o f private placements was restricted to a limited number 
o f pre-qualified, “sophisticated,” typically institutional, investors. The maximum “number” o f investors in 
a traditional private placement was dependant on several variables including the terms and size o f the 
offering and counsel opinions. Typically, the number ranged from 5 to 100 potential investors. 
“Institutional investors” typically had a net worth in excess o f US$1.25 million. For Rule 144A, qualified 
institutional investors were required to manage at least US$100 million in assets. These characteristics 
made private placements less attractive because their lack o f liquidity was reflected in higher borrowing 
costs.
61 See Glossary and footnote 58 above.
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without necessarily disclosing sensitive information. The SEC’s proposal had the 
potential to galvanise foreign interest in US capital markets.
The SEC also released for comment proposed Regulation S (“Reg. S”), which 
further amended US securities issuance regulations. Regulation S provided a “safe 
harbour” for certain types of securities offerings made outside the United States. This 
regulation clarified offering procedures for non-US entities, ensuring that issuers’ 
securities did not fall within the regulatory ambit of the SEC.62
These two complicated rules had important goals and implications. First, they 
were designed to open US markets to disclosure-shy foreign issuers. Second, they 
created a global methodology for offering securities, but on US regulatory terms. 
Previously, issuers of securities would tap discrete domestic markets to meet their 
funding requirements. Now they could structure a single offering to tap into markets 
around the globe. Efficiency gains promised to be significant. Third, because they 
facilitated global offerings, the rules would influence the standardisation of corporate 
disclosure for securities offerings in markets around the world. If an issuer could prepare 
one offering document to serve both the US and other capital markets, the cost savings 
would be major. Most significantly, this had the effect of moving non-US borrowers 
closer to US regulatory issuance standards by extending US regulation extraterritorially. 
Rule 144A’s disclosure standard, despite being “looser” than the SEC’s registered 
“public” disclosure standard, was still generally tougher than disclosure standards for 
either a typical Euromarket offering or conventional US private placement.
62 A “safe harbour” was an exemption, if  certain procedures were followed, from SEC registration 
requirements for a non-US offering o f securities (a securities offering made outside the US by either a US 
or non-US entity). The need for a safe harbour arose as a consequence o f an SEC rule stipulating that 
simultaneous private US and “public” offshore offerings (so-called “global” offerings) could be deemed 
“integrated,” or unitary rather than separate, by the SEC, if  the two offerings were similar enough that an 
investor could not easily distinguish between them (Regulation S assumed the offerings would be made by 
related corporate entities simultaneously). A finding o f integration could result in the SEC requiring that 
both offerings, which had been structured according to less onerous private placement and Euromarket 
disclosure and offering standards, be amended to meet US public offering and disclosure requirements. 
This was an exceptionally risky proposition for issuers, as it would occur coincident with or shortly after 
offerings were completed. Euromarket securities offerings were also sold in bearer form (see Glossary), 
which was prohibited in the US. Consequently, an SEC integration finding would be both embarrassing 
and extremely costly to rectify.
63 Rule 144A’s influence on disclosure -  and international precedent -  was clearest in legal opinions. To 
minimise their legal liability in distributing “private” securities in a “registered” manner, underwriters of 
Rule 144A securities asked attorneys to issue SEC-registered “style” legal opinions covering the adequacy 
of issuer disclosure. Such opinions were standard on SEC-registered public offerings but atypical for 
private placements. To obtain the legal opinions, attorneys insisted that “registered” issuer disclosure
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The potential impact of Rule 144A and Reg. S on non-US markets was not lost 
on international regulators. According to these observers, the SEC was not 
accommodating foreign issuer disclosure concerns. Rather, they were updating outmoded 
market practices and, more significantly, extending the SEC’s regulatory authority 
offshore, a practice the SEC had also followed with insider trading regulations.64 A US 
NASDAQ executive, speaking at a Paris conference, commented that Rule 144A did not 
fully address foreign investor concerns with US market regulation: “unless the SEC is 
prepared to harmonize, there will never be true internationalisation of trading.”65 
However, in proposing Rule 144A and Regulation S, the SEC indicated its intention to 
lead regulatory evolution rather than harmonise with other jurisdictions. This approach 
was reflected in the standoff between the US and EU member-states in IOSCO.
The SEC re-proposed Rule 144A and Regulation S in July 1989, following the 
public comment period. In 1990, Former SEC Chairman Ruder described Rule 144A as 
“dramatic; it leapfrogs both the accounting and disclosure questions to create a liquid 
secondary market for foreign issuers.” He also noted that the new rules might promote 
competitive inequality. “To the extent you relax SEC rules and regulation to mollify 
international issuers...to what extent will this create competitive burdens for domestic 
companies in this market?”66 Ruder’s comment reflected concern over potential domestic 
differences with the SEC’s approach to international securities regulation. The SEC had 
made it easier for non-US issuers to enter domestic markets but had not changed 
corresponding regulations applicable to domestic firms. However, the SEC was not 
creating a two-tier domestic market. By taking its initiative with international securities 
offerings, the SEC was molding regulation into a form it found acceptable. The powerful 
desire of international issuers to enter US markets, combined with US legal liability and
( \ 7the extraterritorial reach of US courts, encouraged a convergence on US regulatory
accompany Rule 144A offerings, which, o f course, conflicted with Rule 144A’s original objective. This 
led to lengthy negotiations between issuers, underwriters and attorneys over appropriate disclosure. 
However, ultimately, attorneys’ demands for “public-like” disclosure prevailed, permanently influencing 
non-US issuers’ approach to disclosure.
64 McCahery, "Market Regulation and Particularistic Interests: The Dynamics o f Insider Trading 
Regulation in the US and Europe.”
65ISRR, "European Exchanges Look to 1992, Some Question Commission's Role.”
66 ISRR, "Implementation o f Rule 144A and Reg. S Expected Soon,” March 26, 1990.
67 See below under “Extraterritoriality.”
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standards rather than a true harmonisation of national standards.68 This in fact did not 
happen. Euromarket disclosure standards did not change in response to the SEC’s new 
rules. This is not surprising, because Euromarket standards were always less onerous 
than US standards.
The SEC approved Reg. S and Rule 144A in April 1990. SEC Chairman Breeden 
noted the rules would enhance the competitiveness and efficiency of US markets.69 Rule
7ft144A and Reg. S offerings grew in popularity over the next three years.
The Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (“MJDS”)
Following the June 1989 launch of the Rule 144A/Reg. S initiative, SEC 
Chairman Ruder testified before the Senate Banking Committee that the agency was 
considering further regulatory experiments to expand investment and borrowing options 
for market participants. The next trial involved the deployment of a multi-jurisdictional 
securities registration procedure, which was prepared in reaction to EU prospectus 
directives. This procedure, established initially with Canada would, if  successful, be 
expanded to other jurisdictions. The core of the SEC’s proposal was the recognition by 
Canada and the US of each other’s regulatory standards and their use as a basis for 
accessing each other’s capital markets. The proposal represented the successful 
conclusion of two years of negotiations between Canadian and US regulatory authorities.
The experiment was based on the principle that Canada and the US could agree to 
harmonised issuance regulations, inasmuch as they had roughly comparable securities 
registration and offering procedures, and could create a multijurisdictional disclosure 
system applicable to securities issuers in both countries.71 Ruder noted that the initial 
trial could lead to MJDS agreements with other jurisdictions, but only with those whose 
accounting, auditing and disclosure standards provided information similar to that 
required in the US.
Thus, MJDS was intended to be a further inducement to convergence on US 
regulatory norms and an SEC “endorsement” of selected national regulatory standards.
68 See: “Daimler Benz” below.
69 ISRR, "Rule 144A Will Shift Some Euromarket Business to U.S.,” May 7, 1990.
70 See below.
71 "Ruder - Rules to Be Re-Proposed," Dow Jones News Service - Ticker, 6/15/89.
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Because more Canadian issuers wanted to access US markets than US issuers wanted to 
utilise Canadian markets, it became a means of promoting SEC standards 
extraterritorially. In this respect, MJDS represented, as did Rule 144A/Reg. S, an SEC
77effort to direct the course of international regulatory harmonisation.
The initial trial stalled over accounting reconciliation. A basic assumption of 
MJDS had been that the US and Canada would recognise the validity of each other’s 
accounting principles. However, while the proposed regulation did not require 
reconciliation of Canadian statements to US GAAP for investment grade debt 
securities,73 it did require reconciliation for below investment grade and equity securities. 
The SEC justified different accounting treatments by noting that equity and junk bonds 
were riskier than high-grade debt. Greater risk implied greater potential legal liability for 
issuers and underwriters, mandating higher disclosure standards.74 As with Rule 144A 
disclosure, the SEC proved intractable when asked to amend domestic regulations 
considered crucial for investor protection.75 Though inspired by standardised 
documentation used in Euromarket offerings, the MJDS regulatory regime was 
“captured” by US legal liability principles endorsed by the SEC.
The MJDS trial’s promotion of the US regulatory model was facilitated by the 
attractiveness of US markets in comparison with Canadian markets. In the MJDS’ first
7 f \two years of operation, no US issuer used it to access Canadian capital markets. In 
contrast, US$3.5 billion of debt securities and US$0.6 billion of equity securities were 
registered with the SEC under MJDS in 1993 alone. MJDS encouraged the closer
77integration of North American markets -  but on the SEC’s terms.
72 Jordan, "Regulation o f Canadian Capital Markets in the 1990s: The United States in the Driver's Seat".
73 See Glossary.
74 Very generally speaking, investment decisions in debt securities are based on issuer creditworthiness, 
tenor and yield considerations. Equity and junk bond investment decisions are typically based on a wider 
range o f factors because those investments are deemed riskier than investment grade debt.
75 ISRR, "Accounting Reconciliation Key to U.S.-Canada Pact," March 26, 1990. The same US legal 
opinion issues that arose in Rule 144A offerings, arose in MJDS offerings. US attorneys, steeped in the 
legal bases o f US securities regulation, refused to offer full legal opinions (covering, inter alia, the 
adequacy o f disclosure) on MJDS securities unless offering materials were conformed in certain respects 
to US mandated public disclosure standards.
76 MJDS implementation was in 1991.
77 Jordan, "Regulation o f Canadian Capital Markets in the 1990s: The United States in the Driver's Seat,", 
p. 590-592.
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The MJDS concept was initially well received in London although no agreement 
was ever signed. Stewart Douglas-Mann, Director of the LSE, indicated the SEC’s 
initiative was “receiving substantial political support.” Commenting on negotiations 
between the UK and the US, Douglas-Mann noted inconsistencies between the two 
systems but argued the benefits of a common approach. “Agreement on this matter 
should result in an end-product which is simple to use -  but there must be genuine
no
equivalence.” Press commentary focused on the possibility of the MJDS being 
extended to Japan.
The utilisation of bilateral agreements with prominent trading partners as 
precedents (or substitutes) for multilateral agreements or harmonisation, a practice 
pioneered with the Basle Accord, lies behind the MJDS. However, critical to MJDS 
“success” in promoting SEC standards was the extent of foreign borrowers’ interest in 
gaining access to US capital markets. At the time MJDS was implemented, the SEC’s 
scepticism of IOSCO’s ability to develop acceptable regulatory standards was growing. 
This encouraged the SEC to execute bilateral regulatory precedents in order to protect 
their regulatory preferences.
In promoting bilateral agreements, the SEC attempted to encourage convergence 
to a US model. Their attempt, however, was unsuccessful. Only one country signed an 
MJDS agreement with the US.
Memoranda of Understanding79
To further extend its regulatory authority extraterritorially, the SEC executed
numerous informal, bilateral agreements, called Memoranda of Understanding
/
(“MOUs”). The SEC was a leader in establishing MOUs, which addressed a range of 
issues including insider trading, the exchange of financial information, and cross-border
OA
investigations. Because the SEC’s regulatory regime was more robust, more focused on
78 ISRR, "U.K. Place Strong Political Support on Achieving U.S. Multijurisdictional Pact," March 12,
1990.
79 See: Jimenez, "International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act and Memoranda o f  
Understanding".
80 As o f June 1989, the SEC had entered into MOUs with four countries; Switzerland (1982), Japan (1986), 
Brazil (1988) and the United Kingdom (1986), and with three Canadian provinces: Ontario, Quebec and 
British Columbia (all in 1988), and was negotiating MOUs with France, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Australia and New Zealand. The Swiss MOU addressed insider trading, MOUs with Japan and the UK 
addressed the exchange o f financial information, and the Brazilian MOU permitted investigation into 
financial matters on each country’s behalf. MOUs with Canadian provinces went further than those with
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enforcement and more pro-active than the regimes of its bilateral partners, MOUs served 
to extend SEC regulatory norms and influence offshore.
Predominantly US concern with insider trading and other securities frauds, 
prosecuted almost exclusively by the SEC, encouraged the use of MOUs to establish 
bilateral agreements on a variety of matters including securities law enforcement and
• ft 1information sharing. Rapid globalisation created situations where cross-border 
securities trading provoked cross-jurisdictional problems; information needed to be 
shared, for example, when individuals from one jurisdiction, trading in a second 
jurisdiction, violated its laws. MOUs provided an efficient, informal vehicle for 
addressing such issues. The scope of MOUs varied, but they shared a basic objective: 
improved copperation between securities regulators in the administration and 
enforcement of securities laws.
MOUs were not treaties. They did not have to be ratified and could be executed 
by national regulatory agencies such as the SEC, SIB or COB. Thus they were more 
flexible and executable than publicly debated treaties. MOU enforcement could be kept 
confidential, for instance, while treaties required legislative or court procedures.
Late in 1989, shortly after Richard Breeden became chairman, the SEC signed 
bilateral agreements with French and Dutch iegulators that confiimed the Commission’s 
desire to export domestic regulatory norms. Both accords were far stronger than previous 
bilateral agreements. Earlier MOUs had called for “best efforts” cooperation. The new 
agreements established a requirement for cooperation, which, in the case of the Dutch 
agreement, became part of Dutch domestic legislation.83 Since the SEC was more 
concerned with enforcement than were French or Dutch regulators, cooperation was 
more likely to be triggered by US regulatory requirements than by either French or 
Dutch concerns.
sovereign entities, permitting information gathering on individuals. The UK was also a leader in the use of 
MOUs, but principally to address information exchange rather than the extraterritorial application o f  
British securities regulations.
81 Dennis Levine was caught through a cooperative cross-border investigation.
82 This section is adapted from: "Capital Market Globalization and the SEC’s Use o f Memoranda of  
Understanding," Brown & Wood - Corporate Newsletter, (1995-96). and ISRR, "Constitution Issues Posed 
by Extraterritorial Enforcement," June 21, 1989.
83 ISRR, "SEC Signs Assistance Pacts with France, the Netherlands," January 3, 1990.
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The adoption of MOUs accelerated after 1989, and by 1995 the SEC had signed 
more than 20 agreements. While providing an effective mechanism for addressing 
specific SEC regulatory objectives, MOUs also extended the SEC’s jurisdictional 
purview and regulatory authority across borders.84
The SEC’s Definition of International Harmonisation
Speaking in January 1992, Linda Quinn, an SEC Director,85 remarked that the 
SEC was not changing its requirement that foreign companies issuing registered 
securities in the US reconcile their accounting statements to US GAAP. Her statement 
clashed with the intent of the MJDS initiative, which encouraged recognition of other 
countries’ disclosure standards.86 She indicated that the SEC’s primary concerns 
remained protection of US investors and maintenance of a level playing field for US 
companies. Despite European objections that US disclosure standards were onerous and 
harmful to US market interests, Quinn argued that disclosure should be based on 
equivalence, not mutual recognition. “Why should US firms be held to a higher standard 
than foreign issuers?” Quinn asked rhetorically.87 She rejected harmonisation, noting 
pessimistically that mutual recognition based on universally accepted accounting 
standards could not be achieved. Referring to her experience at IOSCO Technical 
Committee meetings, she noted, “It is difficult to look at the same standard and have 13 
people agree on what the standard requires.”88 Quinn’s statements reaffirmed the SEC’s 
unwillingness to compromise domestic standards, even where SEC standards were more 
burdensome than others’ or where harmonisation had prompted bilateral discussions.
Breeden also indicated that the SEC would maintain its inflexible stance on 
accounting standards. “Some propose total reciprocity in accounting and disclosure 
requirements with any country, no matter how low its own standards of investor 
protection. That type of blanket abolition of US rules is not an attractive option
84 MOUs addressed specific bilateral issues and were, as a consequence, o f  limited multilateral utility. 
Also, despite their ability to encourage regulatory norm migration to US standards, their impact was 
specific and incremental, focused on issues o f  concern to US regulators. Consequently, while MOUs 
reflected SEC policies encouraging convergence on US regulatory norms, they did not materially affect 
capital harmonisation negotiations. They did, nevertheless, highlight the SEC’s policy objectives, its 
international authority, and its lack o f enthusiasm for multilateral harmonisation.
85 For the SEC’s Division o f Corporate Finance.
86 See Glossary and below. MJDS also promoted US regulatory values.
87 ISRR, "SEC Official Sees No Near-Term Change to Reconciliation Rules," January 28, 1992.
88 Ibid.
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compared with the more targeted policy of flexibility that we have been pursuing.” 
Breeden restated his position at a meeting of the SEC’s Congressional Market Oversight 
and Financial Services Advisory Committee in July 1992. Relaxing US standards would 
extend “overt and quite substantial preference” to foreign companies. Breeden singled 
out Germany and Japan as examples of countries unwilling to expand domestic 
disclosure standards to incorporate information required by the SEC.90
Responding to critics who argued that SEC standards discouraged foreign 
companies from entering US markets, Breeden noted a dramatic increase in foreign 
entities issuing both Rule 144A and registered securities in US capital markets. Since the 
adoption of Rule 144A, 174 issuers had made 167 placements of Rule 144A securities, 
totalling US$18.2 billion. Since October 1989, 121 foreign issuers from 24 countries had 
entered US markets publicly, registering US$47.8 billion with the SEC in approximately 
175 offerings of debt and equity securities.91 These statistics confirmed for Breeden that 
the SEC’s strategy of amending domestic securities regulations in line with SEC 
preferences, rather than as defined by international forums such as IOSCO or the Basle 
Committee, had been successful. This reinforced his belief that domestic regulatory 
compromises were largely unnecessary in negotiating international regulatory standards.
US courts apply securities laws extraterritorially
A further example of the international extension of US securities authority can be 
seen in the extraterritorial application of US securities laws.92
The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (“Second Circuit”)93 resolved 
jurisdictional issues concerning the application of US securities laws to extraterritorial 
transactions. The Second Circuit adopted an expansive view of the appropriate 
international reach of US securities laws.94 Two examples, Consolidated Gold Fields 
PLC v. Minorco, SA95 and MCG, Inc. v. Great Western Energy Corporation96, both
89 ISRR, "SEC Chairman Urges Capital Rules That Cover All Types o f Securities".
90 Ibid.
91 ISRR, "SEC Stands Firm on Requiring Foreign Reconciliation to GAAP," July 14, 1992.
92 See, for example: Symposium, "The Internationalization o f  Securities Markets," Maryland Journal o f  
International Law and Trade 11 (1987).
93 This court is located in New York City.
94 Gunnar Schuster, "Extraterritoriality o f Securities Laws: An Economic Analysis o f Jurisdictional 
Conflicts," Law & Policy in International Business 26 (1994).
95 871 F.2d 252 (2nd Cir. 1989).
96 896 F.2d 252, 261 (2nd Cir. 1989).
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adjudicated in 1989, highlight the aggressive application of US extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.
In the first case Minorco, a Luxembourg company, attempted to acquire a British 
company, Consolidated Goldfields. As part of its bid, Minorco sent offering documents 
to British nominees of American owners of Consolidated Goldfields shares. Minorco did 
this specifically to avoid coming under US jurisdiction.97 The documents were, however, 
subsequently forwarded to the American owners. Based on the documents coming into 
the possession of US citizens, Consolidated Goldfields sued Minorco in US federal court 
to halt the acquisition.98 On appeal, the Second Circuit issued an injunction halting 
Minorco’s acquisition.
In the second instance, MCG, a US company, purchased shares in Great Western, 
another US company, on the London Stock Exchange. The shares subsequently lost 
much of their value. MCG sued in US courts, claiming that it had purchased the shares 
based on fraudulent statements, including a statement that the sellers were not citizens or 
residents of the United States. Despite the transaction occurring entirely outside the US, 
the lawsuit was heard by the federal district court, which dismissed the suit. The Second 
Circuit upheld the decision.
In both cases, defendants had taken specific steps lo avoid direct contact with US 
shareholders in order to avoid falling within the jurisdictional reach of US courts. 
Despite these efforts, the Second Circuit extended its jurisdiction outside the US. It felt 
comfortable doing so because of a US tradition imbuing regulatory agencies with 
extensive enforcement powers, which US courts actively supported and administered 
domestically and extraterritorially.
Because capital markets in the UK, Germany and other countries were largely 
self-regulating, there had been little development of a regulatory enforcement 
infrastructure or culture. As a result, British and German courts were rarely called upon 
to resolve capital markets conflicts. This had retarded the development of legal 
precedents that might have guided regulators and courts in resolving securities disputes.
97 If the documents had been mailed to Consolidated Goldfields shareholders in the US, they would have 
come under US jurisdiction automatically.
98 On anti-trust and anti-fraud grounds.
331
In the US however, securities regulation had evolved into a powerful tool, supported by 
voluminous precedents, for US courts to use in resolving conflicts arising in non-US 
markets, even when only a tenuous connection to US markets existed.
Contractual choice-of-law provisions are another example of US assertion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. International jurisdictional conflicts arise when courts in 
different countries attempt to adjudicate the same dispute, particularly when there is no 
generally accepted standard for allocating jurisdiction.
When conflicts over securities regulatory standards arose, US courts generally 
refused to recognise even previously agreed contractual choice of law provisions that 
required the use of non-US laws for adjudication." This practice was amended by a 1974 
US Supreme Court decision that accepted foreign court adjudication for sophisticated 
business professionals.100 However, US courts continued to apply a different standard for 
private investors,101 reflecting their preference for US legal precedents, their 
endorsement of the SEC’s long-standing regulatory focus on investor protection, and the 
extraterritorial extension of US domestic regulatory authority. Such practices are not, of 
course, confined to the US. The European Court of Justice generously applies EU 
competition laws internationally. British and German courts have also issued judgements 
with international consequences. However, these courts have not been as aggressive as 
US courts in applying domestic legulation internationally.
US sponsored training programs
The 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union afforded the SEC an opportunity to export 
regulatory norms directly to formerly socialist states. The SEC and US State Department 
both developed programs to educate non-US bankers and regulators in developing the 
regulatory infrastructure necessary to operate US-style capital markets. One US attorney 
who worked in the State Department’s program described his participation by saying,
1 (Y)“We wrote the rules and regulations of the Polish stock market.”
99 See generally: Schuster, "Extraterritoriality o f Securities Laws: An Economic Analysis o f Jurisdictional 
Conflicts,". p.l69ff.
100 Scherk v. Alberto Culver, 417 US 506 (1974).
101 US courts referred to this as the “conduct and effects test.”
102 Confidential interview, New York, 1996.
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The SEC’s aggressiveness in promoting the export of US regulatory norms 
encouraged Richard Breeden in 1990 to pick a fight with the State Department over the 
responsibilities of the two newly created international securities advisory groups. The 
objectives of the State Department’s Financial Services Volunteer Corps (“FSVC”) 
overlapped with the objectives of the SEC’s newly formed Emerging Markets Advisory
1 f ttCommittee. The dispute was resolved by imposing conditions on FSVC missions that 
increased SEC participation and oversight of their work. The dispute underlined 
Breeden’s sensitivity to the boundaries of the SEC’s authority and his interest in 
extending and managing the SEC’s international advisory activities.104
Breeden’s Third Year
The SEC’s international negotiating activities during Breeden’s third year as 
chairman are described in chapters 8 and 9. Breeden’s increasingly adamant refusal to 
contemplate liberalisation of domestic capital adequacy regulations was evident in 
multilateral meetings throughout 1992. The regulatory inflexibility of Breeden and the 
SEC and their success in imposing their preferences on international actors, were 
demonstrated by their ability to resist pressure from the international and domestic 
private and public sectors to alter SEC listing and disclosure requirements.
German industry pressures the SEC
The most prominent examples of foreign pressure for US regulatory 
harmonisation came from blue-chip German companies seeking access to US public 
markets. A public equity listing in the US demonstrated the international stature of a 
non-US company and dramatically broadened its investor base. However, a US listing 
required that German companies amend their financial statements to disclose business 
segment revenue and profitability as well as “hidden reserves.”105
103 ISRR, "SEC Questions Role o f FSVC Emerging Markets Effort," July 2, 1990.
104 ISRR, "FSVC, SEC Resolve Differences; Hungary Mission to Depart," September 10, 1990.
105 Typically, “hidden reserves” refers to unexplained entries on corporate balance sheets which, among 
other transactions, represent investments in shares o f other companies. Although these investments may 
have appreciated (or depreciated) substantially from their original acquisition cost, balance sheets did not 
reflect the difference between their carrying cost and their market value. Consequently, the true net worth 
o f companies holding these investments was often impossible to discern. Additionally, these accounts 
could be debited or credited in order to smooth corporate earnings during volatile periods. As well, public 
knowledge o f the extent o f one company’s holdings o f  other companies shares might provoke inquiries 
into other aspects o f their relationship, including supposedly “arms-length” transactions. As a result,
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In October 1992, Ernst Welteke, Hesse Economics Minister and the official 
responsible for supervision of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, met with SEC officials to 
argue for liberalising US disclosure requirements. Welteke, like his predecessors, was 
unsuccessful. “More political pressure -  reciprocity action -  has to be placed on the 
SEC,” threatened Rutbert Reisch, treasurer of the Volkswagen group. “It’s a disgrace. 
We must insist on reciprocity from the United States,” argued Rolf Breuer, a senior 
director of Deutsche Bank. The SEC’s response was that Germany lacked a federal 
securities regulator and, owing to the prevalence of hidden reserves at German 
companies, also lacked adequate disclosure standards. German officials retorted that the 
SEC misunderstood fundamental differences in German and American commercial 
perspectives. In the US, investor protection was paramount; in Germany, universal banks 
focused on lending106 and creditor protection, an arrangement reinforced by cross­
shareholdings between banks and corporations.107
Daimler Benz
The SEC’s regulatory objectives and authority were illustrated by the agency’s 
insistence that the German company Daimler Benz, the tenth largest company in the 
world, conform its accounting practices to SEC standards in order to list on the New 
York Stock Exchange. The SEC was repeatedly lobbied, over many years, by accounting
1 HRfirms, multinational investment banks, the New York Stock Exchange and other 
German companies to permit Daimler to list its shares without conforming its German 
financial statements to US disclosure standards.109 The SEC consistently refused and, 
finally, in 1993 Daimler capitulated and made the necessary accounting changes. Later, 
when Daimler’s restated accounts revealed a weakened financial condition, the SEC 
argued that its intransigence had been justified.
The SEC’s inflexibility reflected simple political and business calculations. US 
equity markets were deep and liquid and, as a result, very attractive to international 
companies seeking to expand capital access. The SEC was also aware that its domestic 
disclosure standards had not prevented more than 200 foreign companies from publicly
hidden reserves were a highly sensitive indicator o f competitiveness and creditworthiness. German and 
Swiss companies, in particular, maintained hidden reserves, a practice that obscured the true performance 
and value o f these companies.
106 Which generated higher earnings than securities underwriting.
107 See: ISRR, "Germany: Businesses Urge Retaliation against SEC's Listing Policy," October 20, 1992.
108 Including leading US investment banks.
109 Confidential interviews, New York, April 2001.
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registering securities in order to raise capital in the US.110 In addition, there was 
substantial domestic political resistance to weakening standards. As a result, the SEC 
was consistently able to resist pressure from foreign corporations, regulators and state 
officials to amend domestic regulations. The SEC’s European peers could not afford to 
adopt a similar stance, as they were subject to competitive pressure from borrowers who 
could easily move their capital-raising efforts from one domestic market to another. 
Europe was experiencing a modified regulatory race to the bottom, while US capital 
markets and regulations operated in relative isolation and remained substantially 
unchanged. This observation provides further evidence against arguments that 
globalisation promotes regulatory convergence. It also highlights constraints on market 
internationalisation and the relationship between market power and state authority.
A report released by the GAO in March 1992111 concluded, “International efforts 
to harmonise securities capital standards have had no effect on US securities markets or 
US securities capital standards.”112 The report traced the history of US capital standards 
and observed that modification of domestic capital rules had been motivated by investor 
protection concerns and the SEC’s historic mission, rather than by issues of 
internationalisation, securitisation, product developments or foreign pressure. The GAO 
cited the SEC’s 1987 market crash study.113 That report had concluded that required 
capital levels, plus substantial, voluntarily maintained, excess capital, had provided a 
safety margin for securities firms. The GAO observed that the SEC had improved the 
competitiveness of US markets, but that “none of the changes previously discussed have 
been made to meet international capital requirements.”114 The report and recent market 
developments reinforced the wisdom of Breeden’s focus on protecting domestic capital 
standards.
110 Peter Lee, "Daimler Listing Opens the Door," Euromoney, May 1993.
111 GAO, "Securities Markets: Challenges to Harmonising International Capital Standards Remain,” 
(Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 1992).
112 Ibid, p.5.
113 SEC, "Report o f the Staff o f the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce: 
Internationalization o f Securities Markets Ii-36,", (Washington, D.C.: United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 1987).
114 GAO, "Securities Markets: Challenges to Harmonising International Capital Standards Remain,” p.43.
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Conclusions
Richard Breeden bolstered the SEC’s domestic authority through a series of 
domestic and international regulatory and bureaucratic initiatives. These efforts 
redressed the gaffes of Ruder’s tenure and built on regulatory proposals designed to 
enhance the attractiveness of US markets to foreign borrowers. The SEC’s regulatory 
authority was revealed in a number of ways: in its strategy of domestic regulatory export 
and incremental domestic regulatory change, in the support it received from US courts, 
in state-sponsored “training programs,” and in its successful regulatory harmonisation 
intransigence. The SEC’s actions and authority were motivated by Breeden’s firm 
conviction that regulatory harmonisation around international norms would weaken the 
US securities industry and would weaken domestic investor protections.
Consistent with state-centric hypotheses, the SEC was able to impose its 
preferences on other international actors and institutions through bilateral regulatory 
initiatives, thus ensuring its individual regulatory sovereignty. However, Breeden was 
unable to achieve his policy preferences through collective decision-making. As a result, 
international regulatory convergence was limited and what little did occur took place 
around US regulatory norms. SEC authority was enabled by US market attractiveness 
and the competitiveness of US securities firms. More significantly, it was encouraged by 
domestic political considerations and by Breeden’s political clout in Washington. 
Decision-making was not shared between levels of government or with non-state actors. 
Sub-national actors did mobilise internationally but had a minimal effect on the SEC’s 
capitalisation policy. As noted earlier, the SEC’s ability to act autonomously was issue 
specific. On issues other than capitalisation, it was subject to domestic institutional 
challenges and to private sector influence.
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Chapter 12
Conclusions and Observations
This thesis has several objectives. Empirically it is designed to assess the location 
and structure of authority in the case studies. This empirical objective is complemented 
by theoretical objectives. State and non-state centric analytical perspectives are used to 
generate contrasting hypotheses on the location of authority. The theoretical objectives 
are first, to determine the accuracy of state and non-state centric hypotheses and second, 
to determine whether non-state centric analytical perspectives are superior to more state 
centric perspectives in assessing this study’s empirical questions. Third, the thesis 
considers whether a synthetic perspective, combining findings from state and non-state 
centric perspectives, generates observations not revealed by individual analytical 
perspectives. Fourth, the thesis examines whether the conflation of authority and 
influence in state/market theoretical perspectives benefits from refinement. This study 
also assesses related issues. Are non-state centiic and synthetic perspectives superior to 
monocausal perspectives simply because they are comprehensive or because they 
generate new observations and highlight the limitations of narrower perspectives? Has 
globalisation transformed the state or encouraged regulatory convergence, as predicted 
by non-state centric theorists?
Summary
Empirically, this thesis observes that both state and non-state actors and 
institutions express authority in international policy-formation. The EU case offers 
inconsistent support for state and non-state-centric hypotheses, while the IOSCO case 
more consistently supports state-centric hypotheses. Consequently, there is no clear 
support for the argument that authority has migrated from state actors (that is, from the 
US and from EU member-states) to non-state actors and institutions. In both case studies,
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states retained their sovereignty and imposed their fundamental regulatory preferences 
on international actors. The thesis therefore concludes that in the case studies, state actor 
and institutional authority and influence predominated in policy formation.
Based on the empirical analysis, I have modified three arguments that are made 
by non-state centric theorists. First, state and non-state actors and institutions 
demonstrated influence and authority in the case studies. However, state preferences 
were decisive in policy formation and, as a consequence, determinative authority and 
influence resided with states.1 State preferences were determined principally by national 
structural variables considered fundamental by the state and by the states’ interest in 
insulating domestic institutions and actors from foreign encroachment. Second, the 
argument of state/market theorists that globalisation has “transformed” the state and/or 
state authority is, in light of the first observation, strained. Third, non-state theorists’ 
prediction that globalisation will promote regulatory convergence is also over-stated. 
These observations are supported by non-state centric and synthetic analysis.
Theoretically, the thesis argues that non-state centric perspectives are analytically 
superior to narrower perspectives because they are more realistic and because they 
facilitate more accurate identification and evaluation of the variables that drive 
international policy-formation. The thesis argues that authority is multi-layered and 
originates from formal and informal state and 11011-state sources. A non-state centric 
analysis reveals relationships between these layers and the influence of state and non­
state actors and institutions on state autonomy.
A synthetic analysis of empirical findings reveals limitations of individual 
analytical perspectives and distinctive relationships between their observations. Because 
of this, it may modify the conclusions of individual approaches regarding the process of 
international policy formation. It also demonstrates the role of non-state actors and 
institutions in shaping state preferences, in propelling policy negotiations, and in 
providing context-based expertise. This analysis highlights the dynamic process of 
policy-formation and confirms the value of assessing observations from several 
perspectives interactively.
1 As noted earlier, this thesis is time-bound; consequently it is impossible to determine whether authority 
has “migrated over time.” Nevertheless, it is possible to make a closely related argument, that both state 
and non-state actors and institutions express authority.
338
The thesis makes three additional arguments. First, EU integration perspectives 
are useful in assessing non-EU-related developments. Second, state/market theorists’ 
conflation of authority and influence impedes identification of variables influencing 
international policy-formation. Third, neither non-state centric perspectives nor synthetic 
analysis is parsimonious. However, the complexity of these approaches is offset by their 
greater explanatory power and by their ability to identify weaknesses in narrower 
perspectives.
This chapter assesses the main empirical findings against the hypotheses and 
examines their implications for theoretical and empirical research. The benefits of 
synthetic analysis are also addressed. Finally, the chapter turns to a broader discussion of 
international regulatory harmonisation.
Empirical Observations and Hypotheses
State-centric hypotheses -  summary
Core Argument: States dominate international norm/policy development.
Specific Hypotheses IOSCO Observations EU Observations
1. National governments impose 
preferences on international 
actors/institutions:
Yes. IOSCO failed to develop a 
regulatory standard due to the 
SEC’s opposition to the 
preferences o f EU members and 
the Basle Committee. This 
failure was abetted by IOSCO’s 
lack o f authority.
Yes/Mixed observations. The 
directives reflected input from 
private and EU sources as well 
as from states. State and non­
state institutional/economic 
preferences were significant in 
shaping the directives even 
when state preferences 
predominated.
2. National governments are 
able to ensure their sovereignty:
Yes. IOSCO’s failure was due 
in part to members’ decisions to 
pursue harmonisation (and their 
sovereignty) elsewhere when 
agreement in IOSCO was 
deemed impossible.
Yes. Agreement on the CAD 
and ISD reflected numerous 
compromises based on national 
preferences as expressed by 
state and non-state actors. States 
avoided implementation, 
reflecting the subordination o f  
regional authority to national 
sovereignty.
3. National governments control 
the mobilisation o f sub-national 
interests:
Yes. Sub-national (private) 
interests did not mobilise in the 
IOSCO negotiations, either 
because they prioritised EU 
regional objectives or because 
US domestic considerations and 
the SEC inhibited mobilisation.
No. Sub-national interests 
worked directly with the EU 
Commission, DG XV, and with 
states.
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Non state-centric hypotheses -  summary
Core argument: Decision-making is shared among states, sub- and supra-national actors 
and institutions.
Specific Hypotheses IOSCO Observations EU Observations
1. There is a pattern o f shared 
decision-making across levels o f  
authority:
No. Decision-making 
overwhelmingly reflected the 
decisions o f member- 
govemments.
Mixed. Decision-making 
reflected the concerted lobbying 
of all three levels o f authority, 
but decisions largely reflected 
state preferences and were made 
by states.
2. Individual state executives are 
unable to deliver policy 
preferences through collective 
decision-making:
Yes. The collective efforts o f  
EU member-states failed. 
Breeden’s objectives were 
realised, but not collectively.
No. Compromises arrived at by 
collective decision-making 
largely preserved state 
executives’ preferences.
3. Sub-national interests 
mobilise directly in the 
supranational arena:
No. Sub-national interests 
mobilised in the EU rather than 
in IOSCO.
Yes. Sub-national interests 
lobbied directly with the EU.
Authority and influence in policy-formation
The summary analysis above indicates that the empirical observations 
predominantly support state-centric hypotheses. However, it also indicates that public, 
private and supranational actors and institutions exercised some authority and influence 
and that the interaction of state and non-state preferences did have an influence on 
policy-formation.2 State actors expressed authority through the negotiation and adoption 
of directives. Non-state actors expressed influence and authority through lobbying and 
advocacy, particularly on issues where they had specialised expertise. They provided 
information to negotiators and multilateral agents on the consequences of regulatory 
options and thereby facilitated compromises. Their influence and their access to formal 
authority were a function of their context-based knowledge and their significance in 
national regulatory, economic and political structures. Though exercised ultimately 
through state decisions, the influence of non-state actors was expressed throughout the 
policy-formation process. However, in each case, the adoption or rejection of non-state 
recommendations was assessed against its potential effect on fundamental state 
preferences. These were determined by critical national structures or policies (economic,
2 In the EU case, through the Council and Parliament -  and, subsequently through national 
implementation. In IOSCO, theoretically, through Committee votes and national implementation.
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political and regulatory) that were deemed public goods and served as minimum 
thresholds for determining whether to accept policy proposals.
The principal variables affecting harmonisation debates included embedded 
domestic and market relationships, national regulatory histories and operational 
practices. They also included domestic political considerations and institutional 
objectives and capabilities. Despite this empirical complexity, this study finds that the 
resolution of policy debates principally reflected state preferences.
This representation of international policy-formation -  and of the composition of 
authority -  is closer to Underhill’s “condominium” than to Cemy or Strange’s regulatory 
convergence projections.3 A number of observations confirm the predominance of state 
authority in international policy-formation.
1. Fundamental state regulatory objectives remained unaltered throughout the 
process of international policy-formation. These objectives were based on critical 
national structures and were used as a minimum threshold to evaluate the acceptability of 
policy recommendations from other states and from non-state actors and institutions. 
This indicates that, in the negotiations, state objectives constituted minimum standards 
for acceptable policy.
States’ fundamental policy preferences grew out of their desire to preserve 
national market and economic structures from foreign encroachment. Non-state 
preferences and policy recommendations helped to refine states’ deliberations, but state 
preferences were predominant. The domestic economic and political risks posed by 
change to national structures dictated their critical status and conservative state policy 
objectives. Specific fundamental state preferences are discussed in detail below. (See 
page 345.)
2. Policy preferences of state and non-state actors and institutions often 
overlapped, but private actor influence was realised largely in conjunction with or
3 International policy-making is built on a foundation comprised o f state preferences. Non-state sources of  
authority and influence help determine the distinctive shape that policy assumes; however, state influence 
and authority predominate.
341
through state institutions and actors. While this confirms that state and non-state actors 
often agreed on policy options, it confirms neither public actor capture by non-state 
interests, nor that non-state interests persuaded public actors to adopt a course of action 
they would not have otherwise pursued.
Because of the overlaps of state and non-state preferences, bright-line 
identification of policy responsibility is difficult to establish. However, there were very 
few instances where conflicts between state and non-state actor or institutional 
preferences were resolved in non-state actors’ favour.4 Neither did states “rubber-stamp” 
non-state preferences. Only one instance of non-state actors compelling change in state 
preferences is noted.5 Moreover, in the EU case, language conflicts between member- 
states were resolved by compromises that preserved national regulatory distinctiveness 
and national autonomy -  an indication of the predominant role of state authority.
3. EU decision-making procedures were designed to encourage collective 
decision-making, but they protected state autonomy instead. In the EU case study, 
member-states approved regional harmonisation initiatives6 but ensured that their 
eventual approval would be executed through intergovernmental institutions and be 
subject to national implementation.7 In IOSCO, the US-sponsored Strategic Assessment 
was intended to improve IOSCO’s policy output, but it concentrated decision-making 
authority instead, biinging member conflicts into sharper relief and impeding collective 
agreements. This indicated member-states’ reluctance to relinquish national sovereignty.
The policy-formation procedures created by the SEA mandated coalition 
building. But this had the paradoxical effect of politicising policy-formation. Its 
objective of diluting state autonomy was weakened. The provisions prevented Germany 
from holding out for tougher capital standards, but they also impeded an unequivocal 
resolution of transparency and concentration debates.
4 The reciprocity language debate is the notable exception.
5 The Patronat’s intercession on ISD language -  however, the public/private sector distinction in France is 
very ambiguous and, ultimately, French state negotiators were able to preserve existing national regulatory 
norms.
6 The Cockfield White Paper, the SEA and the 1992 objectives.
7 The Council o f Ministers and Parliament.
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4. Private actors were generally in favour of harmonised regional regulatory 
standards, although their relative aggressiveness in promoting harmonisation differed 
significantly. Regulatory harmonisation would shrink home-market advantages and 
arbitrage opportunities and would increase competition. For more sophisticated financial
o
institutions this prospect was attractive, as it would reduce costs and competition. States, 
on the other hand, while initiating regionalisation and harmonisation discussions, 
responded to globalisation by enhancing domestic markets -  a counter-intuitive action. 
This underscored states’ anxiety that international harmonisation would marginalise 
home markets and/or increase economic and political risks. In the EU, states insisted on 
derogations, ambiguous language and delayed directive implementation, all of which 
impeded regulatory harmonisation. At IOSCO, the SEC refused to accept regulatory 
proposals it deemed risky, which led to the breakdown of negotiations. As a result of 
state actions in both cases, regulatory harmonisation goals were not achieved. Despite 
shared harmonisation objectives and collective negotiations, individual state political and 
economic concerns and authority predominated in international policy harmonisation 
outcomes.
5. The EU directives reflected compromises that preserved individual state 
structural preferences. This indicates that zero-sum decision-making did not replace 
lowest common denominator decision-making. This also confirms that policy 
pieferences weie nested within states. These conclusions indicate that states 
predominated in international policy formation.
These case study observations confirm that the contours of authority were multi­
level and interconnected, built upon a base of state preferences, but shaped by non-state 
actor and institutional recommendations. Non-state preferences were significant in an 
“integrated ensemble of governance,”9 but it was predominantly state preferences that 
determined policy outcomes.
Locating authority
These arguments underscore the difficulty of pinpointing precisely where 
“authority” lies. This is confirmed by an assessment that identifies whose preferences
8 This included the US, UK, Swiss and, increasingly in the early 1990s, German and Benelux firms.
9 Underhill, "States, Markets and Governance. Private Interests, the Public Good, and the Democratic 
Process.”
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were incorporated in the various agreements. The analysis below focuses on the EU 
negotiations since they, unlike the IOSCO deliberations, resulted in concrete agreements. 
Private actors, some of whose context-based preferences were adopted, lobbied the EU 
Commission and member governments. However, the EU directives reflected multiple, 
overlapping -  state and non-state -  preferences.10
Issue Preferences
Incorporated
Preferences Not 
Incorporated
Market access: N. Europe Group 
Private sector
Club Med Group
Transparency: Club Med Group N. Europe Group 
Private sector
Concentration: Club Med Group N. Europe Group 
Private sector
Capitalisation: London-operating 
institutions and 
most EU member- 
states, ex-Germany
German state and 
banks
This rough analysis of the EU case confirms the disparate beneficiaries of the 
negotiations. The resolution of market access did not significantly benefit any group; 
derogations were granted to Club Med states, reflecting the preferences of local firms 
and state regulators. The language of the transparency and concentration provisions was 
sufficiently ambiguous to leave operating methods in London and Club Med countries 
unchanged. This met UK, French and private institutional preferences. The CAD 
favoured UK-based banks and UK regulatory preferences, but German banks and 
regulators were not significantly disadvantaged by the results. Private actors influenced 
the final language of directives through lobbying, but their efforts were not completely 
successful. Member-states, working with the Commission, made final language 
decisions, and even they had to compromise with each other on many points.
10 Private actors may be reluctant to lobby publicly for fear o f eroding their continuing influence. 
Conversely, the relationship o f authority, influence and legitimacy may also be subject to public actors 
being able to preserve the “facade” o f authority while they are following guidelines laid down by private 
interests. Lobbying by the Patronat and by UK/US investment banks was clearly very private -  to preserve 
the fragile relationship o f public and private authority and the impression that policy decisions are made by 
“public” officials.
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Despite IOSCO’s failure to establish regulatory standards, the predominant 
source of authority in these negotiations is easier to identify. The SEC impeded IOSCO’s 
endorsement of objectionable norms. The SEC’s response to international harmonisation 
initiatives was shaped by US structural and historic considerations. Its influence derived 
from these same factors. For its part, IOSCO had little influence because it lacked formal 
authority and market expertise. Despite the contextual legitimacy and potential influence 
of non-state actors, they were ineffectual in the IOSCO deliberations. US financial 
services firms were inhibited by disagreements over preferences. Other private actors 
acknowledged the low probability of changing the SEC’s stance. Once these factors 
became apparent, EU states and private actors concentrated their attention on the EU and 
the Basle Committee discussions, where they could have greater influence. This 
assessment confirms the predominant influence of the SEC in the IOSCO negotiations.
Fundamental policy preferences
Fundamental state policy preferences acted as a minimum threshold for 
determining the admissibility of non-state preferences.11
Fundamental state preferences consisted of the following: the preservation of the 
German state/banking sector relationships, which was achieved by Germany’s insistence 
on a level regulatory playing field; French dirigisme which, although a failed policy, 
encouraged the protection of domestic operating norms through language compromises 
and derogations; preservation of London’s market dominance and domestic operating 
norms, which consistently dictated UK negotiating positions; and the SEC’s discomfort 
with domestic regulatory change, which was based on the US’s domestic regulatory 
history and institutional structure. In each case fundamental state preferences were 
determined by domestic economic and regulatory structures that were historically based 
or economically critical to the state.
Examples of how these state preferences served as minimum thresholds for non­
state policy proposals are provided below.
11 Alan Greenspan, Chairman o f the Federal Reserve, has endorsed States’ use o f fundamental preferences 
to establish parameters for acceptable policy options. Arguing against the creation o f fixed monetary 
targets and in favour o f discretionary decision-making, Mr. Greenspan observed that “the world economy 
was too complex and uncertain for simple policy prescriptions.” He noted that “rules by their nature are 
simple. They cannot substitute for risk-management paradigms.” See: Andrews, Edmund L., “Greenspan 
Argues Against Strict Rules for Fed,” The New York Times, pp. C l, August 30, 2003.
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1. Germany’s level playing field objectives were not compromised by their
acceptance of the trading book proposal recommended by DG XV. Once German level
10playing field objectives were met, Germany was largely neutral to other proposals.
2. French domestic market protection objectives were not compromised by their 
acceptance of the Patronat’s ISD recommendations. However, market protection was 
threatened by open-exchange access proposals, and the French sided with other Club- 
Med countries in seeking derogations.
3. The UK’s objectives of preserving domestic and Euromarket operating norms 
(and revenue streams) and London’s stature were not threatened by their agreement to 
derogations and ambiguous language in the final directives. However, the UK objected 
strenuously to proposals that would require capitalisation for small brokers -  the 
backbone of the British domestic investment industry and a sensitive domestic 
constituency.
4. The US/SEC’s fundamental regulatory objective (investor protection) was not 
compromised by their acceptance of “Euromarket” hedging techniques in calculating 
capital for debt products. But the SEC stopped short of permitting hedging for equity 
products, indicating their view ihat equity was a riskier in vestment than debt. Private 
actors preferred the inclusion of hedging for both products.
Non-state influence
At the sub-national level, non-state actors’ influence varied from country to 
country and from issue to issue according to their context-based expertise and the 
economic and political significance of non-state actors to the state. Influence derived
13primarily from domestic economic/political and historic (structural) relationships. 
These factors affected their access to formal authority. Influence derived from symbiotic 
state/private sector relationships (as in Germany), economically powerful business 
associations (such as the Patronat), the City’s importance to the UK government in 
revenue terms, and from entrenched (and profitable) industry norms and practices (such
12 Confidential interviews, London, 2001.
13 This list is adapted from Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, Private Authority and International Affairs.
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as Euromarket and French brokerage practices). Actors such as the Patronat or large UK 
or US investment banks had access to decision-makers based on their market stature and 
their expertise. They also represented the views of large private capital pools. In 
addition, certain markets, because they were attractive to foreign borrowers and 
important to national governments, bolstered the international influence of individual 
governments and of non-state actors. This applied especially to the US and Euro markets.
In the EU, state and private actor preferences overlapped significantly, producing 
little disagreement except on marginal issues. Where private actor influence was most 
manifest was in interstate negotiations, where governments worked to preserve their 
domestic operating norms against those of other states. Where state and non-state 
preferences diverged, states evaluated the possible application of non-state policy 
recommendations through the filter of existing domestic economic and political 
structures and through interrelated state objectives. In the IOSCO negotiations, private 
actors in the US disagreed with the SEC’s position but were inhibited from domestic 
lobbying and turned their attention to the EU.
At the supranational level, the EU Commission and DG XV exercised influence 
through their staffs of experts and their supranational authority. Their influence was 
notable in the reciprocity debate, in the trading book proposal and in the development 
arid promotion of successive compromise proposals on the directives. Arguably, their 
perseverance was decisive in the eventual adoption of the CAD and ISD. However, their 
recommendations were only realised through decisions negotiated by states in the 
intergovernmental Council and Parliament. The EU’s influence and authority were 
predominantly manifested through their development of compromise policy proposals 
and through advocacy.
The structure of compromise solutions to policy conflicts indicates that non-state 
preferences and exogenous issues rarely circumscribed state autonomy. Compromises 
negotiated on the CAD and ISD did not violate fundamental state objectives. Where 
proposals would violate state objectives, the affected states raised objections and rejected 
language. States managed to preserve their decision-making autonomy and their historic 
domestic market relationships. States and EU Commission representatives were required 
to develop compromise solutions that reflected the subordination of regional and, in
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some cases, private, interests to individual state interests. The case studies indicate the 
influence of non-state actors in the refinement of directives but not in final decision­
making.
In IOSCO, a similar, if  starker, pattern is discerned. Supranational authority 
existed in IOSCO’s working parties. However, the ability of these groups to pose 
recommendations was stymied by the SEC. The SEC’s motivation can be traced 
predominantly to domestic political considerations and to Breeden’s intransigence. 
Private actors were not prevented from lobbying IOSCO’s working parties and the SEC. 
They elected not to -  because of recent scandals, because of the SEC’s firmly stated 
views and because of the greater likelihood of success in the EU negotiations. As with 
the EU case study, state authority was predominant and state autonomy was preserved.
In both case studies, fundamental state objectives determined the structure of 
policy and the contours of authority. Non-state preferences influenced and shaped state 
preferences. Primary state objectives, however, defined the scope of policy outcomes and 
the location of authority in policy formation. In the case studies, the preservation of 
national sovereignty took precedence over regional and international harmonisation
Regulatory convergence
Susan Strange piedicted that globalisation would encourage regulatory 
convergence: “The common logic of integrated world markets [will].... bring nationalist 
versions of capitalist production and exchange ever closer to a common pattern.”14 This 
statement underscores her belief in the transformative power of markets. Philip Cemy 
also emphasises the conforming power of markets: “National varieties of capitalism will 
be tolerated only so long as they do not undermine profits...”15 The case studies indicate, 
however, that evidence of market or regulatory convergence was limited.16 In IOSCO,
1 7harmonisation negotiations failed. This was a testament to the SEC’s and Breeden’s 
intransigence and influence. In the EU, the use of derogation, differentiated domestic
14 Strange, "The Future o f Global Capitalism; or, Will Divergence Persist Forever?”
15 Cemy, "International Finance and the Erosion o f Capitalist Diversity.”
16 International regulatory convergence has occurred in certain technical areas o f international finance. See: 
White, "International Agreements in the Area o f Banking and Finance: Accomplishments and Outstanding 
Issues.”
17 However, as noted separately, shortly after Breeden left the SEC, international regulatory harmonisation 
talks started up again.
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implementation and ambiguous language ensured that national regulatory distinctiveness 
would continue. Indeed, over a decade after 1992, a harmonised EU capital adequacy
1 ftstandard for investment firms is still under development, a modification of the Basle 
Capital Accord begun in 1997 still awaits finalisation,19 EU member-state domestic 
capital markets remain distinctive, a common securities regulator for the Euromarkets 
does not exist, and different private sector risk management models are being endorsed 
to manage portfolio risk and capital adequacy. National varieties of capitalism and 
regulation persist, unmolested by “harmonising” globalisation, private, or market forces.
State transformation
The case studies reveal that state/market arguments stressing the ability of
91globalisation or market power to “transform” the state/market relationship are strained. 
The use of globalisation to explain the perceived migration of authority away from the
99state can be construed as monocausal, economically deterministic and incomplete. 
While significant non-state influence and authority were identified in the case studies, 
the thesis concludes that international policy was formed predominantly through the
9*1
actions of state actors and institutions. As noted above, private actor regulatory regimes 
have developed in technical and operational areas. Despite private actor involvement, 
however, the state’s central role in setting capitalisation standards, standards that are
18 A CAD 3 has been mooted.
19 It is now predicted for early 2004. Revision discussions actually began in 1993.
20 By public sector institutions.
21 See, for example, Cemy, "Globalization and the Changing Logic o f Collective Action,” p. 597, 
“Structural differentiation increasingly is spreading across borders and economic sectors, driving other 
changes and resulting in the increasing predominance o f political and economic structures that.. .(3) may 
permit actors to be decisionally autonomous o f the state.” And, as quoted previously, “National varieties of 
capitalism will be tolerated only so long as they do not undermine profits in international financial 
markets. If genuinely new forms o f transnational regulation are not forthcoming from states acting in 
concert, then the transnational financial structure is increasingly likely to be run by a de facto  private 
regime centred in the financial markets themselves.” Cemy, "International Finance and the Erosion of  
Capitalist Diversity,” p. 181. Cemy also argued that “The state is being not only being eroded but also 
fundamentally transformed.” He subsequently modified this argument by observing that “the logic of 
collective action is becoming a heterogeneous, multi-layered logic; derived not from one particular core 
structure, such as the state, but from the structural complexity embedded in the global arena.” (Cemy, 
"Globalization and the Changing Logic o f Collective Action,” p. 595) He also argued that unless states 
band together to develop new forms o f  transnational regulation, private firms will create their own de facto  
private regulatory regimes: See: Filipovic, Governments, Banks and Global Capital: Securities Markets in 
Global Politics. Cited in Cemy, "International Finance and the Erosion o f Capitalist Diversity.” V. Cutler 
notes “a general sense that we are in the midst o f a structural transformation that is simply not captured by 
state-centric analysis.” (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, eds., Private Authority and International Affairs.) See 
also: Strange, "The Future o f Global Capitalism; or, Will Divergence Persist Forever?".
22 In this context, “globalisation” refers to the erosion o f state power due to capital liberalisation.
231 agree, o f course, with Cutler’s principal observation, viz., that state-centric analysis is overly limiting. 
Ibid., p. 349.
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closely associated with maintaining a public good (the viability of banking systems), has 
not changed.24
In the case studies, state negotiators selectively adopted non-state preferences in 
forming compromises that shaped policy. However, as noted, in the EU the directives 
were predominantly influenced by the need to meet 1992 deadlines, by the need to 
achieve a qualified voting majority, and by member-states’ fundamental regulatory 
objectives. For example, German policy concessions were influenced through the efforts 
of the private sector to convince German regulators that the inclusion of hedging in 
calculating capital would not weaken German level playing field criteria. Private sector 
arguments were also used to persuade French regulators to accept compromise language 
on the ISD. But the final versions of the ISD and CAD preserved fundamental German 
and French state preferences. In the US, private sector hedging preferences for debt were 
accepted, but the state rejected hedging for equity. State sovereignty was preserved in the 
case studies.
The empirical evidence supports a more modest argument than state 
transformation. Rather than transform the state, globalisation expanded the policy- 
formation process, and influence was more dispersed. Globalisation constricted state 
autonomy, but states still predominated in sensitive risk management areas of policy 
formation. Such transformation as occurred in the case studies was incremental.
The fact that multiple sources of influence operated in policy-formation is neither 
a new phenomenon nor indicative of a transformation in state authority. States have 
collaborated with the private sector in policy-formation and have endorsed market-based 
regulation (principally through SROs ) for many years. What is new is that the 
globalisation of finance has increased the breadth of markets and the complexity of 
products -  and the potential influence of both on state policies and regulations. That in 
turn has increased the number of actors with context-based knowledge (and the
24 See: W. White, "International Agreements in the Area o f Banking and Finance: Accomplishments and 
Outstanding Issues.” See also L. White, "International Regulation o f Securities Markets: Competition or 
Harmonization.” W. White makes the point that when regulation touches the public interest, state 
involvement and preferences are predominant in policy-formation.
25 Such as stock exchanges -  viz. the NYSE, the ASE, the NASDAQ and the LSE.
26 An example is the Bank o f England’s traditional laissez faire , “consultative guidance” approach to 
regulation o f City o f  London institutions.
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significance of that knowledge). This has made international policy formation more 
complex. But, as the protracted CAD 2/3 and Basle II processes and development of the 
Basle Accord and DPG demonstrate, de facto  private regulatory regimes and authority 
have not supplanted the authority of state actors -  at least not yet.27
Theoretical Observations
What do these observations indicate about state and non-state centric perspectives 
and synthetic analysis?
Armstrong and Bulmer argue that, “The emergence of governance beyond the 
state has been a response to the inability of traditional formal state institutions to manage 
the size and complexity of the regulatory tasks facing them.”28 This study challenges 
their assertion. States, supplemented (but not superseded) by supranational and private 
institutions and actors, promoted international policy-formation. Does this mean, 
however, that intergovemmentalism is correct?
Moravcsik argues that state leaders pursue national interests, particularly 
powerful commercial and economic interests. National interests precede regional and 
supranational interests. He concludes that, “The integration process did not supersede or 
circumvent the political will of national leaders.”29 In this thesis I have argued that 
national interests did piedominate in policy formation. But, in light of international 
regulatory harmonisation responses to globalisation and the demonstrated influence of 
non-state actors, Moravscik’s argument is expanded. State preferences in policy 
formation were shaped by both exogenous and endogenous variables. In both case
27 The caveat noted in footnote 24 above applies to this statement.
28 K. Armstrong and S. Bulmer, The Governance o f  the Single European Market (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1998)., p. 259 quoted in Puchala, "Institutionalism, Intergovemmentalism and European 
Integration".
29 Moravcsik, The Choice fo r  Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht., p.4, 
quoted in Puchala, "Institutionalism, Intergovemmentalism and European Integration". This comment 
refers, o f course, to the EU.
30 Moravscik has amended his theoretical arguments to encompass the potential for non-state preferences 
to influence and shape state preferences. As noted in Chapter 3, Moravcsik added a third layer o f analysis 
to his liberal intergovemmentalist framework, bringing his approach closer to constructivist perspectives 
and to the conclusions argued by this thesis. Within a rationalist structure defined by national preferences 
and intergovernmental bargaining, Moravcsik added a notion o f  institutional choice by acknowledging that 
institutions might enjoy agenda-setting powers and arguing that nation-states might pool their sovereignty 
-  through institutions -  to increase the “credibility” o f their commitments. However, Moravscik still 
argues for a linear, one-direction, state policy formation process. This thesis agues that policy formation
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studies, non-state preferences influenced state policy decisions. This conclusion confirms 
that combining state and non-state centric perspectives is necessary for accurate 
assessment. This is an argument for synthetic analysis.
Five theoretical observations are made. First, non-state centric perspectives are 
analytically superior to state-centric perspectives. A complex, non-parsimonious analysis 
is superior to a monocausal or narrower analysis, not solely because it is comprehensive, 
but because it develops deeper insights into policy formation and the limitations of 
individual perspectives. Second, as discussed above, predictions of non-state centric 
theorists are not wholly confirmed. Globalisation did not bring about regulatory 
convergence nor transform state authority. State authority remained predominant in 
international policy formation even while sources of regulatory influence expanded. 
Third, a synthetic perspective, which combines state and non-state centric observations, 
not only reveals limitations of both perspectives, but also develops a more accurate and 
dynamic assessment of authority and influence. Fourth, the theoretical conflation of 
authority and influence diminishes analysis of policy formation. Disaggregating these 
variables develops a more accurate assessment of regulatory development. Fifth, EU 
integration perspectives can be usefully employed in non-EU analyses.
State versus non-state centric perspectives
The case studies support the analytical superiority of non-staie centric 
perspectives.
In the EU case, a narrow perspective focusing on unitary state interests or 
institutions does not identify the important roles of private and supranational actors in 
policy-formation. A focus on states or institutions also ignores the interaction of private 
actors with the Commission, the role of 1992 commitments, and the multifaceted role of 
the Commission itself. The unique structures and histories of domestic EU member-state 
political and economic institutions also shaped EU debates. Treating either the EU or its 
member-states as unitary, or ignoring the ability of sub-national or supranational actors 
and institutions to interact independently, ignores this critical complexity.
operates across and between levels o f authority and influence. See: Moravcsik, The Choice fo r  Europe: 
Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht.
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Similarly in the IOSCO case, a non-state centric perspective facilitates 
identification of the critical reasons why the SEC adopted the stance it did and why the 
negotiations failed. The institutional structure of the US financial services industry, 
IOSCO’s governance weaknesses, competition from parallel EU and Basle negotiations, 
recent market crises and scandals, and the attraction of US markets to non-US borrowers, 
all influenced policy formation. State/market and MLG theses, while not supported
empirically by the IOSCO case study, are confirmed by subsequent regulatory
11
developments. This supports the contention that the IOSCO case study may be 
exceptional.
Despite weaknesses, state-centric perspectives are also critical to appreciating the 
structure of authority. In the EU case, the competitive desire of the Commission and 
member-states to establish an international regulatory precedent is significant to 
understanding their drive to complete the directives and to meet their 1992 obligations. 
However, this analysis is incomplete, ignoring the role of domestic economic 
relationships and histories in shaping states’ responses, and the role of private sector 
interaction with states and supranational actors. In the case of IOSCO, an emphasis 
primarily on interstate negotiations or on IOSCO’s organisational weaknesses excludes 
the domestic structural background to the regulatory preferences and international 
harmonisation strategy of Richard Breeden and the SEC.
This thesis concludes that authority in policy-making resides predominantly with 
the state -  a state-centric view. Paradoxically, it argues that non-state centric 
perspectives are superior to state-centric perspectives -  a non-state centric view. If the 
conclusion is state-centric in nature, why are non-state centric perspectives important to 
consider in analysing policy-formation? The analysis above explains the paradox. It 
confirms the utility of perspectives that locate authority in a three-dimensional 
“condominium,” rather than along a two-dimensional state/market continuum. It avoids 
debate over whether authority has migrated or whether the state has been transformed.
31 See Appendices. The DPG and VaR, in particular, indicated the increasing authority o f non-state actors 
in market regulation. The private sector worked closely with multilateral organisations in developing these 
initiatives, often working directly with the Basle Committee, rather than with or through states, to express 
their preferences.
32 Underhill, "States, Markets and Governance. Private Interests, the Public Good, and the Democratic 
Process".
353
Instead, it acknowledges the complex structure of authority and influence and directs 
attention to understanding the dynamic nature of policy-formation.
This approach moves analysis beyond the binary determination of the balance or 
location of authority and influence in policy-formation by accepting that they are multi­
dimensional and that their composition varies from case to case. In each instance, 
influence was defined by public and private, state and non-state, variables. The contours 
of influence were determined by at least three variables: by state; by market/private 
factors; and by supranational actor and institutional variables. A fourth variable, which 
must be considered in any discussion of policy formation, is Odell’s concept of 
“process.” International policy negotiations take place over time and are dynamic. These 
characteristics imply that the contours of authority and influence may change over the 
course of a negotiation.
Synthetic analysis
This study’s empirical and theoretical findings demonstrate that adoption of a 
single analytical focus may fail to reveal relationships and evidence critical to evaluating 
policy-formation. By discouraging multiple independent variable analysis, focused 
perspectives demonstrate both omitted variable and selection biases. As noted in Chapter 
1, state/market and integration perspectives dramatically expand the number of 
independent variables and levels of analysis under consideration. They manage the 
resulting analytical complexity by concentrating on core topics and by identifying 
linkages between levels of analysis.33 However, even these perspectives may evidence 
limitations. State/market approaches may over-emphasise the roles of private or market 
interests and ignore factors emphasised by integration approaches such as MLG and the 
role of economic or political structure. Additionally, the state/market focus on power 
relationships may ignore the importance of legitimacy and utility in locating influence 
and authority.
Similarly, integration approaches are, as noted earlier, middle-level analytical 
perspectives. They emphasise specific variables -  policy networks, institutional
33 See: King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. 
“Selecting observations for inclusion in a study according to the categories o f the key causal explanatory 
variable causes no inference problems. The reason is that our selection procedure does not predetermine 
the outcome o f our study, since we have not restricted the degree of variation in our dependent variable.”
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structure, or MLG -  and may over-emphasise the roles of examined variables to the 
detriment of others. These observations argue for synthetic analysis, which examines the 
process of policy formation: particularly, how it incorporates context-based knowledge 
and how influence is exercised. Synthetic analysis encourages the expansion of empirical 
focus to encompass multiple perspectives, explanatory variables and case studies. It 
exposes aspects of policy development that are not revealed by state or non-state centric 
approaches alone. This thesis observes that conclusions drawn from individual 
perspectives, when juxtaposed, often modify each other, producing a more complex and 
nuanced understanding of international policy formation.
Synthetic analysis operates through the combination and assessment of 
observations drawn from defined theoretical approaches. For example, from a state- 
centric perspective, the decision by EU member-states to develop harmonised regional 
regulatory precedents represented the assertion of the EU’s regional regulatory authority. 
From a non-state centric perspective the EU’s effort reflected multiple influences and 
incentives: private actors’ efforts to promote certain operating practices; the EU’s 1992 
objectives; the influence of the Basle Committee and the SEC; and EU domestic market 
responses to globalisation favouring the Euromarket. When juxtaposed, these two sets of 
observations generate a third perspective of policy formation, which highlights the 
development of state policy objectives.
For example, EU member-states’original objectives were designed to bolster both 
regional norms and the EU’s international authority. During negotiations it became 
apparent that this objective conflicted with member-states’ preference for preserving 
domestic institutions, relationships, and regulatory norms. It also became evident that the 
EU’s work might be superseded by a Basle Committee proposal. The EU Commission 
recognised that its original harmonisation objectives were not achievable, and it 
negotiated a series of compromises in order to meet member-states’ treaty-based 
obligation to establish the CAD and ISD. Synthetic analysis identifies how these 
observations modify each other. The interaction of private, state and multilateral actor 
and institutional preferences was evident in compromises on CAD and ISD language. 
Compromises were necessary in order to preserve state preferences dictated by national 
economic and regulatory institutions and to include constructive recommendations of 
private sector lobbyists and the EU Commission. The 1992 deadline and the competing
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Basle process incentivised negotiators to establish a regulatory precedent that fixed EU 
preferences ahead of the Committee. This interaction was apparent in the lobbying of 
Commission, DG XV and national regulators by investment bankers and policy 
networks. Identifying interactions between actors and institutions in policy-formation 
indicates how authority and influence emerge and operate.
These actions achieved several goals. First, they established a regulatory 
precedent favouring Euromarket standards. Thus the directives more closely paralleled 
the evolving Basle Committee standards than they did those favoured by the SEC. It also 
meant that EU standards could potentially influence the Basle Committee’s deliberations. 
Second, the adoption of the directives effectively ended any possibility of the SEC’s 
capitalisation standards being implemented internationally. Private and public sector 
actors and institutions broadly favoured the directives’ approach. Finally, the adoption of 
the directives reinforced the EU’s ability to achieve difficult regional harmonisation 
objectives. This was particularly significant in light of the ongoing Maastricht debate. 
Based on these observations, this thesis concludes that predominant state preferences, 
influenced by private actors and EU institutions, modified the EU’s harmonisation 
strategy.
The IOSCO case study also benefits from synthetic analysis. A state-centric view 
focuses on the SEC’s international authority and international legulatory piecedent- 
setting ambitions. It emphasises the size and attractiveness of US domestic markets, the 
SEC’s long institutional tenure and well-established regulatory template, and Richard 
Breeden’s unique individual authority. A non-state centric perspective identifies 
additional important sources of influence: IOSCO’s history of domination by the US and 
its weak governance structure; the roots of the SEC’s regulatory preferences; domestic 
challenges to SEC authority; debates within international policy communities over the 
efficacy of SEC capitalisation prescriptions; and EU member-states’ own motivations for 
developing a different regulatory precedent from the SEC’s.
Synthetic analysis suggests a third interpretation of IOSCO’s failure, which also 
focuses on the development o f state policy objectives. The SEC’s initial response to 
market globalisation and pressure for an international regulatory harmonisation strategy 
was to seek to enhance IOSCO’s policy formation capabilities so that IOSCO could
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serve as a stalking horse for US regulatory preferences as it had in the past. Under Ruder 
and Breeden, the SEC also staked out a regulatory harmonisation strategy that stressed 
the promotion of US regulatory values overseas. The SEC created a special high-level 
office for this purpose, established a separate group to promote US regulatory norms 
overseas, and initiated domestic regulatory reforms to take advantage of the 
attractiveness of US markets to non-US borrowers. However, the SEC’s ability to 
promote its international regulatory preferences multilaterally was limited by IOSCO’s 
governance structure -  despite the US-sponsored Strategic Assessment -  and by the 
opposition of EU member-states. The SEC was also distracted by domestic institutional 
competition, exacerbated by regulatory scandals and market events. As a result, the SEC 
found its multilateral regulatory objectives frustrated and its international authority 
constrained. These circumstances encouraged the agency to emphasise a bilateral 
regulatory harmonisation strategy built on domestic regulatory initiatives and standards. 
Finally, this analysis focuses attention on EU member-states’ progressive disillusionment 
with the IOSCO negotiations and their prioritisation of a regional, rather than an 
international, regulatory precedent.
In the IOSCO case, authority did not migrate away from state institutions or 
actors. A synthetic analysis contributes significantly to this conclusion, because it 
identifies the interaction of the multiple reasons behind state dominance in policy- 
formation. Most importantly, it identifies the reasons for iOSCO's weak governance, as 
well as the bases for Breeden’s unique independence and authority over international 
capital harmonisation initiatives. Conflicting state preferences, influenced by domestic 
and supranational considerations, brought about the collapse of the IOSCO negotiations.
If we did not examine non-state variables, would our interpretation of state 
predominance in policy-formation change? Our identification of state predominance and 
fundamental preferences would remain the same, but our understanding of policy 
formation would be very different. If we only examine state-centric variables, we are 
presented with a static portrait of policy formation based on power -  the US’s market 
power enabling it to stymie IOSCO’s negotiations and balanced EU member-state power 
leading to regulatory compromises. These two-dimensional portraits do not provide 
insight into the dynamic process of the negotiations, into the roles of non-state actors in
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shaping state preferences and decisions, nor into how various actors (public and private) 
operated across levels of authority and propelled the negotiations forward.
Conversely, would a conventional non-state centric analysis change our 
interpretation of state predominance? The answer is again yes. While a non-state centric 
analysis focuses on the important role of non-state influence in state decision-making, 
this thesis has argued that a critical element in assessing policy formation is the 
identification of fundamental state preferences. These preferences determine whether 
non-state preferences are, or are not, acceptable to state decision-makers. International 
policy outcomes hinge on this relationship between state and non-state preferences.
We can now answer the central theoretical question: “What is the best way to 
understand both the exercise of authority and the resulting patterns of securities market 
governance across levels of analysis and a range of actors?” A synthetic approach, 
combining observations developed by a range of perspectives, provides a comprehensive 
appreciation of the factors influencing international policy-formation. More importantly, 
a synthetic approach reveals how these factors interrelate in policy-formation. This 
analysis also highlights the limitations of individual perspectives and facilitates weighing 
the significance of each perspective’s contribution. These observations steer empirical 
analysis away from a focus on the location of authority to such broader questions as: 
“How is authority constituted?” and “How does it operate?”, probing more deeply into 
the nature of authority and influence.34
This thesis has argued that state preferences were not shaped predominantly by 
state-centric considerations of power or market failure. Rather, they were based on the 
interaction of politically and economically important domestic institutional structures on 
larger state objectives. These structures are identified by state and non-state centric 
approaches.35 Their importance to the state is revealed through analysis that identifies 
fundamental state motivations, combined with analysis of the dynamic interaction of
34 For a longer discussion o f authority see: Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, Private Authority and International 
Affairs.
3 Domestic and bargaining approaches represent a middle-ground on the analytical continuum between 
state and non-state centric theoretical extremes. Structures are identified by these approaches as well as by 
state/market and integration perspectives. Consequently, analysis based on identification o f critical 
structures and fundamental state preferences operates most effectively by combining these approaches in 
synthetic analysis.
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state and non-state variables in policy formation. This is the essence of synthetic 
analysis. It leads to a conclusion that synthetic examination of state and non-state actor 
and institutional preferences is critical to understanding the structure of authority and 
influence.
As we have seen, synthetic analysis can modify our interpretation of authority 
and influence in policy formation. It also identifies why and where non-state actors and 
institutions have influence. In the case studies, the influence of non-state actors was 
exercised through their expertise and their economic significance, through their role in 
the achievement of state objectives, through proposing compromises or explaining the 
consequences of policy options, and through clarifying technical issues.36 Analysis of 
non-state actors and institutions shows how domestic structures inform and influence 
state preferences, how policy networks operate in propelling negotiations, and how 
variables operate across levels of authority.37
Influence and authority
The conflation of authority and influence by state/market theorists benefits from 
an amended analytical approach. The objective is to identify the contours of authority 
and influence in policy-formation. Conflating authority and influence obscures the 
relationship between legitimate, formal authority and other sources of influence.
As argued in Chapter 3, narrowly defining authority as explicit and formal allows 
it to be treated as simply one form of influence over policy formation. This approach 
distinguishes authority from other potential sources of influence, including context-based 
expertise, which may be expressed by either public or private actors. As an example, the
36 UK objectives for the Euromarkets (driven by status and revenue considerations) were supported by the 
domestic private sector, German public/private institutional relationships (vital to reconstruction and 
Germany’s role in Europe) were preserved by shared level playing field objectives, French dirigisme 
resisted wholesale changes to domestic market practices and met limited resistance domestically. These 
domestic structures were important to the vitality o f state and non-state actors and institutions. As a 
consequence, state arguments and decisions made in international forums were strengthened by their being 
supported by both state and non-state actors’ objectives. This gave national negotiators the flexibility and 
negotiating leverage to resist disadvantageous compromise proposals. They could defer decisions and not 
risk debilitating domestic dissension. The interrelationship o f domestic and state objectives is only 
revealed by synthetic analysis.
37 State/market approaches point us in this analytic direction. However, their lack o f precision hampers 
identification o f  critical variables. Integration approaches are more precise, but do not seek to synthesise 
perspectives.
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Patronat had context-based legitimacy and therefore influence, but it did not have 
explicit authority. French state negotiators, evidently persuaded by the Patronat’s ISD 
arguments, changed their position in the intergovernmental ISD debates. However, only 
the French government had the formal authority to approve a change in policy. More 
importantly, it was the French government that negotiated how the policy change would 
be reflected in the ISD. The change in French government policy was only one issue in 
larger ISD debates that were not influenced by the Patronat. Influence may be expressed 
by state and non-state agents in various forms. Distinguishing among these forms is 
important in understanding dynamic policy-formation.
Influence may be expressed by public, private or supranational agents and 
institutions and may take various forms, ranging from brute force to specialised 
knowledge. The conflation of authority and influence inhibits discrimination among 
sources and types of influence. More importantly, conflation distracts attention from the 
process of policy-formation, during which different sources of influence are identified. A 
process-oriented synthetic analysis enables us to identify which type of influence appears 
at different points in a negotiation and why. For example, EU institutions, 
demonstrating their formal authority, established the 1992 goals. This was the only way 
these negotiations could be started, as the private securities sector had little interest (or 
authority) in harmonising their lightly regulated industry. State negotiators, through a 
combination of influence (persuasion/negotiation) and formal authority, negotiated the 
language of the directives. On technical issues, private actors influenced the negotiations 
by providing context-based expertise. But compromises were devised predominantly by 
actors and institutions with formal authority. Finally, the directives were adopted by 
states through the Council and Parliament. This brief summary delineates the different 
forms of influence and authority that helped bring the directives to conclusion.
The IOSCO case demonstrates little formal authority but significant influence. As 
in the EU negotiations, the IOSCO deliberations were initiated by states. However, 
IOSCO’s structure and policy-making procedures undermined states’ negotiating 
effectiveness and the authority (formal or otherwise) of the policy-formation process. EU 
member-states, influenced by European commitments and the Basle Committee, turned 
away from IOSCO. The SEC used its formal authority (bilateral treaties and MOUs),
38 A related point is made in Odell, Negotiating the World Economy, 2000.
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abetted by informal influences (attractive domestic markets, domestic political concerns, 
and Breeden’s regulatory views), to undermine IOSCO’s efforts.
EU integration perspectives
As discussed earlier, EU integration perspectives are presented as sui generis to 
EU research. Although the EU’s structure and authority are, of course, sui generis, 
integration perspectives are useful in non-EU contexts, particularly for identifying 
empirical anomalies. Precursors to EU integration perspectives are located in the non-EU 
research of Moravcsik and Milner;39 the early work of Katzenstein,40 Gourevitch41 and 
Zysman,42 emphasising the comparative significance of domestic economic structures in 
shaping national responses to external stimuli; in Haas’s work on epistemic 
communities; and in Keohane’s work on institutions. These scholars’ arguments were 
foreshadowed by Polanyi’s emphasis on the close connection between markets and 
states.43 In this sense, EU integration analyses, while obviously stimulated by the 
development of unique, powerful EU institutions, represent an extension of core 
analytical principles that originated in traditional IR/IPE studies. These approaches 
reflect “shared conceptual assumptions.”44 While they depart from structural 
assumptions, they represent a logical intellectual evolution when examined against the 
continuum of analytical perspectives. What distinguishes these research perspectives is 
their goal of combining domestic and international observations and the degree to which 
non-state aciors are deemed influential.
MLG, new institutionalism and network perspectives provide direction to critical 
observations in both the EU and IOSCO cases, highlighting a basic but important 
difference between them; private sector and multilateral influence are prominent in the
39 Milner, Resisting Protectionism.
40 Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies o f  Advanced Industrial States.
41 P Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources o f Domestic Politics.”
42 John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
43 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944). Noted in G.R.D. Underhill, 
"Conceptualizing the Changing Global Order," in Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, 2nd 
ed., eds. Richard Stubbs and G.R.D. Underhill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
44 Political and economic domains are indivisible, economic structures are constructed and changed 
through political activity, and domestic and international levels o f analysis are analytically indissoluble. 
Ibid., G.R.D. Underhill, "Conceptualizing the Changing Global Order," in Political Economy and the 
Changing Global Order, 2nd ed.. See also: Majone, "Cross-National Sources o f Regulatory Policymaking 
in Europe and the United States.”
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EU negotiations but are absent from the IOSCO case.45 Influence arises from three levels 
of governance/analysis in the EU case, but from only one level in the IOSCO case -  an 
important observation inviting further investigation.
Another potential application for EU integration perspectives can be seen in the 
interaction of national agencies and private actors with supranational bodies such as the 
EU, the Basle Committee and the WTO. Research into the development of a 
transnational “market-polity,”46 analogous to EU integration theory’s “Euro-polity,” 
could prove useful in further assessing theoretical predictions of regulatory convergence. 
This thesis’ observation that US and UK investment banks lobbied state and 
supranational actors in favour of Euromarket preferences indicates potential support for 
this contention.
Complexity
As discussed above under “State-centric versus non-state centric perspectives” 
and under “Synthetic analysis,” the complexity of non-state centric perspectives and 
synthetic analysis is justified by each perspective’s ability to highlight limitations in 
narrower perspectives and to identify new relationships from empirical data.
The Basle Committee
Three institutions carried out capital harmonisation discussions: IOSCO, the EU 
and the Basle Committee. This section considers the significance for the EU and IOSCO 
of the Basle Committee’s parallel discussions.
Given modest differences between the capital recommendations of the EU and 
the Basle Committee, and given the ultimate failure of the CAD and ISD directives,47 it 
is useful to assess the Basle Committee’s influence on EU deliberations. As described 
earlier, the EU and the Basle Committee differed significantly.48 The Basle Committee’s
45 EU integration approaches cannot always be applied to non-EU case studies. MLG does not operate well 
in the IOSCO case as IOSCO lacked authority. However, MLG does highlight this observation.
46 Comprised o f private market actors sharing market, rather than state-based, preferences.
47 See Appendix B. CAD 2 was initiated in 1995/96 when universal adoption o f the original CAD failed. A 
CAD 3 is under development.
48 See Chapter 6. Unlike the EU, the Basle Committee did not face time pressure, have a SEA/QMV 
incentive or a powerful institutional bureaucracy. The Committee’s process was also less adversarial. Most
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international stature and the successful implementation of the Basle Accord gave its 
policy formation processes superior authority, legitimacy and influence. Consequently, I 
have argued that the Committee’s research initially incentivised the EU to establish its 
own capital precedent to influence the Committee’s work. Ultimately however, the 
Committee’s recommendations superseded the EU’s precedent. Because EU member- 
states were aware that the Committee’s pending regulatory release would supersede their 
own directives, the Committee’s work encouraged EU member-states to adopt politically 
expedient “interim” compromise resolutions to CAD and ISD conflicts in order to meet 
1992 objectives and in order to move on to more pressing Maastricht issues.
The general alignment of the EU and Basle Committee on capitalisation 
temporarily marginalised both IOSCO and the SEC.49 Corrigan and Breeden differed 
over capitalisation, but Corrigan never publicly criticised the SEC.50 After Breeden left 
the SEC, and after the IOSCO negotiations collapsed, both the SEC51 and IOSCO began 
to align their work and their views more closely with the Basle Committee. This 
confirmed the seniority of the Basle Committee in international policy formation.
Research implications
The findings of this study suggest that research approaches should expand the 
number of variables assessed and incorporate observations from multiple perspectives. 
The continuum of factors affecting regulatory development should be viewed as 
interrelated rather than static or hierarchical. Policy-formation should be understood as a 
process, occurring and evolving across the spectrum between completion and failure, not 
as a binary outcome.
importantly, the Committee was comprised o f senior central bankers, who, together with Finance or 
Treasury Secretaries, represented senior state financial services regulatory authority. EU member-state 
representatives to CAD and ISD discussions were generally securities market regulators or exchange 
representatives.
49 The SEC’s marginalisation was rapidly redressed when Breeden left the SEC in 1993 and was replaced 
by Arthur Levitt.
50 He was constrained by the awkwardness o f an apolitical FRBNY President (and Basle Committee 
Chairman) criticising the views o f an SEC Chairman. Breeden indirectly criticised the Basle Committee by 
opposing EU member-states’ perspectives on capitalisation. There is also speculation that Corrigan felt the 
EU might be going too far in its capital adequacy proposals. Source: Confidential interviews. New York, 
April 2000. Corrigan supported tougher capital rules than ultimately proposed by the EU. Corrigan and 
Breeden’s “stress test” o f the CAD, while criticised as flawed, may also have influenced Corrigan’s 
preferences - even though the Committee’s views on capitalisation closely paralleled the EU’s. See 
Appendices.
51 Under a new Chairman, Arthur Levitt.
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The case studies reflect unique circumstances and this thesis’ arguments should 
not be generalised without corroborating research. The governance structure of IOSCO, 
the exceptional conditions of the SEC’s domestic and international authority, and the 
unique weaknesses of private actors in the US preclude using the IOSCO case study to 
generalise about the location of authority. In fact, following the conclusion of IOSCO’s 
discussions, private actor authority increased, although in different venues.
The EU case is exceptional as well. The compromises that characterised the 
resolution of EU policy deliberations were influenced by one-time events (states’ 
commitment to the 1992 deadline and the competing importance of the Maastricht vote) 
as well as by the interaction of state and non-state authority. It would be important to 
compare conclusions from this case study with case studies unaffected by significant 
one-time events.
To test these findings, dynamic comparative analysis of rule-making over time is 
recommended. Research studies should examine international policy-formation over a 
range of international and regional harmonisation issues, including capital adequacy. 
Authority could be examined from different analytical perspectives and evidence 
compared. This would be a constructive addition to the debate between “British” and 
“American” approaches to IR and IPE.53 Recent IPE scholaiship has evidenced 
increasing use of multiple analytical perspectives, which could be expanded to assess 
their comparative analytic utility.54
Broader Considerations
The Basle Committee defined a fixed international capital standard for 
universal/commercial banks with the 1988 Basle Capital Accord. Those standards are 
now being modified to a hybrid form determined by market and institutional standards. 
Is this due to a decline in the authority of supranational or state regulatory institutions?
52 See below and Appendix B.
53 See: D.W. Miller, "Storming the Palace in Political Science," The Chronicle o f  Higher Education, 
September 21, 2001 for a discussion o f  the ongoing debate between theses two approaches to analysis.
54 See, for example, Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the State., and 
Underhill, "Private Markets and Public Responsibility in a Global System: Conflict and Cooperation in 
Transnational Banking and Securities Regulation.”
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Or is it due to increasing market complexity and to the increasing velocity of change in 
financial markets? More specifically, did the creation of the private sector DPG confirm 
that regulators had been compelled to share regulatory responsibility with the private 
sector? A brief review of international regulatory harmonisation after 1992 will provide 
some answers.55
In the spring of 1993, the Basle Committee proposed tougher minimum capital 
standards for bank equity activities than had been included in the recently agreed CAD. 
In 1994, building on the DPG initiative supervised by the FRBNY, IOSCO and the Basle 
Committee released joint guidelines proposing the use of private proprietary VaR models 
for determining capitalisation for derivatives risk exposure.
Following the derivatives-associated collapse of Barings in 1995, national 
regulators and G-7 heads of state called for closer international regulatory cooperation, 
particularly between IOSCO and the Basle Committee. The Basle Committee and 
IOSCO continued to collaborate on derivatives, releasing joint reports in 1995 that 
formally endorsed VaR for risk management. Their recommendation was also endorsed 
by the DPG. Because the recommendation marked a clear advance over CAD 
technology, EU member-states delayed CAD implementation. By the January 1996 CAD 
adoption deadline, fewer than 50 percent of member-states had passed implementing 
legislation, and plans for a ‘ CAD 2” were already in circulation. In 1998, the Basle 
Committee began work on “Basle II,” a restructuring of the 1988 Capital Accord.56 Five 
years later, neither the CAD, CAD 2 nor Basle II had been fully implemented -  and a 
CAD 3 was under discussion.57
Two observations can be made. First, the development of the DPG and the 
endorsement of proprietary VaR risk models indicate that private actor influence is 
increasing over time. This does not, however, refute the predominance of state 
preferences in international policy-formation. States have insisted that they authorise 
VaR models used and the DPG was “supervised” by the FRBNY. But it does provide
55 See also Appendix B.
56 On top o f revisions recommended in 1993 and 1995. It was still under development in 2003.
57 As o f August 2003, the SIA, the BBA and the London Investment Banking Association were 
complaining that proposed Basle II rules were “too complex and prescriptive” and would “seriously 
undermine liquidity in the capital markets.” See: Pretzlik, Charles, “Basle II ‘could damage banks’ capital 
market liquidity, Financial Times, August 10, 2003.
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support for the observation of state/market and EU integration theorists that authority is 
expanding.
Second, the EU’s original CAD was inflexible, unable to adapt to market and 
institutional developments. The CAD’s rigidity, combined with protracted regional 
harmonisation processes, exposed the directive to rapid obsolescence, encouraged in part 
by the Basle Committee and in part by the development of VaR models. A major 
rationale for EU regulatory harmonisation had been that it would increase the EU’s 
international negotiating leverage. This strategy was only partially successful with 
respect to the CAD. Moreover, the glacial pace of other supranational regulatory 
harmonisation discussions confirms that the EU’s CAD experience was not unique. This 
leads us back to the familiar hypothesis that traditional regulatory models and 
developmental processes, whether regional or supranational, cannot keep pace with 
rapidly changing markets. This hypothesis questions the continuing utility of the EU’s 
original regulatory principles and the general feasibility of developing detailed 
harmonised regulatory standards for market-driven institutions.
One may well also ask whether full regional or international regulatory 
harmonisation is possible. This prompts a related question, “Can EU identification ever 
replace national identification?” The answer to both, based on evidence from the case 
studies, is a qualified no. National preferences weie held so strongly that, in order to 
resolve disagreements, derogations and compromises preserving national distinctiveness 
were necessary. The directives were subject to national implementation, and more than 
half the member-states failed to meet the 1996 implementation deadline. Threats of fines 
were ineffective. The character of national implementation also varied, with “super-
CO
equivalent” measures implemented in some countries. This points us to the basic 
impediment facing any regional or international harmonisation initiative; states are 
reluctant to alter embedded national commercial practices and structures, particularly 
when they are tied to national political and economic structures.
Nevertheless, the SEM, the Maastricht Treaty, the Euro, and the European central 
bank initiatives all indicate that regionalisation objectives can be achieved.59 But if this is
58 This reflected domestic opinion the CAD was inadequate. This was notably the case in the UK.
59 This listing ignores, o f course, other successful harmonisation initiatives outside the EU.
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true, is it sufficient to say that securities regulations are difficult to harmonise simply 
because national structures resist change?60 Or does the answer lie in the intensely 
competitive nature of financial services, in the rapidity of technological and product 
change in this industry, in its unceasing search for regulatory arbitrage, and even in the 
attractiveness of the industry to ambitious, intellectually aggressive, and entrepreneurial 
individuals? These are, of course, issues for further study.61
In highly technical areas such as financial services, trade and environmental 
regulation, there are aggressive advocates for transferring regulatory responsibility from 
the state to the “marketplace.” Market-driven regulatory solutions assume that private 
economic and commercial considerations outweigh public goods concerns in resolving 
issues involving an uneven allocation of benefits. This assumption, which prioritises 
competition in regulatory development, is both naive and dangerous. Market-driven 
regulation has proven inadequate to meet the challenge of balancing the public good with 
private interests, notably in financial services, on numerous occasions.
This returns us to the question of whether market globalisation has eroded the 
ability of states to regulate markets and financial institutions. When financial stability -
60 The EU more closely resembles a federal state, albeit a loose and decentralised one, than it does an 
international one. The reconciliation o f national preferences through compromise encourages analogising 
EU regulatory harmonisation to a federal (US or Canadian) legislative process rather than to an 
international negotiation. In a federal system, divergent state views are accommodated to preserve 
commitments and unity. Dissimilar views are rarely excluded. Conversely, the IOSCO process reflected an 
international negotiation in two important, respects: negotiating states could disagree and not risk fatally 
damaging inter-state relationships or domestic markets and, second, one negotiating state with sufficient 
structural power and domestic support could veto cooperation.
61 In 2001, Alexandre Lamfalussy proposed a system o f  “committees and consultation” to accelerate 
development o f EU securities legislation, but he did not recommend the creation o f a pan-European 
securities supervisor The idea was championed by the French but opposed by the British. Lamfalussy’s 
proposals accelerated development o f new EU securities laws covering market abuse, prospectuses and 
investment services. Why? A regional securities supervisor would need pan-European enforcement 
powers, along with common civil and criminal laws, which currently do not exist for the EU. Their 
creation would require radically re-shaping existing national securities regulatory regimes, which is the 
issue that nearly scuttled the CAD and ISD. Although not recommended by Lamfalussy, debate about a 
possible pan-European securities supervisor has sparked concern, mainly in Britain, over “creeping EU 
federalism” and potential loss o f national sovereignty and autonomy. It has also prompted the City to 
propose the British FSA as an alternative EU regulator. Domestic economic and regulatory structures 
continue to be impediments to the development o f  a more “federal” EU and to the development o f  
harmonised regulation. See: "Trojan Horses," The Economist, February 13, 2003.
62 See the 2002/3 debates within the administration o f US President Bush over environmental legislation. 
Katherine Q. Seelye, "A Spectrum o f  Color-Coded Choices for the White House's E.P.A. Nominee," The 
New York Times, 26 May 2003.
63 As noted earlier, scandals in financial services regularly appear in such lightly regulated areas as new 
products. Junk bonds and highly leveraged financing in the 1980s, derivatives in the late 1990s, and the 
collapse o f  the corporate finance/equity research “Chinese Wall” in the US early in the 21st century, all 
reflect the inability o f the “market” to regulate financial services efficiently, fairly, or in the public interest.
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domestic or international -  is threatened, states intercede and encourage a move to 
greater regulation, redressing problems that are frequently market-driven (that is, private- 
sector in origin).64 States address market crises predominantly on an ad hoc basis: 
through bilateral agreements; through state sponsored organisations such as the DPG; 
and through spontaneous coordinated efforts such as the bailout of LTCB and the 
resolution of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.65 These initiatives are often 
carried out in collaboration with the private sector and multilateral institutions. Thus, 
from an empirical perspective, regulatory responses to market evolution and to market 
crises continue to require the involvement primarily of state and secondarily of non-state 
actors.66 Several interesting questions arise from this observation. What criteria do states 
use to determine when they will be involved in international policy development and 
when they can leave policy development to the private sector? Also, why are some issues
f * j
resolved by states and some issues shifted to multilateral institutions?
These questions focus attention on the policy-formation capabilities of 
multilateral, state and private actors, in particular on their respective incentives, strengths 
and weaknesses. Because each level is significant in resolving market issues, they need 
to be considered jointly when assessing international policy formation.
Looking forward
Based on the case studies and a review of international regulatory harmonisation
Aftafter 1992, several comments are ventured concerning the structure of future market
64 In the US, the New York State Attorney General, Elliot Spitzer, moved aggressively to investigate and 
penalise financial institutions for equity sale and research irregularities in 2002/3. In response to the same 
concerns, the US Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Bill, which dramatically increased accounting 
disclosure obligations for corporations filing financial statements in the US and penalties for failure to 
comply. Internationally, the Asian financial crisis o f 1997 is an example o f states being forced to address 
market failure.
65 See generally: Thomas Oatley, "The Dilemmas o f International Financial Regulation," Regulation 23, 
no. 4 (2000).
66 The critical involvement o f national and supranational regulators in the resolution o f the Asian financial 
crisis, the re-building o f Russian and Eastern European economies, the resolution o f the Long-Term 
Capital Management crisis, the more recent Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco and accounting supervision 
issues -  all confirm the thesis that state and multilateral regulators remain critical in regulatory 
application, development and crisis management.
67 Thomas Oatley argues that national political and commercial incentives lie behind international policy- 
formation. States, unwilling to tackle distributional disagreements among domestic institutions (raised by 
arbitrage or related issues), push the process o f resolution into the international arena. Oatley, "The 
Dilemmas o f International Financial Regulation,".
68 See Appendix B for a detailed description o f the evolution o f  regulation and regulatory institutions after 
1993.
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regulation. Continued market growth and intensified competition will compel regulators 
to rely increasingly on a mixture of formal (state and supranational) and market 
regulation and supervision. Both forms of regulation have encouraged greater 
institutional, transactional and supervisory transparency as well as market-based 
regulation. These developments acknowledge that financial markets have, at least 
\ recently, outstripped the ability of static formal regulation to track trading activity, 
portfolio risk or to expeditiously address new product developments. It also indicates that 
distinctive national economic and commercial structures continue to impede international 
harmonisation. To address the limitations of formal regulation and the constraints of 
national structures, regulators are attempting to shift more of the responsibility for risk 
mitigation onto the marketplace. But it is not yet clear how regulatory leadership will be 
determined nor which areas will be subject to greater market or statutory regulation.69
IOSCO addressed its structural weaknesses in two ways: by working jointly with the Basle Committee to 
enhance its regulatory influence and by narrowly addressing technical securities issues. But IOSCO has 
never achieved the stature Richard Breeden hoped it would acquire when he recommended a strategic 
assessment in 1989. Considering the increasing market dominance o f  universal banks, IOSCO’s future 
regulatory role will be increasingly dependent on the scope o f the Basle Committee’s work.
The Basle Committee remains the “senior” multilateral regulatory organisation, despite the fact that its 
public review processes have delayed international policy formation. (The composition o f the Basle 
Committee is, however, considered illegitimate in Asia, where it is perceived as a narrowly Western body - 
an observation reinforced by the recent accession o f Spain. (Comment from Dr. A.R. Walter, November 
2002)). Delays have arisen from difficulties in accommodating changes in technology and product 
markets, as well as in organisational and governance preferences. Delays have also resulted from the 
Committee’s effort to address legitimacy and democratic deficit concerns raised by its policy formation 
processes and membership. (As noted earlier, the Basle Committee’s authority and influence derive largely 
from its small, powerful membership. This raises legitimacy and democratic deficit concerns with the 
Committee’s recommendations. Research has noted the potentially undemocratic nature o f supranational 
rule-making processes. However, the broad acceptance o f Basle Committee recommendations indicates 
that legitimacy concerns are minimal. This may be a result o f the Committee’s policy development 
processes, which avoid regulatory regimes dominated by private or narrowly national interests. This 
observation should be examined by focusing on regulatory development over time. Increasingly, the Basle 
Committee’s developmental work involves collaboration with other public and private regulatory forums 
including IOSCO, the IASC, the DPG and the IIF. Since the 1988 Capital Accord, the Committee has 
consistently sought and incorporated private sector opinion on draft recommendations. This is reflected in 
a 1995 Committee proposal to include a private supervisory option and in the Basle II exercise.
For recent Basle Committee research see: Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: International 
Finance and the State., Oatley and Nabors, "Redistributive Co-Operation: Market Failure, Wealth 
Transfers, and the Basle Accord.”, and Richards, "Toward a Positive Theory o f International Institutions: 
Regulating International Aviation Markets.”
69 Market evolution will continue to provide opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and risk-taking, leading 
to new market crises. The rapidity o f market change and crisis development, and the slow pace of  
supranational regulatory deliberations, will confine supranational institutions to making general 
supervisory policy recommendations. This leaves large transnational markets, such as the foreign exchange 
market, subject predominantly to market-based regulation. But financial institutions will remain subject 
predominantly to national regulation. As a consequence (and as Richard Breeden surmised), it is probable 
that the quality o f  national regulation will influence the competitiveness o f financial institutions. Rather 
than a race to the regulatory bottom, market competition should encourage migration to a regulatory 
middle ground dominated by standards set by the US and Euro markets. This is, however, not an 
immediate prospect as markets remain nationally differentiated. Nevertheless, as long as solvent financial 
institutions and open markets represent quasi-public goods, states, not the private sector, will lead in crisis
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The ongoing Basle II exercise contemplates a combination of market and 
supervisory regulation.70 However, by vesting aspects of regulatory responsibility with 
market practitioners, national supervisors potentially decrease accountability and 
regulatory legitimacy.71 This may create further problems. While the financial services 
industry is sensitive to maintaining the public’s confidence, the equity market run-up and 
collapse of the 1990s revealed that avarice continues to outweigh prudence in private 
sector decision-making. Over the same period, we witnessed the commercial and 
economic failures of institutions and states through financial mismanagement and 
malfeasance.
To monitor the public interest and to anticipate and respond to future crises, 
international and national regulators must maintain a predominant presence in regulatory 
evolution and market supervision. More importantly, the ability of regulators to 
supervise and monitor markets and institutions must continue to be enhanced, even as 
markets strive to diminish the supervisory capacity of states. To provide guidance to 
market actors and institutions, formal regulation should continue to increase market 
transparency and to simplify rules and regulations by establishing regulatory paradigms 
and parameters, rather than hard and fast rules. These objectives may be augmented 
through the greater formalisation of procedures to address market crises and by 
identifying institutions that would take leadeiship roles in a crisis.
resolution and in regulatory development; through moral suasion, through policy-formation, through 
intergovernmental actions, and through direct intervention For a longer discussion see: Pauly, Who Elected 
the Bankers? and Andrew Large, "The Future o f Global Regulation,” (Washington, D.C.: Group o f Thirty, 
1998).
70 Charles Taylor argues the Basel II exercise will “create major problems,” by increasing supervisory 
costs, exaggerating negative effects o f business downturns and stimulating herd behaviours among banks. 
He suggests a simpler approach involving banks selecting a capital threshold and regulators imposing a 
second, “loss” threshold equal to capital multiplied by a loss parameter, which would constrain the amount 
of risk a bank could incur. His approach simplifies the 1,000+ page Basle II proposal - still in development 
- and may pre-empt Basle III, which has threatened to follow Basle II. See: http://www.csfi.org.uk and 
www.bis.org.
71 Ironically, it also reposes an apparently unwelcome increase in supervisory responsibility on the private 
sector. When early drafts o f Basle II were circulated, banks and, in particular, rating agencies, complained, 
not about transparency but about delegated regulatory responsibility, preferring regulatory authority 
remain (primarily) with the public sector. It may also argue for a supervisory formulation that applies 
different standards to firms’ institutional and individual relationships, i.e., functional regulation, applying 
high, statutory standards to individual accounts, hybrid market/statutory standards to institutional accounts, 
and some mixture for an institution’s own trading account -  which increasingly represents a large portion 
of overall trading. This may allow financial services firms to combine profit objectives and the provision 
of public goods under one roof.
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These steps would help avoid conflicts and redundant initiatives between ad hoc 
state crisis management agencies, public/private partnerships such as the DPG, and 
multilateral organisations. To enhance international regulatory capabilities, it will be 
useful to establish clear lines of regulatory demarcation between retail and institutional 
markets, to concentrate resources on the protection of less sophisticated capital market 
participants. Regulatory clarity, continuous supervision, and transactional transparency 
are the only available mechanisms for the detection of problems before they become 
crises. Finally, firms and their senior managements must be held accountable for
7 7institutional and personal failures to fulfil supervisory responsibilities.
It would be a mistake for states to transfer a majority -  much less all -  of their 
supervisory responsibilities to the marketplace. The case studies show that states initiate, 
structure, and establish critical regulatory standards. Private expertise is essential in 
developing effective regulatory standards, but private firms promote their own interests 
over those of the state. Only states can be held accountable for the protection of the 
public interest.
72 A salient case in point is the series o f  legal actions brought by New York State Attorney General Elliot 
Spitzer in 2002/2003 against Wall Street firms for their failure to adequately supervise conflicts o f  interest 
between equity research analysts and bankers from the same institutions. While these actions resulted in 
steep fines being levied against several firms, only modest penalties were levied against the offending 
firms’ senior managers.
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Appendix A
EU Integration Theory -  A Brief History
“Regional integration theory,” a significant field of IR theory and research during 
the 1960s and 1970s, focused principally on the EEC. Its leading advocates; Ernst Haas,1 
Leon Lindberg, and Stanley Hoffmann,2 built their research in part on David Mitrany’s 
research into informal bases of world confederation and governance.3 Regional 
integration perspectives examined state institutions to understand the development of 
international authority. These theorists argued that international institutions were 
promoted by domestic groups and developed initially in functional and technical areas. 
Their accomplishments created momentum,4 which encouraged the wider adoption of 
successful governance procedures. Despite its analytical attractiveness, shortly after 1970 
Haas concluded that international developments and inherent theoretical biases precluded 
pursuing “functionalist”5 integiation theoiy further.6 As the theory faded,
1 E. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1964).
E. Haas and P. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns o f Political Integration: Projections About 
Unity in Latin America," in International Political Communities: An Anthology (New York: Doubleday, 
1966)., and Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting o f  Europe: Political, Social, and Economical Forces, 1950-1957, 
Library o f  World Affairs, No. 42 (London: Stevens, 1958).
2 See: Karl Deutsch, et. al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957)., S. Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate o f the Nation-State and the Case 
of Western Europe," Daedalus 95, no. 3 (1966)., L. Lindberg, "Decision-Making and Integration in the 
European Community," International Organization 19, no. Winter (1965)., L. Lindberg, The Political 
Dynamics o f  European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963)., Joseph S. Nye, 
Jr., "Comparative Regional Integration: Concepts and Measurement," International Organization XXII 
(1968)., and D. Puchala, "Of Blind M en, Elephants, and International Integration," Journal o f  Common 
Market Studies 10, no. 3 (1972).
3 David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (1943).
4 Referred to as “spill-over” effects.
5 Termed “neo-functionalism” and “institutionalism” after 1985.
6 Haas’ approach had been attacked for normative content and inability to consistently predict the 
consequences or causes o f regional integration. See: E. Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of 
Regional Integration," International Organization 30, no. 2 (1976).
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interdependence,7 regime8 and neo-corporatist9 perspectives, all, in part, outgrowths of 
functionalism, occupied scholars’ attention -  together with neo-realist and 
intergovemmentalist perspectives. With state-centric research predominant, focus on 
domestic, private or supranational sources of authority and governance waned.
In 1977, Webb criticised intergovemmentalist approaches for denying “the 
uniqueness of the EU as a framework for international cooperation... it 
(intergovemmentalism) denies that the national political and economic systems of 
Europe are so interdependent and so penetrated by the Communities that the 
governments cease to be the sole arbiters of their country’s external future(s)....”10 
Despite Webb’s critique, functionalist approaches did not regain favour until the mid- 
1980s.
The mid-1980s adoption of the Single European Act (“SEA”) and the Treaty on 
Political Union (“TPU”) re-kindled scholarly interest in Haas’ ideas. These political 
developments blurred distinctions between domestic and international politics by 
empowering regional institutions and actors and stimulated research into the composition 
of EU member-states’ sovereignty and autonomy. Scholarly consideration of both 
intergovemmentalist and neo-functionalist perspectives increased as the EU expanded 
regional decision-making authority, confirming its readiness to migrate authority from 
member-states to EU institutions. Research focused on specific topics,11 in particular
17agreements (including the SEA and TPU ) that addressed the distribution of authority
7 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition.
8 John Gerard Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology. Concepts and Trends," International 
Organization 29, no. 4 (1975).
9 P. Schmitter, "Still the Century o f Corporatism?," Review o f  Politics, 36, no. 1 (1974).
10 C. Webb, "Introduction: Variations on a Theoretical Theme," in Policy-Making in the EC, eds. C. Webb, 
et. al. (London: Wiley and Sons, 1977)., p. 17, in J. Haaland-Matlary, "What Is Integration Theory, and Do 
We Need It?" (1994).
11 These case studies included telecommunications, energy, regional and technology policy, and 
environmental concerns. See: Gary Marks, "Structural Policy and Multi-Level Governance in the European 
Community," in The State o f  the European Community, ed. A.W. Cafruny and G Rosenthal (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1993)., J. Matlary, "The EC Policy-Making Process in the Field o f Energy: An Analysis 
with a View to Norwegian Interests," in Norwegian Gas in the New Europe, ed. O. Austvik (Oslo: Vett og 
Viten, 1991)., Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht,"., and M. Sharp, "The 
Community and New Technologies," in The EC and the Challenge o f  the Future, ed. J. Lodge (London: 
Pinter, 1989). See additional case studies in: Haaland-Matlary, "What Is Integration Theory, and Do We 
Need It?”
12 Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the 
European Community.”, J. Pinder, "The Single Market: A Step Towards European Union," in The EC and 
the Challenge o f  the Future, ed. J. Lodge (London: Pinter, 1989)., Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary
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between member-states and EU institutions. The adoption of QMV procedures, the 
development of formal EU regional competencies,13 and the agreement to proceed to 
monetary union differentiated these developments from increased integration in 
functional, “technical” fields by virtue of the transfer of member-state autonomy to the 
EU implicit, if not explicit, in these latter events.
Politics and Maastricht.”, and P. Taylor, "The New Dynamics o f EC Integration in the 1980s," in The EC  
and the Challenge o f  the Future, ed. J. Lodge (London: Pinter, 1989).
13 In areas such as the environment.
Appendix B
What Happened After the Negotiations Stopped?
Introduction
The European Parliament’s ratification of the CAD and ISD in the spring of 1993 
coincided with IOSCO’s decision to abandon its capital adequacy discussions. The EU’s 
“success” and IOSCO’s “failure” in their respective regulatory harmonisation efforts 
appeared unambiguous. However, we are aware this conclusion is inaccurate. This 
appendix addresses what happened to the CAD and ISD following Parliamentary 
ratification, IOSCO’s subsequent attempts to develop harmonised regulatory standards, 
and the Basle Committee’s subsequent harmonisation activities. This overview is not 
exhaustive. Rather, it is designed to address an important question, what happened after 
negotiations ceased and, more significantly, why? This will place the negotiations at the 
heart of this study into a larger context, will solidify observations regarding the 
“success” or “failure” of the negotiations, and will provide an insight into the impact of 
globalisation on regulatory evolution.
The EU’s CAD and ISD, the subject of so much intense negotiation, were never 
fully implemented by the majority of member-state legislatures following Parliamentary 
ratification. Instead, shortly after ratification, the EU found itself in the awkward position 
of watching while the Basle Committee released regulatory capital proposals addressing 
equity market risk, the issue over which Richard Breeden and Leon Brittan had argued so 
vehemently, that made the EU’s directives appear both outdated and overly restrictive. In 
1994 discussion on the need for a revised CAD, “CAD-2,” had already begun. By 
January 1, 1996, the deadline for implementation of the CAD and ISD, fewer than half of
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all EU member-states had adopted domestic implementation legislation. By 1996/97 
formal discussions to amend the CAD had started.
Following the collapse of the IOSCO capital adequacy discussions in 1992, 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee continued to actively publish research on regulatory 
issues arising from the globalisation of securities firms. However, IOSCO was not 
prepared to re-address the harmonisation of capital adequacy standards on its own. As a 
result, IOSCO’s work immediately following 1992 generally focused on less sensitive 
issues - operational, disclosure and accounting concerns. IOSCO’s efforts to influence 
regulatory harmonisation of capital adequacy standards and supervision were carried out 
on a joint basis, predominantly with the Basle Committee, but also including the LAIS. 
IOSCO and the Basle Committee began jointly issuing guidelines on risk management 
for OTC derivatives in 1994.
Events Refocus Harmonisation onto the Basle Committee
The first major blow to the EU’s regulatory harmonisation achievements, as well 
as to IOSCO’s efforts, was the April 1993 release by the Basle Committee of a 
consultative paper on equity market risk. The EU attempted to pressure the Basle 
Committee to produce a joint report but the Committee decided to move ahead on its 
own.1 The paper was intended to establish common minimum capital levels for banks 
trading in equity securities. The proposal incorporated complex guidelines covering 
interest rate, foreign exchange and specific2 risks in calculating required capital. Despite 
the proposal being patterned after the CAD’s building block structure, it was criticised 
by bankers as potentially costly to implement and operate and as unreflective of market 
risks. The Basle Committee was unrepentant even though its proposal was also 
considerably tougher than the CAD. The Committee’s new proposal came to be called 
the “standard approach” to market risk and capital adequacy.
Despite the proposal’s provocative content, it also contained an olive branch 
aimed at IOSCO, “These proposals contain certain features which bank supervisors 
acting on their own would not necessarily favour but are prepared to adopt in the hope
1 Filip Moerman, "Ruffles on the Level Playing Field," Euromoney November 1993.
2 Specific risk is the risk that a specific stock’s value will move out o f line relative to similar market 
instruments.
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that further convergence with securities regulators will be achieved at some future date. 
Thus, while the focus of the consultative process is the banking industry, the overall 
approach has been designed with a view toward its ultimate application to a wider 
spectrum of institutions.”3
In 1994, the Basle Committee and IOSCO jointly released guidelines on risk 
management for OTC derivatives.4 This represented one of the first joint reports issued 
by IOSCO and the Basle Committee. Shortly after the report was released an article 
published in Institutional Investor5 magazine described new risk management techniques 
being developed by commercial banks. The most radical of these techniques was called 
“value-at-risk” or “VaR”. Under VaR, required capital levels were correlated to the 
financial riskiness of the businesses a bank was engaged in based on measures of income 
volatility. JP Morgan and Bankers Trust, two large, US commercial banks aggressively 
pushing into investment banking, were said to be setting up internal VaR risk 
management systems because they found them to be accurate gauges of market and 
business risk.
This development was significant for two reasons. First, because it reflected the 
early application of internally developed risk management models. Second, because it 
presaged the evolution of international regulation over the 1990s to a hybrid model based 
on a mixture of market and statutory regulation.
In September 1994, the FRBNY, the Bank of Japan and several European central 
banks, in a follow-up to the IOSCO/Basle Committee report and to publicity surrounding 
internal risk models, asked several financial institutions active in derivatives markets to 
run a portfolio of approximately 300 derivative contracts through their proprietary VaR 
models to determine how closely the risk profiles generated by the models were to each 
other. If the risk profiles were close enough the Basle Committee would consider 
supporting VaR as an alternative to the “standard” market risk model it released in 1993. 
After the tests were run the Chairman o f the Basle Committee, Tommaso Padoa-
3 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, "The Supervisory Treatment o f Market Risks, Consultative 
Proposal,” (Basle: April 1993).
4 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and Technical Committee o f IOSCO, "Joint Report, 
Framework for Supervisory Information About Derivatives Activities,” (Basle: May 1994).
5 David Fairlamb, "High-Tech Capital Adequacy," Institutional Investor August 1994.
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Schioppa, announced “The Committee decided the differences between the results of 
these tests were not too wide to make them unacceptable.” Padoa-Schioppa went on to 
note, “It is unfeasible to oblige those sophisticated banks to stick with the standardised 
approach. No one model can be ‘right’ in this new, evolving field.”6
These developments put institutions and regulators subject to the EU’s CAD in 
an uncomfortable position. The evolving regulatory landscape clearly signalled the 
arrival of new risk management technology yet EU member-states had barely begun 
national implementation of the CAD, which was looking increasingly outdated. EU 
institutions faced the ugly prospect of being subject to both new and CAD standards. EU 
regulators had very little interest in reopening the CAD considering how difficult it had 
been to craft compromises in the first place. Added to this was regulators’ improved 
appreciation of the nature of new market risks to which financial institutions were 
exposed, particularly in the field of derivatives. These complex risks encouraged 
centralised risk management programs, a development reflected in the radical decision 
taken by Germany’s leading bank, Deutsche Bank, to move its investment banking 
headquarters to London from Frankfurt. The move reflected both the centralisation of 
risk management trading and supervision in London as well as London’s attractive 
regulatory environment, which had evolved with market developments more rapidly than 
Germany’s.
Further complicating directive adoption for EU institutions were two additional 
factors, distinctive national regulatory implementation regimes and delays in the 
implementation of the CAD.
The UK published domestic CAD implementation proposals in 1994 and, in an 
implicit criticism of the CAD, included many “super-equivalent”7 items in their proposal. 
In response to subsequent industry complaints that UK markets would be over-regulated 
relative to their continental peers and that regulatory distortions were being created, the 
Bank of England and SFA modified their recommendations in final proposals released in 
1995. Nevertheless, the final proposals contained super-equivalent provisions covering 
target and trigger capital ratios, the employment of internal risk models, equity position
6 "Basle's Model for Success," International Financial Review 15/4/95.
7 Meaning more stringent than required by the final directive.
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risk, consolidation and the definition of trading books. The discretion afforded UK (and 
other EU) authorities in the implementation of the CAD reinforced national regulatory 
distinctions rather than encouraging harmonisation. One scholar noted, “Competition 
among rules is itself seen as a necessary but regrettable consequence of the EU’s 
inability to legislate full harmonisation.”9 The prospect loomed of each EU member-state 
implementing its own version of the CAD, encouraging, rather than inhibiting, 
regulatory arbitrage.
By mid-1995, Italy and Spain had implemented portions of the CAD. The UK 
had published guidelines. However, France, the Netherlands and Germany were behind 
on implementation. The reasons given for delays were numerous but perhaps summed up 
best by a UK banker who commented about the CAD, “it all looks terribly 1970s or 
1980s.”10 The CAD’s inflexibility, ambiguous language and lengthy implementation 
process, all designed to ensure member-states’ agreement, appeared to be rapidly 
undermining its potential effectiveness. Calls for a “CAD-2” circulated in Brussels and 
EU financial capitals.
In early 1995, the Basle Committee and IOSCO had jointly issued guidelines on 
disclosure necessary to evaluate derivatives. In April the Basle Committee released 
amendments to its 1993 proposals for market risk. The amended proposal reflected a 
diamatic endorsement of VaR proprietary models foi risk management. The proposal 
added an “internal models” approach to risk management to join the standard approach 
released in 1993. The new approach would allow banks, subject to certain conditions,11 
to use proprietary models to determine VaR in trading portfolios to calculate regulatory 
capital. Padoa-Schioppa declared the new proposal, “a profound innovation in the 
methods and philosophy of regulation.”12
In June 1995, at a meeting in Halifax, Nova Scotia, the G-7 heads of government 
called for greater cooperation between the Basle Committee and IOSCO to avoid the
8 Dale and Wolfe, "Capital Standards"., p. 244.
9 Benn Steil, quoted in David Shirreff, "Regulatory Overload," Euromoney June 1995.
10 Ibid.
11 These included the bank meeting certain minimum qualitative risk management criteria and the bank 
using specified parameters to calculate VaR (10 day holding periods for calculation, 99% confidence 
levels).
12 "Basle's Model for Success," International Financial Review 15/4/95.
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rapid spread of financial problems. The G-7 request was stimulated primarily by the May 
1995 collapse of Barings Bank, but also by well-publicised earlier contretemps between 
IOSCO and the Basle Committee. The Barings collapse had revealed huge gaps in 
communication between regulators and exchanges.
The Baring collapse prompted the May 1995 release of the Windsor Declaration, 
which urged greater international regulatory cooperation. The Declaration, issued by 
regulators from sixteen major futures and options markets, established agreed procedures 
for information sharing, emergency cooperation, defaults and investor protection.
A month after the release of the Basle Committee’s amended market risk 
proposal, the Committee and IOSCO published a further joint derivatives report that 
detailed the collaboration between the two agencies on OTC derivatives regulation and 
included VaR as a regulatory option. Shortly afterward, the Derivatives Policy Group 
(“DPG”)13 announced it would endorse the Basle Committee’s standards for derivatives, 
including VaR. IOSCO, asked for its formal opinion on VaR models, reserved 
judgement, stating that it would wait for the results of ongoing DPG studies. 
Subsequently however, IOSCO issued its own report on VaR models.14 The release of 
IOSCO’s report, combined with the observations that the firms comprising the DPG all 
actively employed internal risk models and were expected to endorse their usage, led to 
the conclusion that IOSCO had endorsed VaR models on a ae facto basis.15
The Basle Committee’s recognition of internal models represented an historic 
shift in the development of international regulatory standards. It reflected regulators’ 
acknowledgement that market evolution was outpacing standard fixed regulatory models, 
which, in the future, would have to be supplemented by market-driven regulation rather 
than by regulation developed by state or supranational institutions.
13 “DPG”, See Glossary. The DPG was an ad hoc securities industry group established in 1994 to forestall 
formal regulatory intrusions into the derivatives industry by establishing “market” regulatory standards in 
conjunction with the FRBNY.
14 IOSCO Technical Committee, "The Implications for Securities Regulators o f the Increased Use o f Value 
at Risk Models by Securities Firms,” (Montreal: International Organization for Securities Commissions, 
July 13, 1995).
15 Joseph J. Norton and Christopher D. Olive, "The Ongoing Process o f Bank and Regulatory Supervisory 
Convergence: A New Regulatory-Market "Partnership"," Annual Review o f  Banking Law  16 (1997).
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The revolutionary Basle Committee approach eliminated any semblance of a 
level regulatory playing field for EU institutions implementing the CAD. EU firms 
would be subject to the “old-fashioned” CAD while Japanese and American institutions 
would be subject to home country rules until the Basle Committee worked out final 
capital regulations. As the deadline for implementation of the CAD approached, it 
became clear that many member-states would not have implemented the directives by the 
deadline. The UK, Ireland and Belgium passed national laws on time, but France, 
Germany, Spain and Italy, among others, delayed implementation. As of December 
1995, 10 EU member-states were behind schedule on CAD implementation and 8 were 
behind on the ISD. Embarrassingly, in January 1996, the same month the CAD and ISD 
were to take effect, the Basle Committee published its final capital standards for market 
risk for G-10 countries.
In July 1996, ISMA issued a report on the CAD that stated, “it would, perhaps, 
not be too unfair to compare the CAD to the castle built by the mad King Ludwig of 
Bavaria -  newly built but to an antique design.”16 By April 1997, Germany, Spain and 
Luxembourg had still not implemented the CAD or the ISD and were being threatened 
with fines for their failure. An amended version of the CAD, CAD-2, which paralleled 
the Basle Committee’s 1995 market risk proposal, was widely discussed. An interim 
amendment to the CAD, referred to as the Amsterdam Accord, was adopted in 1997. It 
permitted EU banks to use VaR models for the calculation of capital adequacy and 
limited a laborious required capital calculation to twice a year, but did not create 
significant capital savings for EU banks.
Despite the Basle Committee’s endorsement of market risk management tools, 
the Basle Accord was itself considered overly rigid and out of date by market 
practitioners. It was accused of encouraging banks to take on higher levels of risk
1 7without commensurately increasing capital. In June 1999 the Basle Committee released 
for comment a proposed new capital adequacy framework. The proposal was modified 
and substantially expanded in a second version released in January 2001. The proposal,
16 “Getting closer,” The Economist, May 25, 1996.
17 Remarks by William J. McDonough, President o f the FRBNY, before the 11th International Conference 
of Banking Supervisors (Basle, September 20, 2000), p. 8. Quoted in Eugene M. Katz, "The New Basle 
Capital Accord," Bank Accounting & Finance, (3/22/2001).
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which is still under consideration, combines a minimum capital level, with both 
supervisory and market-based regulation.
Observations
The failure of even 50 percent of EU member-states to implement national 
legislation adopting the CAD by its January 1, 1996 deadline (or for several years 
afterward) underlines the difficulties in developing fixed harmonised regulatory 
standards. There were many reasons for the ISD’s and the CAD’s unpopularity. The 
directives, based on the 1988 Basle Accord, inflexibly preserved standards that were 
rapidly outstripped by market practices, new technology and other regulatory regimes. 
Additionally, the compromises negotiated into the directives allowed member-states to 
develop unique national implementation schemes that preserved national distinctiveness 
and encouraged regulatory arbitrage. For example, ISD Article 15.5 gave EU states the 
right to prohibit the creation of “new markets” within their territories. The Dutch used 
this provision to demand Dutch licensing of foreign screen-based trading systems 
providing remote access to the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. The demand was ultimately
1 ftabandoned but demonstrated the ambiguity of the article and that it could be used to 
inhibit other developments. Derogations to the directives’ implementation targets created 
an uneven regulatory playing field even before the directives were ratified. Additionally, 
challenges to member-states over their failure to implement directives led to protracted 
legal battles that further impaired the directives’ potential effectiveness.19 The CAD’s 
building block and trading book approach has also come under criticism for being 
unreflective of business risks. Despite functionally segregating trading and other assets 
for capital purposes, the risks to which corporations are exposed are not segregated. This 
makes the trading book concept “inappropriate” in accurately reflecting institutional 
financial risk.20
The ISD and CAD’s drawbacks are functions of both their rigidity and their 
flexibility. Flexible compromises engineered to ensure adoption of the CAD and ISD 
undercut the directives’ effectiveness by permitting delays and the preservation of 
distinctive national implementation regimes that encourage regulatory arbitrage. The
18 In 1995.
19 Steil, "Regional Financial Market Integration: Learning from the European Experience.”
20 Ibid.
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directives’ rigidity is reflected in the EU’s difficulty in amending the directives despite 
their being made obsolete and inconsistent by Basle Committee actions. The directives’ 
difficulties reflect the political process that led to their development. The EU’s goal of 
regulatory harmonisation was substantially weakened by decisions to enshrine national 
preferences and to adhere to the objective of establishing fixed directives in an area that 
was rapidly evolving.
IOSCO’s international regulatory influence has improved significantly as a 
consequence of its decision to work jointly with the Basle Committee -  despite IOSCO 
remaining encumbered with governance mechanisms that inhibit the development of 
flexible, responsive market guidelines. The slow evolution of international financial 
services to a universal banking model will eventually confront international regulators 
with the decision of whether IOSCO should continue as a distinct intergovernmental 
regulator, should be folded into the Basle Committee, or should assume a different, 
perhaps strictly technical, role. The Basle Committee has indicated its willingness to 
enter regulatory discussions and make recommendations that affect IOSCO’s 
constituencies. IOSCO’s rigid governance procedures and wide membership make it 
difficult to develop international regulation on highly sensitive topics such as capital 
adequacy absent the imprimatur of the Basle Committee. The Basle deliberative 
procedures and senior stature have been more effective at producing harmonised 
international regulatory guidelines. It is also clear that on topics such as capital 
adequacy, the powerful Basle Committee is prepared to use its considerable prestige to 
advance its regulatory preferences, even at the cost of publicly disagreeing with the EU 
or IOSCO. Nevertheless, on a wide range of “lesser” topics, including disclosure, 
operational and technical issues, managerial issues and market manipulation, IOSCO 
continues to lead standards development for securities firms.
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Appendix C
Decision-making in the European Community: The 
Single European Act and Qualified Majority Voting
A primary objective behind the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA”) in
1986 was the completion of the Single Market by the deadline of December 31, 1992.
1The SEA recognises the inertia that had characterised EU rule making prior to the 
Act’s adoption. That inertia had been caused in large part by the requirement of 
unanimous approval by the EU Council of Ministers for the majority of EU legislation. 
The SEA established that only qualified majority vote was required for most issues 
associated with the development of the internal market.
The path to achievement of the Single Market was defined by the 1985 White 
Paper,24 which detailed 300 discrete legislative steps necessary to achieve the internal 
market by the end of 1992. The EU functions as a supranational institution, capable of 
adopting legislation that binds its member states and their citizens by less that unanimous 
vote. The Couxicil of European Coxnmumties (Council), the Commission of the Euiopeaxi 
Communities (the Commission) and the European Parliament (the Parliament) develop 
EU legislation.
The Commission is responsible for representing the interests of the EU, as a 
discrete entity. As a result, the Commission’s members are expected to consider the 
interests of the EU over their own national interests. The Council is comprised of
21 Single European Act, O.J. (L 169), (July 1, 1987).
22 A. Campbell, "The Single European Act and the Implications," International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 35 (1986).
23 A qualified majority vote in the SEA was defined as a minimum o f 54 out o f a possible 76 votes (71%) 
in the Council to approve a Commission proposal. The votes of member-states were accorded differing 
numerical weights, ensuring the interests o f larger member states did not consistently dominate those of  
smaller states in voting on legislation. In the EC, the twelve member-states’ votes were weighted as 
follows: Belgium (5), Denmark (3), France (10), Germany (10), Greece (5), the Republic o f Ireland (3),
Italy (10), Luxembourg (2), the Netherlands (5), Portugal (5), Spain (8), and the United Kingdom (10).
24 See: Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Market, COM 
(85).
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member state representatives who reflect the interests of their home jurisdictions. This 
sets up a tension between these institutions. This is reflected in debates over legislative 
proposals that promote EU regional interests at the expense of national interests or 
sovereignty. The third party to EU legislation, the Parliament, has the smallest role in 
the formulation of EU rules. The role of the Parliament is advisory and consultative 
rather than legislative.
The SEA amended Article 100 of the EEC Treaty, which required unanimous 
voting in the Council. The amendment is broadly applicable, covering any “measures” 
adopted by the Council, not just directives. The EEC Treaty had provided for five 
different types of measures to be adopted by the Council and Commission: regulations, 
directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. Regulations were binding on 
member-states and did not require national implementation. The other categories were 
increasing less binding. Directives were binding as to their objective but subject to 
national implementation. Interestingly, as of 1997 several member states had not yet 
implemented the ISD, which was originally adopted in 1992.
The Council and Commission more frequently adopted directives than 
regulations as they complemented the EU principle of mutual recognition, which was 
more flexible than the strict harmonisation implied by regulations. There are several 
mechanisms available to member-staies in the event they do not want to adopt legislation 
but don’t have sufficient votes to counter a qualified majority. These include citing the 
“Luxembourg Accord26” understanding that permits a member-state to veto legislation 
contrary to its vital national interests.
Legislation is developed through the interaction of the three legislative bodies, 
the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. The Commission can initiate and 
implement legislation. The Council, however, has the authority to make decisions. The 
Parliament advises and consults. The cooperation procedure mandated by the SEA is as 
follows:27
25 Potter, "Implications o f the Single European Act on European Community Law-Making: A Modest Step 
Forward.”
26 Peter Sutherland, "The Dawn o f a United Europe: An Introduction to 1992 and Beyond," St. Louis 
University Public Law Review 9(1990). Cited in Potter.
27 Adapted from Potter, "Implications o f the Single European Act on European Community Law-Making:
A Modest Step Forward.”
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1. The Commission proposes legislation to the Council.
2. The Council forwards the proposal to Parliament, which adopts an 
opinion with regard to the proposed legislation.
3. The Parliament sends the proposal back to the Council, which 
may, by qualified majority vote, adopt a “common position” on 
the legislation. The Council explains the “common position” to 
Parliament.
4. If Parliament approves the common position within three months 
(or does nothing at all signifying disapproval), the Council will 
adopt the legislation as its common position. Alternatively, the 
Parliament may, by absolute majority, either reject or propose 
amendments to the Council’s common position.
5. If Parliament rejects the legislation, the Council must vote 
unanimously to override and adopt the legislation. If, however, 
Parliament suggests amendments, the Commission must examine 
them in the context of the Council’s common position. Following 
deliberations, the Commission will again forward the proposed 
measure to the Council. The Commission is given one month to 
review and indicate which of the proposed amendments are 
unacceptable.
6. The Council is then given an additional three months to take one 
of four available steps:
a) Adopt the Commission’s reviewed proposal by qualified 
majority vote,
b) Adopt, by unanimous vote, Parliament’s amendments 
previously rejected by the Commission,
c) By unanimous vote, otherwise amend the Commission’s 
reviewed proposal, or
d) Do nothing and allow the proposed measure to lapse.
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Parliament’s review of Commission proposals (steps 3 and 4) is referred to as a 
“first reading.” Time limitations are not imposed on Parliament’s review. Neither is a 
time limit imposed on Council’s issuance of a common position.
The largest change, aside from the adoption of qualified majority voting, in new 
review procedures stemming from the SEA was the development of a “second reading,” 
following step 4. Under earlier procedures Parliament would have adopted a definitive 
text of proposed legislation. Under the new procedures, the Council requests a second 
reading by the Parliament by transmitting its common position. All three legislative 
bodies now negotiate over final terms subject to strict time limits.
The SEA and amended legislation review procedures had several implications for 
the adoption of EU directives. First, they provided a more active role to Parliament in the 
consideration of legislation. However, limitations on Parliament’s powers circumscribed 
substantive alteration of its largely consultative role. Second, the amendments increased 
the level of interaction between the Council and Commission. More fundamentally, the 
adoption of qualified majority voting was significant because it undermined the ability of 
a single member state to derail legislation with which it objected. This meant that even 
controversial issues were more closely scrutinised and subject to greater give and take 
between the Council and Commission. As is evident in the resolution of disagreements 
over the CAD and ISD, qualified majority voting acted as a powerful incentive to 
member-states to initiate compromises in order to resolve contentious issues and finalise 
legislation. It also acted as a robust incentive for the Commission and the Council to hear 
out each other’s views and develop consensus resolutions to issues arising particularly 
out of national preferences.
Negatively, the SEA and qualified majority voting promoted compromise as the 
path to resolve disagreements. Compromise may not produce effective legislation or 
problem-solving especially if, as was the case with the CAD and ISD, certain issues were 
simply swept under the rug through derogations or ambiguous language in order to 
achieve agreement in the Council. This reflects a politicisation of the directive 
development process that was the consequence of legislatively imposing compromise.
28 Ibid.
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Finally, the SEA increased the influence of the Council in developing legislation. 
While only the Commission could propose legislation, the Council carried final voting 
approval. This arrangement forces the Commission to be responsive to the concerns of 
the Council, particularly to possible member state protectionist interests. This was case 
in the development of the compromises that facilitated agreement by the Council to the
9QISD and CAD. In particular, neither of the voting blocs on ISD issues, the Club-Med 
and Northern European30 groups, represented a qualified majority. As a result, they were 
forced to compromise in order to develop a consensus view on the ISD. However, rather 
than construct a compromise that struck a defined middle ground (or reflected 
concessions by affected states), the Council and Commission elected to permit 
derogations by member-states and the inclusion of ambiguous language in the final 
directives. Both “compromises” were consequences of the SEA and the political pressure 
to which it subjected EU directive debates. In particular, both the ISD and CAD were 
subject to intense political pressure associated with the deadline to complete the Single 
Market. As a result, the SEA and qualified majority voting both had a material impact on 
the final form of the CAD and ISD.
29 France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece represented 43 votes in the Council.
30 Germany, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland represented 33 votes in the 
Council.
Appendix D
Memoranda of Understanding
A factor competing with multilateral co-ordination of international regulatory 
harmonisation was the rapid proliferation of bilateral regulatory agreements. Bilateral 
agreements frequently took the form of Memoranda of Understanding. In his 1991 
annual report, SIB Chairman Walker noted that progress in establishing cooperation 
agreements with foreign regulators had been made. Walker noted that the SIB had 
entered into eight new bilateral regulatory agreements in the past year. This brought to
i
40 the regulatory agreements the SIB had signed. Discussions had begun with the SEC 
and US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to extend existing agreements. 
Walker predicted these agreements would “gain momentum.”32 During the four years 
Richard Breeden was Chairman of the SEC, the US entered into 18 bilateral 
agreements.33
MOU growth was tied to the expansion of cross-border capital market activity. 
As cross-border trading increased, bankers and borrowers increasingly accessed markets 
in differing jurisdictions. Regulators saw a need to enhance the scope of information and 
assistance they could expect from their foreign counterparts. MOUs were initially used to 
formalise understandings related to exchange of information and assistance.34 The scope 
of MOUs varied but they generally shared a common goal: the encouragement of mutual 
cooperation between national securities regulators regarding the administration and 
enforcement of securities laws. These general objectives differed from those of the EU 
and IOSCO negotiations. The execution of bilateral MOUs and the development of
31 Representing 29 countries and offshore financial centres.
32ISRR, “Progress Being Made on Foreign Talks with Regulators, SIB Says”, 1 July 1991.
33 Jurisdictions with which the SEC executed MOUS included: Italy (1993), Australia (1993), Spain 
(1992), Norway, (1991), UK (1986 and 1991), Sweden (1991), Luxembourg (1990), Canadian Provinces 
o f Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia (1998), Japan, (1986), and Switzerland (1982). See: Alan L. 
Jakimo, "Capital Market Globalization and the SEC's Use o f  Memoranda o f Understanding,” (New York: 
Brown & Wood, 1995).
34 Ibid.. See article for a fuller discussion o f MOUs.
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multilateral capital adequacy standards were considered unlikely to generate 
jurisdictional or regulatory conflicts. However, the scope of bilateral cooperation 
expanded beyond information sharing and the potential for MOUs to complicate the 
objectives of multilateral negotiations grew. The multi-jurisdictional disclosure system 
between the US and Canada was one example. The US in particular entered into bilateral 
education and consulting contracts, sponsored by the SEC and State Department, with 
the objective of extending US’ securities regulatory experience to other securities 
markets. A by-product of these arrangements was the dissemination of US regulatory 
practices and values. More generally, MOUs established precedents and benchmarks for 
other states and markets. In the same way, a 1987 bilateral agreement between the 
United States and the UK on capital adequacy standards for commercial banks had
i f
established a precedent and impetus for the 1988 Basle Capital Accord; the expansion 
of bilateral agreements carried the potential to influence the direction, speed and scope of 
international negotiations over regulatory standards. If nothing else, these agreements 
encouraged the EU to develop its own standards or risk potential conflicts with separate 
bilateral precedents.
35 Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the State.
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